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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The seventeenth edition of Employment in Europe appears at a challenging moment. In the 
international context of rapid economic growth in much of the developing world and sustained economic 
growth in the US, the EU seems to be mired in economic difficulties. This is why, at their 2005 Spring 
summit, Heads of State and Government have put employment and growth as the two main objectives of 
the renewed Lisbon strategy, in order to raise the living standards and the quality of life of EU citizens. As 
set out by the new Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008), the Strategy implies raising 
growth performance of the EU on a sustainable basis and striving for full employment, improved quality 
and productivity at work, and greater social and territorial cohesion. Indeed, linking economic and social 
progress is at the heart of the European Social Model. 
Creating more and better jobs largely depends on a subtle balance between the macro-economic policy 
mix, micro-economic reforms and effective employment and social policies. First, an appropriate macro-
economic policy framework is important to reassure consumers and entrepreneurs and help maintain or 
restore high levels of demand. Second, reform of product markets and achieving a fully integrated 
economic area would bolster economic activity and thus trigger employment creation. Third, effective 
employment and social policies are crucial elements to attract and retain more people in employment, to 
improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises in the context of rapid economic change, and to 
increase investment in human capital through better education and skills. Action is all the more 
necessary in the EU in the context of current demographic trends, as the working age population will 
gradually diminish. These issues will feature prominently in the National Reform Programmes which 
Member States will adopt this autumn. 
Against this background, the current report sees encouraging signs of global economic recovery which 
should spill over and benefit Europe, if Europe actively enacts further reforms and does not simply wait 
for growth to appear. The benefits from such structural reforms, which have already translated into 
structural improvements in the past few years, should not be jeopardised by inaction. Five issues 
developed in detail are politically prominent. 
• The findings confirm that macro-economic, micro-economic and employment policies go hand in hand 
to deliver more and better jobs. 
• Overall, positive employment prospects depend on the economic cycle and on improvements in 
domestic demand, especially in some larger countries in the EU. 
• Particular concerns remain regarding the unemployment situation of young people; this is in large part 
why the European Council recently adopted the Youth Pact. 
• In the face of an ageing and declining workforce, Europe still has a large potential labour reserve to draw 
upon; this should receive urgent priority. 
• Attention must be paid to social inclusion and cohesion, preventing exclusion from the labour market 
and reducing regional disparities in terms of employment, unemployment and earnings, as there are 
worrying signs that the recent economic slowdown may have affected Europe’s record in this regard. 
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3Foreword by the Commissioner
The seventeenth edition of Employment in Europe appears at a challenging moment. In the international context of rapid
economic growth in much of the developing world and sustained economic growth in the US, the EU seems to be mired
in economic difficulties. This is why, at their 2005 Spring summit, Heads of State and Government have put employment
and growth as the two main objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy, in order to raise the living standards and the qual-
ity of life of EU citizens. As set out by the new Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008), the Strategy
implies raising growth performance of the EU on a sustainable basis and striving for full employment, improved quality
and productivity at work, and greater social and territorial cohesion. Indeed, linking economic and social progress is at
the heart of the European Social Model. 
Creating more and better jobs largely depends on a subtle balance between the macro-economic policy mix, micro-eco-
nomic reforms and effective employment and social policies. First, an appropriate macro-economic policy framework is
important to reassure consumers and entrepreneurs and help maintain or restore high levels of demand. Second, reform
of product markets and achieving a fully integrated economic area would bolster economic activity and thus trigger
employment creation. Third, effective employment and social policies are crucial elements to attract and retain more peo-
ple in employment, to improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises in the context of rapid economic change, and
to increase investment in human capital through better education and skills. Action is all the more necessary in the EU
in the context of current demographic trends, as the working age population will gradually diminish. These issues will
feature prominently in the National Reform Programmes which Member States will adopt this autumn.
Against this background, the current report sees encouraging signs of global economic recovery which should spill over
and benefit Europe, if Europe actively enacts further reforms and does not simply wait for growth to appear. The bene-
fits from such structural reforms, which have already translated into structural improvements in the past few years, should
not be jeopardised by inaction. Five issues developed in detail are politically prominent.
• The findings confirm that macro-economic, micro-economic and employment policies go hand in hand to deliver
more and better jobs. 
• Overall, positive employment prospects depend on the economic cycle and on improvements in domestic demand,
especially in some larger countries in the EU. 
• Particular concerns remain regarding the unemployment situation of young people; this is in large part why the Euro-
pean Council recently adopted the Youth Pact. 
• In the face of an ageing and declining workforce, Europe still has a large potential labour reserve to draw upon; this
should receive urgent priority. 
• Attention must be paid to social inclusion and cohesion, preventing exclusion from the labour market and reducing
regional disparities in terms of employment, unemployment and earnings, as there are worrying signs that the recent
economic slowdown may have affected Europe’s record in this regard.
Employment in Europe is an important part of the Commission’s analytical work and I sincerely hope that the findings of
this year’s report will contribute to a better understanding of Europe’s main employment challenges and serve the renewed
endeavour of the Lisbon Strategy. Growth and jobs are at the core of our citizens’ concerns: Europe must succeed. 
Vladimir Špidla.
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Executive summary
Continued slow employment response in 2004 to the pick-up in economic
activity in Europe
Despite the pick up in economic
activity …
… employment growth in the EU
was again limited in 2004, while
the unemployment rate remained
unchanged.
Recent progress towards the Lisbon
and Stockholm objectives has been
limited as a result….
…although across Member States,
overall employment performance in
2004 was generally positive, with
negative growth in only a few
countries.
The services sector continues to
drive employment expansion,….
After gathering momentum in the first half of 2004, economic activity in the
EU25 decelerated in the second half of the year, reflecting in part the impact of
the sharp rise in oil prices and the strength of the euro. Nevertheless, economic
growth in the EU averaged 2.4% for the year as a whole (1.1% in 2003), sup-
ported by strong world GDP and trade growth. 
Employment growth in the EU was again quite limited at 0.6% in 2004, slight-
ly up on the previous year's level of 0.3%, and has now been low for three years
in a row. This compares with employment growth of 1.1% in the US, where
growth resumed in 2004 following two years of "jobless recovery". As a result
the average employment rate for the EU increased by 0.4 of a percentage point
to reach a level of 63.3%, an improvement on the years 2002 and 2003 when
total employment rates hardly rose at all. The rise in the total employment rate
was again driven by the ongoing increase in the employment rate for women
(+0.7 of a percentage point on average in the EU). It also reflects continued
strong rises for older people (aged 55-64) for whom the employment rate rose
by 0.8 of a percentage point. Unemployment remained unchanged compared to
2003, although the long-term unemployment rate increased slightly to 4.1%
(4.0% in 2003).
The weak labour market performance in Europe over recent years is an impor-
tant element in explaining the slow progress towards the Lisbon and Stockholm
objectives. The overall employment rate remains 7 percentage points below the
employment rate target for 2010, while the female and older people's employ-
ment rates are around 4 and 9 percentage points below their respective 2010 tar-
gets. In 2004, the rates were 63.3%, 55.7%, and 41.0%, respectively. It should
be noted that the 2004 female employment rates and in particular the 2004 over-
all employment rates remain far away from the intermediate employment targets
(for 2005). In response to the mixed results achieved so far and the increasing
challenge to meet the 2010 objectives the European Council recently agreed to
revise the Lisbon Strategy and re-focus its priorities on economic growth and
employment. As part of this, a first set of 'Integrated Guidelines' has been adopt-
ed by the Council with the main aim to spur growth and job creation.
Although employment growth has been limited at EU level, it has been positive
for the majority of Member States. Only four experienced negative annual
growth, most notably the Netherlands where employment contracted by 1.3%. In
contrast, seven Member States achieved positive employment growth of over
1%, with particularly strong growth in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg
and Spain. In Germany annual employment growth turned positive in 2004 fol-
lowing negative average growth in the previous two years, possibly already
reflecting institutional changes in the context of the Hartz labour market
reforms, while the decline in employment experienced in 2002 and 2003 in
Poland also showed signs of coming to an end in 2004.
Between 2003 and 2004 employment growth in the EU was again driven by the
continued expansion of employment in the services sector. Over 2004 growth in
this sector remained stable at just above the 1% level, an improvement on the
Employment in Europe 2005
10
….. while there are continuing
rises in the employment shares of
more flexible types of employment
The employment situation for older
people keeps on improving in most
Member States …
… but concerns remain for the
employment situation of youth.
Positive employment prospects for
2005 and 2006 are dependent on
improving growth prospects.
Evaluation has been at the core of
the EES since 1997.
rates of the previous year. In contrast, employment in both the agriculture and
industry sectors continued to contract in 2004, although the recent trend suggests
the contraction in the industry sector may be coming to an end, at least temporar-
ily.
The share of more flexible types of employment in total employment, such as
part-time and fixed-term employment, continues to rise. In contrast, the share of
self-employment has remained broadly stable since 2000. 
At EU level older people aged 55-64 have seen employment rates rise markedly
since 2000, with an overall increase of 4.4 percentage points for this age group,
and account for the majority of the increase in total employment between 2000
and 2004. The improvement in the employment rate of older workers since 2000
has been a general feature across almost all Member States, and suggests that
policies to improve the participation of older people, and especially reforms of
pension systems and early retirement schemes, may be taking effect in the labour
market. Nevertheless, despite the recent improvement, efforts need to be stepped
up if the 2010 target of an employment rate of 50% for those aged 55-64 is to be
reached.
In contrast to the positive developments for older people, the large majority of
Member States have experienced deterioration in the labour market situation for
the youth population in recent years. At 18.7%, youth unemployment in the EU
is still around twice as high as the overall unemployment rate. At EU level, for
young people aged 15-24 increases in the employment rate over the late 1990s
have been replaced by declines from 2002 onwards, with developments more
severe for young men than young women. However, the decline was much more
moderate in 2004. This evolution in employment rates reflects the general devel-
opment in youth activity in Europe, namely a decline in labour market participa-
tion which coincides with recent trends for young people to remain longer in
education and training. Greater efforts are needed to integrate young people into
the labour market and to support them as they pursue "non-linear" careers alter-
nating between employment, study, unemployment and retraining or the updat-
ing of skills. It is with this in mind that the European Council recently adopted
a European Youth Pact to enable young people to benefit from a set of policies
and measures fully integrated in the revised Lisbon Strategy.
The employment prospects for 2005 and 2006 are positive overall, with the
employment situation expected to improve in line with the general pick-up in
economic activity. However, these positive prospects remain dependent on
improving business confidence and on rising economic growth. Further, the
expected more positive development in employment does not reduce the need to
implement further structural reforms in labour markets.
The European Employment Strategy (EES) was launched in 1997 with a view to
making decisive progress in the fight against unemployment within five years.
A 'mid-term review' was carried out in 2000 to provide a first assessment of the
effectiveness of the new approach. At the end of the first five years, it was decid-
ed to launch a full-scale impact evaluation. The results of this impact evaluation
Taking stock of the European Employment Strategy: the evidence behind
improved performances of EU labour markets
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Overall progress is heavily
dependent on the economic cycle …
… with the weakness of domestic
demand in some Member States
being a concern.
Progress towards full employment
was significant in the early years of
the Strategy at EU level thanks to
structural reforms …
... but problems remain in a
number of areas.
Progress in terms of quality and
productivity at work is mixed.
published in 2002 served as a basis for the debate on the future of the EES. As
part of the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, several evaluation activities
were carried out at EU level, including an exercise to take stock of the EES, the
findings of which are summarised below.
Economic growth in the EU nearly halved from close to 3% per year in the peri-
od 1998-2000 (the value implicitly assumed at the time the Lisbon targets were
established) to the average value registered in the period 2001-2004. Given the
close relation between economic growth and labour market performance, this
slowdown in economic growth had a significant negative impact on employment
creation.
Although in the EU15 GDP growth was similar during the cyclical downturns of
1992-1994 and 2001-2003, an analysis of individual Member States shows dif-
ferent labour market performance during these periods. Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Poland, for instance, displayed a weaker labour market performance
in the 2001-2003 economic slowdown than during that of 1992-1994, partly
because of the weakness or stagnation of domestic demand. 
Structural improvements have occurred since 1997 at the EU level thanks to
reforms in a number of areas, such as competition policy and labour markets.
These improvements are reflected in a number of features: lower structural rates
of unemployment on average, despite the marked deterioration in some new
Member States; lower long-term unemployment rates and shorter average spells
in unemployment; increased efficiency in matching between the unemployed
and unfilled vacancies; a rise in aggregate labour demand; a wage formation
process that takes better account of prevailing conditions in the economy and
competitiveness constraints, thus raising the employment content of growth; a
positive effect of atypical labour contracts, such as part-time and fixed-term
employment, although as regards the latter there is some evidence of market seg-
mentation; and an increase in expenditure on labour market policies and on
training which are better targeted to the labour market needs with positive results
on job creation.
Despite structural progress unemployment remains high and problems remain in
a number of areas, such as tax wedges on labour costs or the unemployment and
low-wage traps. Little progress has been achieved in lowering marginal effective
tax rates on low-wages or on facilitating the transition from unemployment or
inactivity to employment, especially for low-skilled people.
Moreover, progress in terms of quality and productivity at work is mixed. There
has been some progress in rising participation in lifelong learning, while youth
education attainment levels continue to rise, despite the emergence of a gender
gap favourable to women. Nevertheless, further progress is necessary as regards
both the transitions from temporary to permanent jobs and out of low-paid jobs.
In addition since the mid 1990s, there has been a relative decline in hourly labour
productivity growth in the EU when compared to the US. This relative decline
may be partly explained by a higher rate of job creation, involving a high pro-
portion of low-productivity jobs and, especially, a slowdown in total factor pro-
ductivity growth. The latter has been associated with the following factors: low
investment in R&D; the difficulty in the EU of reorienting outlays towards those
sectors with high productivity growth prospects; and the difficulty in producing
and absorbing new, more knowledge-based technologies. In order to fully bene-
fit from ICTs, EU-based firms, especially in the services sector, have, in partic-
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There may have been some
progress towards greater social
cohesion …
… but the recent economic
slowdown can negatively impact on
social cohesion.
The level and dynamics of
earnings matter for productivity,
the quality of jobs and social
cohesion.
Overall there is no sign of
increasing earnings inequality in
Europe.
Earnings disparities are wide both
within Member States and across
regions.
Some services pay more than
industries.
ular, to be more adaptable to the changing competitive environment by introduc-
ing new work practices while investing in ICTs.
Some signs of improvement towards greater social cohesion have been regis-
tered. In particular, labour market gaps related to gender and age have been
somewhat reduced. Moreover, moving from unemployment into employment
lowers considerably the likelihood of being exposed to the risk of poverty.
Employment is a key factor for social inclusion, not only because it raises
income but also because it can promote social inclusion per se and personal
advancement in a professional career.
For instance, there is the risk that the 2001-2003 economic slowdown, accompa-
nied by rising unemployment and fewer job opportunities, has put more people
at risk of poverty and social exclusion and worsened the position of those who
are already affected. The challenge is even greater in many of the new Member
States, where economic restructuring requires appropriate social policies to limit
the number of people at risk of poverty.
The distribution and growth of earnings are at the heart of concerns about effi-
ciency and equity. Finding the right balance between these two objectives is cen-
tral to societal/political choices, particularly as regards solving the possible
dilemma between social cohesion and growth objectives. Many economic fac-
tors can influence this potential dilemma. As an example, the distribution of
earnings reflects individual characteristics of workers (e.g. skills, gender, age),
firms' specificities (e.g. size, activity), and institutional features (e.g. bargaining
schemes, type of contract). 
Overall there is no sign of an increase in earnings inequality in Europe since the
1970s. Yet there are marked country differences. Some countries such as the UK,
Poland and Denmark have shown increasing earnings inequalities in the nineties,
while others such as France and Sweden, display the opposite trend. Moreover
there is no clear-cut relationship between the level and dynamics of earnings
inequalities on the one hand and labour market and economic performance on
the other hand. Nevertheless, the Scandinavian countries, which have the lowest
degree of earnings inequality, are at the same time countries with good econom-
ic and labour market performance.
Earnings disparities in old Member States are between two to four times larger
than in new Member States. In 2002 these earnings disparities were also substan-
tial within Member States, in particular in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Slovenia. Regions driven by innovation and rich infrastructure connected to net-
works feature wider earnings disparities (e.g. Ile de France, North-Western Italy)
than rural and traditional industrial areas. It also appears that certain specific
groups are subject to higher degrees of earnings inequality than others, such as
women (in Germany for instance), but also young men and women aged 20 to
29 across the EU.
Across the EU, some services pay more than industry, yet industrial hourly
wages are still comparatively high in Denmark, Germany, and the UK and rela-
Earnings inequalities in the EU labour market: between efficiency and equity
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Firm characteristics have a
substantial impact on earnings.
Individual characteristics such as
skills and occupation are a major
determinant of earnings… 
… but gender also remains a major
factor.
Institutions affect unequally the
distribution of earnings in most
countries.
The EU as a whole underutilises its
labour force potential, and
inactivity remains high in most
Member States.
Inactivity is higher among women,
the young, older workers and the
low-skilled …
… but while the incidence of
inactivity is higher among the low-
tively low in Latvia and Lithuania. Among services, high-skilled activities, espe-
cially financial intermediation, pay much more than low-skilled activities (such
as working in the hotels and restaurants sector). Within services and industry, the
premium can vary widely: it is positive for financial intermediation and mining
and quarrying whilst it is negative for hotels and restaurants and construction,
for example.
Company size has a positive impact on individual earnings and notably compa-
ny-specific reward schemes, such as bonuses, amount to on average 8.4% of
annual earnings in the EU. Firms that introduce new methods of work organisa-
tion leading to more flexible practices tend to have a higher dispersion of salaries
than others, because new work practices favour high-skilled and adaptable work-
ers compared to low-skilled workers. Moreover, technical change and human
capital are complementary. The more firms are involved in R&D activity, the
more they need highly skilled and educated workers, and the more wage inequal-
ity may be exacerbated. 
Being a high-skilled worker brings a high earnings premium (i.e. returns to edu-
cation are unambiguously positive), as well as working in top high- skilled occu-
pations, pointing at the importance of human capital for employment and career
prospects. Seniority, being a non-manual worker, and working in industrial sec-
tors also leads to higher rewards in the case of men.
Controlling for other characteristics (among which occupations play an impor-
tant part in the persistent gender gap), gender accounts on average for a gap of
slightly over 17% in earnings between male and female employees in the private
sector. 
Workers having fixed-term or part-time contracts as well as apprentices earn less
on average. The rate of coverage of collective bargaining and the existence of
extension laws seems to reduce earnings dispersion and in general, labour mar-
ket institutions have a dampening effect on earnings inequality, which points to
a deliberate social choice of Europeans for more equality. 
In 2004 the economically inactive population of working age (15-64) in the
EU25, i.e. those that are neither working nor actively seeking and immediately
available for work, amounted to some 92 million people, corresponding to an
average inactivity rate of over 30%. The rate of inactivity varied quite markedly
across Member States, ranging from a low of 19.9% in Denmark to a high of
39.5% in Hungary and 41.7% in Malta.
In the EU, inactivity is around 16 percentage points lower for men than for
women. The inactive population aged 15-64 is distributed evenly with one third
in each of the three main age segments - youth, prime-age and older people,
despite the fact that the prime age group is the largest one. Inactivity rates are
over 47% for the low-skilled against just over 13% for the high-skilled.
Just over 50% of the inactive population in the EU is low-skilled, and this per-
centage is as low as 33% in Luxembourg and the UK. If inactivity is to be
Tapping Europe's potential - Inactive people: permanently out of the labour
force or potential labour supply?
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skilled, they often constitute less
than 50% of the inactive
population.
The reasons why these people are
inactive should be taken into
account.
There has generally been a gradual
long-term decline in the inactivity
rates since the mid-1980s,
especially for certain groups …
… which is accompanied at any
point in time by relatively large
flows into and out of inactivity.
Being inactive is a broad and
partly misleading concept.
reduced substantially, it is also important to consider the problems of all skill
groups including the higher skill groups: not only is it necessary to have an ade-
quate level of skills per se, but it is equally important that these skills correspond
to the changing requirements of the labour market.    
The main reason for inactivity is participation in education and training, corre-
sponding to around a third of the inactive population, but once we exclude the
younger age group (15-24), this percentage drops dramatically to 4.7%. The fact
that over 85% of the young are inactive because of education or training means
that for the majority of them inactivity is not necessarily a concern for the poli-
cy maker. The second most important reason for inactivity is retirement, at
around 20% of the inactive population, while family or personal responsibilities
comes third at approximately 16%. Finally, illness or disability accounts for
around 13% of the inactive population while a further 4.5% are not looking for
work because they believe that there is none available. However, there are impor-
tant differences by age and gender, between countries and over time: in particu-
lar, in the past ten years, the proportion of women that are inactive because of
personal or family responsibilities has decreased by almost 13 percentage points.
This may be due to better public care facilities, higher income so that more peo-
ple can afford private care facilities, more extensive parental leave, lower fertil-
ity rate or changes in social or cultural norms. 
The decline in the inactive population in the EU over recent years has been driv-
en by two main trends; the entry into the labour market of increasing numbers
of women aged over 25 and the entry or staying longer of older people (aged 55-
64) of both sexes. In contrast, men of prime working age have shown signs of a
limited withdrawal from the labour market, while youth of both sexes have seen
a more significant change with inactivity rates rising by around 1.5 percentage
points in the period 2000 to 2004.
Between 2003 and 2004 around 9.5% of the inactive population moved into
employment, while a further 4% entered the labour force as unemployed. At the
same time, 3% of the employed and almost 22% of the unemployed withdrew
from the labour force. In the present circumstances, the main reason why the
unemployed leave the labour market is because they stop searching for a job
since they believe there is none available (5.6% become discouraged against
3.1% who leave the labour market because of illness or disability and 1% who
retire). Therefore withdrawal of unemployed people from the labour market in
the short-term is not primarily linked to institutional factors, such as the design
of the benefit system or early retirement schemes, but to the functioning of the
labour market, either because of imperfect information or lack of demand.  
Between "unemployment" – whereby someone without a job has been actively
looking for work in the four weeks prior to the survey and is willing and avail-
able to work in the following two weeks - and "inactivity", whereby the individ-
ual is out of the labour force, lies a "grey" area, which is also classified as "inac-
tivity", with varying degrees of labour market attachment. As an example, in
2004 more than 8% of the inactive population in the EU was registered at a Pub-
lic Employment Office (PEO) and 14% of the inactive population (23% for
those aged 25-54) were willing to work. Furthermore, around 37% of the inac-
tive population receives some education and training, although this percentage
declines with age, while the proportion of those attending training not leading to
a formal qualification increases with age.
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The heterogeneity of the inactive
population is a major challenge for
policy-making.
Policies aimed at activating
inactive people should take into
account for how long they have
been out of the labour force …
…and should also take into
account demand-side problems.
The EU and its Member States
must step up their efforts to create
more and better jobs ….
… by linking employment-friendly
macro-economic management and
the pursuit of structural reforms.
The experience of European
Employment Strategy will serve the
renewed Lisbon Agenda.
Several categories of the inactive have tendencies to work that equal those of the
unemployed. Potential labour supply extends far beyond the unemployed, as tra-
ditionally defined, and it is also constituted by a sizeable part of the inactive pop-
ulation. Effective targeting is crucial in order to support their labour market par-
ticipation: demographic characteristics, reasons of inactivity, work experience,
skill levels and individual preferences for work are all key aspects that should be
taken into account. This calls for a personalised approach and support.
Over 40% of the inactive population of working age (15-64 year old) have never
been in employment. A further 23% has been without a job for the previous 8
years and only around 15% of the inactive population were without a job for less
than 2 years. 
Reducing inactivity does not mean dealing with supply-side constraints only,
such as high reservation wages, low skills or disadvantageous individual charac-
teristics. Inactivity tends to be strongly correlated with unemployment and an
effective response to the need for mobilising the workforce more than is current-
ly the case should therefore be characterised by a comprehensive set of policies
that combines Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) with other measures
aimed at supporting job creation and opportunities.
Despite evidence of progress over the years, the EU still has a large gap to bridge
to reach full employment, improve quality and productivity at work and strength-
en social and territorial cohesion. The re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005
is meant to strengthen momentum of action at national and EU level, by putting
a greater focus on growth and jobs, and setting three priorities of action for
employment policies: attracting and retaining more people in employment,
improving the adaptability of workers and enterprises and investing more in
human capital.
The findings of this year's Employment in Europe confirm that macro-econom-
ic, micro-economic and employment policies go hand-in-hand for delivering
more and better jobs. A growth- and employment-friendly macro-economic
environment, as sought for in the framework of the Integrated Guidelines, is cru-
cial for Europe to grow and deliver employment and greater social cohesion, as
well as to initiate and sustain structural reforms. At the same time, Europe
should not just wait for growth to appear; structural reforms played an important
role in the past and further reforms are needed in order to raise Europe's eco-
nomic and employment potential. Synergies between employment policies and
reforms in the service, product and capital markets should be fully exploited.
The European Employment Strategy, backed up by the European Social Fund, is
a central pillar of the revised Lisbon Agenda in order to strengthen employment
performances and improve policy-making and delivery, including through better
governance and mutual learning. While stressing the prime responsibility of
Member States in economic and employment policies, the Council has adopted
a first set of integrated guidelines with the main aim to spur growth and job cre-
ation. Based on the National Reform Programmes established by the Member
States in Autumn 2005 and the Community Lisbon programme, the Commission
will present its first Annual Progress Report in January 2006.
Conclusions: putting growth and jobs at the core of the renewed Lisbon
Strategy
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Chapter 1 Panorama of the European 
labour markets
1 The figures in this chapter are based on the data available up to mid-June 2005 and generally include data for the years up until 2004. Where
“LFS” is mentioned as the data source this refers to the spring results from the Labour Force Survey unless otherwise stated. Where “QLFD” is
mentioned, this should be understood to mean either annual averages from national accounts or annual averages of quarterly data from the
Labour Force Survey, depending on the specific variable in question. Due to the transition to a quarterly survey, data for missing quarters for
the LFS are estimated by Eurostat until 2003. For further details on the data and the sources used, see the statistical annexes.
1. Introduction
This chapter provides a detailed
overview of recent developments in
the European labour market and com-
pares them with developments for cer-
tain other economic partners, in par-
ticular the US and Japan. The chapter
begins with a review of recent labour
market performance, examining the
current labour market situation and
trends in the recently enlarged EU in a
global perspective, and reports on the
short-term prospects for the EU
labour market in the coming years. It
then focuses in more detail on the lat-
est developments in activity, employ-
ment and unemployment rates across
the individual Member States. This is
followed by an overview of recent
employment trends according to type
of employment, an examination of
self-employment in Europe in 2004,
and an update on recent labour market
developments for the older and
younger elements of the working age
population. Further issues reviewed
include recent sectoral employment
trends, as well as a brief overview of
the latest labour market trends in the
remaining Acceding and Candidate
Countries for EU membership. The
findings reported in this chapter are
based on data available up to mid-June
20051, while many of the tables and
charts include data for the EU-15
aggregate to provide a longer-term
historical perspective.
2. Recent labour market
performance
2.1. EU labour market
performance in 2004 in a
global perspective
After gathering momentum in the
first half of 2004, economic activity
in the EU decelerated in the second
half of the year, reflecting in part the
impact of the sharp rise in oil prices
and the strength of the euro. Never-
theless, economic growth in the EU
averaged 2.4% for the year as a whole
supported by strong global growth
and trade, an improvement on the 
previous year’s rate of just 1.1%
(Table 1).
World GDP growth reached a level of
5% in 2004, the fastest pace since the
1970s, with particularly strong growth
in certain emerging economies such as
China (9.5%), India (6.7%) and Brazil
(5.2%). In the US, economic activity
remained strong, with GDP growth of
4.4%, up from 3.1% in the previous
year, although the high current
account deficit and general govern-
ment deficit cast doubt over the sus-
tainability of this rate of economic
expansion. In Japan the economy
experienced a recession in the second
and third quarters of 2004, but strong
first quarter performance and a
rebound in the last quarter meant that
annual growth reached 2.7% for the
year as a whole, up from 1.4% the year
before.
EU-25 EU-15 US JP
Population (millions) 457 383 293 128
GDP (in 1 000 million PPS, 
current prices) 10 213 9 316 10 164 3 210
GDP Growth, at constant prices
(annual % change) 2.4 2.3 4.4 2.7
Employment Rate (as % of 
working age population) 63.3 64.7 71.2 68.7
Employment Growth 
(annual % change) 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.2
Unemployment Rate 
(as % of civilian labour force) 9.0 8.1 5.5 4.8
Table 1 – International comparison of key indicators (2004)
Source: GDP and employment growth from Commission’s Spring 2005 Economic Forecasts and
QLFD, Eurostat. GDP in PPS from AMECO database, Commission Services. Employment rate
from QLFD, Eurostat and OECD data for US and Japan. Unemployment rate from the harmonised
unemployment series, Eurostat. Population from demographic statistics, Eurostat.
Note: Employment rates for the EU and Japan refer to persons aged 15-64; US employment rate
refers to persons aged 16 to 64.
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In 2004, employment in the EU contin-
ued to respond slowly to the economic
upturn that followed the slowdown
from mid-2000 to mid-2003. Employ-
ment growth was once again quite lim-
ited at 0.6%, although slightly up from
the previous year’s level of 0.3%, and
has now been low (around the 0.5%
mark or below) for three years in a row
(Chart 1). As a result the employment
rate in the EU edged up to 63.3% in
2004 (Chart 2), while unemployment,
at 9.0%, remained unchanged com-
pared to 2003.
In the US employment growth resumed
in 2004, following two years of “job-
less recovery”, and averaged 1.1% after
zero growth in 2003. It nevertheless
remains well below the normal increase
associated with the third year of an eco-
nomic recovery and considerably down
on the levels observed in the late 1990s
and 2000. The unemployment rate fell
to 5.5%, down from 6.0% in 2003.
Meanwhile, in Japan employment
growth also resumed but at a much
more moderate pace, climbing to 0.2%
in 2004 following a contraction of
0.3% in 2003. Nevertheless, this was
the first time since 1997 that Japan has
reported positive employment growth.
Reflecting this positive development,
the employment rate rose to 68.7%,
while unemployment dropped from
5.3% to 4.8%.
2.2. General labour market
developments in the EU over
recent years
2.2.1. Employment growth across
Member States
While employment growth for the EU
as a whole was again rather limited in
2004, as employment continued to
respond slowly to the economic
upturn, underlying this overall trend
quite broad variations can be observed
between individual Member States
(Table 2). 
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Chart 1 – Employment growth rates in the EU, US and Japan, 1997-2004
Source: EU data from QLFD, Eurostat; US and Japan data from AMECO database, Commission
Services.
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Source: Eurostat, national accounts, quarterly results.
Note: No quarterly employment growth data from national accounts for CY, EL, MT, PL and PT. Break in time series for LT 2002Q1.
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In the largest Member State, Germany,
the long run of negative employment
growth which began in the last quarter
of 2001 finally came to an end in the
first quarter of 2004, following which
growth picked up over the course of the
year to reach around 0.6% in the last
quarter (Chart 3). Among the other
large Member States, employment
growth in Italy and the UK remained
positive over 2004 at around the 1%
level while in Spain growth was espe-
cially strong, remaining around 2.5%
in all four quarters. By contrast,
employment growth in France was
more or less at a standstill during 2004,
turning from marginally negative in the
first half of the year to just positive in
the second half.
Among the remaining Member States,
the employment situation in Sweden
and the Netherlands deteriorated com-
pared to the previous year, with nega-
tive growth in every quarter, especially
in the Netherlands where employment
contraction remained above 1% for all
quarters. The situation also deteriorated
in Estonia and Hungary where employ-
ment growth turned negative over the
course of the year. By contrast,
employment growth strengthened in
Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Luxem-
bourg, with growth in the last two espe-
cially strong and showing signs of
picking up. Similarly, the situation
improved in the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland and Slovenia where
growth turned positive over the course
of 2004 signalling an end to periods of
employment contraction.
In line with these developments,
employment growth for the year as a
whole was positive for the majority of
Member States (Chart 4). Only four
(Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia
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Chart 3 – Employment growth in the larger Member States, 2001-2004
Source: Eurostat, national accounts, quarterly results.
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and Sweden) recorded negative annual
growth, most notably the Netherlands
where employment contracted by 1.3%.
By contrast, seven Member States
achieved positive employment growth
of over 1%, with particularly strong
growth in Cyprus (1.9%), Greece
(3.1%), Ireland (3.2%), Luxembourg
(2.6%) and Spain (2.6%). In Germany
annual employment growth turned pos-
itive in 2004 following negative average
growth in the previous two years, possi-
bly already reflecting institutional
changes in the context of the Hartz
labour market reforms, while the
decline in employment experienced in
Poland in 2002 and 2003 also showed
signs of coming to an end in 2004.
2.2.2. Overall trends in unemployment
At around 9.0% the (seasonally adjust-
ed) overall unemployment rate for the
EU-25 remained essentially unchanged
over the course of 2004 before showing
signs of a moderate decline over the last
quarter and into 2005 (Chart 5). At this
level it is still only some 0.6 percentage
points higher than the minimum of
8.4% achieved in the first half of 2001.
In the last quarter of 2004 (seasonally
adjusted) unemployment rates ranged
from as low as 4.4% in Ireland and Lux-
embourg to as high as 18.4% in Poland.
In the US, the unemployment rate con-
tinued to fall gradually over the course
of 2004, having peaked at 6.1% in the
second quarter of 2003. By the first
quarter of 2005, it had fallen to 5.3%.
Nevertheless, it still remained at the
sort of level last experienced in the US
in the mid-1990s, and some 1.4 per-
centage points above the minimum of
3.9% attained in the fourth quarter of
2000. Unemployment rates also
declined in Japan over 2004 to reach
4.6% by the first quarter of 2005, down
from the peak of 5.4% in early 2003. In
line with these developments, the gap
between the EU-25 unemployment rate
and those of the US and Japan widened
over 2004, and by the first quarter of
2005 had risen to 3.6 and 4.3 percent-
age points respectively.
2.2.3. Developments in productivity
growth
Average labour productivity growth (in
terms of GDP per person employed) for
the EU stood at 1.9% in 2004, a marked
improvement on the preceding three
years when average annual growth was
below 1% (Chart 6). However, this
compares unfavourably with produc-
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Chart 5 – Trends in unemployment rates in the EU, US and Japan since 1995
(seasonally adjusted quarterly data)
Source: Eurostat, harmonised series on unemployment.
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tivity growth rates of 3.3% for the US
and 2.5% for Japan in 2004. Further-
more, growth rates for Japan and espe-
cially the US have been above those
for the EU since 2002, with the US
sustaining rates of 3% and higher over
this period.
Considering productivity in terms of
GDP per hour worked, the disparity
between productivity growth in the
EU and in the US and Japan has gen-
erally been more moderate (Chart 7),
with EU growth at 2.5% in 2004 and
having been around the 1.5% mark
since 2001. On this basis productivity
improvements in the EU have been
very similar to those in Japan since
2001, though the gap with respect to
the US has nevertheless been growing.
Within the EU, big differences in pro-
ductivity growth persist between indi-
vidual Member States, with continu-
ing strong growth in the new Member
States from central and eastern
Europe, while growth in most large
Member States remained relatively
weak in 2004, especially in Germany,
Italy and Spain (Table 3). Neverthe-
less, compared to 2003 developments
in productivity growth were more pos-
itive as rates picked up in almost all
Member States in 2004.
2.3. Short-term prospects for
the EU labour market
According to the European Commis-
sion’s 2005 Spring Economic Fore-
casts, the recovery in the EU economy
is expected to continue over 2005-
2006, despite the unexpected deceler-
ation experienced in the second half of
2004. Due to the oil price hike and
strong euro, GDP growth in the
enlarged EU is expected to decline to
2.0% in 2005, before rising again to
2.3% in 2006 as growth regains
momentum. However, recent survey
indicators have been sending out
mixed signals about the prospects for
the strength and sustainability of the
recovery. In particular, the surge in oil
prices seems to have dented business
confidence and the balance of risks
has tilted towards the downside. Fur-
thermore, world GDP growth, estimat-
ed to have peaked at around 5% in
2004 (the fastest rate of growth since
the 1970s), is set to ease off to around
4% in both 2005 and 2006. Neverthe-
less, although moderating, the
momentum of global economic
growth remains strong and trade is
still growing vigorously, while there
are also signs that domestic demand is
recovering in some Member States.
During 2004 the main driver of eco-
nomic growth in the EU shifted from
external trade in the first half of the
year to domestic demand in the second
half. However, private consumption
remained relatively flat throughout the
year, although the pace of investment
expenditure is expected to pick up and
be accompanied by a more gradual
increase in private consumption.
The restrained response of the EU
labour market to the slowdown of
2001-2003 (as reported on in detail in
Employment in Europe 2003 and
2004) has been followed by a slow
response by employment to the
upturn. Employment growth has now
been low for three years and has not
picked up markedly since the start of
the economic upturn in mid-2003.
However, as the effects of the protract-
ed economic slowdown wear off, the
performance of the labour market,
supported by wage moderation, is
expected to respond positively to the
general pick-up in economic activity.
Employment growth in the EU is fore-
cast to increase to 0.7% in 2005 and
0.8% in 2006, while the unemploy-
ment rate is expected to remain stable
at around 9.0% in 2005 before edging
downwards to 8.7% in 2006.
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Chart 7 – Growth in productivity per hour worked, 2000-2004
Source: Commission Services.
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Growth in GDP per person employed Growth in GDP per hour worked
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BE 1.9 -0.7 1.2 1.2 2.1 3.4 -2.3 1.3 1.5 3.3
CZ 4.6 2.2 0.0 3.9 4.6 4.4 7.0 1.5 5.5 5.6
DK 2.5 1.0 0.9 1.6 2.4 4.3 -0.7 3.1 0.7 2.1
DE 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 2.2 1.3 1.4 0.7 1.9
EE 11.0 5.6 5.6 4.3 6.0 9.5 4.6 6.7 4.8 5.1
EL 4.2 4.6 3.7 3.2 1.0 5.7 4.6 2.9 2.7 3.2
ES 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.6 -0.7 -0.7 0.7 0.6 1.0
FR 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 2.8 4.1 1.9 3.3 0.7 4.2
IE 5.0 2.9 4.3 1.6 2.4 5.0 3.6 5.0 5.3 3.9
IT 1.3 0.1 -0.9 -0.2 0.4 1.5 0.6 -0.8 -0.2 0.8
CY 2.6 2.0 0.9 0.9 2.2 2.9 3.2 1.6 2.9 3.3
LV 10.1 5.7 4.8 5.6 7.5 10.2 7.1 5.4 7.7 8.4
LT 8.3 10.0 2.7 7.2 7.0 8.4 12.3 3.4 8.6 7.5
LU 3.2 -3.9 -0.5 1.1 1.7 2.3 -2.9 0.2 1.4 2.2
HU 3.9 2.6 3.5 2.2 4.4 4.5 5.7 2.3 1.8 4.7
MT 4.0 -3.7 2.9 -1.1 0.1 4.1 -2.4 3.5 0.8 1.7
NL 1.6 0.1 0.7 0.1 3.0 0.4 -0.3 1.6 -1.7 2.9
AT 2.0 0.3 1.1 0.7 1.0 2.2 -0.5 3.5 1.2 1.7
PL 5.6 3.3 4.5 5.1 5.3 5.8 3.7 4.6 5.2 5.3
PT 1.6 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.9 3.9 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.4
SI 0.7 2.2 3.7 2.8 4.5 0.8 3.6 4.4 4.9 5.3
SK 3.9 3.2 5.2 2.6 5.9 3.9 2.3 7.3 12.2 8.0
FI 2.8 -0.4 1.3 2.4 3.5 4.3 0.6 2.4 3.5 4.3
SE 1.9 -0.8 1.8 1.6 4.0 3.5 0.5 3.3 2.8 4.9
UK 2.7 1.5 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.2 1.1 1.6 2.3 3.0
EU-25 2.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.9 2.9 1.4 1.7 1.3 2.5
EU-15 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.6 2.4 0.8 1.4 0.9 2.3
US 1.6 0.5 3.0 3.2 3.3 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.6 3.9
JP 2.5 0.8 1.1 1.7 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.4 2.9
Table 3 – Annual productivity growth 2000-2004
Source: Commission Services.
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Labour productivity growth in the EU
(in terms of real GDP per occupied
person) is expected to be limited to
1.3% in 2005, down from the growth
rate in 2004, but to pick up again to
1.5% in 2006. Growth in productivity
is expected to be particularly low in
Germany in 2005 (0.1%), partly
reflecting the impact of the “mini-
jobs” development in that country,
while much stronger productivity
growth is expected in many of the new
Member States.
3. Labour market
situation in 2004 in the
enlarged EU
3.1. Unemployment
At 9.0% the overall unemployment rate
for the EU-25 remained unchanged in
2004 compared to the previous year,
but is now some 4 percentage points
higher than the rates in the US and
Japan. At the level of the individual
Member States, compared to 2003
rates rose in around half but fell in the
others. The largest rises occurred in
Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden,
with increases in excess of 0.7 per-
centage points. By contrast, rates fell
substantially in Estonia and Lithuania,
by around 1 and 2 percentage points
respectively. Among the large Mem-
ber States, in Germany rates rose by
0.5 percentage points while in Italy,
Poland and Spain there were falls of
the same order.
Although unemployment rates have
declined in Poland in recent years they
remain comparatively high, at 18.8%
in 2004. Similarly the rate in Slovakia,
at 18.0%, was double the EU average.
Among the other Member States
unemployment rates in 2004 were
above 10% in Greece, Lithuania and
Spain, while among the large Member
States rates were above the EU aver-
age in France and Germany. This com-
pares with annual rates of as low as 4
to 5% in Austria, Cyprus, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the
UK (Chart 8).
Within the EU, the disparity in the
average unemployment rate between
the genders, at 2.1 percentage points
in 2004, was more or less unchanged
from 2003 (when it was 2.2 percent-
age points), with women continuing 
to be more susceptible to unemploy-
ment than men. The actual unemploy-
ment rates in 2004 were 8.1% for men
and 10.2% for women, essentially
unchanged from 2003 except for a
very marginal rise for men. Unem-
ployment rates are higher for women
than for men in practically all Member
States, the only exceptions in 2004
being Estonia, Ireland, Sweden and
the UK. The largest disparities
between unemployment rates for men
and women remain in Greece and
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Chart 8 – Unemployment rates in the EU by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, harmonised series on unemployment.
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Spain, where the differences are
around 10 and 7 percentage points
respectively, and with the disparity in
Greece widening compared to 2003.
At 18.7% the youth unemployment
rate (amongst people aged between 15
and 24) in the EU remained more or
less unchanged compared to 2003 and
is still around twice as high as the
overall unemployment rate (Chart 9).
In 2004 the rate was over 20% in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,
France, Italy, Spain and Finland, and
remained especially high in Slovakia
and Poland at around 32% and 40%
respectively. By contrast, rates were as
low as around 8% in Denmark, Ireland
and the Netherlands. In terms of
changes in the youth unemployment
rate between 2003 and 2004, rates
rose strongly (by between 2 and 3 per-
centage points) in the Czech Republic
and Sweden, but fell by similar mar-
gins in Estonia and Malta, and even
more markedly in Lithuania. Among
the large Member States, the most
marked changes were for Poland,
where the youth unemployment rate
fell by almost 2 percentage points, and
France, where it climbed by close to 1
percentage point.
Long-term unemployment (i.e. unem-
ployment for a duration of 12 months
or more) affected some 4.1% of the
EU labour force in 2004, marginally
up from the previous year. This was a
continuation of the pattern observed in
the previous two years, with long-term
unemployment on a gradually increas-
ing trend since the low of 3.8% in
2001, following the strong falls in the
late 1990s. Most Member States
recorded either only marginal increas-
es or no change in long-term unem-
ployment rates in 2004, although the
rise was more substantial in the Czech
Republic, Germany and the Nether-
lands, at around 0.5 percentage points,
and in Portugal, where there was a rise
of close to 1 percentage point. Some
Member States bucked this trend,
most notably Lithuania, Poland and
Spain, where rates fell by around 0.5
percentage points, and in particular
Italy where the rate fell by close to 1
percentage point.
Within the EU the long-term unem-
ployment rate remains highest in
Poland and Slovakia, where around
10% and 12% respectively of the
labour force, or almost three times the
EU average, are affected (Chart 10). It
also remains relatively high in Ger-
many, Greece and Lithuania, all with
rates around 5% or just over. For the
majority of Member States, long-term
unemployment rates are higher for
women than for men, the EU averages
being 4.7% and 3.6% respectively.
The largest gender differences are
found in Greece, Italy and Spain, with
Greece displaying a disparity of just
over 6 percentage points and the other
two around 3 percentage points each.
Looking at longer-term developments,
just under half the Member States
have seen little change in their long-
term unemployment rates since 2000
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Chart 9 – Youth unemployment rates in the EU by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, harmonised series on unemployment.
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Chart 11 – Change in long-term unemployment rates between 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
Note: Data for CY refer to 2000 and 2003; 2004 data for DE provisional (based on spring LFS results).
% of labour force
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK EU-
25
EU-
15
Men Women Total
Chart 10 – Long-term unemployment rates in the EU by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. 
Note: Data for CY refer to 2003; 2004 data for DE provisional (based on spring LFS results).
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(Chart 11). In particular, in several
Member States (Austria, Denmark,
Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Swe-
den and the UK) rates have stabilised
at around the 1% level in recent years.
In others rates have declined substan-
tially from relatively high levels in
2000, most noticeably in Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Italy and Spain.
However, developments in several
other Member States have been less
positive, in particular in Poland, where
the long-term unemployment rate has
risen by close to 3 percentage points
compared to 2000.
3.2. Activity rates
The overall activity (or participation)
rate (i.e. the labour force (both
employed and unemployed) aged 15 to
64 as a share of the total population of
the same age group) for the EU con-
tinued to rise in 2004, increasing by
0.4 percentage points on the previous
year to 69.7%. Within the enlarged
EU, the activity rates for the individual
Member States ranged from a low of
just over 58% in Malta, with Hungary,
Italy, Luxembourg and Poland also
substantially (5 percentage points or
more) below the EU average, to a
high, in Denmark, of just over 80%,
although the Netherlands, Sweden and
the UK also had rates in excess of
75% (Chart 12). Compared to 2003,
the strongest increases in activity rates
occurred in Belgium, Greece, Italy
and Spain, all with rises of 1 percent-
age point or just over, and Slovenia,
where rates rose by almost 3 percent-
age points. Activity rates declined
noticeably (in excess of 0.5 percentage
points) only in Austria and Lithuania.
At EU level, the difference between
the activity rates for men (77.5%) and
women (62.0%) stood at 15.5 percent-
age points in 2004, noticeably down
on the previous year’s level of 16.3
percentage points. This reflects an
underlying increase in female partici-
pation between 2003 and 2004 of 0.8
percentage points compared to a mar-
ginal increase of only 0.1 percentage
points for men. It also reflects the gen-
eral trend over recent years in which
male activity rates have remained
more or less static around 77.5%
while those for women have continued
to increase, rising by around 4 per-
centage points since 1997 and driving
the overall rise in activity rates over
the period (Chart 13). The Member
States that have seen the most substan-
tial rises in female participation since
1997 (an increase of more than 7 per-
centage points) are Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Spain (Chart 14). Despite these
developments, the gender gaps in
activity rates remain substantial in
most of these Member States. In par-
ticular, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and Spain, as well as Cyprus, all
have disparities between the activity
rates for men and women of 20 to 25
percentage points, while in Malta the
gap remains as high as 44 percentage
points.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
DK SE NL UK FI PT DE CY AT EU-
15
CZ EE SI EU-
25
LV SK FR IE LT ES EL BE LU PL IT HU MT
Men Women Total
Chart 12 – Activity rates in the EU by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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The overall fall in the disparity
between male and female participa-
tion rates in 2004 at EU level was
reflected across the majority of Mem-
ber States, except, most notably,
Cyprus and Malta where the gap
widened by around 1 percentage point
compared to 2003. By contrast, in
eight Member States the gap closed by
around 1 percentage point, and in
Italy by just over 2 percentage points.
The strongest increases in female par-
ticipation between 2003 and 2004
occurred in Greece, Italy and Spain,
with rises of around 2 percentage
points, and in Slovenia with 3 percent-
age points. By contrast female partici-
pation declined by around 1 percent-
age point each in Lithuania and Malta.
However, while female activity rates
rose in the majority of Member States,
developments in male participation
rates were again rather more mixed,
with around half the Member States
experiencing falls, most notably in
Austria, Estonia, Lithuania and Lux-
embourg.
Reflecting the comparatively high pro-
portion of young people (those aged
15 to 24) in full-time education, the
average EU activity rate for that age
group, at just over 45%, is substantial-
ly lower than the overall activity rate,
although the disparities between male
and female participation rates (6.9 per-
centage points) are narrower for this
group. After the increases of the late
1990s, and in contrast to the general
continuing increase in overall activity
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Chart 14 – Change in female participation rates between 1997 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. 
Note: Data for CZ, EE, LV, LT and SK refer to 1998-2004, and for CY and MT to 2000-2004.
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Chart 13 – Trends in EU activity rates by gender, 1997-2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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rates, the average youth activity rate
has been falling over recent years
(since 2000). This trend continued
between 2003 and 2004 as the rate
declined further to 45.1%, although
the decline was marginal and much
lower than in 2002 and 2003 (Chart
15). The decline in youth activity
since 2000 has been observed across
the majority of Member States, with
only six (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
France, Slovenia and Spain) seeing
rates rise or remaining stable (Chart
16). In the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Lithuania the decline in youth
participation over this timeframe has
been particularly strong, with the
activity rate falling by the order of 10
percentage points in these countries.
Youth participation rates vary quite
widely between Member States, from
a low of just over 26% in Luxem-
bourg and Lithuania to as high as
around 72% in the Netherlands
(Chart 17). For almost all Member
States, the activity rates for youth are
well below the average activity rates
for the working age population as a
whole, the only exceptions being
Malta and the Netherlands. For Bel-
gium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia
and Sweden, the gaps between the
activity rates for youth and those for
the working age population as a
whole are all 30 percentage points or
more.
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Chart 16 – Change in youth activity rates in the EU between 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Chart 15 –Trends in EU youth activity rates by gender, 1997-2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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In 2004, the activity rate for older peo-
ple (aged 55 to 64) averaged 43.9% for
the EU as a whole, up 0.8 percentage
points on the previous year and sug-
gesting a slight slowdown compared to
the rapid rise in participation of older
people observed in 2002 and 2003.
Unlike 2003, in 2004 several Member
States (Austria, Estonia, Greece, Malta,
Poland and Portugal) actually recorded
falls in older people’s activity rates
compared to the previous year,
although rates continued to increase for
most Member States and particularly
strongly in Belgium, Germany, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and
Slovakia.
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Chart 18 – Change in older people’s (aged 55-64) activity rates between 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Chart 17 – Youth (persons aged 15-24) activity rates by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
%
 o
f 
po
pu
la
ti
on
 a
ge
d 
15
-2
4
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
31
As in the case of youth, activity rates
for older people are much lower than
those for the working age population
as a whole, but in contrast to youth
they are generally on the rise. Since
2000, all Member States except Aus-
tria and Poland have reported increases
in labour force participation by older
people, most notably Finland, France,
Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands
and Slovakia, all with increases in
activity rates for older people in excess
of 7 percentage points, and especially
Latvia with a rise of almost 13 percent-
age points (Chart 18).
Despite the recent broad increases in
participation by older people in most
Member States, activity rates for the
55-64 age group continue to vary
markedly across countries. In 2004
activity rates for this age group were
below one third in Austria, Belgium,
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, but
over 60% in Denmark and in excess of
70% in Sweden (Chart 19). Of the 25
Member States, only 10 have activity
rates for older people above 50%. 
In all Member States the activity rates
for older women are below those for
older men, averaging 34% for women
compared to 55% for men at EU level.
The activity rates for older women are
generally low – in eleven Member
States, for example, they are below
30% – and are below 15% in Malta
and Slovakia. The low participation
rate for older women results in large
gender disparities in participation rates
for older people, averaging 21 percent-
age points for the EU as a whole but
climbing to over 30 percentage points
in Greece, Ireland, Slovakia and Spain
and more than 40 percentage points in
Cyprus and Malta. Only in Finland and
Sweden are the activity rates for older
men and women close, with gender
gaps of around 1 and 6 percentage
points respectively, while Estonia and
France are the only other Member
States with gaps below 10 percentage
points (though in France the activity
rates for older men and women are
both comparatively low to begin with).
Chapter 5 of this report provides a
more detailed assessment of the struc-
ture and trends in the levels of partici-
pation in the labour force. It takes a
detailed look at the situation and
developments concerning the “inac-
tive” population in Europe and pro-
vides an analysis of the size and struc-
ture of that population, including a
detailed analysis of the current situa-
tion and trends.
3.3. Employment rates and the
Lisbon and Stockholm targets
Between 2003 and 2004, the average
employment rate for the EU (defined as
the share of employed persons aged 15
to 64 in the total population of the same
age group) rose by 0.4 of a percentage
point to 63.3%. Although lower than
the annual increases observed over the
late 1990s, it is similar to the increase
in 2000 and 2001, and a clear improve-
ment on 2002 and 2003 when employ-
ment rates hardly rose at all. The rise in
the overall rate was again driven by the
continued increase in the employment
rate for women, which rose 0.7 per-
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Chart 19 – Older people’s (aged 55-64) activity rates by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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centage points on average to 55.7%,
while the rate for men remained more
or less static at 70.9%. For older people
(aged 55 to 64) the employment rate
rose by 0.8 of a percentage point to
41.0%. While still a significant
increase, this was lower than in the pre-
vious two years, when rates for older
people rose by 1.2 (2002) and 1.5
(2003) percentage points, and could
indicate a slowdown in the rapid rise in
employment for older people experi-
enced since 2000.
3.3.1. Employment rate developments
at Member State level in 2004
In 2004, employment rates within the
enlarged EU ranged from as low as
around 52% in Poland to close to 76%
in Denmark (Chart 20). Despite the
overall improvement in the employ-
ment rate at EU level, it declined,
compared to 2003, in several Member
States, most notably in Austria, the
Czech Republic, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden.
By contrast, employment rates
increased by around 1.5 percentage
points in Italy and Spain, and by
almost 3 percentage points in Slove-
nia. It is also worth noting that
employment rates remained stable in
Germany and rose slightly in Poland
in 2004, indicating signs of a positive
turnaround in their labour markets fol-
lowing several years of decline, while,
on the other hand, rate increases
essentially ground to a standstill in
France and the UK.
Due to the strong rise in the female
employment rate while the rate for
males remained unchanged, the gen-
der gap in employment rates in the EU
narrowed further between 2003 and
2004, falling by 0.6 of a percentage
point to 15.2 percentage points.
Despite the general reduction in the
disparity between male and female
employment rates at EU level, large
gender differences of around 25 per-
centage points or more still remain in
Greece, Italy and Spain, while in
Malta the gap is still around 42 per-
centage points. While the average
employment rates in the EU for men
and women were 70.9% and 55.7%
respectively in 2004, it is interesting to
note that male employment rates were
70% or above in sixteen Member
States, while female rates were 70% or
above in only two (Denmark and Swe-
den). There remains scope, therefore,
in many Member States for increasing
female employment rates further.
Notable disparities persist within the
EU between the employment rates of
different age groups within the work-
ing age population. Employment rates
are much lower for the youth (15-24)
and older persons (55-64) age groups
than for the prime working age (25-
54) group (Table 4). For youth, the
average employment rate for the EU
was just under 37% in 2004, ranging
from below 25% in Hungary, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg and Poland to over
60% in Denmark and the Netherlands.
In recent years most Member States
have witnessed falls in youth employ-
ment rates, this trend being most pro-
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Chart 20 – Employment rates by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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nounced in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Luxembourg where rates
have dropped by the order of 10 per-
centage points since 2000, reflecting,
for the most part, similar falls in the
level of youth labour market participa-
tion. For older people, the employ-
ment rate for the EU averaged 41.0%
in 2004, while at individual Member
State level rates ranged from 26% in
Poland to 69% in Sweden. In contrast
to the employment rates for youth,
those for older people have risen sub-
stantially in the EU since 2000 and
this trend continued with rates
improving in a large majority of Mem-
ber States between 2003 and 2004.
3.3.2. Progress in relation to the
Lisbon and Stockholm targets
Given the developments outlined
above, the overall, female and older
people’s employment rates remain
some 7, 4 and 9 percentage points
below the respective Lisbon and
Stockholm employment targets for
2010 (Box 1). It should also be noted
that the 2004 female employment rate,
and in particular the 2004 overall
employment rate, remain far away
from the intermediate employment
targets (for 2005).
Regarding the position of individual
Member States with respect to the col-
lective EU targets for 2010 (Table 5):
Youth (15-24) Prime working age (25-54) Older people (55-64)
BE 27.8 77.3 30.0
CZ 27.8 81.4 42.7
DK 62.3 83.7 60.3
DE 41.9 78.1 41.8
EE 27.2 78.8 52.4
EL 26.8 73.5 39.4
ES 35.2 72.7 41.3
FR 30.4 79.6 37.3
IE 47.7 76.8 49.5
IT 27.6 72.2 30.5
CY 37.3 82.7 50.1
LV 30.5 77.9 47.9
LT 20.3 79.4 47.1
LU 21.4 78.7 30.8
HU 23.6 73.6 31.1
MT 47.7 61.8 30.9
NL 65.9 82.5 45.2
AT 51.9 82.6 28.8
PL 21.7 68.2 26.2
PT 37.1 81.1 50.3
SI 33.8 83.8 29.0
SK 26.3 74.7 26.8
FI 39.4 81.0 50.9
SE 39.2 82.9 69.1
UK 55.4 80.8 56.2
EU-15 40.0 77.6 42.5
EU-25 36.8 76.8 41.0
Table 4 – Employment rates by age group, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Total employment rate Female employment rate Older people's employment rate
2004 Change Change Gap below 2004 Change Change Gap below 2004 Change Change Gap below 
2003-2004 2000-2004 2010 target 2003-2004 2000-2004 2010 target 2003-2004 2000-2004 2010 target
BE 60.3 0.7 -0.2 9.7 52.6 0.8 1.1 7.4 30.0 1.9 3.7 20.0
CZ 64.2 -0.5 -0.8 5.8 56.0 -0.3 -0.9 4.0 42.7 0.4 6.4 7.3
DK 75.7 0.6 -0.6 > 71.6 1.1 0.0 > 60.3 0.1 4.6 >
DE 65.0 0.0 -0.6 5.0 59.2 0.3 1.1 0.8 41.8 1.9 4.2 8.2
EE 63.0 0.1 2.6 7.0 60.0 1.0 3.1 > 52.4 0.1 6.1 >
EL 59.4 0.7 2.9 10.6 45.2 0.9 3.5 14.8 39.4 -1.9 0.4 10.6
ES 61.1 1.3 4.8 8.9 48.3 2.0 7.0 11.7 41.3 0.6 4.3 8.7
FR 63.1 -0.1 1.0 6.9 57.4 0.2 2.2 2.6 37.3 0.5 7.4 12.7
IE 66.3 0.8 1.1 3.7 56.5 0.8 2.6 3.5 49.5 0.5 4.2 0.5
IT 57.6 1.5 3.9 12.4 45.2 2.5 5.6 14.8 30.5 0.2 2.8 19.5
CY 69.1 -0.1 3.4 0.9 59.0 -1.4 5.5 1.0 50.1 -0.3 0.7 >
LV 62.3 0.5 4.8 7.7 58.5 0.6 4.7 1.5 47.9 3.8 11.9 2.1
LT 61.2 0.1 2.1 8.8 57.8 -0.6 0.1 2.2 47.1 2.4 6.7 2.9
LU 61.6 -1.1 -1.1 8.4 50.6 -1.4 0.5 9.4 30.8 0.8 4.1 19.2
HU 56.8 -0.2 0.5 13.2 50.7 -0.2 1.0 9.3 31.1 2.2 8.9 18.9
MT 54.1 -0.1 -0.1 15.9 32.8 -0.8 -0.3 27.2 30.9 -1.6 2.4 19.1
NL 73.1 -0.5 0.2 > 65.8 -0.2 2.3 > 45.2 0.9 7.0 4.8
AT 67.8 -1.2 -0.7 2.2 60.7 -1.0 1.1 > 28.8 -1.3 0.0 21.2
PL 51.7 0.5 -3.3 18.3 46.2 0.2 -2.7 13.8 26.2 -0.7 -2.2 23.8
PT 67.8 -0.3 -0.6 2.2 61.7 0.3 1.2 > 50.3 -1.3 -0.4 >
SI 65.3 2.7 2.5 4.7 60.5 2.9 2.1 > 29.0 5.5 6.3 21.0
SK 57.0 -0.7 0.2 13.0 50.9 -1.3 -0.6 9.1 26.8 2.2 5.5 23.2
FI 67.6 -0.1 0.4 2.4 65.6 -0.1 1.4 > 50.9 1.3 9.3 >
SE 72.1 -0.8 -0.9 > 70.5 -1.0 -0.4 > 69.1 0.5 4.2 >
UK 71.6 0.1 0.4 > 65.6 0.3 0.9 > 56.2 0.8 5.5 >
EU-15 64.7 0.4 1.3 5.3 56.8 0.8 2.7 3.2 42.5 0.8 4.7 7.5
EU-25 63.3 0.4 0.9 6.7 55.7 0.7 2.1 4.3 41.0 0.8 4.4 9.0
2010 target 70% More than 60% 50%
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
Note: The column “Gap below 2010 target” is for illustrative purposes only, since the 2010 target is a collective target for the EU and not individual
Member States. The symbol “>” indicates that the respective target has already been exceeded by the Member States concerned.
Table 5 – Employment rates in EU Member States in 2004 and progress towards the Lisbon and
Stockholm targets for 2010    
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• Only four (Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Sweden and the UK) already
meet the 70% overall employment
rate target, while seven others
(Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ger-
many, Ireland, Portugal and Slove-
nia) are presently within 5 percent-
age points (Chart 21). However, the
gap remains over 10 percentage
points in six countries, including
the large Member States of Italy
and Poland which are currently
around 12 and 18 percentage points
respectively below the EU target.
Since the launch of the Lisbon
Strategy the greatest improvements
in the overall employment rate have
taken place in Italy, Latvia and
Spain where rates have risen by
around 4 to 5 percentage points.
However, rates have also declined
in several Member States, most
notably in Poland where the rate
has fallen by over 3 percentage
points since 2000.
• Nine Member States already meet
the 2010 employment rate target for
women, and seven others are with-
in 5 percentage points (Chart 22).
Among the remaining Member
States the gap remains above 10
percentage points in Greece, Italy,
Poland and Spain and as high as 27
percentage points in Malta. Since
2000 the largest increases in the
female employment rate have been
achieved in Cyprus, Italy and
Spain, where rates have all risen by
more than 5 percentage points. 
• Seven Member States already meet
the employment rate target for
older people, but only four others
are within 5 percentage points of it
The Lisbon European Council of 2000 set a strategic goal, over the decade 2000-2010, for the EU “to become the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion”. It specifically stated that the overall aim of employment and economic policies should be to raise the employment
rate to as close as possible to 70% by 2010 and to increase the employment rate for women to more than 60% by the same year, not
least in order to reinforce the sustainability of social protection systems.
In addition to the 2010 Lisbon targets, the Stockholm European Council of 2001 set intermediate targets for employment rates in the
EU in 2005 of 67% overall and 57% for women. It also set a new target of raising the average EU employment rate for older men and
women (aged 55 to 64) to 50% by 2010.
Box 1 – Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate targets 
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Chart 21 – Overall employment rate for EU Member States, 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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(Chart 23). Indeed, substantial
gaps remain for many Member
States, being of the order of 20
percentage points or more in nine
cases (Austria, Belgium, Hungary,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia). Neverthe-
less, substantial progress has been
made towards the target in several
Member States since 2000. In par-
ticular, eleven have achieved
increases of over 5 percentage
points, with especially strong rises
in Finland, Hungary and Latvia.
Only Austria, Poland and Portugal
have not experienced rises in rates
since 2000, with only the last two
seeing rates actually decline. 
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Chart 22 – Female employment rates for EU Member States, 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Chart 23 – Older people’s employment rates for EU Member States, 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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To raise the average employment rate in
the EU to 70% by the end of 2010
seems increasingly challenging. Taking
into account the latest demographic
projections published by Eurostat, it is
estimated that employment of the work-
ing age population would need to
increase by around 23 million in order
to attain this target. Similarly, to meet
the employment rate targets for women
and older workers, increases in employ-
ment of around 7.5 million in each of
these population subgroups would be
necessary. In response to the mixed
results achieved so far since the launch
of the Lisbon Strategy and the increas-
ing challenge posed by the 2010 targets,
the European Council recently agreed
to relaunch the strategy without delay
and refocus priorities on economic
growth and employment (Box 2). 
In March 2005, five years after the launch
of the Lisbon Strategy, the European
Council reviewed the progress to date and,
in view of the mixed results, concluded
that urgent action was called for. On the
basis of the European Commission’s
Communication “Working together for
growth and jobs – A new start for the Lis-
bon Strategy”2 it decided to relaunch the
Lisbon Strategy without delay and refocus
priorities on growth and employment. Fol-
lowing this decision, in April 2005 the
European Commission adopted a new 3-
year “Integrated Guidelines Package”3 for
the period 2005 to 2008, designed to spur
growth and jobs in Europe. Recommend-
ing concrete priority actions, it lays out a
comprehensive strategy of macroeconom-
ic, microeconomic and employment poli-
cies to redress Europe’s weak growth per-
formance and insufficient job creation.
The new integrated guidelines bring sim-
pler, more focused EU economic gover-
nance by reducing the number of guide-
lines and by concentrating on core meas-
ures to create growth and jobs. 
On the basis of the guidelines, Member
States will draw up 3-year national reform
programmes and will report each autumn
on the reform programmes in a single
national Lisbon report. The Commission
will analyse and summarise these reports
in an EU annual progress report in Janu-
ary each year. On the basis of the progress
report, the Commission will propose
amendments to the integrated guidelines,
if necessary. The new integrated guide-
lines underline that Member States and
the EU should take every opportunity to
involve regional and local governments,
social partners and civil society in the
implementation of the guidelines. They
should give details of the progress made
in this area in the Lisbon reporting frame-
work. 
In addition to guidelines on macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic policies for
growth and jobs - which cover such issues
as securing economic stability, safeguard-
ing economic sustainability, promoting
economic efficiency, making Europe a
more attractive place to invest and work,
and spurring knowledge and innovation
for growth - a key component of the inte-
grated guidelines are the new employment
guidelines for more and better jobs.
New employment guidelines for more
and better jobs 
The Commission’s proposal on the guide-
lines for the Member States’ employment
policies reflects the renewed focus on jobs
under the relaunched Lisbon Strategy. The
new employment guidelines, which were
adopted by the Council in July 2005 and
are to run from 2005 to 2008, continue to
reflect the EU’s overall goal of achieving
full employment, quality and productivity
at work, and social and territorial cohe-
sion. They specifically mention, for the
first time, the need to modernise social
protection systems. 
The proposal’s three broad headings for
action reflect the key recommendations of
the Employment Taskforce4 set up in 2003
under the chairmanship of Wim Kok: 
• Attract and retain more people in
employment, increase labour supply
and modernise social protection sys-
tems;
• Improve adaptability of workers and
enterprises;
• Increase investment in human capital
through better education and skills. 
The new set of eight Employment Guide-
lines advocate a “lifecycle approach to
work” that tackles the problems faced by
all age groups. They address the need to:
• Implement employment policies aim-
ing at achieving full employment,
improving quality and productivity at
work, and strengthening social and ter-
ritorial cohesion;
• Promote a lifecycle approach to work; 
• Ensure inclusive labour markets,
enhance work attractiveness, and make
work pay for job-seekers, including
disadvantaged people, and the inac-
tive; 
• Improve matching of labour market
needs; 
• Promote flexibility combined with
employment security and reduce
labour market segmentation, having
due regard to the role of social part-
ners; 
• Ensure employment-friendly labour
cost developments and wage-setting
mechanisms; 
• Expand and improve investment in
human capital;
• Adapt education and training systems
in response to new skill requirements. 
Box 2 – Relaunching of the Lisbon Strategy and the new integrated guidelines
2 Communication to the Spring European Council: Working together for growth and jobs: A new start for the Lisbon Strategy, COM (2005) 24.
3 Integrated guidelines for growth and jobs (2005-2008), COM (2005) 141.
4 Jobs, Jobs, Jobs – Creating more employment in Europe, report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, November 2003.
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As part of this response, in 2005 a pro-
posal for a set of new integrated guide-
lines was adopted by the Commission
and later by the Council with the aim of
spurring growth and job creation.
3.4. Recent employment trends
according to type of
employment
3.4.1. Part-time employment
In 2004, the share of people in part-
time employment in the EU relative to
total employment amounted to just
under 18%. The increase of 0.7 of a
percentage point compared to the year
before was much higher than in other
recent years, and marks a continuation
in the rising trend in the prevalence of
this type of employment. Particularly
strong rises in part-time employment
occurred in Luxembourg and Slove-
nia, although in most of the new
Member States the shares of part-time
employment actually either declined
or remained relatively stable.
Within the EU, the Netherlands clearly
stands out as the Member State with
the highest incidence of part-time
employment, where it accounts for
almost 46% of total employment
(Chart 24). This is essentially due to the
fact that three-quarters of female
employment in that country is part-
time. Indeed, part-time working
remains predominantly a feature of
female employment, with almost one-
third of women in employment in the
EU having a part-time job compared to
only 7% for men. However, in the new
Member States (other than Cyprus and
Malta), the gender difference in part-
time working is much less marked,
although it is also the case that within
these Member States the overall share
of part-time employment remains rela-
tively low. Indeed, the proportion work-
ing part-time is below 5% in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (and
is also the case in Greece), and among
the new Member States the highest
share is that in Poland at only around
11%. This compares with shares in
excess of 20% in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the
UK, the Member States where, apart
from the Netherlands, part-time
employment is most common.
Looking at slightly longer-term devel-
opments, the vast majority of Member
States have witnessed increases in the
share of part-time employment since
2000, the only exceptions being the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, where shares have fallen, and
France, where the share has remained
unchanged (Chart 25). Austria, the
Netherlands and Sweden are among the
Member States reporting the greatest
increases since 2000, with shares rising
by around 4 percentage points, while in
Luxembourg the share has risen by more
than 7 percentage points.
While the share of part-time employ-
ment has risen in recent years, there
are indications that the proportion in
such employment involuntarily is also
increasing (i.e. a rising share declare
that they work part-time because they
are unable to find full-time work). At
EU level the share of involuntary part-
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Chart 24 – Part-time employment by gender in the EU, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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time employment (which accounted
for around one sixth of people in part-
time employment in 2004) has been
rising since 2002, reflecting in partic-
ular strong increases in involuntary
part-time employment in the Czech
Republic, France and Germany.
While, in general, males are more
likely to be in part-time employment
involuntarily than females, recent rises
in the share of involuntary part-time
employment have been observed for
both sexes (Chart 26).
3.4.2. Fixed-term employment
In 2004, the share of total employees
within the EU on contracts of fixed
duration was 13.7%, ranging from
32.5% in Spain to below 5% in Estonia,
Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta (Chart
27). In general, fixed-term employ-
ment does not display the same large
gender differences as part-time
employment, with the average share for
the EU being 14.3% for women com-
pared to 13.2% for men. Nevertheless
the difference is substantial in some
Member States such as Belgium, Italy
and Spain, where the share of fixed-
term employment for women is around
5 percentage points higher than that for
men, and Finland and Cyprus where
the gap is around 7 and 9 percentage
points respectively. By contrast, in
many of the new Member States from
central and eastern Europe, as well as
Austria and Germany, larger shares of
men were employed on a fixed-term
basis than women in 2004.
2004 saw a noticeable rise in the share
of employees on fixed-term contracts.
After remaining static at around
0
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Chart 26 – Involuntary part-time employment (as a % of total part-time
employment for the working age population) by gender in the EU-25, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results.
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13.0% for the previous three years the
share increased by 0.7 of a percentage
point in 2004. This was mainly driven
by developments in  Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Poland and Spain, and
also Slovenia where the share rose by
close to 4 percentage points.
Taking a slightly longer perspective,
the share of fixed-term employment
has increased by only around 1 per-
centage point since 2000, although
developments have been more pro-
nounced in certain Member States. In
particular, in Poland the share of
employees on fixed-term contracts has
risen sharply from around 6% to 23%
over this period, a much larger change
than in any other Member State. While
increases in the share of fixed-term
employment since 2000 have mainly
occurred in the new Member States
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Chart 28 – Share of employees in fixed-term employment in the EU in 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
Note: Break in series for AT and IT in 2004.
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Chart 27 – Fixed-term employment by gender in the EU, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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(with some exceptions), shares have
also risen appreciably in some of the
old Member States, for instance the
Netherlands (Chart 28).
3.5. Detailed employment
trends between 2000 and 2004
in the EU and the larger
Member States
The key employment trends in the EU
between 2000 and 2004 (Chart 29) can
be summarised as follows. In terms of
employment rates, the overall figure
for the working age population has
risen by only 0.9 of a percentage point
over this period, consisting of a 2.1
percentage points rise for women as
opposed to a decline of 0.3 percentage
points for men. Underlying this overall
trend there have been significant dif-
ferences in developments for different
age groups. For youth the employment
rate has fallen by 1.3 percentage
points, the decline affecting young
men more than young women. By con-
trast, the overall rate for those of prime
working age has risen by 0.8 percent-
age points, driven by a 2.4 percentage
points rise for women, against a fall of
0.8 percentage points for men. Rates
for older people aged 55 to 64 of both
sexes have risen markedly since 2000,
leading to an overall increase of 4.4
percentage points for this age group. In
terms of different types of employ-
ment, the share of self-employment in
total employment has remained essen-
tially unchanged since 2000. By con-
trast, shares of part-time employment
and fixed-term employment have both
risen, by 1.5 percentage points and 1.1
percentage points respectively, the for-
mer mainly driven by employment
developments for women and the latter
by those for men.
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Chart 29 – Changes in employment rates, in shares of self-employment and
part-time employment in total employment, and in shares of employees in
fixed-duration employment between 2000 and 2004
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Chart 30 – Change in employment in the large EU Member States between 2000 and 2004, by sex and age group
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A particular feature of employment
growth post-2000 is that older people
aged 55 to 64 account for the majority
of the more than 5 million increase in
total employment (by main employ-
ment, resident concept5) between 2000
and 2004. For this age group employ-
ment rose by 3.2 million, compared to
2.7 million for those of prime working
age and a fall of 0.7 million for youth. 
The Member States which have been
the main drivers for the increase in the
overall level of employment within
the EU between 2000 and 2004 are
Italy and Spain, where employment
rose by 1.5 million and 2.4 million
respectively (by main employment,
resident concept), although France
and the UK have also seen employ-
ment increases in the order of 0.8 to
0.9 million over this period. This con-
trasts with falls in employment of 0.8
to 0.9 million each in Germany and
Poland over the same period.
Examination of the characteristics of
the change in employment within
these individual Member States
reveals very different patterns in
terms of employment developments
across gender and different age
groups (Chart 30). In Italy and Spain
the rise in employment has been driv-
en almost entirely by increased
employment of people in the prime
working age group. In Spain the
increase in employment has been
quite evenly spread between men and
women, but in Italy it has been the
rise in employment of females of
prime working age that has dominat-
ed the overall rise in employment. In
France and the UK employment
expansion has mainly come about
through growth in employment of the
55-64 age group, with increases in
this age group larger for men than for
women, although overall (i.e. across
all age groups combined) women
have seen the largest rise in employ-
ment. In both these Member States,
employment of men in the prime
working age group declined while
that for women rose, this being espe-
cially the case in France. In Germany
and Poland, the two large Member
States where overall employment has
contracted since 2000, it is men of
prime working age that account for
most of the fall in employment. Fur-
thermore, the 55-64 age group has
been the least affected by the overall
decline in employment, with little
change in employment in this age
group in Poland for both sexes, while
in Germany employment has
increased for older women but
declined slightly for older men. For
youth, employment has declined in
both these Member States, with the
decline stronger for young men in
Germany, but for young women in
Poland.
4. Sectoral employment
structure and trends
4.1. Sectoral employment
structure in the EU in 2004
At EU level, the overall sectoral
employment structure6 in 2004 con-
sisted of a dominant services sector
(accounting for 67.1% of total
employment), a still sizeable industry
sector (27.9% of employment) and a
relatively small share of employment
in the agricultural sector (5%). How-
ever, at the level of individual Mem-
ber States there are substantial varia-
tions in the relative shares of employ-
ment in these broad sectors (Table 6
and Chart 31). For example, in Poland
and Slovenia the services sector
accounts for less than 55% of total
main employment, compared to over
75% in Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK. Industry’s share
of employment varies from around
20% in Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands to just below 40% in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. Agriculture’s
share in 2004 ranged from as low as
1.3% in the UK to close to 18% in
Poland. 
4.2. Sectoral employment
trends in 2004
Between 2003 and 2004 employment
growth in the EU was again driven by
the continued expansion of employ-
ment in the services sector (Chart 32).
Over 2004 the rate of growth in this
sector remained stable at just above
1%, an increase on the rates in the
previous year. By contrast, employ-
ment in both agriculture and industry
continued to contract in 2004,
although the recent trend suggests
that the contraction in industry may
be coming to an end. Employment
growth in agriculture remained
around the -1% level over the course
of 2004, while in industry growth
shifted from around -1% in the first
quarter to zero (i.e. no change) in the
last quarter of 2004.
Focusing on sectoral employment
developments in the four largest
5 All persons employed who are resident in the country (also known as “national concept”).
6 By main employment and resident concept.
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Chart 32 – Employment growth in the EU by main sector, 2000-2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Member States (Chart 33), which
have a strong influence on the overall
EU aggregate, all experienced posi-
tive employment growth throughout
2004 in the services sector. However,
while employment growth in services
accelerated over 2004 in France and
Germany (following a period of con-
traction in this sector in 2003 in both
Member States) and remained broad-
ly stable in the UK, it decelerated
sharply in Italy over the course of the
year. In industry, employment devel-
opments were rather mixed. In Ger-
many employment in industry contin-
ued to contract, with negative growth
of around -2% for all quarters, while
in France the contraction generally
accelerated over 2004 before easing
off slightly in the last quarter. By con-
trast, in the UK the rate of decline in
industry was lower than in previous
years and the underlying trend shows
a slightly improving employment situ-
ation in this sector. In Italy the
improvement in employment in indus-
try over 2004 was even stronger, with
a turnaround from negative employ-
ment growth at the start of the year to
growth of almost 2% in the last quar-
ter. Employment developments in
agriculture were also mixed, although
in France employment in this sector
continued to contract strongly over
2004, with negative employment
growth of -2.0 to -2.5% in all four
quarters.
4.3. Sectoral employment
trends in the EU since 2000
Since 2000 total employment in the
EU has increased by more than 5 mil-
lion. This has been due to strong net
employment creation of over 8 mil-
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Chart 33 – Sectoral employment growth in the four largest Member States,
2000-2004
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
on
 s
am
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2
0
0
0
Q
1
2
0
0
0
Q
2
2
0
0
0
Q
3
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
1
2
0
0
1
Q
2
2
0
0
1
Q
3
2
0
0
1
Q
4
2
0
0
2
Q
1
2
0
0
2
Q
2
2
0
0
2
Q
3
2
0
0
2
Q
4
2
0
0
3
Q
1
2
0
0
3
Q
2
2
0
0
3
Q
3
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
1
2
0
0
4
Q
2
2
0
0
4
Q
3
2
0
0
4
Q
4
Agriculture Industry Services
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
on
 s
am
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r
Germany
France
 
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
47
7 By resident concept.
lion in the services sector7 (Chart 34),
which has more than made up for the
employment contraction in industry
(down 1.7 million) and agriculture
(down 1.1 million). 
Within industry, employment has con-
tracted particularly strongly in manu-
facturing, where it has fallen by
1.8 million (or about 5% on 2000 lev-
els), and only the construction sector
has generated any increase in employ-
ment. For services the picture is one of
expanding employment in all sub-sec-
tors apart from “Financial intermedia-
tion”. Within services, employment
creation has been especially strong in
“Real estate, renting and business
activities” (up 2.9 million), “Health
and social work” (up 1.9 million) and
“Education” (up 1.2 million), the last
two normally accounting for a rela-
tively high share of public sector
employment in many Member States.
At country level, Italy and Spain are
among the Member States that have
witnessed a strong improvement in their
labour market situation between 2000
and 2004. The strong overall employ-
ment growth in these countries shows a
broadly similar sectoral pattern, the
main exceptions between the two being
in the “Electricity, gas and water sup-
ply” and “Public administration and
defence, compulsory social security”
sectors (Chart 35) where employment
declined in Italy but rose in Spain. At
broad sectoral level, both Member
States experienced declines in employ-
ment in agriculture but increases in both
industry and especially services. Within
industry, employment growth was par-
ticularly strong in “Construction”, and
well above the EU average for this sec-
tor. For services, employment growth
was well above average in almost all
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Chart 33 (cont.)
Source: Eurostat, national accounts.
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sub-sectors in Spain, and for the most
part in Italy as well where only “Public
administration and defence, compulso-
ry social security” was well below the
EU average (declining by around 20%)
while growth in the “Wholesale/retail
trade, repair of vehicles and domestic
goods”, “Financial intermediation” and
“Education” sectors was close to the
EU average. 
These sectoral employment trends in
Italy and Spain between 2000 and
2004 contrast markedly with develop-
ments in Germany and Poland, Mem-
ber States which have experienced a
-3 000 -1 000 1 000 3 000 5 000 7 000 9 000
Agriculture, fishing  and forestry
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Electricity, gas and water supply
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Wholesale/retail trade, repai r of vehicles and domestic goods
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Real estate, renting and business  activities
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Other comm unity, social and personal  service activities
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Industry
Services
Chart 34 – Changes in sectoral employment in the EU between 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Break in series for AT and IT in 2004.
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Chart 35 – Sectoral employment growth for Italy and Spain 2000-2004 compared to the EU average
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Break in series for AT and IT in 2004.
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worsening labour market situation
over this period. Developments in
both have been characterised by
strong negative employment growth
in agriculture and industry, combined
with weak or non-existent employ-
ment creation in the services sector
(Chart 36). Employment growth has
been below the EU average in almost
all sectors, the main exceptions being
“Real estate, renting and business
activities” and “Public administration
and defence, compulsory social secu-
rity” in Poland and “Health and social
work” in Germany. Importantly, these
two countries have not experienced
the same broad expansion in employ-
ment across the services sector that
has characterised developments in
Italy and Spain.
Examination of sectoral employment
developments in the large Member
States in terms of employment levels
(Chart 37) shows marked variation
across countries in terms of the sec-
toral contribution to changes in overall
-2 000
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Chart 37 – Change in employment in the large EU Member States between
2000 and 2004, by sector
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Break in series for IT in 2004.
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Chart 36 – Sectoral employment growth for Germany and Poland 2000-2004 compared to the EU average
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Break in series for AT and IT in 2004.
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employment between 2000 and 2004.
For example, in Spain the “Construc-
tion” and “Real estate, renting and
business activities” sectors were main
contributors to the expansion in
employment, followed by “Wholesale
and retail trade, repair of vehicles and
domestic goods”. The first two were
also key drivers of employment
increases in Italy together with “Hotels
and restaurants”, although for Italy, in
contrast to Spain, the contribution of
“Real estate, renting and business
activities” was more significant than
that of “Construction”. In France and
the UK, where the overall increase in
employment was lower than in Italy
and Spain, there was much less
employment creation in the “Real
estate, renting and business activities”
sector and significant contraction in
“Manufacturing”. However, both
Member States registered large
increases in employment in “Health
and social work”, and in the case of the
UK also in “Education” and “Public
administration and defence, compulso-
ry social security”. Indeed, in the UK
these three sectors, traditionally areas
with a high share of public sector
employment, accounted for the major-
ity of the expansion in employment in
this period and helped offset the sharp
decline of employment in manufactur-
ing. In Germany, increases in employ-
ment in “Real estate, renting and busi-
ness activities” and “Health and social
work” could not make up for the
marked declines in “Construction” and
“Manufacturing”, with employment
also falling in most other sectors. In
Poland employment expanded only in
the “Real estate, renting and business
activities”, “Public administration and
defence, compulsory social security”
and “Education” sectors, with almost
all the others witnessing employment
losses, these being especially strong in
“Agriculture” and “Construction”.
5. Self-employment in
Europe
5.1. Trends in self-employment
in Europe and the structure of
the self-employed population
in 2004
For the EU as a whole some 29 million
people were self-employed (i.e. work-
ing in their own business, professional
practice or farm for the purpose of
earning a profit) in 2004, compared to
around 161 million employees. This
puts self-employment’s share of total
employment at around 16% in 2004
(compared to a much lower share of
around 7.5% in the US in 20038), up
slightly (by 0.2 percentage points) on
the year before. However, at EU level
the share has remained more or less
stable around 16% since the late
1990s, and has remained essentially
unchanged compared to 2000. Howev-
er, even though the share of total
employment has remained quite stable
in the EU, in terms of overall employ-
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Chart 38 – Share of self-employment in total employment by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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ment levels the number of self-
employed has been increasing. 
The prevalence of self-employment
varies markedly between Member
States (Chart 38). For example, the
number of self-employed as a share of
total employment is particularly high in
many southern Member States includ-
ing Greece, where the share is around
40%, and in Cyprus, Italy and Portugal
where it is of the order of 25%. Of the
remaining Member States only Poland
has a share above 20%, at around 29%,
although such a high share is quite
atypical for central and northern Euro-
pean Member States and reflects the
still high share of self-employment in
agriculture in that country. Indeed, the
share is below 15% for the majority of
the abovementioned group, and is even
below 5% in Sweden.
In all Member States there are higher
proportions of men than women in
self-employment, the gender gap being
as high as around 14 and 17 percentage
points in Cyprus and Ireland respec-
tively. At EU level the gender gap in
the share of self-employment is 7.3
percentage points, the average share
being 19.1% for men and 11.8% for
women in 2004.
Examination of the structure of self-
employment by age and gender at EU
level (Chart 39) shows that the inci-
dence of self-employment is higher in
the older age groups, with the majority
of workers aged over 65 in self-
employment, while the share for youth
is only around 4%. Furthermore, there
are lower shares of women than men in
self-employment for all age groups,
and this disparity increases with age.
For youth, male and female shares of
self-employed are very similar, but for
the 55 to 64 years and 65+ age groups
the disparity is around 13 and 19 per-
centage points respectively.
Within the EU, on average the biggest
share of self-employment is found
among low-skilled workers, 19% of
whom are self-employed, followed by
the high-skilled at just under 15%
(Chart 40). Medium-skilled workers
are the least likely to be self-employed,
with a share of around 13.5%. This
general pattern in the distribution of
self-employment shares by skill level
is common to men and women alike. 
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Chart 39 – Employment shares of self-employment in the EU-25 by age group
and gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 40 – Shares of self-employment in employment in the EU-25 by skill level
and gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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The foregoing results refer to the self-
employed population as a whole. It is
also of interest to examine only non-
agricultural self-employment, i.e.
excluding the self-employed in the
agriculture and fishing sectors (NACE9
economic activities A and B). Exclud-
ing agricultural employment, the self-
employed population in the EU
totalled 24 million in 2004, equivalent
to a share of around 13% of total non-
agricultural employment (compared to
only 6.9% in the US in 200310). 
The age and gender structure of non-
agricultural self-employment at EU
level shows the same pattern as for
the self-employed population as a
whole (Chart 41). Again, the inci-
dence of self-employment is higher
among older age groups and compar-
atively rare among young people,
with lower shares of women in non-
agricultural self-employment for all
age groups and with this disparity
increasing with age. The only major
difference relative to the self-
employed population as a whole is
with regard to the older populations
aged 55 to 64 and 65+, where the
shares of self-employment in non-
agricultural employment are notice-
ably lower, reflecting the high amount
of self-employment in agriculture for
these age groups.
Concerning the shares of self-employ-
ment in non-agricultural employment
according to different skill categories
(Chart 42), the shares of the low-
skilled and high-skilled in self-
employment are very similar at 14 to
15%, while around 12% of medium-
skilled workers are self-employed.
This indicates that the share of low-
skilled workers in self-employment in
non-agricultural sectors is lower than
in the self-employed population as a
whole, and more evenly balanced with
the share of high-skilled workers.
5.2. Structure of the self-
employed population compared
to employees
The structure of the population in self-
employment shows marked differ-
ences with respect to the population of
employees (Chart 43). Of the total
population in self-employment, the
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Chart 41 – Shares of non-agricultural self-employment in total non-
agricultural employment in the EU by age and gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 42 – Shares of non-agricultural self-employment in non-agricultural
employment in the EU by skill level and gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 43 – Composition of self-employed and employee populations in the EU in 2004 by gender, age group and skill level
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“Non-agricultural self-employed population” excludes employment in the agriculture and fishing sectors (NACE economic activities A & B).
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vast majority are men (71%), while
only 29% are women, and this differ-
ence between the genders is much
more marked than for employees. The
age distribution of the self-employed
population also shows some differ-
ences compared to that for employees.
For example, for both men and women,
youth account for much lower shares of
the self-employed than of employees
(around 3% versus 12%), while the
older age groups (55-64 and 65+)
account for greater shares of the self-
employed population than of employ-
ees. Broadly, this means that the self-
employed population has an over-rep-
resentation of older people and an
under-representation of young people
compared to the population of employ-
ees and, hence, an older age distribu-
tion overall. 
There are also some differences with
regards to the skills composition of the
two groups. In terms of skill levels,
31% of self-employed are low-skilled,
45% medium-skilled and 24% high-
skilled. Compared to employees the
proportion of high-skilled workers is
essentially the same, but there is a high-
er share of low-skilled and a lower
share of medium-skilled workers
among the self-employed. This indi-
cates that the skill level of the self-
employed population is on average
lower than that of the population of
employees. Focusing on self-employ-
ment excluding the agricultural sector,
the structure of the non-agricultural
self-employed population is essentially
the same as that for the overall self-
employed population in terms of gen-
der and age breakdowns (although with
a slightly younger age distribution) but
shows a higher overall skill level, with
the low-skilled representing 27% of
this population and the high-skilled
28%. Indeed, the share of high-skilled
workers is greater than in the popula-
tion of employees, but the share of low-
skilled also remains higher.
5.3. Sectoral structure of self-
employment
Some sectors are more disposed to self-
employment than others. Within the
EU, on average the largest share of self-
employed people work in the “Whole-
sale and retail trade and repair” sector,
which accounted for 20% of all self-
employment in 2004 (Chart 44). This is
closely followed by “Agriculture, hunt-
ing and forestry”, with a share of just
below 18%, and by “Real estate, rent-
ing and business activities” and “Con-
struction” with around 14% and 13%
respectively. Among these sectors,
there is a marked gender difference
only in the “Construction” sector,
which clearly accounts for a much larg-
er share of male self-employment than
female (17.3% versus 1.4% respective-
ly). Higher shares of male self-employ-
ment are also observed in “Manufac-
turing” and “Transport, storage and
communication”, while by contrast far
higher shares of female self-employ-
ment are found in the “Health and
social work” and “Other community,
social and personal service activities”
sectors.
Comparison of the sectoral employ-
ment structure of the self-employed
with that of employees (Chart 45) indi-
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Chart 44 – Sectoral structure of self-employment in the EU by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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cates substantially higher shares of
self-employed in the “Agriculture,
hunting and forestry”, “Wholesale and
retail trade and repair”, “Construction”
and “Real estate renting and business
activities” sectors. By contrast, sub-
stantially lower shares of self-employed
work in the “Manufacturing” sector
and, within services, in the “Education”
and “Health and social work” sectors as
well as, obviously, in the “Public
administration and defence” sector
where self-employment is essentially
non-existent. It is clearly with regard to
the agriculture and manufacturing sec-
tors that the differences in employment
shares are most pronounced.
5.4. Occupational structure of
self-employment
In terms of occupations, around a quar-
ter of self-employed people work in the
occupational grouping11 “Legislators,
senior officials and managers”. For the
self-employed this group, which
includes managers of small enterprises
as well as legislators, senior officials
and corporate managers, accounts for
the highest share of employment, but in
contrast accounts for only 6% of
employees. High proportions of the
self-employed are also found in the
occupational groups “Skilled agricul-
tural and fishery workers” and “Craft
and related trades workers”, each of
which account for around one sixth of
the population in self-employment
(Chart 46). Among the high-skilled
11 International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88 (com)) classification of major occupational groups.
0
5
10
15
20
25 Self-employed Employees
Ex
tra
-te
rr
ito
ria
l o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 b
od
ie
s
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, h
un
tin
g 
an
d 
fo
re
st
ry
Fi
sh
in
g
M
in
in
g 
an
d 
qu
ar
ry
in
g
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
, g
as
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 su
pp
ly
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
W
ho
le
sa
le
 a
nd
 re
ta
il 
tra
de
, r
ep
ai
r o
f m
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
s, 
 
m
ot
or
cy
cl
es
 a
nd
 p
er
so
na
l a
nd
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 g
oo
ds
H
ot
el
s a
nd
 re
st
au
ra
nt
s
Tr
an
sp
or
t, 
st
or
ag
e 
an
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Fi
na
nc
ia
l i
nt
er
m
ed
ia
tio
n
R
ea
l e
st
at
e,
 re
nt
in
g 
an
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
Pu
bl
ic
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
an
d 
de
fe
nc
e,
 c
om
pu
ls
or
y
so
ci
al
 se
cu
rit
y
Ed
uc
at
io
n
H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 w
or
k
O
th
er
 c
om
m
un
ity
, s
oc
ia
l a
nd
 p
er
so
na
l s
er
vi
ce
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
Pr
iv
at
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 w
ith
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 p
er
so
ns
Chart 45 – Comparison of sectoral employment structures of the self-employed and employees in the EU, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 46 – Comparison of occupational employment structures of self-
employed and employees in the EU, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results. 
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occupations, the shares of self-
employed are similar to those of
employees in the “Professionals”
grouping but somewhat lower in the
“Technicians and associate profession-
als” grouping. The greatest disparities
in employment shares between self-
employed and employees are for the
occupational groups “Legislators, sen-
ior officials and managers”, “Skilled
agricultural and fishery workers” and
“Clerks”.
6. A more detailed review
of recent labour market
trends for the older and
younger elements of the
working age population
6.1. Older people of working
age
Against a background of demographic
ageing in the EU (driven by low birth
rates and increasing life expectancy)
and the need to increase labour market
participation to reduce the mounting
pressure on social protection systems,
the EU has set itself two important
objectives with regard to the employ-
ment of older people. First, the Stock-
holm European Council of 2001 agreed
a target that at least 50% of older per-
sons aged 55 to 64 should be in
employment by 2010. Second, the
Barcelona European Council of 2002
concluded that efforts should be
stepped up to increase opportunities for
older people to remain in the labour
market, setting an objective of a five-
year delay by the end of the decade in
the average age at which people with-
draw from the labour force.
On the whole, there is a lack of incen-
tives for employers to retain or hire
older people of working age and for
older workers to remain in the labour
force. This is despite the fact that com-
panies can benefit from the acquired
skills of older workers, although they
run the risk of becoming increasingly
obsolete when access to training is lim-
ited. High separation costs deter
employers from employing older peo-
ple in the first place. Early retirement
schemes, social security benefits and
disability benefits have often been, and
still are being, used by employees and
employers alike as exit routes from the
workplace. However, the fact that some
Member States have achieved higher
employment rates for older people sug-
gests that something can be done to
overcome the lack of incentives limit-
ing the participation and employment
of older people.
For example, to equip them to remain
longer in active employment, attention
must be paid to developing the compe-
tences of older people of working age.
Currently, participation in lifelong
learning decreases with age. The study
“Achieving the Lisbon goal: The Con-
tribution of VET”12, found evidence that
although a range of training initiatives
do exist, most countries have not yet
effectively included the needs of older
workers as part of their lifelong learn-
ing strategies, although the study does
point to positive developments in Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
Regarding the latter, between 1997 and
2002 some 800,000 adults in Sweden,
including older working-age people,
benefited from the Swedish Adult Edu-
cation Initiative, which established tar-
gets to provide free full-time upper sec-
ondary education, mainly for the
unemployed. Similarly, the Noste Pro-
gramme launched in 2003 in Finland,
which provides mostly employed 30-59
year-olds lacking upper secondary edu-
cation with opportunities to complete
initial vocational qualifications and
improve their information society skills
free of charge, is showing some success
in raising the level of education among
employed people in this age group.
6.1.1. Trends in older people’s
employment rates
Concerning the Stockholm objective,
as detailed in the earlier section on
recent developments in employment
rates in the EU, there are still big differ-
ences between individual Member
12 Achieving the Lisbon goal: The Contribution of VET (Leney, T. et al, November 2004). Study commissioned by DG Education and Culture for
the Maastricht ministerial and conference on enhanced European cooperation in vocational education and training on 14-15 December 2004.
(see http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/2010/studies/maastricht_en.pdf)
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Chart 47 – Change in employment rate of older people (aged 55-64) and
working age population (aged 15-64)
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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States in employment rates for older
people aged 55 to 64, which ranged
from 26% in Poland to 69% in Sweden
in 2004. Furthermore, while several
Member States already meet the 2010
employment rate target, substantial
gaps remain for many countries. Nev-
ertheless, recent developments have
been encouraging, with many Member
States making substantial progress
towards the target over recent years.
This has allowed the employment rate
for older people in the EU to increase
from 36.6% in 2000 to 41.0% in 2004.
Some Member States, such as the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, are
clearly doing better or have made more
progress than others, suggesting that
policies can make a difference (Box 3). 
At EU level, employment rates for
older people in the working age popu-
lation increased rather modestly
between 1997 and 2000 but rose
strongly over the subsequent three
years before returning to a slightly
more moderate increase in 2004
(Chart 47). Whereas before 2000 the
employment rate increases for older
people aged 55 to 64 were below those
for the working age population as a
whole, after 2000 the situation was
reversed, with rate increases for the
older age group well above those for
the working age population. Apart
from 1999 and 2004 (when rates for
older women rose substantially more
than for older men) there were no
large differences between annual
employment rate increases according
to gender, and during the years of
greatest expansion (2001-2003) the
increases for older men were general-
Various approaches have recently been
taken in the Netherlands, Sweden and the
UK to improve the labour market partici-
pation and employment levels of the older
members of the working age population.
In the UK and the Netherlands, the flow
of older workers into disability
allowances has been stemmed though
stricter controls, and current recipients of
benefits have also been re-assessed. In the
Netherlands, legislation has also been
introduced which requires employers to
pay the employee’s wage for the first two
years of disability. These measures dis-
courage employers and employees from
abusing the system for the purpose of
early retirement. Other disincentives to
early retirement include the obligation for
workers over 57.5 years of age to contin-
ue to look for work and the deduction of
severance payments from unemployment
benefits. Sweden has also introduced
changes to the pension scheme to encour-
age people to stay in work longer or to
exit more gradually.
Employability of older people is particu-
larly problematic for those with lower lev-
els of education, since employability at
later stages of working life is still to a
large degree determined by investments in
human capital earlier in life. This suggests
that the issue of early school leavers must
be addressed, and human capital invest-
ment and mobility during people’s careers
must be enhanced. This approach is taken
by Sweden, which has a very high activi-
ty rate among older workers. For people
who already belong to the older element
of the working age population or who will
enter this category in the next few years,
training, mobility and wage-subsidy
schemes may help to increase employ-
ment rates. Job mobility schemes can be
an effective solution to the changing pro-
ductivity of older workers, in particular
when the physical demands of the job
become too arduous. 
Active labour market policies can also
make a difference for older inactive or
unemployed people, particularly job
counselling, job search monitoring, sanc-
tions (for those who do not search for
jobs), and placement subsidies for regular
jobs. For the older unemployed, training
seems to have positive effects on their job
chances. Schemes such as “New Deal
50+” and “Pathways to work” in the UK
provide tailored support back into
employment for unemployed older work-
ers and people on incapacity benefits
respectively.
Prejudice against older workers may also
play a role. Awareness-raising is neces-
sary to reduce discrimination against
older workers and has been used quite
extensively and with some success in the
UK. A “National Guidance Campaign”
for employers was launched to argue the
case for employers to hire or keep on
older workers plus an “Age Positive” cam-
paign to promote good practice on age
diversity in the workplace. In Sweden a
great deal of work has been done on
changing attitudes and negative percep-
tions towards older workers.
In light of the above, the following types
of policies may help to increase employ-
ment rates for older people:
• Policies increasing the incentives for
employers to employ older people, and
for older people to continue to partici-
pate in the labour market, including
reforms of pension and early retirement
schemes;
• Policies improving the employability of
older people either by reducing the
labour costs for older workers or by
enhancing their productivity;
• Policies aimed at changing attitudes and
stereotypes about older workers and
mobilising them for participation in the
labour market;
• Active labour market policies focused
on the needs of older people.
Box 3 – Recent approaches to employment of older people in the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK13
13 Extracts from the Synthesis Report Attracting more people to the labour market, July 2005 (produced in the framework of the mutual learning
programme of the European Employment Strategy, see www.mutual-learning-employment.net).
 
Employment in Europe 2005
58
ly similar to those for older women.
The marked increase in employment
rates post-2000 suggests that policies
to improve the participation of older
people, and especially reforms of pen-
sion systems and early retirement
schemes, may be taking effect in the
labour market.
This improvement in the employment
rate of older workers since 2000 has,
for the most part, been a general fea-
ture across individual Member States
(Chart 48). Since 2000, almost all
have witnessed substantial increases
in the employment rates for older peo-
ple aged 55 to 64, with particularly
strong rises in Finland, France, Hun-
gary, Latvia and the Netherlands, all
with increases of 7 percentage points
or more. Only Austria, Cyprus and
Greece have not witnessed substantial
rises in employment rates since 2000,
while only Poland and Portugal have
seen rates actually decline.
In order to reach the Stockholm
employment rate target for older peo-
ple, it is estimated that employment of
people in the 55-64 age group would
need to increase by around 7.5 million
between 2004 and 2010, or about
1.3 million per year. Over the period
2000 to 2004, employment in this age
group increased by an average of
around 800,000 per year. Therefore,
despite the recent improvement in
older people’s employment rates,
efforts need to be stepped up if the
2010 target is to be met.
6.1.2. Recent trends in the exit age
Concerning the second objective set
by the European Council – to increase
the average exit age by five years by
the end of the decade – developments
over the period 2001 to 2003 indicate
that there has been a gradual increase
in the average age at which older peo-
ple exit from the labour force14 (i.e.
transit from active to inactive life
purely in labour market terms) in the
EU (Table 7). By 2003 the exit age
had risen to 61.0 years compared to
59.9 years in 2001, with the vast
14 Exit age figures are derived from a model using activity rates by individual year LFS data to calculate the probabilities that individuals in each
same age cohort will stay active in period t compared to period t-1. For a full description of the model see the annex to EiE 2003, Chapter 5.
The results from the model do not refer to the effective retirement age but rather provide an estimate for the average exit age from the labour
force for active persons aged 50 to 70, regardless of whether they are receiving a pension or not.
Table 7 – Average exit age from the labour force 2001-2003
EU-25 59.9 60.4 61.0
EU-15 60.3 60.8 61.4
BE 56.8 58.5 58.7
CZ 58.9 60.2 60.0
DK 61.6 60.9 62.1
DE 60.6 60.7 61.6
EE 61.1 61.6 60.8
EL 59.4 61.8 63.2
ES 60.4 61.5 61.4
FR 58.1 58.8 59.6
IE 62.8 62.4 64.4
IT 59.8 59.9 61.0
CY 62.3 61.4 62.7
LV 62.4 : 60.3
LT 58.9 : 63.3
LU 56.8 59.3 :
HU 57.6 59.2 61.6
MT 57.6 58.2 58.8
NL 60.9 62.2 60.4
AT 59.2 59.3 58.8
PL 56.6 56.9 58.0
PT 61.9 63.0 62.1
SI : 56.6 56.2
SK 57.5 57.5 57.8
FI 61.4 60.5 60.3
SE 61.7 63.2 63.1
UK 62.0 62.3 63.0
2001 2002 2003
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results. 
Note: Break in series for LV and LT in 2003.
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majority of Member States recording
increases in the exit age over this peri-
od, most notably Belgium, Greece and
Hungary. Nevertheless, wide varia-
tions remain across Member States,
with exit ages ranging from as low as
56.2 years in Slovenia to a high of
64.4 years in Ireland in 2003 (Chart
49). Furthermore, it is still the case
that no Member State has an average
exit age above the Barcelona target,
equivalent to an EU average of around
65 years, and that for the EU as a
whole the 55-64 age group accounts
for around one third of the total eco-
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Chart 48 – Changes in employment rates of older people aged 55-64 between 2000 and 2004 across EU Member States
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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nomically inactive population (see
Chapter 5 for further discussion of
this point). Strong efforts are there-
fore still needed to encourage older
people not to withdraw from the
labour force at relatively early ages
and to increase opportunities for them
to remain economically active. As
shown in Employment in Europe
2003, this means continued efforts to
address such issues as health and
safety at work, flexible forms of
employment and continuing training
for older workers, as well as reforms
of pension and early retirement
schemes.
6.1.3. Sectoral employment structure
for older workers
The sectoral employment structure for
older workers shows some significant
differences with respect to other age
groups (Chart 50). At EU level,
employment in agriculture accounts
for around 7.5% of total employment
of people aged 55 to 64, around dou-
ble the share for the young and prime
working age groups. Older workers
are also over represented with regard
to the other age groups in the educa-
tion sector, which accounts for close
to 10% of employment of older per-
sons. By contrast, relatively low
shares of older workers are employed
in the “Wholesale and retail trade and
repair” and “Hotels and restaurants”
sectors compared to the share of youth
employment in these sectors. Indeed,
the sectoral employment structure for
older workers is markedly different
from that of the younger age group,
but apart from “Agriculture”, “Educa-
tion” and to a certain extent “Manu-
facturing”, is rather similar to that of
the prime working age group.
As mentioned earlier, people in the 55-
64 age group accounted for around 3.2
million of the total increase in employ-
ment between 2000 and 2004 (by main
employment, resident concept). The
sectoral distribution of this increase in
employment of older workers was
quite broad with employment for this
age group increasing in all main eco-
nomic sectors (services and industry)
except agriculture (Chart 51). The
strongest rise in employment for this
age group was in the “Health and
social work” sector with an increase of
around 0.6 million, followed by the
“Real estate, renting and business
activities” and “Education” sectors
with around 0.5 million each and
“Wholesale and retail trade, and
repair” with around 0.4 million. In
fact, employment levels increased for
older people of working age in all
service sectors. It is interesting to note
that this was also the case in the “Man-
ufacturing” and “Construction” sec-
tors of industry, in both of which
employment of people in the 55-64 age
group increased by around 0.2 million.
6.2. Youth
6.2.1. Trends in employment rates for
youth 
Looking at labour market trends for
the youth element of the working age
population, as shown in last year’s
Employment in Europe report the vast
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majority of Member States have expe-
rienced a deterioration over recent
years in the labour market situation of
young people15 (although this trend
must also be seen in the context of
efforts to increase participation rates
in education, in line with the EU
objective to have at least 85% of 22-
year olds having completed upper sec-
ondary education by 2010). This dete-
rioration has been particularly severe
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Luxembourg, where employment rates
for the 15-24 age group have declined
by the order of 10 percentage points
since 2000 (but also where participa-
tion rates in education have risen).
Nevertheless a few countries, includ-
ing the large Member States of
France, Italy and Spain, have bucked
this general trend, with employment
rates rising for this section of the
working age population (Chart 52). 
As in the case of older workers, there
remain large variations at the level of
individual Member States, with
employment rates for young people
ranging from 20% in Lithuania to
66% in the Netherlands in 2004. The
Netherlands together with Denmark
stand out as having very high
employment rates for youth, with
Austria, Ireland, Malta and the UK
also having rates well above the EU
average. However, even these “good
performers” in terms of youth
employment rates have all seen rates
decline over recent years. 
15 See Employment in Europe 2004, Chapter 1, for a detailed assessment of developments in individual Member States.
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Chart 51 – Change in employment levels between 2000 and 2004 for older
people aged 55-64 by sector
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 52 – Changes in employment rates of young people (aged 15-24) between 2000 and 2004 across EU Member States
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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At EU level, the increases in the
employment rate for young people
over the late 1990s and up to 2000
have given way to declines from 2002
onwards, with broadly similar trends
for both sexes although more severe
for young men than young women
(Chart 53). It is also worth noting
that, apart from 1998, the year-on-
year increases in the employment rate
have always been below the increase
for the working age population as a
whole, with a marked divergence in
employment rate developments from
2001 onwards. Nevertheless, the falls
in the employment rate in 2002 and
2003 were followed by a much more
moderate decline in 2004.
6.2.2. Trends in youth participation
in the labour market
This evolution in employment rates
reflects the general trend in youth
labour market activity in Europe. After
a trend of gradual rises over the late
1990s, from 2000 onwards labour mar-
ket participation by young people has
been falling. At EU level the youth
activity rate declined by 1.4 percentage
points between 2000 and 2004 (from
46.5% to 45.1%), with the decline in
participation being the same for young
women and young men (Chart 54). In
line with this decrease in participation,
the employment rate fell by a similar
amount, while the unemployment rate
rose from 17.4% to 18.7%. Since the
employment rate fell more for men
than women, this was reflected in a
stronger rise in the unemployment rate
for young males of around 2 percent-
age points, while for young females
the rise in unemployment was much
more subdued at 0.3 percentage points.
However, the ratio of youth unem-
ployed to the total youth population
changed very little overall, and in fact
declined marginally, indicating that for
the youth population as a whole the
development in unemployment was
much less significant. In conclusion,
recent developments for youth as a
whole (i.e. at EU level) have been driv-
en mainly by the trend for young peo-
ple to participate less in the labour
market, as opposed to their being eco-
nomically active and becoming unem-
ployed.
Falling youth participation in the
labour market may to a large extent be
Employment in Europe 2005
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Chart 53 – Change in employment rate of young people (aged 15-24) and
working age population (aged 15-64)
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Chart 54 – Developments in the labour market situation of young people (aged
15-24) in the EU between 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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the flip side of increasing participation
in education, and could in that sense
be considered a positive development,
contributing towards greater employa-
bility when they eventually join the
labour market. In this regard, declin-
ing participation rates for youth seem
to coincide with recent trends for
young people to remain longer in edu-
cation and training. For the EU as a
whole, the share of early school
leavers (i.e. the percentage of the
population aged 18 to 24 with at most
lower secondary education and not in
further education or training) has
declined from 17.3% in 2000 to
15.7% in 2004 (Chart 55), while the
share of students in the 15-24 age
group has risen from 56.3% in 2000 to
59.0% in 2003 (Table 8). In addition,
there has been a clear increase in the
shares of young people participating
in tertiary education (ISCED levels 5
and 6) since 2000 (Chart 56). These
developments indicate that the
declines in youth employment are at
least partly linked to the tendency for
young people to stay in education
longer rather than participate in the
labour market at an early age and are
in line with aims to ensure that youth
receive an education which prepares
them well for the world of work. This
would suggest that raising employ-
ment among youth may require
greater efforts to increase the avail-
ability of more flexible forms of
employment, such as part-time work,
which would allow young people to
better combine work responsibilities
with education.
6.2.3. Improving the labour market
integration of young people
International comparisons suggest
there is scope to increase participation
and employment rates for youth in the
EU. Youth employment as a whole is
generally low in Europe (in 2004 the
employment rate for youth was around
54% in the US16 and 40% in Japan,
compared to only 37% in the EU) and
most Member States have not insignif-
icant shares of youth who are neither
in the labour force nor in education
(generally varying across Member
States in the region of 3% to 6% of the
youth population). This suggests that
greater efforts are needed to integrate
young people into the labour market
and to support them as they pursue
5
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Total Men Women
Chart 55 – Trends in the share of early school leavers (% of the population
aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further
education or training) in the EU-25, 2000-2004
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16 Data for the US and Japan from the OECD, Economic Outlook 2005. For the USA “youth” refers to the 16-24 age group.
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“non-linear” careers alternating
between employment, study, unem-
ployment and retraining or skills
updating. With this in mind the Euro-
pean Council recently adopted a Euro-
pean Youth Pact (Box 4) to enable
young people to benefit from a set of
policies and measures fully integrated
into the revised Lisbon Strategy,
which should lead to better integration
of youth into the labour market in the
years ahead. This pact provides a
framework for formulating policy
responses combining both employ-
ment and education objectives,
notably for building new employment
pathways and developing action plans
with job assistance, guidance and
training.
6.3. Comparison of labour
market developments for older
workers and youth
Comparing the changes in employ-
ment rates since the start of the eco-
nomic slowdown in 2000 with those
during the period of economic expan-
sion of the late 1990s, there seems to
have been a change in the characteris-
tics of labour market developments
post-2000 (Chart 57). During the peri-
od 1997 to 2000, employment rates
rose across all age groups and for both
men and women. The rise in youth
employment rates was greater than for
older workers and similar to that for
prime age workers. Post-2000, which
was marked by a period of economic
slowdown, the increase in the overall
employment rate slowed considerably
and was accompanied by marked vari-
ations in employment rate develop-
ments across age groups and sexes.
Between 2000 and 2004 employment
rates for women continued to rise
EU-25 : 55.3 56.3 57.7 58.8 59.0
EU-15 : 56.5 57.2 57.4 58.4 58.1
BE : 65.5 65.3 65.3 65.9 67.6
CZ 44.7 44.2 47.9 52.0 55.1 56.2
DK 56.9 57.0 58.4 61.9 61.0 62.8
DE 61.7 62.4 62.8 63.0 63.2 63.5
EE 54.4 57.4 60.7 62.1 63.0 62.5
EL 51.3 51.2 53.6 52.3 57.6 58.1
ES 55.7 55.0 56.3 55.8 54.9 54.0
FR 61.8 61.9 61.8 61.1 60.2 60.3
IE 54.6 54.2 54.3 54.6 54.7 55.2
IT 46.4 46.3 46.9 48.1 50.9 53.0
CY : 37.8 37.0 37.5 39.2 42.1
LV 50.0 53.3 55.4 59.3 62.1 62.9
LT 50.9 55.6 60.1 64.1 66.0 68.0
LU : 41.2 40.8 43.1 43.2 43.6
HU 46.4 48.2 50.1 51.6 54.0 56.5
MT : 36.4 37.1 37.1 37.8 40.4
NL 61.4 62.8 62.7 63.1 62.4 62.4
AT 49.9 51.3 50.9 51.3 50.4 50.4
PL 57.6 59.8 61.6 64.3 66.1 67.3
PT 50.7 50.2 52.5 52.4 51.5 50.7
SI 53.6 56.3 59.3 62.7 65.2 66.9
SK : : : 46.0 47.2 49.4
FI 63.9 66.4 67.5 68.3 68.3 69.4
SE 61.5 63.9 64.5 64.7 65.2 66.1
UK 47.8 52.7 53.0 53.5 57.2 55.2
Table 8 – Students (all ISCED levels) aged 15-24 years (as a per-
centage of the population of the same age) in EU Member States
1998-2003
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Eurostat, Education Statistics.
Note: For CY & LU, most tertiary students study abroad and are not included; Data for DE, IT,
PL, SI are without ISCED 6; For BE data exclude independent private institutions.
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almost as strongly as before the slow-
down, while rates for men declined
slightly. There was also wide variation
across age groups, with employment
rates for older persons aged 55 to 64
rising sharply while those for prime
age workers rose less strongly and
those for youth fell.
Clearly, therefore, labour market
developments post-2000 have been
quite varied for different sections of
the working age population. With this
in mind, it is sometimes said that
improving the employability of certain
groups will only reduce the job entry
chances of other groups, although this
reasoning is essentially based on the
rather dubious assumption that the
volume of total employment is fixed.
Looking further into this issue and
focusing on changes specifically for
the youth and older persons’ age
groups, during the period of strong
economic expansion of the late 1990s
there seemed to be in general strong
complementarity in employment cre-
ation for both young and older people
of working age, with a broad trend of
parallel movements in employment
rates for both age groups across the
majority of Member States as well as
for the EU as a whole (Chart 58).
However, this parallel movement
seems to have broken down after
2000, during the period of economic
A return to sustained and sustainable
growth requires greater demographic
dynamism, improved social and voca-
tional integration and fuller utilisation of
the human potential embodied by Euro-
pean youth. To this end, the March 2005
European Council concluded that young
people should benefit from a set of poli-
cies and measures fully integrated into
the revised Lisbon Strategy, and adopted
the European Youth Pact which focuses in
particular on employment and social
advancement.
The Youth Pact aims to improve the edu-
cation, training, mobility, vocational inte-
gration and social inclusion of young
Europeans, while making it easier to rec-
oncile working life and family life. It
should ensure the overall consistency of
initiatives in these areas and provide the
starting point for strong, ongoing mobili-
sation on behalf of young people.
In this context, the European Council has
called on the Union and Member States
to draw upon a number of lines of action.
Within the specific area of employment,
integration and social advancement these
are the following:
• Specifically monitoring policies for
the sustained integration of young
people into the labour market, in the
context of the mutual learning pro-
gramme on employment;
• Endeavouring to increase employment
of young people;
• Giving priority under national social
inclusion policy to improving the situ-
ation of the most vulnerable young
people, particularly those in poverty,
and to initiatives to prevent education-
al failure;
• Inviting employers and business to
display social responsibility in the
area of vocational integration of
young people;
• Encouraging young people to develop
entrepreneurship and promoting the
emergence of young entrepreneurs.
In addition to these, other lines of action
cover such issues as preventing early
school leaving, improving the quality of
education and matching initial training
more closely to labour market demands.
Box 4 - The European Youth Pact 
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Chart 57 – Change in employment rates by gender and age group over the two
periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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slowdown, with the result that there is
now no clear relationship across
Member States between the changes
in the employment rates for older peo-
ple and those for youth (Chart 59). For
example, Finland, Ireland, the Nether-
lands and Sweden are among the
Member States which showed very
strong increases in employment rates
for both young and older persons dur-
ing the late 1990s, but post-2000 these
Member States have seen a clear de-
coupling of the movements in rates,
with those for younger people falling
while those for older people continue
to rise strongly, while by contrast,
France and Spain have maintained
strong parallel improvements in
employment rates of both younger and
older people beyond 2000. 
The developments post-2000 do not,
however, necessarily imply any clear
general substitution effect between
older and younger workers. There is
no clear negative relationship across
Member States between the changes
in older people’s employment rates
and those for the youth age group.
Furthermore, in those countries where
the employment rates of older workers
fell significantly in the period 1998-
2000, there was no corresponding rise
in the employment rate of young
workers, and this was also the case for
Poland and Portugal post-2000. Also,
certain Member States such as Italy,
Latvia and Slovenia recorded increas-
es in older people’s employment rates
only for the period 2000-2004, but
youth employment rates also rose over
this period. The case for a generally
more complementary rather than sub-
stitution relationship between older
and younger workers is supported by
the fact that in general Member States
with higher employment rates for
older people aged 55 to 64 also tend to
be among those with higher rates for
youth (Chart 60), i.e. there is no evi-
dence of an inverse relationship. In
particular, Denmark and the UK have
high employment rates for older per-
sons combined with high, and very
similar, rates for youth as well. Final-
ly, as shown earlier, post-2000 trends
are linked at least in part to young
Employment in Europe 2005
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Chart 58 – Changes in employment rates in EU Member States between 1998
and 2000 for young (15-24) and older people (55-64)
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. 
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Chart 59 – Change in employment rates in EU Member States between 2000
and 2004 for young (15-24) and older people (55-64)
Source: Eurostat, QLFD. 
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people remaining longer in full-time
education and participating less in the
labour market at early ages. This trend
responds to some extent to the
increasing demand for higher skill
levels in work and so may have longer
term labour market benefits.
On the other hand, examination of sec-
toral employment developments for
the young and older working age
groups between 2000 and 2004 seems
to indicate there could be an element
of substitution between old and young
people at sectoral level, since employ-
ment changes for these age groups
moved in opposite directions in sever-
al sectors. However, it must also be
highlighted that although comparison
of sectoral developments for the two
age groups indicates different direc-
tions of employment change (increas-
ing for older workers and declining for
youth) in services sectors such as
“Wholesale and retail trade, and
repair”, “Transport, storage and com-
munication” and “Financial interme-
diation” the falls in youth employment
in these sectors are relatively limited
(Chart 61) and, apart from the first,
are not sectors that traditionally
account for a high share of youth
employment. It is also clear that, at
EU level, the greatest factor in the
decline in youth employment in recent
years has been the marked fall in
youth employment in manufacturing
(which goes a long way to explaining
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Chart 60 – Employment rates for youth (15-24) versus older persons (aged 55-
64) across EU Member States in 2004
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Chart 61 – Comparison of changes in employment of young (15-24) and older people (55-64) between 2000 and 2004 by
sector in the EU
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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why young men have been affected
more than young women) and to a less-
er extent agriculture. Indeed, the fall in
employment in manufacturing for the
youth age group has been around 0.7
million since 2000. This development
suggests that, at least at overall EU
level, the recent evolution in employ-
ment for youth may to some extent be
more a reflection of the ongoing gener-
al decline in manufacturing in Europe
rather than a result of any major substi-
tution effect between older and
younger workers, especially as employ-
ment for the older age group in this
sector rose by only 0.25 million and
given that employment for those of
prime working age (25-54) also
declined by some 1.3 million.
At Member State level, sectoral
employment changes suggest there
may be a stronger case for evidence of
a substitution effect between employ-
ment of older and younger workers for
some Member States. For example,
there appears to be some support for
the presence of such an effect in the
Czech Republic (Chart 62) and Hun-
gary, where sectoral employment
changes for the older and younger sec-
tions of the working age population
have clearly moved in opposite direc-
tions in virtually all sectors. However, it
is also the case that for these two Mem-
ber States there has been a very pro-
nounced reduction in labour market
participation by young people (down
around 10 percentage points since 2000
in both cases) which has been mirrored
to a large extent by substantial increas-
es in the proportion of students in this
age group. Indeed, the percentage of
students aged 15 to 24 years in the total
population of the same age rose from
47.9% in 2000 to 56.2% in 2004 in the
Czech Republic and from 50.1% to
56.5% in Hungary over the same peri-
od. This highlights that a key issue in
assessing the presence of a substitution
effect is whether the fall in activity
rates for youth is due to increased and
longer participation by young people in
education out of a clear desire or need
to do so, or as a result of lack of job
opportunities specifically linked to
higher employment of older people in
the labour market. Such an assessment
is beyond the scope of this chapter.
In conclusion, based on the above rudi-
mentary examination of recent develop-
ments for the young and older elements
of the working age population, there
appears to be no clear overall evidence
of an employment substitution effect
between these age groups, at least at EU
level. In any case, given that overall
employment growth in the EU has been
rather limited since 2000 due in part to
labour hoarding during the slowdown,
even if keeping older workers in
employment longer or encouraging
them back into the labour market would
have had an impact on employment
opportunities for youth during the peri-
od of slowdown, considering the gener-
al aim to raise total employment levels
towards full employment and the more
positive economic outlook, there is no
clear reason not to expect a return in
coming years to the same general pat-
tern of parallel developments in older
people’s and youth employment rates as
was observed over the late 1990s.
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Chart 62 – Comparison of changes in employment of young (15-24) and older people (55-64) between 2000 and 2004 by
sector in the Czech Republic
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
(1
00
0s
)
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
69
7. Conclusions
Overall, this chapter shows that despite
the pick-up in economic activity both
in the EU and worldwide, employment
growth in the EU was again weak in
2004 and has now been low for three
years in a row. As a result, progress
towards the Lisbon and Stockholm
employment objectives has continued
to be limited, although at country level
employment performance in 2004 was
generally positive, with negative
employment growth in only a few
Member States. The services sector
continued to drive employment expan-
sion, in contrast to agriculture and
industry where employment continued
to contract in 2004. 
Over recent years, there has been an
increase in the shares of more flexible
types of employment, such as part-time
and fixed-term employment. Employ-
ment of older people has increased
markedly and accounts for the majority
of the increase in total employment
since 2000 compared to other age
groups, suggesting that policies to
improve the participation of older
workers and reforms of pension sys-
tems and early retirement schemes may
be taking effect in the labour market.
Yet deep concerns remain about the
employment situation of youth, which
has deteriorated over recent years,
although this trend seems to coincide
with young people staying longer in
education and training. This points to
the need to step up efforts aimed at
enabling young people to better com-
bine education and employment, in the
overall context of improving youth
integration into the labour market.
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After successfully expanding from 15 to
25 members in May 2004, the European
Union is now preparing for the next
enlargement. Following the signing of
the Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005,
Bulgaria and Romania are now “Acced-
ing Countries” likely to become full EU
Members in 2007, while Croatia and
Turkey are “Candidate Countries”, in the
process of negotiations for EU member-
ship. It is appropriate, therefore, to
examine the labour market situation in
these four countries and compare how
they stand relative to the EU as a whole.
The labour market situation in 2004
compared to the EU
For all four countries the activity rates
and employment rates in 2004 were con-
siderably below the average for the EU
(Chart 63). While in Bulgaria, Romania
and Croatia employment rates were 6 to
9 percentage points lower than in the EU
in 2004, the gap with regard to Turkey
was significantly wider at 17 percentage
points, largely due to the exceptionally
low employment rate for women of only
24.3% (Chart 64).
Unemployment rates are generally on a
par with the EU average, although lower
in Romania and slightly higher in Bul-
garia and Turkey. Part-time employment
is less common in these countries than
for the EU as a whole, and is especially
low in Bulgaria where only 2.4% of
those in employment are working part-
time. Similarly, shares of employees
employed on fixed-term contracts are,
apart from Croatia, generally much lower
than in the EU.
Recent labour market trends
Over recent years the employment rate
has risen by almost 4 percentage points
in Bulgaria, from 50.4% in 2000 to
54.2% in 2004, driven by a fall in unem-
ployment from around 16% to 12% and a
slight improvement in the overall activity
rate (Chart 65). Employment rates rose
particularly strongly among the older
persons’ age group (55-64) where labour
market participation has risen sharply,
especially for older women, although
rates for young and prime working age
people have also risen. By contrast,
employment rates in Romania and
Turkey have fallen by around 5 and 3
percentage points respectively since
2000, although in Romania (within the
Box 5 - Overview of the labour market situation in the Acceding and Candidate Countries
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Chart 63 – Labour market indicators in the Acceding and Candidate
Countries, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD and harmonised series on unemployment. 
Note: No UR data for HR, no P/T or fixed-term empl share data for TR.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
BG RO HR TR EU
Men Women Total
Chart 64 – Employment rates in Acceding and Candidate Countries by
gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
%
 o
f 
po
pu
la
ti
on
 a
ge
d 
15
-6
4
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
71
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
AR 15-64 ER 15-64 UR
Bulgaria ER changes 2000-2004
Total ER 15-64 3.8
Male ER 15-64 3.2
Female ER 15-64 4.3
ER 15-24 1.8
ER 25-54 2.7
ER 55-64 11.7
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limitations of the data available)17 this
reflects a similar fall in the activity rate
and little change in the unemployment
rate, while in Turkey the overall activity
rate changed little and the main impact
has been a rise in unemployment of close
to 4 percentage points. Unlike Bulgaria,
in Romania labour market participation
and, hence, employment rates for the 55-
64 age group have fallen markedly since
2000. (Comparable data for Croatia are
available only from 2003 onwards, so it
is not possible to comment on develop-
ments in that country since 2000.)
Sectoral employment structure in the
Acceding Countries
Focusing on the Acceding Countries,
data on the sectoral employment struc-
ture (by main employment, resident con-
cept) in 2004 (Table 9) reveal that in both
countries there are higher shares of peo-
ple who are mainly employed in agricul-
ture than for the EU as a whole, especial-
ly in Romania where around one third of
all main employment is accounted for by
this sector. In fact, the employment
structure (by main employment) for
Romania broadly consists of one third of
total employment in each of the main
sectors, with employment in services
much less developed than in the EU.
While Bulgaria also has a low share of
people with employment in services as
their main employment in comparison to
the EU as a whole, its sectoral employ-
ment structure is broadly similar to that
of certain existing Member States such
as Portugal and Slovenia, while, in con-
trast, Romania has a structure quite
unlike that of any EU Member State.
At a more detailed sectoral level, within
industry both Bulgaria and Romania
have higher shares of employment (by
main employment) than the EU in the
manufacturing, utilities and mining sec-
tors but considerably less in construction
(Chart 66). Within services, Bulgaria has
broadly similar shares to the EU in many
sectors, the main exceptions being “Real
estate, renting and business activities”,
“Financial intermediation” and “Health
and social work” which account for
much lower shares of employment than
in the EU. By contrast, in Romania all
services sectors account for much lower
employment shares compared to the EU,
in line with the relatively low overall
level of employment in services in that
country. This indicates that Romania
faces a much greater challenge to
restructure its economy if it is to adjust
to a sectoral employment structure more
typical for the EU.
Box 5 (cont.) - Overview of the labour market situation in the Acceding and Candidate Countries
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Table 9 – Employment structure (% of employment) by main
employment in Bulgaria, Romania and the EU, 2004
Total Agriculture 10.7 32.6 5.0
Total Industry 32.9 31.1 27.9
Total Services 56.3 36.4 67.1
BG RO EU
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
17 There was an important break in data series in Romania in 2002 related to revised employment and unemployment definitions
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Chapter 2 Taking stock of the European
Employment Strategy (EES): the
evidence behind improved
performances of EU labour
markets
1. Introduction
1.1. The European
Employment Strategy (EES)
The European Employment Strategy
(EES) was launched in November 1997
at a special European Council in Lux-
embourg. Since the late 1970s, labour
market developments in Europe, char-
acterised by both persistently high
unemployment and correspondingly
low employment creation, were widely
felt to be unsatisfactory. As a result, the
launch of the EES was intended to send
a strong signal that the EU considered
employment to be a top priority. The
Lisbon European Council (March
2000) gave further impetus to the EES
by linking it to the broader economic
and social agenda for the EU. 
The basic role of the EES – the pro-
motion of more and better jobs – was
set out in the Employment Guidelines
approved by the Council in 2003 for
the period 2003-20051. These employ-
ment guidelines set three overarching
objectives: i) full employment; ii)
quality and productivity at work; and
iii) strengthening social cohesion and
inclusion. They comprise ten specific
guidelines plus guidance on improv-
ing the governance of employment
policies. 
The main aim of this chapter is the
evaluation of the EES, focusing on
each of the three overarching objec-
tives2. As regards the labour market,
although the analysis in this chapter
and elsewhere strongly suggest that
structural improvements have
occurred in recent years, the situation
(in a number of Member States) is far
from satisfactory. Employment rates
in many Member States and in the EU
as a whole remain significantly below
targets and overall progress has been
slow in recent years, while both actual
and structural unemployment rates
remain high, at 9.0 percent and 8.5
percent, respectively, in 2004.
In a Communication to the Spring
European Council3, the European
Commission called for the renewal of
the Lisbon Strategy, to refocus it on
growth and jobs. In a subsequent
Communication4, the European Com-
mission set out the first integrated
guidelines for growth and jobs5 for the
period 2005-2008, which are present-
ed in one comprehensive document
with two parts, taking account of the
interrelations and synergies between
micro/macroeconomic and employ-
ment policies. The adoption of this
revitalised strategy is also considered
to be a necessary condition6 –
although not wholly sufficient – for
securing the environmental sustain-
ability of growth and for modernising
and advancing Europe’s social model. 
1 In this chapter all references to employment guidelines refer to the 2003 set: OJ L197/13, Council Decision of 22 July 2003 on guidelines for
employment policies of Member States. The employment guidelines should be fully reviewed only every three years (i.e. the next round is sched-
uled for 2005), while in the intervening years their updating should remain strictly limited. 
On 12 April 2005, the Commission published its recommendation for Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs for the period 2005-2008,
COM(2005) 141 final, which for the first time, and in order to improve governance, put together in a single document both the Commission
Recommendation on the Broad Policy Guidelines and the proposal for a Council Decision on the Employment Guidelines. 
The new set of integrated guidelines was approved at the European Council of June 2005, leading to the Council Decisions of 12 July 2005 on
guidelines for employment policies of Member States (OJ L205/21), and on the broad guidelines for economic policies of the Member States
and the Community (OJ L205/28).
2 This is part of a second review of the European Employment Strategy. A first review took place in 2002, leading to Communication COM(2002)
416 final of 17/7/2002, entitled Taking stock of five years of the EES. This Communication was accompanied by a technical document containing
the main findings of an evaluation programme initially drafted by the Commission and then endorsed by the Employment Committee. The evalua-
tion programme included: i) national impact evaluation studies; and ii) an aggregate assessment of employment performances at the EU level. 
3 Communication to the Spring European Council Working together for growth and jobs – a new start for the Lisbon Strategy, Communication
from President Barroso in agreement with Vice-President Verheugen, COM(2005) 24.
4 Communication of the European Commission Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs, Communication from the President Barroso, in agree-
ment with Vice-President Verheugen and Commissioners Almunia and Špidla, COM(2005) 141.
5 Including both the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines.
6 Achieving higher growth potential and more jobs will provide an essential contribution to sustainable development and cohesion, COM(2005) 141.
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1.2. Labour markets in a
rapidly changing environment
The 1990s witnessed a series of far-
reaching changes in Europe, with a
potentially large impact on labour
markets, principally: i) the single mar-
ket programme; ii) the introduction of
the single currency; iii) the accession
of three new Member States; iv) Ger-
man reunification; v) deep transfor-
mations in a number of Central and
Eastern European countries. 
All this turbulence makes it difficult to
isolate the impact on labour markets of
the launch of the EES in 1997. More-
over, the EES is also part of a wide
range of policies for strengthening eco-
nomic governance in the EU in general
and in the euro area in particular. Since
the second half of the 1990s7, several
rounds of the “guidelines package”
have recommended a policy-mix
judged more favourable to sustainable
economic growth, better labour market
outcomes, social cohesion and inclu-
sion, as well as environmental sustain-
ability. These instruments involve the
coordination of three major policy
strands: microeconomic, macroeco-
nomic and employment. 
2. General
macroeconomic
developments
2.1. Retrospective
The Lisbon European Council of 23
and 24 March 2000 agreed on a new
strategic goal for the EU in order to
strengthen employment, economic
reform and social cohesion as part of a
knowledge-based economy. At that
time, the EU was experiencing its best
spell of economic performance since
the mid-1970s in terms of economic
growth, employment creation, low
inflation, and fiscal consolidation.
There was a clear sense of optimism
following the successful introduction
of the single currency, progress
achieved with the single market proj-
ect, and the opportunities arising from
the (then) imminent enlargement of the
EU. However, the Council, having
realised that the situation in some areas
was far from satisfactory, agreed on a
number of policy measures leading in
some cases to the setting of quantified
targets that subsequently turned out to
be rather challenging. The need for
action was identified in a number of
areas: employment creation – the cre-
ation of more and better jobs – with
the setting of ambitious employment
rate targets in order to move EU
economies towards full employment;
the modernisation of social protec-
tion8; and the promotion of social
inclusion in order to reduce the inci-
dence of poverty. 
In order to assess the progress made
towards meeting these quantified tar-
gets, and in particular those for the
employment rate (table 10), it is
important to point out that at the time
of the Lisbon Council a realistic aver-
age economic growth rate was
assumed to be around 3%9. In reality,
actual GDP growth was considerably
lower (table 11).
Table 10 – Employment ratea) targets for the EU
Overall employment rate (aged 15 to 64) 67.0 70.0
Employment rate for women (aged 15 to 64) 57.0 60.0
Employment rate for older workers (aged 55 to 64) --- 50.0
Table 11 – Average annual percentage changes 
in the period 2001-2004
(except for the unemployment rate which are period averages)
EU-15 1.5 0.8 7.7
EU-10 a 3.4 -0.5 ---
EU-25 1.6 0.6 8.8
2005 2010
GDP Employment Unemployment rate
Note: a) The ratio between employment and working age population. 
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco and Eurostat.
Note: a) CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK.
7 Since 1996 for the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, and since 1998 for the Employment Guidelines.
8 According to the presidency conclusions, the major aims for the modernisation of social protection systems were: i) to adapt them in order to
ensure that work pays; ii) to secure their long-term sustainability in the face of population ageing; iii) to promote social inclusion and gender
equality; and iv) to provide quality health services. 
9 The presidency conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 state the following: “If the measures set out below are implement-
ed against a sound macro-economic background, an average economic growth rate of around 3% should be a realistic prospect for the coming
years.”
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In the period 2001-2004, the average
annual GDP growth rate for the EU-15
turned out to be around half of what
had been initially anticipated. Obvi-
ously, given the strong relationship
between economic growth and labour
market performance, this had a nega-
tive impact on employment creation. 
Moreover, the weakness of domestic
demand in some EU Member States,
especially in Germany since 2000, is
worrying not only in itself, but also
because of the potential knock-on
effects in the rest of Europe (further
explored in Chapter 3 of this report),
which represents a major downward
risk to the current economic recovery
in Europe in general, and job creation
in particular. Given the low levels of
economic confidence, firms might not
want to expand in the present circum-
stances (early on in the upswing), fear-
ing a possible "double-dip" economic
downturn. However, given the sus-
tained improvement in price-competi-
tiveness and the introduction of sub-
stantial reforms in the labour market,
Germany is now in a better position to
take full advantage of the next eco-
nomic upswing than in recent years,
especially as regards employment cre-
ation.
A major aim of this chapter is to eval-
uate the relative importance of a num-
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Chart 67 – The jobs cost of weak growth
Estimate of the impact on the total employment rate of GDP growth below 3% in the EU-15, assuming the implicit
employment elasticity of the Commission’s Spring 2005 forecast
Employment growth rates
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 v
al
ue
s
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 v
al
ue
s
Employment in Europe 2005
76
ber of factors contributing to labour
market development. They include:
the economic cycle, the relatively 
poor progress in raising  produc-
tivity/growth, and factors of a more
“structural” nature some of which
can be directly linked to the func-
tioning of labour markets, such as
the eff iciency of job matching,
active labour market policies, etc. 
Since 1997 (the start of the EES) and
then 2000 (the setting of the first
employment rate targets in the Lisbon
Council), the lack of progress in rais-
ing long-term growth and also the
economic slowdown have clearly
played a major role in labour market
developments. In order to assess the
impact of low growth (due either to
cyclical change or to low productivi-
ty growth) it would be helpful to
answer the following question: how
many additional jobs could have been
created had average economic growth
remained close to 3% as envisaged at
the outset of the Lisbon agenda? 
A comprehensive (and potentially
more satisfactory) answer to this
question is beyond the scope of this
chapter. However, a rough, but also
conservative estimate of the cost in
terms of jobs for the EU-15 of eco-
nomic growth below the 3% thresh-
old can be provided up to 2006, the
latest year for which the Commis-
sion has published an economic
forecast (Spring 2005). This esti-
mate basically applies the (implicit)
employment/growth elasticity
assumed in the Spring 2005 forecast
to a hypothetical GDP growth rate of
3%. Given the responsiveness of
employment to cyclical economic
change, it can be argued that this
represents a conservative (or lower)
estimate of the actual employment
loss associated with low growth.
According to these calculations,
economic growth below 3% during
the period 2001-2004 cost, in cumu-
lative terms, over 5 million jobs in
the EU-15, which represents a
decline in the average annual
employment growth rate from a
hypothetical value of 1.5% to the
projected value in the Spring 2005
economic forecast of just 0.7%. This
exercise also suggests that an aver-
age economic growth of 3% during
the period 2001-2004 would have
yielded a total employment rate of
about 67.5% in 2006 (67% in 2005),
thus closer to meeting the 70% tar-
get by 201010 (chart 67). 
2.2. Prospects
In the second half of 2004, econom-
ic activity in the EU, although
remaining positive, slowed down
unexpectedly11. This reflects in part
the increase in the price of oil and
the strength of the euro. During
2004, the main driver of growth in
the EU shifted from the external sec-
tor in the first half of the year, to
domestic demand in the second half.
According to the Commission’s
Spring 2005 economic forecast,
GDP growth in the EU as a whole is
expected to decline from 2.4% in
2004 to 2.0% in 2005 (which basi-
cally reflects the lower carry-over
into 2005) and to increase in 2006 to
2.3% (i.e. closer to the potential
growth rate) as the effects of high oil
prices and euro exchange rate appre-
ciation gradually work their way
through and eventually taper off
(table 12). The continuation of the
economic recovery over the period
of the forecast is driven by the accel-
eration in domestic demand.
In line with the lower than expected
reaction of labour markets to cyclical
fluctuations in the recent economic
slowdown of 2001-200312, together
with the usual lagged response of
labour markets, employment creation
is only expected to pick-up gradually
from 0.9 million jobs in 2004 (for the
EU-25) to about 1.5 million in 2006.
According to the Spring 2005 Eco-
nomic Forecasts, the overall employ-
ment rate is (implicitly) projected to
rise from 64.4% in 2003 to 65.0% in
2006. The unemployment rate is fore-
cast to remain relatively stable
Table 12 – Average annual percentage changes 
in the period 2005-2006 
(except for the unemployment rate which are period averages)
GDP Employment Unemployment rate
EU-15 2.0 0.7 7.9
EU-10 a 4.4 0.7 ---
EU-25 2.2 0.7 8.9
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
Note: a) CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK.
10 The intermediate target for the total employment rate in 2005 is 67%.
11 At the time of writing, the Commission’s Autumn 2005 economic forecast had not yet been published. 
12 In the EU-15, during the 1992-1993 recession the unemployment rate rose by about 3 percentage points (pp) to above 10%, while employment
declined by approximately 3 pp. This contrasts with labour market outcomes in the 2001-2003 period, where the average unemployment rate
increased by only 1 pp, peaking at 9% in the first quarter of 2004, while employment levels actually increased by about 2 pp in cumulative terms. 
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throughout the period 2005-2006 at
close to 9%, before edging down-
wards in 2006. 
3. Taking stock of the
three overarching
objectives of the EES
3.1. Progress made towards the
employment rate targets/full
employment 
The period of economic slowdown
between 2001 and 2003 had a marked-
ly negative impact on labour market
outcomes in general, halting (or hold-
ing back) progress towards the
employment rate (ER) targets. In order
to restore a satisfactory situation that
would allow the ER targets to be
reached, an economic recovery is
essential – but will not suffice by
itself. Europe’s underlying economic
potential depends on its ability to
boost employment and productivity
growth simultaneously. This will rely
on further structural reforms not just in
the labour market but also in the serv-
ices, product and financial markets13. 
As explained in Chapter 1, in 2004,
the total employment rate increased
by 0.4 percentage points, reaching
63.3% in the EU-25 (table 14), after
having stagnated at around 63% in
the cyclical downturn of 2001-2003.
The employment rate for women con-
tinued its gradual rise, approaching
56% of the female working age popu-
lation in 2004, largely on account of
the increased labour market partici-
pation of younger age cohorts. The
employment rate of older workers
(table 15) has increased significantly
in recent years reaching 41.0% in
2004. This remarkable rise partly
reflects the delayed impact of past
reforms of pension and early retire-
ment schemes in a number of Mem-
ber States. 
In the 2001-2003 period14, the
growth rate for older workers in
employment significantly outpaced
that of total employment in the EU-
25, increasing by an annual average
of 5.5% compared with 0.3%15. A
simple breakdown of employment
13 Communication from the Commission to the Council, Joint Employment Report 2004/2005, SEC(2005) 64.
14 At the time of writing, a complete data breakdown for 2004 was not yet available. 
15 In the same period, female employment increased on an annual average by 0.9%.
Table 13 – Employment rate 
Contribution to changes by gender and age groups
2003 2001
Employment rate 62.9 64.4 62.8 64.1
2003-2001 2001-1997
change in pp ~– (1)+(4) 0.1 0.3 2.2 3.4
due to the employment rate effect
TOTAL (1) ~– (2)+(3) 0.3 0.4 1.9 3.1
Young age (15-24) -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.7
Prime age (25-54) 0.1 0.1 1.3 2.1
Older age (55-64) 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4
MALE (2) -0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.1
Young age (15-24) -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3
Prime age (25-54) -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.6
Older age (55-64) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
FEMALE (3) 0.5 0.6 1.5 2.0
Young age (15-24) -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3
Prime age (25-54) 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.4
Older age (55-64) 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
due to the population composition effect
TOTAL (4) -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.2
Young age (15-24) 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
Prime age (25-54) -0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.5
Older age (55-64) 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
EU-25 EU-15 EU-25 EU-15
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EUROSTAT LFS.
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rate16 changes by gender and age
group is shown in table 1317. 
From an accounting perspective, table
13 highlights in a succinct way a num-
ber of significant facts: 
• The rise in the female employment
rate has been the dominant factor
driving up the total employment rate;
• The positive contribution of older
workers to the total employment
rate has also been highly signifi-
cant, specially given that the older
age working population represents
only about 17% of the total work-
ing age population;
• The contribution of young and
prime-age workers to the total
change in the employment rate
declined substantially in the 2001-
2003 period in comparison to the
1997-2001 period due to the cycli-
cal downturn;
• The total demographic composition
effect has been relatively small in
absolute value, having turned nega-
tive in the 2001-2003 period. 
In tables 16, 17 and 18, Member
States are classified according to their
employment rate in 2004 and the pace
of progress since 1997. This gives a
rough ranking for employment rate
performance across the EU Member
States. The bottom left-hand cell is
the least favourable classification (i.e.
low employment rate and low
progress towards a target). In contrast,
countries in the bottom right-hand
cell are in a better situation because
they have made rapid progress in
recent years, though they still have a
relatively low employment rate.
In 2004, only four Member States
among the twenty five had already
reached the total employment rate tar-
get of 70% (DK, NL, SE and the UK),
while AT, CY, FI and PT were close to
that value (i.e. within 3 percentage
points). A number of Member States
with initial low employment rates had
also caught up (most notably ES and
16 The ratio of employment to population.
17 Applying a simple shift share analysis, the total employment rate change between periods one and zero can be decomposed approximately as:
. Where is the employment rate in period j of the age/gender
group i; is the fraction of the age/gender group i in the total working age population in period j. The first term is the
(pure) employment rate effect, while the second term is the population composition effect. 
Total 35.8 37.5 40.2 41.0
Women 25.5 27.8 30.7 31.7
Men 46.6 47.7 50.3 50.7
Table 15 – Employment rate by gender for older workers in the 
EU-25 (persons aged 55 to 64)
Total 61.2 62.8 62.9 63.3
Women 51.8 54.3 55.0 55.7
Men 70.6 71.3 70.8 70.9
Table 14 – Total employment rate by gender in the EU-25 
(persons aged 15 to 64)
1998 2001 2003 2004
1998 2001 2003 2004
Source: Eurostat.
Source: Eurostat.
Table 16 – Total employment rates (as percentages)
Low Close to average High
Rates in 2004
> 70 DK, NL, SE, UK
65-70 AT CY, DE, FI, PT, SI IE
< 65 CZ, EE, LT, MT, BE, EL, FR, HU, ES, IT
PL, SK LU, LV
Pace of progress since
1997
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL calculations. 
Note: Pace of progress is defined as the percentage point change in the employment rate between
1997 and 2004. “Low”: employment rate increase below the EU-25 average minus half of the
(unweighted) standard deviation. “Close to average”: employment rate increase within a band of
one standard deviation centred on the EU-25 average. “High”: employment rate increase above the
EU-25 average plus half of the (unweighted) standard deviation.
 
IT). In recent years, due to the cycli-
cal downturn, the employment rate
has either stagnated or declined in
most Member States. Following a
severe economic and labour market
crisis, the total employment rate in
Poland, for example, was 51.7% in
2004, down from 58.9% in 1997. 
Nine Member States (AT, DK, EE, SI,
UK, FI, PT, SE, and NL) already
exceed the 2010 Lisbon target for the
female employment rate and seven
others (CY, CZ, DE, FR, IE, LT, and
LV) are close to or above the 57%
mid-term target for 2005. The EU
average is reduced significantly by
the low rates in a number of Member
States, notably EL, ES, IT and PL,
although there are signs of improve-
ment in ES and IT. 
As regards older workers, the Stock-
holm target of 50% for 2010 has been
reached in just seven Member States
(CY, EE, PT, SE, DK, FI, and UK)
and is within reach in another three
(IE, LV and LT). In order to bridge the
existing gap of 9 percentage points
(between the average employment
rate and the target for 2010), reliance
on favourable cohort effects will not
be sufficient, suggesting that a
stronger policy effort is required.
3.2. The structural
improvement in labour markets 
Economic analyses carried out both
by the European Commission18 in par-
ticular and by the academic commu-
nity in general strongly suggest that
structural improvements have occurred
in the functioning of labour markets
over the economic cycle. These
improvements are reflected in a num-
ber of features, notably: i) lower
structural rates of unemployment on
average, despite the marked deteriora-
tion in some new Member States; ii)
lower long-term unemployment rates
and shorter average spells in unem-
ployment; iii) increased efficiency in
matching between the unemployed
and unfilled vacancies; iv) wage for-
mation processes that take better
account of prevailing conditions in
the economy and competitiveness
constraints, thus raising the employ-
ment content of growth; v) the econo-
metric finding that a positive signifi-
cant break in the aggregate labour
demand function occurred in many
EU Member States (but not in all)
around 1997; vi) econometric evi-
dence suggesting that the labour force
and, to a lesser extent, employment
have become more responsive during
cyclical upturns; vii) statistical evi-
dence indicating that the development
of certain types of labour contracts,
namely part-time and temporary
work, are positively correlated with
employment creation and rises in
employment rates, especially for some
usually under-represented groups;
although as regards temporary work
there is some evidence of market seg-
mentation; and viii) expenditure on
active labour market policies and on
training has been increased and better
targeted to the needs of the labour
market, with positive results for,
among other things, the transition
between economic statuses and job
matching. 
On the negative side, it should be
noted that, according to the available
indicators to date, no significant
progress has been achieved in lower-
ing tax wedges on labour costs or the
unemployment and low-wage traps.
However, according to a number of
empirical studies19, an increase in the
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Table 17 – Employment rates for women (as percentages)
Low Close to average High
Rates in 2004
> 60 AT, DK, EE, SI, UK FI, PT, SE NL
55-60 CZ, LT CY, DE, FR, LV IE
< 55 MT, PL, SK BE, EL, HU, LU ES, IT
Pace of progress since
1997
Table 18 – Employment rates for older workers aged 55-64 
(as percentages)
Low Close to average High
Rates in 2004
> 50 CY, EE, PT SE DK, FI, UK
40-50 CZ, ES IE, LV, NL, LT
< 40 AT, DE, EL, PL IT, LU, MT, SI, SK BE, FR, HU
Pace of progress since
1997
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL calculations. 
Note: See table 16 for legend. 
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL calculations. 
Note: See table 16 for legend. 
18 See recent issues of the European Economy Review and of the Employment in Europe publications (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/pub-
lications/the_eu_economy_review_en.htm and http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/index_en.html, respectively). 
19 EIE 2004, chapter 2. 
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tax wedge has a limited impact on the
labour cost faced by firms and thereby
on short-term aggregate employment
demand20, although the impact on
some particular groups such as low-
skilled workers and second-wage
earners tends to be more significant.
Furthermore, a majority of empirical
studies (but not all) suggest that the
tax wedge leaves equilibrium unem-
ployment unaffected in the long-
term21. As regards the different com-
ponents of the tax wedge (employers’
and employees’ social security contri-
butions and the income tax rate), their
short-run effects on real labour costs
differ but not substantially. Moreover,
the temporary effects of these various
components tend to disappear in the
long term. 
As regards strengthening social cohe-
sion and inclusion, some estimates
presented in section 3.4 and Annex II
of this chapter suggest that the unem-
ployment rate gaps for some under-
represented groups, such as women,
the long-term unemployed and unem-
ployed youth, compared with the
aggregate unemployment rate, have on
average narrowed significantly in the
EU-15 since the launch of the EES in
1997. 
The following points cover some
structural features in the functioning
of European labour markets. 
20 Recent estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in the tax wedge leads to a contemporaneous increase in real labour costs of 0.1 percent. 
Arpaia and Carone (2004), “Do labour taxes (and their composition) affect wages in the short and the long run?”, ECFIN, Economic Papers, No 216.
21 Layard and Nickell (1999), “Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance”, Handbook of Labour Economics, vol. 3, 3029-3084.
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Chart 68 – The unemployment rate and the Nairu in the EU-15
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Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
Note: For each variable, a country is classified in the "highest" group if its average for the 2004-1997 period is above the overall average for the
group plus 2/3 of the unweighted standard deviation; a country is classified in the "lowest" group if its average for the 2004-1997 period is below
the overall average for the group minus 2/3 of the unweighted standard deviation. Countries not classified in either of these two groups are not
explicitly mentioned. 
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3.2.1. The structural unemployment
rate (Nairu/Nawru)22
In Europe, labour markets are charac-
terised by a wide diversity of institu-
tions23 and performance – even more
so following the accession of ten new
Member States in May 2004. For the
EU-15, although the unemployment
rate has increased since 2001 because
of the economic slowdown (chart 68),
the Commission’s estimates of the
Nairu24 suggest that a small, although
significant, reduction in structural
unemployment has occurred since the
second half of the 1990s. To a large
extent such an improvement reflects
the decline of over 2 percentage points
in the average level of structural
unemployment amongst the EU-15
Member States with the highest
(structural) unemployment rates,
notably EL, ES, FR, IT, and FI, togeth-
er with a 3 percentage points reduc-
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EU-10
Chart 69 – The unemployment rate and the Nairu in the EU-10a
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22 The non-accelerating inflation/wage rate of unemployment. The Nairu concept captures the theoretical prediction that over the long term real
demand and unemployment generally tend towards the level consistent with stable inflation. 
23 Under the heading of labour market institutions, economic theory understands a number of factors influencing (macroeconomic) labour market
performance such as: (a) the unemployment benefit system, involving the level of benefits, the duration of entitlement, the coverage of the sys-
tem, and the strictness with which it is operated; (b) active labour market policies; (c) systems of wage determination, involving the level of
coordination, degree of collective bargaining coverage, union density, and the existence of extension laws; (d) employment protection legisla-
tion; (e) labour taxes; and (f) barriers to labour mobility. Employment in Europe 2004, chapter 2, provided a lengthy discussion of the impact of
various labour market institutions on labour market performance. For a recent paper on this topic see: Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005),
“Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s, What do we know?”, The Economic Journal, 115 (January). 
24 The Commission (DG ECFIN) uses a Kalman filter methodology (i.e. an unobservable components method) to obtain estimates for the Nairu.
The basic idea is to break down the observed unemployment rate into trend and cyclical components. The trend component, after smoothing, is
then taken as the Nairu. 
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Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
Note: a) CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK.
See note in chart 68.
Unemployment rate
NAIRU
 
Employment in Europe 2005
82
tion in the UK. Among the larger EU-
15 economies, Germany is the only
one where the structural unemploy-
ment rate has increased by about 1
percentage point since 1995. 
Throughout the period 1997-2004, the
structural unemployment rate (the
Nairu) fell uninterruptedly in the EU-
15, although at a slower pace in 2001-
2004 than in 1997-2001 (-0.1 and -0.2
percentage points, per year, respec-
tively). This reflects to a large extent a
deceleration in the rate of progress in
a number of Member States, namely
DK, ES, FR, IE, IT, FI and the UK,
together with an increase in structural
unemployment in NL and SE. 
In the new Member States, labour
market performance has on average
deteriorated significantly since 1997
compared to older EU Member States.
This reflects the cumulative effect of a
number of factors: the continuing eco-
nomic restructuring of some transition
economies (especially Poland); an
adverse policy-mix characterised by
an overly strict monetary policy, part-
ly compensating for the lack of fiscal
consolidation25; and the general eco-
nomic slowdown in the EU-15. As a
consequence of all of these factors, the
Commission estimates that in the new
Member States the structural unem-
ployment rate (the Nairu) rose by
about 5.5 percentage points on aver-
age between 1997 and 2004, reaching
nearly 14% in 2004. This deterioration
is largely the result of a significant
increase of approximately 8.5 percent-
age points in the structural unemploy-
ment rate in the three new Member
States with the highest structural
unemployment rates, namely LT, PL
and SK26. 
3.2.2. Lower long-term
unemployment rates and shorter
average spells in unemployment
In recent years, despite the economic
slowdown, the long-term unemploy-
ment rate27 has decreased significantly
(chart 70), especially in the EU-15.
This decline basically reflects a reduc-
tion in the average duration of unem-
ployment spells. Using Eurostat macro-
data for a breakdown of total unem-
ployment by duration, and a simple
methodology presented in Layard et
al.28, the average duration of unemploy-
ment spells has been calculated for six-
teen EU Member States29. The results
suggest that the average duration of
unemployment fell by about 10%
between 1997 and 200330, and by close
to or over 30% in a number of Member
States (BE, ES, IE, HU, NL, SE and
UK). Moreover, the country data sug-
gest the existence of a significant posi-
tive correlation between the unemploy-
25 Darnaut and Kutos (2005), “Poland’s policy mix: fiscal or monetary leadership?”, ECFIN Country Focus, v.2, No 1.
26 In Poland, by far the largest of these three new Member States, the structural unemployment rate is estimated to have increased from 9.6% in
1997 to 18.7% in 2004.
27 The long-term unemployment rate refers to those unemployed for 12 months or more as a percentage of the total active population.
28 R. Layard, S. Nickell and R. Jackman, (1991), “Unemployment, Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market”.
29 BE, CZ, DK, DE, ES, FR, IT, HU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK, IE, EL.
30 The following equation is used to estimate the average duration of unemployment: , where d is the average duration of unemployment,
u is the unemployment rate, and i is the inflow rate into unemployment. The above equation is only valid over the long term (i.e. in a steady state),
because it requires that the number of separations equals the number of hires. This equation is basically an accounting relation (i.e. it is not a behav-
ioural equation). The inflow rate into unemployment (i) is calculated as: , where u1 is unemployment with a duration inferior to 1
month, u12 is unemployment with a duration between 1 and 2 months, and N is total employment. Data are used at an annual frequency. 
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
EU-25
EU-15
Chart 70 – The long-term unemployment rate
Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators.
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ment rate and the average duration of
unemployment (chart 71)31. 
An interesting finding is that countries
registering the largest reductions in
unemployment rates during the period
1997-2003 are usually also those that
have had the largest reductions in the
average duration of unemployment,
or, in equivalent terms, have seen the
largest increase in the hiring rate (i.e.
the probability of an unemployed per-
son finding a job). 
3.2.3. Some signs of improved
efficiency in matching (or pairing)
between the unemployed and unfilled
vacancies
The equilibrium level of unemploy-
ment is affected by variables that
influence the ease with which the
unemployed can be matched with
available job vacancies. Shifts in the
Beveridge Curve (i.e. the loci of
unemployment and vacancy rates) are
usually a sign of changes in the equi-
librium level of unemployment32. Any
change that improves/worsens the
matching process will shift the Bev-
eridge Curve to the left/right and
reduce/increase the equilibrium level
of unemployment33. 
In what follows, two types of Bev-
eridge Curve are calculated for a num-
ber of EU Member States (chart 72)34.
The first uses vacancy data from the
OECD Macroeconomic Indicators
database. The second uses a labour
shortage index as a proxy for vacan-
cies35. Visual inspection of the charts
roughly confirms the main conclu-
sions reached by other studies relying
both on graphical and on econometric
analysis (e.g. Nickell et al.36). 
As pointed out in Nickell et al. (2003),
the Beveridge Curve shifted to the
right in nearly all countries from the
early 1960s to the mid-1980s, indicat-
ing an increase in the equilibrium
level of unemployment. After the mid-
1980s, EU Member States can be
roughly divided into two groups: (i)
those for which the Beveridge Curve
did not shift significantly; and (ii)
those for which the Beveridge Curve
has moved leftwards. The following
countries belong to the former group:
Belgium, Germany, France, Austria,
Portugal, Finland and Sweden, and the
following countries to the latter group:
Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Hungary and the United King-
dom. 
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Chart 71 – Correlation between percentage changes in the unemployment rate
and in the average duration of unemployment between 1997 and 2003
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL calculations. 
Note: The countries for which data were available are: BE, CZ, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT,
HU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, and UK. 
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percentage changes in the unemployment rate
31 According to this methodology, the average duration of unemployment is the inverse of the outflow rate (i.e. the ratio between hires and total
unemployment).
32 In the steady state, the Beveridge curve is based on the existence of a matching function: , where M is the number of
matches/hires from unemployment, U is unemployment, V is vacancies, ε is the matching efficiency, and c is the search effectiveness of the
unemployed. It is normally assumed that the matching function has constant returns to scale. Where s is the separation rate out of employment,
sN is thus the flow into unemployment. Then in the steady state, one has sN=M, and hence , which is the (implicit) Beveridge
Curve. 
33 Economic theory also suggests that for a given downward sloping steady-state Beveridge Curve, actual unemployment/vacancy points cycle anti-
clockwise around the steady state relationship. If the steady-state Beveridge Curve shifts, the anticlockwise loops described by
unemployment/vacancy points during the economic cycle should also move with the underlying curve.
34 Chart 72 is incomplete due to lack of data. Note that on the left side the Beveridge Curve is plotted using the vacancy rate and on the right side
using the labour shortage index. Job vacancy data from Eurostat are not used, because they are available only from 2001.
35 Source: DG ECFIN, namely the question in the European Industrial Survey about factors (labour) limiting production.
36 S. Nickell et al. (2003) “The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment, and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s”.
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Nickell et al. (2003) estimate an
aggregate Beveridge Curve for 15
OECD countries, using pooled data
and including some non-European
countries, which permits an econo-
metric evaluation of the impact of a
number of variables on the efficiency
of job matching. Controlling for the
inflow rate into unemployment (i.e.
the separation rate out of employ-
ment), the authors find that the fol-
lowing variables/institutions had the
effect of shifting the Beveridge
Curve to the right in a statistically
signif icant way: (i) the level of
owner-occupied residential housing;
and (ii) the duration of unemploy-
ment benefits. In addition, the rela-
tive strictness of employment protec-
tion legislation is found to shift the
Beveridge Curve to the left37.
Finding (i) is considered intuitive,
while (ii) is less so. A higher percent-
age of owner-occupied housing (as the
alternative to renting) could contribute
to lower geographical mobility, shift-
ing the Beveridge Curve rightwards. In
addition, other things being equal,
where unemployment benefits are paid
for a long period, this could be expect-
ed to contribute towards a lower search
effort by the unemployed, thereby
leading to a lower job matching rate
(i.e. a rightwards shift of the Beveridge
Curve). However, it can also be argued
that a relatively long duration of unem-
ployment benefit – at least until a cer-
tain threshold duration is reached –
could also improve the quality of
matches, in particular by not “forcing”
the unemployed to accept undesirable
jobs or outright bad matches. 
The finding that stricter employment
protection legislation actually raises
the efficiency of job matching (i.e. a
leftward shift of the Beveridge
Curve) might result from firms being
more cautious about the quality of
proposed job matches38 since the cost
of a poor match would be higher in
such situations. Conversely, Blan-
chard and Wolfers39 (2000) argue that
higher employment protection mag-
nifies the effect of adverse macro-
economic shocks on unemployment. 
3.2.4. A more job-friendly
macroeconomic environment
A number of indicators suggest that
the overall macroeconomic environ-
ment in the EU has become more
conducive to job creation in recent
years. On the one hand, there is evi-
dence of increased moderation in
wage-setting behaviour, and on the
other, figures show that the prof-
itability of capital has improved sig-
nificantly since the mid-1990s. 
3.2.4.1. Wage moderation
In line with some publications of the
European Commission40, a simple
indicator can be calculated to identi-
fy potential shifts in the aggregate
wage-setting curve in the EU-15.
This indicator follows the work of
Blanchard41 (1997, 1998) and is
called a “real wage gap/pressure indi-
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Chart 72 (cont.) – Beveridge Curve
Source: Eurostat, OECD and DG ECFIN.
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37 Recall that a shift to the left/right tends respectively to lower/increase the equilibrium level of unemployment. 
38 Economic theory considers that the net effect of employment protection legislation on job matching/level of labour demand is ambiguous as bar-
riers to the layoff of workers are expected to hinder both job creation and job destruction (Bentolila and Bertola, (1990) “Firing costs and labour
demand: how bad eurosclerosis?” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 57, pp. 381-420). In addition, employment protection legislation may
strengthen the bargaining power of “insiders” (i.e. those who are employed), allowing them to extract higher wages to the detriment of “out-
siders” (i.e. those who are without jobs). 
39 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence”, Eco-
nomic Journal vol. 78(2), pp. 182-187. 
40 “The EU economy: 2003 review”, chapter 4, and “EMU after 5 years”, chapter 3.
41 Blanchard (1997), “The medium run”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1997, pp. 89-158. Blanchard (1998), “Revisiting European
unemployment: Unemployment, capital accumulation and factor prices”, NBER Working Paper Series No 6566.
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cator”42. An increase in its value basi-
cally means that real wages are grow-
ing faster than (total factor) produc-
tivity43. A significant (positive)
cumulative deviation in relation to a
base year44 can then be interpreted as
excessive wage pressure in the labour
market. 
Chart 73 plots the wage gap/pressure
indicator calculated for the EU-15 and
the US. The values for the EU-15
show a large increase during the
1970s, with a peak of more than 25
percent in 1981-1982. Thereafter,
wage pressure gradually decreased
with the exception of the period 1991-
1994, which featured both high nomi-
nal and real wage growth (charts 74
and 75). The decline in the second half
of the 1990s basically reflects a period
of wage moderation. At present, how-
ever, the wage pressure indicator for
the EU-15 is still above its level at the
beginning of the 1970s45.
Given the low growth of (total factor)
productivity in the 1990s46, the partial
correction of the wage pressure gap
since 1993 largely reflects a period of
wage moderation. 
Wage moderation was common
across EU Member States during the
second half of the 1990s. For the pur-
pose of characterising wage inflation
during this period, the EU Member
States are divided into three groups
(charts 74 and 75). The first group
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Chart 73 – Real wage gap/pressure indicator (1970=0)
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco and own calculations.
42 Formally, this wage indicator is derived from a simple wage setting equation, linking the real product wage in efficiency units (w/e) to the unem-
ployment rate (u) and a shift parameter (Z) that stands for other/omitted labour market conditions/variables affecting wage setting. This relation-
ship can be written as: , where b is the elasticity of real efficiency wages with respect to the unemployment rate. A real wage
gap indicator can then be built from , setting b equal to 1 and after normalisation of the series to zero in 1970.
43 After correcting for slack in the labour market using the unemployment rate.
44 The base year usually chosen is 1970, because it precedes the first oil shock and the ensuing deterioration in the performance of labour markets.
45 Bruno and Sachs (1985), “The Economics of Worldwide Stagflation”, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. These authors were the first to argue that the
sustained increase in the unemployment rate from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was mostly due to the failure of social partners to adjust
wages in time to the slowdown in productivity growth. Since the early 1980s, however, wages have been increasing below the underlying total
factor productivity growth, leading to a fall in the income share of wages. However, despite this extended period of wage moderation, the labour
market (both employment and unemployment rates) only started to improve after the second half of the 1990s. Blanchard (1998) puts forward
the idea that this unusually long lag in the labour market recovery might be due essentially to two mechanisms that have depressed labour
demand. First, the rise in the relative price of labour, leading to a reduction in labour demand and, creating a labour surplus at the level of the
firm (i.e. labour hoarding). Given adjustment costs and legal/administrative constraints on dismissals, it took a considerable amount of time for
firms to bring down employment levels to their desired values. The second explanation, complementary to the first, states that factor price move-
ments induced firms to progressively introduce technologies that substituted capital for labour.
46 See point 3.3 on “quality and productivity at work”. 
Employment in Europe 2005
90
includes the 12 euro area Member
States, the second comprises Den-
mark, Sweden and the UK (EU-3),
and the third consists of the 10 new
Member States (EU-10).
In the euro area, in the run-up to Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) and in
line with a strong price disinflation
trend, wage growth decelerated signifi-
cantly from 7.7% in 1992 to close to
2.5% per year from the second half of
the 1990s. In addition, the dispersion of
wage growth in the euro area, as meas-
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Chart 74 – Nominal compensation per employee; total economy (national currency, pps weighted)
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
Note: a) CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK. b) DK, SE, UK.
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Chart 75 – Real compensation per employee; deflator GDP; total economy (national currency, pps weighted)
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
Note: a) CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK. b) DK, SE, UK.
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ured by the coefficient of variation47,
declined significantly after 1997. In the
“old” EU Member Countries not par-
ticipating in monetary union (EU-3),
wage growth also declined markedly
during the 1990s from about 9.5% in
1990 to below 4.5% per year from
1995. In the 10 new Member States,
and in line with the ongoing progress
towards nominal convergence, average
wage inflation declined from above
20% in the mid-1990s to about 5.5% in
the 2003-2004 period.
Therefore, wage growth decelerated
across the EU during the second half
of the 1990s both on account of the
disciplinary mechanism that monetary
union provided and because of the
sustained progress of the 10 new
Member States towards nominal con-
vergence. 
In a perfect competition setting, for
the cases of both a profit-maximising
and a cost-minimising firm, there
should be a negative relationship
between labour demand/employment
and real labour costs (i.e. values
deflated using GDP prices), all the rest
being constant. A number of empirical
studies48 suggest that part of the
employment growth registered in the
second half of the 1990s, particularly
in the euro area, can be attributed to
very favourable developments in real
labour costs (chart 75). 
However, the fairly benign picture in
terms of wage/price growth in the euro
area as a whole conceals relatively
divergent trends at Member State
level. In Germany and Austria, price-
competitiveness with the rest of the
euro area has improved. While it has
remained relatively stable in Belgium,
France and Finland, it has however
deteriorated in a number of euro area
Member States, from moderately
(Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Nether-
lands) to very significantly (Spain and
Portugal) (chart 76)49.
Since monetary union – a period
which roughly coincides with the
launch of the European Employment
Strategy – wage developments and
wage setting mechanisms have gained
more importance in euro area Member
States because domestic monetary and
exchange rate policies are no longer
available as adjustment instruments.
Moreover, the continuing process of
market integration is likely to raise the
output and employment costs of price-
compet i t iveness misal ignments
(Bertola and Boeri50, 2002). Therefore,
47 The ratio between the standard deviation and the average.
48 Mourre, G. (2004), “Did the Pattern of Aggregate Employment Growth Change in the Euro Area in the Late 1990s?”, ECB Working Paper No 358.
49 “EMU after 5 years” (2004), European Commission, DG ECFIN. 
50 Bertola, G. and T. Boeri (2002), “EMU labour markets two years on: Microeconomic tensions and institutional evolution”, in Buti M. and A.
Sapir (eds.), EMU and economic policy in Europe: The challenge of early years, pp. 249-280.
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Chart 76 – Intra euro area real effective exchange rates (nominal unit labour costs relative to competitors, 1987=100)
(1) Nominal unit labour costs; total economy – Relative to the euro area
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
Note: 1) Ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person employed.
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divergent trends at Member State level
in wage developments adjusted for
productivity are a cause for concern if
not warranted by the fundamentals
(e.g. exogenous shifts in demand, Bal-
assa-Samuelson51 effects, etc.). Persis-
tent price-competitiveness misalign-
ments might lead to situations of eco-
nomic overheating or overcooling,
requiring protracted periods of adjust-
ment or even raising serious tensions
inside the monetary union. 
3.2.4.2. Turnaround in profitability
In this section, the argument that
European labour markets are showing
increasing resilience to economic
fluctuations is discussed, while the
next section presents strong evidence
for the occurrence of a positive break
in labour demand in many (but not all)
EU Member States from 1997
onwards. Later on, econometric esti-
mates are presented suggesting that
the labour force and, to a lesser extent,
employment have become more
responsive during cyclical upturns,
raising labour force participation and
the employment content of growth. 
The data reveal that in the economic
slowdown of 2001-2003, the elasticity
of employment to changes in GDP52
was positive, compared to the negative
values observed in previous recessions
(chart 77). This apparent change in the
elasticity of employment to GDP may,
in part, be due to the nature of this last
economic slowdown, which was rather
prolonged but not very sharp53. How-
ever, it may also result from structural
changes in the labour market. The next
section presents some compelling evi-
dence suggesting that a positive struc-
tural break did occur in labour
demand in many EU Member States
(but not in all) around 1997. 
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Chart 77 – Employment to GDP elasticity and the output gap in the EU-15
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco and own calculations.
51 In a small open economy (i.e. unable to affect either interest rates or the prices of tradeable goods on world markets), the only (real) element of
the exchange rate that can be made endogenous is the relative price between tradeable and non-tradeable goods. In a two-goods model (i.e. with
a tradeable and a non-tradeable sector) of a small economy, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis states (among other propositions) that a rise in
total factor productivity in the tradeable sector raises wages not only in this sector but, owing to intersectoral labour mobility, also in the non-
tradeables sector, thus raising non-tradeable prices, which yields a real appreciation. 
A large body of literature in the second half of the 1990s and earlier 2000s suggests that the generalised real appreciation across central and east
European transition economies is at least partly due to the impact of productivity shocks via a Balassa-Samuelson type effect; Fischer (2002),
“Real currency appreciation in accession countries: Balassa-Samuelson and investment demand”, DP 19/02, Deutsche Budesbank.
52 The employment to GDP elasticity in chart 77 is a 3-year moving average centred on the current year. The potential output gap is calculated
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The HP filter decomposes a time series into two components: a long term trend and a stationary cycle;
it is a linear filter that requires previous specification of a parameter known as lambda (λ). This parameter tunes the smoothness of the trend,
and depends on the periodicity of the data. For annual data, a value of 100 was used. 
53 DG ECFIN (2005), Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2004, with a Special Focus on the Risk of Jobless Growth, European Economy
Special Report N° 3/2005.
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Since the mid-1990s, profitability54
has turned around significantly in the
EU area. While there are multiple (and
inter-related) causes contributing to
this favourable outcome, which broad-
ly coincided with the run-up to EMU,
wage moderation and the fall in risk
premiums on interest rates across
Europe are likely to have played a
major role. 
The comparison between the EU-15
and the US (chart 78) suggests that a
positive (and adequate) level of prof-
itability is likely to reduce the risk of
large-scale labour losses during eco-
nomic recessions or slowdowns. 
The sustained increase in profitability
during the 1990s, the general favour-
ing of stability-oriented macroeco-
nomic policies and the introduction of
structural reforms in a number of
areas such as competition policy and
labour markets have all contributed to
an improvement in the functioning of
labour markets, which is beginning to
bring benefits, particularly since
1997. 
54 The profitability of capital/investment is measured using DG ECFIN’s Ameco database “net returns on the net capital stock” variable minus the
unweighted average of short- and long-term interest rates. The “net returns on the net capital stock” variable is basically the ratio between a net
operating surplus variable (approximately output minus the wage bill) and the net capital stock.
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Chart 78 – Employment/GDP elasticity and profitability
The employment/GDP elasticity and profitability in the EU-15
The employment/GDP elasticity and profitability in the US
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco and own calculations.
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3.2.5. Evidence of a positive break in
labour demand in many EU Member
States (but not all) since 1997
Econometric estimates of labour
demand based on aggregate time-
series data (focusing on the euro area)
show that traditional determinants,
such as trend productivity, GDP
growth and real labour costs, fail to
explain a significant part of employ-
ment growth after 1997 (Mourre,
2004). The assumption of a break
from 1997 onwards improves signifi-
cantly the quality of (dynamic) fore-
casting and increases the stability of
the estimated equations55. 
The finding of a significant break
around 1997-1998 coincides with a
cyclical upturn, the beginning of the
EES and the “effective” start of
EMU56. The timing of the structural
break seems to confirm the IMF’s57
(1999) view that the positive effects
of structural reforms are reinforced
during economic upturns, which
sometimes come considerably after
their introduction. This suggests that
the full impact of labour market
reforms implemented under the EES,
particularly in Germany, will only
fully materialise once the current
recovery out of the long economic
slowdown of 2001-2003 is completed. 
In addition, using macro-panel data,
estimates suggest that a group of EU
Member States58 (representing close
to one half of total EU-15 employ-
ment) have experienced a positive
break in their aggregate labour
demand since 1997. However, five
EU Member States59, including Ger-
many, did not record any significant
positive change in their aggregate
labour demand equation in the late
1990s. 
Therefore, econometric evidence,
based mainly on time-series analysis
but also on panel data, suggests that
recent employment performance is
related to structural improvements in
the behaviour of aggregate employ-
ment in some EU Member States. The
following factors are prime candi-
dates to explain this positive break in
aggregate labour demand: i) changes
in the sectoral composition of
employment; ii) developments in
labour market institutions; and iii) the
impact of active labour market poli-
cies. 
Garibaldi and Mauro60 (2002) find
that in the first half of the 1990s, the
strong growth of part-time employ-
ment, particularly in the service sec-
tor, was a major driving force behind
the increase in the total number of
jobs, despite some displacement of
full-time jobs. However, the
dynamism of part-time employment
growth was basically present in the
first half of the 1990s, so cannot
explain the break in employment
demand in the late 1990s. In contrast,
the sectoral composition of employ-
ment growth in the late 1990s, when
compared to the early 1990s/late
1980s, may have played a significant
role in developments in aggregate
employment growth (Marimon and
Zilibotti61, 1998). European
economies benefited from favourable
composition effects resulting from the
high employment (and GDP) growth
rates in most service sectors, which
accounted for a higher proportion of
total employment in the late 1990s
than a decade earlier. Conversely, sec-
tors with low or negative employment
growth (such as agriculture and
industry excluding construction)
accounted for a lower proportion of
total employment in the late 1990s
than a decade earlier. 
In line with a large body of literature on
the impact of labour market institutions
on labour market performance, Mourre
(2004) presented some preliminary evi-
dence linking (average macroeconom-
ic) labour tax wedges62 to the presence
of a positive break in aggregate
employment demand. Specifically,
Member States with higher than
expected employment in the late 1990s
experienced a decline (IE, NL, and ES)
or at least no upward movement in their
labour tax wedge (BE and FR), while
most of those that did not experience
any significant positive break in their
employment demand in the late 1990s
saw an increase in their labour tax
wedge. As regards the potential role of
active labour market policies in foster-
ing employment growth, Mourre
(2004) finds that most active policies
seem to be statistically insignificant in
explaining employment developments. 
A note of caution is warranted as
regards the effectiveness of labour
market institutions in general, and
active labour market policies in partic-
ular. Findings based on macroeco-
nomic data usually suffer from a num-
55 The inclusion of an equation break turns out to be significant whatever the measure of employment used: number of people employed, full-time
equivalents or hours worked.
56 For prospective EMU Members, interest rates had nearly converged by 1997 and exchange rate stability had been virtually achieved.
57 IMF (1999), “Chronic unemployment in the Euro Area: Causes and Cures”, World Economic Outlook, May.
58 BE, ES, FR, IE, IT LU, NL. 
59 AT, DE, EL, FI, PT.
60 Garibaldi and Mauro (2002), “Employment growth. Accounting the facts”, Economic Policy, April.
61 Marimon and Zilibotti (1998), “Actual versus virtual employment in Europe: Is Spain different?”, European Economic Review, 42(1).
62 The difference between the after-tax disposable labour income received by wage earners and total labour costs faced by employers.
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ber of drawbacks because the results
and policy conclusions do not tend to
be robust across the estimated mod-
els63.
3.2.6. The effect of the cycle on
labour market variables
Labour market variables display a
strong cyclical pattern. A common
way of evaluating this is by estimating
Okun-type equations (Annex I)64.
Using data for the EU-1565, covering
the period 1972-2003, a set of Okun-
type equations is estimated using
pooled data techniques. The evidence
reported in table 19 (and further
explored in Annex I) suggests that the
cyclical response of labour market
variables such as employment and
unemployment varies according to the
cyclical position of the economy. In
addition, since the implementation of
the EES in 1998 and over the years
with positive output gaps, the results
tentatively suggest a rise in the
responsiveness of labour market par-
ticipation and, to a lesser extent,
employment66.
From the estimation results in table 19,
a number of important points emerge.
Firstly, and as expected, labour market
variables show a clear cyclical pattern
that is correctly signed. Secondly,
there is evidence of asymmetry in the
response of some labour market vari-
ables over the business cycle. In par-
ticular, employment and labour force
participation tend to undergo a
stronger adjustment during downturns
than in upturns. Thirdly, the econo-
metric evidence suggests that labour
force participation and, to a lesser
extent, employment have become
more responsive to the economic
cycle since 1998, which reflects the
favourable developments in the labour
market registered during the cyclical
upturn of 1998-2001.
Since 1998, and during the cyclical
upturn, labour force participation
increased above what would have been
expected given past statistical trends,
suggesting that a structural improve-
ment in the labour market has
occurred. Although these results are
highly suggestive and encouraging
they cannot be taken as formal proof
that implementation of the EES
caused by itself the observed improve-
ment in labour markets. Indeed, other
factors, either policy-induced or not
directly related to policy action, might
also have been largely responsible for
the observed improvement in labour
market performance68.
3.2.7. Making work pay through
incentives to enhance work
attractiveness
In the Employment Guidelines69,
Member States are asked to pay par-
ticular attention to the link between
benefit systems and effective job
search, and to introduce measures to
eliminate inactivity traps, while pre-
serving an adequate level of social
protection. By 2010, Member States
aim to achieve a significant reduction
in high marginal effective tax rates
and, where appropriate, in the tax
burden of low-paid workers. 
Tables 20 and 21 present data on four
structural indicators calculated by
Eurostat: a) the tax wedge on low
63 This type of analysis based on macroeconomic panel data is usually affected by a number of technical problems, notably i) small number of
time-varying observations for labour market institutions; ii) high multicollinearity between explanatory variables; and iii) endogeneity of regres-
sors in particular for active labour market policies. These problems do not permit a precise identification of estimates for individual institutions
(i.e. within acceptable confidence intervals). 
64 The original Okun law predicted a negative correlation between unemployment and output over the business cycle.  
65 EU-15, excluding Luxembourg. 
66 Although the latter is not statistically significant. 
67 The medium run is defined as two years. 
68 The former group includes: monetary union, budgetary consolidation and structural reforms in areas not directed related with labour market pol-
icy. The latter covers: economic shocks such as the protracted effects of German reunification, the impact of a period of relative wage modera-
tion since the second half of the 1990s, and effects due to productivity trends.
69 Specifically, the eighth Employment Guideline for 2003-2005. 
Table 19 – Medium-run impact of a percentage point increase in
the output gap on the deviation of labour market variables from
their trends (as percentage) 67
Unemployment Employment Labour Force
1972-1997
GDP above potential -0.25 0.20 -0.08
GDP below potential -0.25 0.48 0.21
1998-2003
GDP above potential -0.25 0.33 0.28
GDP below potential -0.25 0.48 0.21
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco; OECD, MEI; and IMF, IFS. Own calculations.
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wages; b) the unemployment trap for
low paid workers; c) two low-wage
trap indicators; d) an inactivity trap
indicator calculated in a joint Com-
mission/OECD project70, and e) an
implicit tax rate on total labour
income calculated by DG TAXUD/
Eurostat71. 
A tax wedge indicator measures the
gap between the net wage for the
employee and the labour cost for the
employer. This type of indicator is rel-
evant for the demand for labour. For a
given net wage/take-home pay, a high-
er tax wedge should be associated
with lower labour demand. In previous
research covering Europe and the
US72, it was found that a relatively
large tax wedge reduces income
inequality and increases unemploy-
ment, while the effect on participation
is insignificant. In the EU, the tax
wedge on low-paid workers has fallen
on average by about 3 percentage
points since 1997 (table 20). The EU
countries with the largest declines are:
FR, IE, IT, HU, FI and SE. 
An unemployment trap indicator
attempts to capture the financial
incentive for an unemployed person to
take up a job. In particular circum-
stances, an unemployed individual
with low earning potential and/or
receiving relatively generous unem-
ployment benefits may face a situation
where accepting an employment offer
may lead to very low (or no) increase
in disposable income, as the result of
the combined effect of benefit with-
drawal and higher taxes on in-work
income. In the EU, the unemployment
trap indicator remained on average
relatively stable but at a high value
during the period 2001-2003, hover-
ing at just under 80%, which com-
pares with about 70% in the US. In
eight EU Member States, the unem-
ployment trap is over 85%, namely in
BE, DK, DE, LV, LU, NL, PT and SE.
Although data are only available for
three years (2001 to 2003), significant
changes in this indicator have
occurred in some countries: a decrease
in FR, LT, HU, PL and SK and an
increase in EL, for example. 
Table 20 – The tax wedge, the unemployment trap, the low-wage
trap indicators and the implicit tax rate on labour
Source: Eurostat, Structural and Employment indicators, and DG TAXUD.
Note: (a) Tax wedge on labour costs, defined as income tax on gross wage earnings plus the
employee’s and employer’s social security contributions expressed as a percentage of labour costs for
a single person without children earning 67% of the average earnings of a full time average production
worker (APW); (b) Unemployment trap, measuring the percentage of gross earnings which is taxed
away through higher tax and social security contributions and the withdrawal of unemployment and
other benefits when an unemployed person returns to employment. This structural indicator is
available only for single persons without children earning 67% of the APW when in work; (c) Low
wage trap for a single person without children, defined as the difference between the increase in gross
earnings and the increase in net income, expressed as a percentage of the increase in gross earnings,
when gross earnings increase from 33% to 67% of the APW; (d) Low wage trap for a single earner
couple with two children in the age between 6 and 11 years, defined as the difference between the
increase in gross earnings and the increase in net income, when gross earnings increase from 33% to
67% of the APW; (e) The implicit tax rate on labour is a macro indicator that approximates an average
effective tax burden on total labour income in the economy.
70 Some care may be necessary when interpreting these indicators as they primarily focus on the situation of individuals without taking into account
broader household circumstances (e.g. income from financial wealth, the labour market situation of other household members, etc.). 
71 “The Structures of the Taxation System in the European Union” (2004), DG TAXUD and Eurostat.
72 Groot et al. “Is the American Model Miss World, Choosing between the Anglo-Saxon model and a European-style alternative”, 2004, CPB No
40 Discussion Paper. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Tax wedge (a)
EU-15 40.0 39.3 38.5 37.9 37.0 36.9 37.2
EU-25 40.1 39.4 38.6 38.1 37.2 37.1 37.4
US 29.2 29.1 29.2 29.0 27.4 27.3 27.1
Unemployment trap (b)
EU-15 NA NA NA NA 79.1 78.8 78.7
EU-25 NA NA NA NA 78.8 78.5 78.3
US NA NA NA NA 70.6 70.6 70.3
Low wage trap (s/c) (c)
EU-15 NA NA NA NA 54.3 53.7 53.9
EU-25 NA NA NA NA 53.8 53.1 53.1
US NA NA NA NA 32.2 31.8 31.1
Low wage trap (c2c) (d)
EU-15 NA NA NA NA 55.1 56.1 61.4
EU-25 NA NA NA NA 55.6 56.5 61.5
US NA NA NA NA 58.5 55.2 53.0
Implicit tax rate on labour (e)
EU-25 37.8 37.9 37.6 37.3 36.9 36.5 37.0
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A low-wage trap indicator is usually
used to look at the financial conse-
quences of increasing working hours
or moving up the wage ladder. This
type of indicator is relevant for
analysing circumstances where low-
paid workers may be locked/trapped
in benefit receipt, because they would
suffer a significant reduction in their
benefits if they were to take a job in
the regular labour market. In Euro-
stat’s Structural Indicators, this type
of indicator is available for a single
person without children and a single-
earner couple with two children in the
age between 6 to 11 years. The former
indicator suggests that the marginal
effective tax rate on labour supply
remained relatively stable in the EU-
15 and EU-25, while the latter indica-
tor registered an average increase of 5
percentage points over a three-year
period, reaching 61.5% in 2003.
Therefore, one-earner couples with
Table 21 – Inactivity trap indicator for 2001 showing the marginal effective tax rate of moving from
social assistance to work at a wage level equivalent to 67% of the average production worker (APW) for
the first worker, while the wage level for the second earner is indicated in each column.
BE 85 71 67 64 61 97 77 71 67 63 97 78 69 63 61
DK 96 96 83 72 69 84 92 87 76 72 34 59 73 70 67
DE 84 90 80 71 67 84 90 85 74 67 84 90 81 69 62
EL 16 16 16 18 22 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 18 22
ES 69 50 44 40 37 100 68 58 46 40 88 60 47 41 37
FR 81 83 71 60 52 69 75 81 69 55 76 83 86 65 54
IE 100 87 73 59 54 51 50 54 60 53 100 100 87 68 54
IT 10 16 20 27 31 -1 -1 -2 17 27 7 8 13 24 30
LU 89 92 76 63 58 86 94 82 59 54 79 90 98 73 59
NL 97 92 84 72 59 93 82 80 70 59 96 96 92 78 63
AT 100 88 75 64 57 100 99 84 69 61 100 100 86 71 62
PT 55 50 42 36 35 55 55 55 52 45 55 55 55 54 44
FI 100 86 78 67 61 70 65 66 65 60 100 97 91 78 69
SE 100 98 82 67 60 82 63 61 60 56 100 100 98 78 67
UK 80 78 70 58 49 81 45 56 65 57 88 84 82 66 55
CZ 83 70 59 49 43 100 94 80 67 57 100 92 79 64 53
HU 69 55 53 49 51 61 45 38 39 45 69 55 53 49 51
PL 92 72 63 53 47 100 86 84 68 57 100 94 78 63 54
SK 99 81 72 56 46 100 100 91 72 59 100 100 100 80 62
NO 83 85 71 60 56 78 73 69 68 60 93 91 76 63 56
SZ 100 100 81 63 53 100 100 92 69 56 100 100 95 71 57
US 21 29 29 29 33 30 33 43 45 40 18 25 32 31 31
JP 79 69 56 43 36 108 103 95 70 55 79 84 71 54 43
Single Single parent, 2 children 1 earner couple 
% of APW 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150%
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two children have a lower financial
incentive to take a job than a single
person without children. 
Besides unemployment and low-wage
trap indicators, an inactivity trap indi-
cator can also be calculated. This type
of indicator can be interpreted as the
marginal effective tax rate relevant for
influencing the decision of inactive
people to enter the labour force. Such
an indicator covers those out of work
and not eligible to receive unemploy-
ment benefits, but who are instead
benefiting from income or social
assistance programmes. Table 21 pres-
ents some values for the inactivity trap
indicator calculated in a joint Euro-
BE 97 72 65 60 59 46 45 49 51 52 46 45 48 51 52
DK 37 58 74 74 69 56 52 50 50 55 83 70 64 59 61
DE 84 90 77 69 62 42 45 47 48 49 52 51 51 51 51
EL 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 18 22 16 16 16 16 20
ES 106 77 64 49 42 18 16 19 23 25 15 12 15 20 23
FR 68 75 82 74 58 21 23 27 30 31 56 43 41 37 34
IE 100 95 87 72 57 12 15 18 22 24 34 29 29 29 29
IT -5 -4 -7 12 26 28 33 32 35 37 37 44 43 44 43
LU 75 87 93 76 59 14 17 20 24 28 14 14 14 18 24
NL 96 94 90 78 63 35 33 36 39 38 38 35 38 40 39
AT 100 100 97 78 67 21 20 24 30 34 21 20 24 30 34
PT 55 55 55 57 56 42 33 30 28 27 87 73 57 46 39
FI 100 100 99 89 76 25 27 30 35 40 42 38 38 40 43
SE 100 100 100 84 71 27 27 29 32 36 37 37 37 36 40
UK 93 66 72 74 62 7 15 19 24 26 63 49 44 40 38
CZ 100 100 96 77 63 31 29 28 28 29 31 30 30 31 31
HU 61 45 38 39 45 21 23 27 32 40 21 23 27 32 40
PL 100 100 91 80 65 31 32 33 33 33 54 47 44 41 41
SK 100 100 100 96 72 32 28 27 26 27 81 61 51 46 40
NO 100 99 92 73 63 26 29 30 32 37 26 29 30 32 37
SZ 100 100 100 75 59 20 21 23 25 27 20 21 22 24 26
US 30 37 46 49 43 27 28 28 29 29 27 20 22 24 26
JP 79 84 86 71 56 15 16 16 17 18 36 28 24 25 23
1 earner couple with  2 children 2 earners couple* 2 earners couple with 2 children*
% of APW 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150% 33% 50% 67% 100% 150%
Table 21 (cont.) – Inactivity trap indicator for 2001 showing the marginal effective tax rate of moving
from social assistance to work at a wage level equivalent to 67% of the average production worker
(APW) for the first worker, while the wage level for the second earner is indicated in each column.
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefit models.
Note: * The wage level of the first earner is fixed at 67% of the APW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column.
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pean Commission/OECD project73
aimed at monitoring the direct influ-
ence of tax and benefit policies on
household incomes. 
The authors of this report74 state that:
the likelihood of an inactivity trap for
people receiving means-tested bene-
fits (i.e. under an assistance pro-
gramme) is highest for low-skilled
workers with low earning potential,
possibly leading to continued benefit
dependency and progressive margin-
alisation in the labour market. The
authors conclude by saying that the
inactivity trap is potentially more wor-
rying than the unemployment trap.
The implicit tax rate (ITR) on
employed labour is defined as all
direct and indirect taxes, and employ-
ees’ and employers’ social contribu-
tions levied on employed labour
income divided by the total compensa-
tion of employees75. The resulting ITR
on labour income is a summary meas-
ure that approximates an average
effective tax burden on labour income
in the economy76. The evolution of the
ITR in the EU shows little overall
progress in reducing the effective tax
burden on labour.
3.2.8. Part-time employment
One main feature over the past two
decades in the EU-15 has been the
growing share of part-time employ-
ment78. In 2004, part-time employ-
ment accounted for about 17.3% of
total employment (for the age group
1998 2001 2003 2004
ft pt nkwn ft pt nkwn ft pt nkwn ft pt nkwn
EU-15 M+F 82.9 16.9 0.1 82.3 17.6 0.1 81.8 18.2 NA 80.9 19.0 0.1
F 67.1 32.7 0.2 66.6 33.3 0.2 66.3 33.6 NA 65.0 34.9 0.1
M 94.4 5.5 0.1 94.2 5.7 NA 93.8 6.2 NA 93.3 6.6 0.1
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA 83.7 15.9 0.3 83.3 16.5 0.2 82.7 17.3 0.1
F NA NA NA 70.3 29.4 0.3 69.9 29.9 0.1 68.8 31.1 NA
M NA NA NA 94.1 5.6 0.3 93.7 6.0 0.3 93.6 6.3 NA
Table 22 – Employment by type of contract and gender for individuals aged 15-64 
(proportions of total employment as percentages)77
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: ft: full-time; pt: part-time; nkwn: not known.
73 In the European Commission, this project is financed jointly by DGs ECFIN, EMPL and TAXUD and coordinated by EUROSTAT.
74 G. Carone, A. Salomäki, H. Immervoll and D. Paturot, (2003), “Indicators of unemployment and low-wage traps (marginal effective tax rates on
labour)”, ECFIN Economic Papers No 197, December. 
75 The ITR is a macro indicator that takes into account the whole economy, whereas the tax-wedge (between labour costs to the employer and the
corresponding net take-home pay of the employee) is a micro indicator of a specific private sector calculated for various household types and
different representative wage levels. 
Par-wise comparisons between the ITR macro indicator and the tax-wedge micro indicator for a single average production worker at average
earnings (without children) indicate that tax-wedges are significantly higher than the implicit tax rates on labour income for some Member
States. Nevertheless, the correlation between the macro and micro indicators is still moderately strong. Member States with a high tax-wedge
for an average production worker generally also have relatively high tax rates on labour.
Heijmans and Acciari (2004), “Examination of the Macroeconomic Implicit Tax Rate on Labour derived by the European Commission”, DG
TAXUD, Taxation Papers, 4/2004.
76 The ITR on labour income is a macro indicator, thereby it can hide important variation in effective tax rates across different household types or
at different wage levels. In some Member States, for example, recent tax reforms may have a more pronounced effect on low-paid, low-quali-
fied workers or families with children.
77 DG EMPL estimates of annual averages are based on quarterly LFS data to allow for detailed breakdowns (by gender, age, education, sector,
etc.). These breakdowns were estimated for the sections on part-time employment (3.2.8), on fixed-term/temporary employment (3.2.9), and on
inactivity (3.2.10). These estimates can differ from Eurostat’s official annual totals (reported in tables 37 and 38 and in Chapter 1), mainly
because they cover the 15-64 age group (instead of the population of working age, i.e. 15 years and above) and due to rounding errors. 
78 The distinction between full-time and part-time work is made on the basis of a spontaneous answer given by the respondent. It is impossible to
establish a more exact distinction between part-time and full-time work due to variations in working hours between Member States and also
between branches of industry. However, by checking the answer against the number of hours usually worked, it should be possible to detect and
correct implausible answers, since part-time work should not exceed 35 hours, while full-time work will usually start at about 30 hours. 
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15-64) in the enlarged EU79, with a
large dispersion across Member
States. Tables 22 to 26 describe in
some detail the major characteristics
of part-time employment. Using data
from the EU labour force survey
(LFS), the relevant facts that emerge
are: i) the strong gender dimension of
part-time work (nearly one in three
women have a part-time job, table 23);
ii) the above-average proportion of
young people and older workers in
part-time employment (about 25% for
individuals aged 15-24 and 22% for
those aged 55-64, table 23); iii) the
proportion of part-time employment
drops for individuals with tertiary
education (table 24); iv) the propor-
tion of part-time employment is high-
est in the service sector (table 25); and
v) slightly below one fifth of part-time
employment is involuntary, about one
quarter is due to “family or personal
responsibilities”, while slightly below
one third is voluntary (table 26). As
regards the percentage of “not
known”/“no answer” responses, it is
negligible for the full-time/part-time
question (table 22), but amounts to
more than 20% in the replies to “level
of education attained” (table 24).
According to some analyses80, the
cumulative rise in part-time employ-
ment observed since the early 1980s
explains between one fifth and one
third of the total increase in the
employment rate over the same period. 
Part-time working has contributed to
increased flexibility in labour markets.
On the labour demand side, this type
of contract is particularly suited to
cushion against economic fluctuations,
as its administrative and legal rules
(i.e. employment protection legisla-
tion) are usually less stringent than
those for full-time employment. More-
over, from the standpoint of employ-
ers, some studies have found that the
hourly wage rate received by part-time
workers is lower (by about 10%) than
for those in full-time employment
(OECD81, 1999). On the labour supply
1998 2001
EU-15 M+F 16.9 22.4 15.7 20.1 17.6 22.9 16.2 21.8
F 32.7 29.9 31.8 41.3 33.3 30.9 32.3 42.0
M 5.5 16.3 3.7 7.9 5.7 16.2 3.7 9.3
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA 15.9 21.3 14.4 21.3
F NA NA NA NA 29.4 28.5 28.2 40.2
M NA NA NA NA 5.6 15.3 3.6 9.7
2003 2004
EU-15 M+F 18.2 24.7 16.6 22.3 19.0 26.0 17.4 22.9
F 33.6 32.6 32.6 41.5 34.9 34.6 33.9 42.1
M 6.2 17.9 4.0 9.9 6.6 18.8 4.3 10.3
EU-25 M+F 16.5 23.1 14.8 21.5 17.3 24.5 15.5 22.0
F 29.9 30.4 28.5 39.4 31.1 32.3 29.7 39.9
M 6.0 16.9 3.8 10.0 6.3 18.0 4.1 10.3
15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64 15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64
15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64 15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64
Table 23 – Proportion of part-time working by gender and age groups (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
79 17.7% for the total population (see Chapter 1). 
80 Chapter 2 of Employment in Europe 2004. 
81 OECD (1999) “Focus on part-time work”. Employment Outlook, June. 
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side, part-time work is likely to
increase the opportunities open to indi-
viduals, drawing people into the labour
market who were previously unwilling
or unable to work. By bringing addi-
tional individuals into the labour mar-
ket, the development of part-time
employment is likely to increase
potential output in the EU. 
However, this type of contract also has
a number of potential drawbacks.
Notably, it is associated with lower
wages (and fringe benefits) than a
full-time contract, lower chances for
promotion, and lower investment in
training. 
In a recent study82, the determinants of
the part-time rate83 are investigated
using pooled macro-panel data for: i)
the business cycle; ii) labour market
institutions and policy; and iii) other
structural factors of a sociological,
demographic or economic nature.
From this work, the following find-
ings stand out: 
Firstly, the part-time rate is negatively
correlated with the output gap, mean-
ing that in “good times” part-time
work grows more slowly than total
employment and, conversely, the part-
time rate tends to increase when the
economy operates below its potential.
Furthermore, the counter-cyclical
behaviour of the part-time rate is more
accentuated in periods of weak activi-
ty than in periods of strong activity.
This asymmetric behaviour of the
part-time rate is a desirable feature
that could enhance the counter-cycli-
cal properties of part-time employ-
ment and reduce the fluctuations in
(total) employment. 
Secondly, some institutions and poli-
cies appear to have a significant
impact on the part-time rate, with the
relationships having the correct sign
as expected by the economic theory.
Employment protection legislation for
regular jobs is found to be significant-
ly and positively correlated with the
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: 0-2: Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education – levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997); 3-4: Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
education – levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997); 5-6: Tertiary education – levels 5-6 (ISCED 1997); nkwn: not known.
82 Buddelmeyer, Mourre and Ward, (2004), “The determinants of part-time work in EU countries: empirical investigations with macro-panel data”,
DG ECFIN Economic Papers No 213. 
83 The ratio between part-time employment and total employment (defined as full-time plus part-time). 
EU-15 M+F 16.9 14.2 15.2 13.2 20.4 17.6 17.3 19.3 14.1 23.7
F 32.7 29.5 29.1 21.7 39.3 33.3 34.8 36.3 24.9 44.5
M 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.2 8.4
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA 15.9 16.9 16.4 13.1 23.6
F NA NA NA NA NA 29.4 33.2 30.2 22.6 44.2
M NA NA NA NA NA 5.6 6.1 5.4 5.1 8.3
EU-15 M+F 18.2 17.9 19.9 15.0 22.2 19.0 18.6 21.0 15.8 22.6
F 33.6 35.6 36.8 25.5 41.6 34.9 37.2 38.5 26.5 41.9
M 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.0 8.0 6.6 6.4 6.7 6.5 8.0
EU-25 M+F 16.5 17.6 17.0 13.8 22.2 17.3 18.4 18.0 14.6 22.6
F 29.9 34.2 31.0 23.0 41.6 31.1 35.8 32.7 23.9 41.9
M 6.0 6.6 5.8 5.6 8.0 6.3 6.8 6.2 6.1 NA
1998 2001
total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn
2003 2004
total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn
Table 24 – Proportion of part-time working by gender and education level for individuals aged 15-64
(percentages)
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part-time rate. This finding is consis-
tent with the interpretation that in the
presence of very stringent employ-
ment protection legislation for regular
jobs, the development of part-time
employment can be seen as a way of
circumventing regulatory constraints
and enhancing flexibility at the mar-
gin. Furthermore, it has been found
that child benefits can represent a
strong disincentive to part-time work-
ing, making it less attractive for indi-
viduals (notably women) to re-enter
the labour market. The above-men-
tioned study (Buddelmeyer et al.,
2004) also finds that temporary work
is positively correlated with the part-
time rate, suggesting: the absence of
substitution effects between part-time
employment and temporary employ-
ment and that these two flexible
schemes are complementary in cir-
cumventing the rigidity of European
labour markets (for regular employ-
ment).
Thirdly, some structural factors of a
sociological, demographic or econom-
ic nature are also found to be impor-
tant determinants of the part-time rate.
In line with conventional wisdom, the
share of the service sector in the econ-
omy and the proportion of youth in
tertiary education are significantly
and positively correlated with the
part-time employment rate. The
female participation rate and the fer-
tility rate are also significantly and
positively correlated with the part-
time employment rate. This suggests
that part-time work potentially creates
an opportunity for women to reconcile
childcare with market work. 
3.2.9. Fixed-term/temporary
employment
The percentage of employees with
temporary contracts84 has been
increasing over the past two decades.
In 2004, the number of temporary
contracts corresponded, on average, to
about 13.5% of total dependent
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: pri: primary sector (A to B of Nace); man: manufacturing sector (C to E of Nace); con: construction (F of NACE); ser_pa: services without
public administration (G to K + M to Q of NACE).
EU-15 M+F 16.9 13.6 6.9 5.0 23.0 17.6 14.2 7.2 5.0 23.4
F 32.7 27.9 19.2 34.8 36.2 33.3 28.6 19.6 35.8 36.4
M 5.5 6.6 2.2 2.3 8.3 5.7 7.0 2.4 2.1 8.5
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA 15.9 14.8 6.4 4.7 21.4
F NA NA NA NA NA 29.4 25.4 16.1 31.9 32.7
M NA NA NA NA NA 5.6 8.8 2.4 2.2 8.2
EU-15 M+F 18.2 13.3 7.6 5.2 24.1 19.0 14.2 7.9 5.4 25.1
F 33.6 26.3 20.6 35.9 36.7 34.9 27.7 21.5 37.4 37.8
M 6.2 7.0 2.6 2.4 9.2 6.6 7.7 2.7 2.5 9.8
EU-25 M+F 16.5 14.6 6.8 5.0 22.0 17.3 15.8 7.0 5.1 22.9
F 29.9 25.2 17.1 32.3 33.1 31.1 26.8 17.8 33.9 34.3
M 6.0 8.9 2.5 2.5 8.7 6.3 10.0 2.6 2.5 9.3
1998 2001
total pri man con ser_pa total pri man con ser_pa
2003 2004
total pri man con ser_pa total pri man con ser_pa
Table 25 – Part-time rate among individuals aged 15-64 by gender and economic sector (percentages)
84 A job is regarded as temporary if it is understood by both employer and the employee that the termination of the job is determined by objective
conditions such as reaching a certain date, completion of an assignment or return of another employee who has been temporary replaced. In the
case of a work contract of limited duration the condition for its termination is generally mentioned in the contract.
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Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: invpt: “could not find a full-time job”; wantpt: “did not want a full-time job”; illdis: “own illness or disability”; fam_per: “Family or personal
responsabilities; ineduc: “in education or training”; noreas: “no reason given”; other: “other reasons”.
1998
invpt wantpt illdis fam_per ineduc noreas other
2001
invpt wantpt illdis fam_per ineduc noreas other
2003
invpt wantpt illdis fam_per ineduc noreas other
2004
invpt wantpt illdis fam_per ineduc noreas other
EU-15 M+F 18.4 58.1 2.3 NA 11.2 1.9 8.0
F 16.2 64.9 1.8 NA 7.3 1.6 8.3
M 28.0 29.2 4.9 NA 27.9 3.1 6.9
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
M NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
EU-15 M+F 15.3 30.9 2.9 26.5 10.9 2.7 10.8
F 13.7 31.6 2.2 31.8 7.5 2.1 11.0
M 22.2 27.8 5.5 3.5 26.1 5.0 9.9
EU-25 M+F 16.1 30.7 3.6 25.3 10.8 2.5 11.0
F 14.3 31.5 2.6 30.7 7.5 2.1 11.2
M 23.5 27.2 7.3 3.2 24.3 4.4 10.0
EU-15 M+F 15.7 30.0 2.9 26.5 10.2 3.0 11.6
F 14.4 30.4 2.3 31.8 7.1 2.5 11.6
M 21.2 28.7 5.6 4.1 23.5 5.5 11.5
EU-25 M+F 16.7 29.5 3.6 25.3 10.2 2.9 11.8
F 15.2 30.0 2.7 30.8 7.1 2.4 11.8
M 22.3 27.4 7.2 3.7 22.6 5.0 11.8
EU-15 M+F 16.9 27.3 3.1 28.0 10.0 4.3 10.4
F 15.4 27.5 2.6 33.8 7.0 3.7 10.1
M 23.2 26.9 5.4 4.0 22.6 6.4 11.5
EU-25 M+F 17.7 27.1 3.7 26.7 10.1 4.1 10.6
F 16.1 27.3 2.9 32.7 7.0 3.6 10.4
M 24.0 26.1 6.8 3.6 21.9 5.9 11.7
Table 26 – Reasons for part-time employment among individuals aged 15-64 (percentages)
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employment in the enlarged EU, with
a large variation among individual
Member States. Tables 27 to 31
describe in some detail the major
characteristics of fixed-term employ-
ment. Using data from the EU LFS,
the relevant facts can be summarised
as follows: i) fixed-term work has a
moderate gender dimension (table
27); ii) temporary contracts are heavi-
ly concentrated among young people
(close to 40% for individuals aged 15-
24, table 27); iii) the proportion of
employees with temporary contracts is
highest for the lowest education level
(table 28); iv) the proportion of fixed-
term employment is higher in the pri-
mary and construction sectors and
lower in manufacturing (table 29); v) a
majority of individuals holding a tem-
porary contract (about half) report that
their status/situation is involuntary or
unwanted (i.e. they would prefer a per-
manent labour contract, see table 30),
although about one in five individuals
did not answer this question; and vi)
about two-thirds of all temporary con-
tracts have a duration under one year
(table 31), although according to a
number of studies this does not pre-
vent a high proportion of fixed-term
contracts being rolled over on expiry. 
The development of fixed-term
employment, together with that of
part-time work, has made a significant
contribution to increasing the flexibili-
ty of labour markets in recent years.
Temporary employment can be viewed
as a buffer for cyclical fluctuations,
especially in situations of increased
uncertainty, allowing firms to adjust
employment levels at a lower cost (e.g.
lower firing costs). This is particularly
so when, due to strong political or
trade union opposition, the option of
liberalising the strict regulations and
laws governing permanent employ-
ment is not immediately available,
leading instead to a strategy of “flexi-
bility at the margin”, represented by
the deregulation of fixed-term employ-
ment. Temporary employment can also
be seen as a mechanism that facilitates
transitions into the labour market and
employment, particularly in the Euro-
pean (continental) labour markets
characterised by relatively low flows.
There are important differences in the
perceptions of fixed-term versus part-
time employment that should be high-
lighted. In fact, while only about one
1998 2001
EU-15 M+F 12.7 37.4 10.1 6.0 13.4 38.7 10.8 6.2
F 13.6 36.1 11.2 6.1 14.6 38.2 12.1 6.6
M 12.0 38.5 9.2 5.9 12.5 39.2 9.7 5.9
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA 12.8 36.6 10.3 6.8
F NA NA NA NA 13.7 36.3 11.3 7.7
M NA NA NA NA 12.1 36.9 9.5 6.3
2003 2004
EU-15 M+F 12.9 37.6 10.6 5.8 13.4 38.7 11.1 5.8
F 14.0 37.1 12.0 6.0 14.3 37.6 12.5 6.2
M 12.0 38.2 9.4 5.6 12.5 39.7 9.9 5.6
EU-25 M+F 12.9 37.1 10.7 6.3 13.5 38.5 11.3 6.3
F 13.7 36.6 11.7 6.7 14.2 37.6 12.4 6.8
M 12.2 37.4 9.7 6.1 12.9 39.3 10.4 6.0
15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64 15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64
15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64 15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64
Table 27 – Employees with temporary contracts by gender and age group (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
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in five individuals report that part-
time working is involuntary (i.e. they
would prefer to have a permanent job),
nearly one in two individuals holding
a fixed-term contract would prefer a
permanent job instead. Moreover, the
available evidence suggests that fixed-
term posts are subject to high
turnover, contradicting the “causality
principle” under which fixed-term
contracts are supposed to be used only
for the temporary needs of firms85. In
addition, hourly wages in fixed-term
employment tend to be lower than in
permanent jobs by a factor of approx-
imately 10%. 
Other risks commonly associated with
temporary employment can be charac-
terised as typical economic externali-
ties. From a social perspective, invest-
ment in training is usually too low,
which can be partly explained by the
high labour turnover and the generally
low prospect of moving to a perma-
nent job, leading both the firm and the
employee to under-invest in vocation-
al training. 
In an insider-outsider wage bargaining
framework86 (e.g. Bentolila and Dola-
do87, 1994), the presence of a signifi-
cant proportion of temporary workers
may allow permanent workers to
negotiate or extract higher wages,
because the brunt of any quantity
adjustment in labour demand will tend
to fall on the fixed-term component of
the labour force.
The high proportion of temporary
employment in a number of EU Mem-
ber States (chart 79) may have a detri-
mental impact on the welfare of tem-
porary workers. In order to maintain
an adequate level of overall flexibility,
it would be preferable instead to
develop part-time work, given the
apparent preference of workers for
this type of work organisation. 
Given the high proportion of young
people holding a temporary contract,
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: 0-2: Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education – levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997); 3-4: Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
education – levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997); 5-6: Tertiary education – levels 5-6 (ISCED 1997); nkwn: not known.
1998 2001
EU-15 M+F 12.7 18.3 12.1 14.2 9.9 13.4 20.0 10.5 12.1 9.6
F 13.6 18.4 14.2 16.9 10.5 14.6 20.0 11.8 14.9 10.4
M 12.0 18.3 10.5 11.6 9.4 12.5 20.1 9.4 9.5 9.0
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA 12.8 19.8 10.2 11.4 9.6
F NA NA NA NA NA 13.7 19.5 11.2 13.8 10.5
M NA NA NA NA NA 12.1 19.9 9.3 9.2 9.0
EU-15 M+F 12.9 19.9 10.0 11.6 8.3 13.4 20.5 10.4 11.8 13.5
F 14.0 20.3 11.1 14.0 9.1 14.3 20.5 11.6 14.1 13.3
M 12.0 19.6 9.0 9.4 7.6 12.5 20.5 9.4 9.5 13.7
EU-25 M+F 12.9 19.9 10.5 11.3 8.3 13.5 20.6 11.2 11.6 13.5
F 13.7 20.1 11.3 13.4 9.1 14.2 20.4 12.0 13.7 13.3
M 12.2 19.8 9.8 9.3 7.7 12.9 20.8 10.5 9.5 13.7
total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn
2003 2004
total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn total 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn
Table 28 – Employees with temporary contracts among individuals aged 15-64 by gender 
and education level (percentages)
85 Ayuso i Casals (2004), “Fixed-term contracts in Spain: a mixed blessing?”, ECFIN Country Focus, v.1, No 1.
86 Where wage formation is controlled by insider/permanent employees protected by high firing costs.
87 Bentolila and Dolado (1994), “Labour flexibility and wages: Lessons from Spain”, Economic Policy, volume 18.
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together with the relatively low proba-
bility of moving into a permanent
position, this situation might be nega-
tively affecting fertility rates in a num-
ber of countries (e.g. Spain), due to
couples having difficulties in estab-
lishing themselves as independent
households (Toharia and Malo88,
2000).
Summing up, the development of
fixed-term employment involves con-
siderably more risks (both for the
worker and society) than part-time
work. The available evidence suggests
that excessive reliance on fixed-term
contracts can produce a segmented
labour market (between temporary
and permanent workers), making it
more difficult to make the transition
from a fixed-term to a permanent job.
In this respect, it should be mentioned
that on average in the EU-15, the
probability of moving from temporary
to permanent employment is relatively
low. Employment in Europe 200489
estimated that even after a period of
six years, the probability of moving
from a temporary to a permanent job
was only slightly above 50%, with a
20% probability of becoming unem-
ployed or leaving the labour force. 
3.2.10. Inactivity
The Employment Guidelines90 (EG)
focus to a large extent on inactivity91,
calling on Member States to: 
EU-15 M+F 12.7 30.4 9.8 18.8 12.9 13.4 34.0 10.1 19.7 13.6
F 13.6 36.0 11.5 11.5 13.9 14.6 39.7 12.0 11.9 14.9
M 12.0 28.1 9.2 19.5 11.7 12.5 31.6 9.4 20.4 11.9
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA 12.8 29.3 9.6 19.1 13.0
F NA NA NA NA NA 13.7 34.1 11.2 10.9 14.1
M NA NA NA NA NA 12.1 27.3 8.9 19.9 11.6
EU-15 M+F 12.9 31.7 9.2 19.9 13.2 13.4 34.0 9.7 20.5 13.6
F 14.0 38.8 10.9 12.0 14.5 14.3 40.1 11.3 11.2 14.8
M 12.0 28.9 8.6 20.7 11.6 12.5 31.5 9.1 21.4 12.1
EU-25 M+F 12.9 28.4 9.7 20.0 13.1 13.5 30.3 10.6 20.6 13.7
F 13.7 33.9 11.2 11.6 14.1 14.2 35.6 12.2 10.7 14.6
M 12.2 26.2 9.1 20.9 11.7 12.9 28.2 9.9 21.6 12.3
1998 2001
total pri man con ser_pa total pri man con ser_pa
2003 2004
total pri man con ser_pa total pri man con ser_pa
Table 29 – Employees with temporary contracts among individuals aged 15-64 by gender 
and economic sector (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: pri: primary sector (A to B of Nace); man: manufacturing sector (C to E of Nace); con: construction (F of NACE); ser_pa: services without
public administration (G to K + M to Q of NACE).
88 Toharia and Malo (2000), “The Spanish experiment. Pros and cons of flexibility at the margin”, in Esping-Anderson and Regini (eds.), Why
deregulate labour markets?, Oxford University Press.
89 Chapter 4.
90 Specifically, the first, fifth and eight Employment Guidelines for 2003-2005.
91 The Labour Force Survey defines inactive persons as the population of working age (15 years and above) excluding persons in employment and
unemployed persons. A person is considered as having employment if he or she did any work for pay or profit during the reference week, even
for as little as one hour. In accordance with the International Labour Organisation guidelines, unemployed persons comprise persons who, dur-
ing the reference week, were: (a) without work; (b) currently available for work; and (c) actively seeking work. 
 
• Develop and implement active and
preventive measures for the unem-
ployed and the inactive to prevent
inflow into long-term unemploy-
ment, and to promote the sustain-
able integration into employment of
unemployed and inactive people;
• Promote active ageing, notably by
fostering working conditions con-
ducive to job retention;
• Eliminate incentives for early exit-
ing from the labour market, notably
by reforming early retirement
schemes and ensuring that it pays
to remain active in the labour mar-
ket, and encouraging employers to
employ older workers; 
• Reform financial incentives with a
view to making work attractive […].
[…] where appropriate, reform tax
and benefit systems and their inter-
action with a view to eliminating
unemployment, poverty and inactiv-
ity traps, and encouraging the par-
ticipation of women, low-skilled
workers, older workers, people with
disabilities and those furthest from
the labour market in employment. 
Moreover, a target has been set for the
EU as a whole aiming for the effective
average exit age from the labour force
to rise by five years by 2010 (estimat-
ed at 59.9 years in 2001).
Given the importance of this subject in
the EES, combined with the UK Pres-
idency’s objective of addressing “inac-
tivity issues”, the fifth chapter of this
report extensively covers this topic.
Therefore, this section presents only
some general facts in order to broadly
characterise inactivity and ensure a
balanced coverage of all the main rel-
evant issues pertaining to the EES. 
Inactivity has a strong life-cycle pat-
tern, reflecting the changing domi-
nance of different activities during a
typical life (i.e. from education in
youth, to labour market participation
in prime age, to retirement in old age).
Between 2001 and 2004, the propor-
tion of inactive older people (aged 55-
64) in the total population of the same
age group declined by about 4 per-
centage points (table 32). This reflects
a concomitant rise in the employment
rate for older workers (table 15). 
There is a strong negative correlation
between inactivity and education
attainment levels (table 33). 
Chapter 2. Taking stock of the European Employment Strategy (EES)
107
1998 2001
EU-15 M+F 39.4 9.0 19.7 4.6 27.4 35.1 6.2 18.1 7.2 33.4
F 37.6 11.2 18.1 4.1 29.0 33.9 7.4 16.8 6.9 35.1
M 41.0 7.0 21.1 4.9 25.9 36.2 5.2 19.5 7.4 31.7
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA 36.9 6.8 18.1 7.5 30.7
F NA NA NA NA NA 35.5 7.8 17.0 7.2 32.5
M NA NA NA NA NA 38.3 5.8 19.1 7.7 29.1
EU-15 M+F 44.3 9.2 17.5 6.7 22.3 47.0 9.1 17.3 6.3 20.3
F 45.0 10.3 15.9 6.4 22.3 48.6 9.9 15.3 6.0 20.1
M 43.6 8.1 19.0 7.0 22.2 45.5 8.3 19.1 6.5 20.5
EU-25 M+F 45.3 9.7 16.1 7.2 21.6 48.4 9.1 15.5 6.8 20.2
F 46.0 10.5 15.0 6.8 21.7 49.5 10.0 14.1 6.6 19.9
M 44.7 9.0 17.2 7.6 21.5 47.3 8.4 16.8 7.0 20.5
invtmp wanttmp ineduc stage noreas invtmp wanttmp ineduc stage noreas
2003 2004
invtmp wanttmp ineduc stage noreas invtmp wanttmp ineduc stage noreas
Table 30 – Reasons for temporary employment among individuals aged 15-64 (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: invtmp: “could not find a permanent job”; wanttmp: “did not want a permanent job”; ineduc: “in education or training”; stage: “probationary
period”; noreas: “no reason given”.
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Table 31 – Distribution of the duration of temporary employment (in months) among individuals 
aged 15-64 (percentages)
EU-15 M+F 36.2 27.9 11.3 12.6 12.0 35.9 26.4 11.6 13.3 12.8
F 34.6 31.1 11.6 12.6 10.2 35.7 29.0 11.8 13.0 10.4
M 37.7 25.1 11.1 12.6 13.6 36.1 23.8 11.4 13.6 15.1
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA 37.6 27.4 11.2 12.1 11.7
F NA NA NA NA NA 36.7 30.1 11.5 12.1 9.7
M NA NA NA NA NA 38.5 24.7 10.9 12.2 13.6
EU-15 M+F 37.2 25.6 10.6 13.7 13.0 38.1 26.5 10.4 12.8 12.2
F 37.0 27.8 10.9 13.3 11.0 37.8 29.5 10.5 12.4 9.8
M 37.4 23.2 10.2 14.1 15.1 38.3 23.4 10.4 13.2 14.7
EU-25 M+F 38.8 26.0 10.7 12.3 12.1 38.8 27.6 10.4 11.5 11.7
F 37.8 28.3 11.1 12.3 10.6 37.8 30.5 10.5 11.5 9.8
M 39.8 23.7 10.4 12.4 13.7 39.8 24.7 10.3 11.6 13.6
0-6M 7-12M 13-24M 25-36M GT_36M 0-6M 7-12M 13-24M 25-36M GT_36M
2003 2004
0-6M 7-12M 13-24M 25-36M GT_36M 0-6M 7-12M 13-24M 25-36M GT_36M
1998 2001
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
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According to the Labour Force Sur-
vey, individuals quote the following
reasons, among others, for being inac-
tive (table 34): i) education or train-
ing; ii) retirement; iii) family or per-
sonal responsibilities; and iv) own ill-
ness or disability. Additionally,
between 10 and 15 percent of respon-
dents did not answer the question. 
According to the data, almost 15 per-
cent of inactive persons say that they
would be willing to work (table 35),
which, together with an inactivity rate
of about 30% (table 32), suggests the
existence of a large pool of discour-
aged potential workers. Nevertheless,
a positive answer to this question does
not necessarily mean that a person was
taking steps to find work or would
accept a job were one to be offered. 
3.2.11. The role of active labour
market policies (ALMPs)
The Employment Guidelines92 call for
Member States to develop and imple-
ment active and preventive measures
to prevent inflow into long-term unem-
ployment, and to promote the sustain-
able integration into employment of
unemployed and inactive people. 
Compliance with these guidelines is
likely to require the strengthening of
active labour market policies93 in
many EU Member States. Using
Eurostat data (Labour Market Policy
database), table 36 presents a break-
down of government expenditure on
labour market policies as a percent-
age of GDP for the period 1998 to
2003. 
In the EU-15, the average government
expenditure on ALMPs amounted to
0.7 percent of GDP in 200394. There is
a wide dispersion in active labour
market spending across Member
States95 and also large differences in
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Table 32 – Ratio of inactive persons to the total population by gender and age groups (percentages)
1998 2001
EU-15 M+F 31.8 53.4 17.0 60.0 31.0 52.8 16.4 59.0
F 41.7 57.1 27.6 71.2 40.0 56.4 26.0 69.2
M 22.0 49.8 6.5 48.3 22.0 49.3 6.8 48.4
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA 31.4 54.4 16.0 60.2
F NA NA NA NA 39.9 58.0 25.0 70.5
M NA NA NA NA 22.8 50.9 7.0 49.4
2003 2004
EU-15 M+F 30.0 53.0 15.7 55.7 29.6 52.8 15.4 54.7
F 38.4 56.4 24.6 65.9 37.7 56.2 24.0 64.7
M 21.5 49.6 6.8 45.0 21.5 49.5 6.9 44.3
EU-25 M+F 30.7 55.2 15.5 57.1 30.5 55.4 15.2 56.2
F 38.8 58.8 23.8 67.3 38.3 58.9 23.3 66.2
M 22.6 51.7 7.1 46.3 22.6 51.9 7.1 45.7
15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64 15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64
15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64 15-64 15-24 25-49 55-64
92 Specifically, the first Employment Guideline for 2003-2005.
93 The general purpose of policies grouped under the heading of active labour market policies (ALMPs) is to provide assistance to the unemployed,
which will improve their chances of obtaining work. By contrast, passive measures essentially refer to income support measures such as unem-
ployment benefits. 
94 Latest year for which there are data. 
95 An unweighted standard deviation of 1/2. 
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the proportion of total spending on
active labour market policies96.
Using pooled macro-panel data,
Employment in Europe 200497 carried
out an econometric analysis of the
determinants of employment rate vari-
ations across Europe. OECD data on
expenditure on various ALMPs were
used, among many other regressors98.
The findings of that analysis suggest
that an increase in the intensity of
spending on ALMPs (defined as the
percentage of GDP allocated to active
policies divided by the unemployment
rate) accounts for 10% to 20% of the
total increase in the employment rate
observed between 1997 and 2002.
Using OECD’s expenditure break-
down for ALMPs, the results of that
analysis suggest that the expenditure
category with the most significant and
positive impact on the employment
rate is spending on public employment
services and administration (i.e. job
search assistance). 
The evidence from cross-country
analyses is that ALMPs significantly
reduce unemployment (Scarpetta99,
1996; Nickell100, 1997; Elmeskov et
al.101, 1998). This finding is backed up
Table 33 – Distribution of inactive persons aged 15-64 by gender and education level (percentages)
1998 2001
0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn
EU-15 M+F 42.0 17.9 4.2 35.9 54.1 32.4 7.9 5.6
F 43.2 17.2 4.1 35.4 55.1 31.5 7.5 5.8
M 39.7 19.2 4.3 36.8 52.2 33.9 8.6 5.3
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA 53.3 34.8 7.2 4.7
F NA NA NA NA 53.9 34.2 7.0 4.9
M NA NA NA NA 52.2 35.9 7.5 4.3
EU-15 M+F 52.7 33.1 8.5 5.6 52.1 34.2 8.9 4.8
F 53.8 32.3 8.1 5.8 52.8 33.6 8.5 5.1
M 50.9 34.6 9.2 5.3 51.0 35.2 9.5 4.3
EU-25 M+F 51.7 36.0 7.7 4.6 50.9 37.1 8.1 3.9
F 52.2 35.5 7.5 4.8 51.0 36.8 8.0 4.2
M 50.9 36.9 8.0 4.2 50.6 37.6 8.4 3.4
0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn 0-2 3-4 5-6 nkwn
2003 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: 0-2: Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education – levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997); 3-4: Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
education – levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997); 5-6: Tertiary education – levels 5-6 (ISCED 1997); nkwn: not known.
96 From less than 15% to more than 50%.
97 Chapter 2.
98 In the regressions, data from the OECD Social Expenditure database were used because they provide a longer series than Eurostat sources.
OECD’s and Eurostat’s data are not directly comparable due to the use of different categories for the breakdown of total spending on ALMPs.
OECD’s Social Expenditure database breaks down total expenditure on ALMPs into the following categories: i) labour market training; ii) youth
measures; iii) subsidised employment; iv) employment measures for the disabled; and v) employment services and administration. 
99 Scarpetta S. (1996), “Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional settings on unemployment: a cross country study”, OECD
Economic Studies, vol. 26, pp. 43-98.
100 Nickell, S (1997), “Unemployment and labour market rigidities: Europe versus North America”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11(3),
pp. 55-74.
101 Elmeskov J., Martin J, and Scarpetta S (1998), “Key lessons for labour market reforms: evidence from OECD countries’ experiences”, Swedish
Economic Policy Review, vol. 5(2), pp. 205-252. 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: layoff: “awaiting recall to work (on lay-off); illdis: “own illness or disability”; fam_per: “familiar or personal responsibilities”; ineduc: “in
education or training”; retired: “retired”; thknowk: “think no work is available”; noreas: “no reason given”; other:” other reasons”.
2003
2004
1998
2001
Table 34 – Reasons for inactivity among persons aged 15-64 (percentages)
layoff illdis fam_per ineduc retired thknowk noreas other
EU-15 M+F NA 8.3 23.2 28.5 16.8 1.4 11.9 9.9
F NA 6.2 34.2 22.2 12.3 1.6 12.0 11.5
M NA 12.2 2.2 40.6 25.3 1.1 11.9 6.7
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
M NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
layoff illdis fam_per ineduc retired thknowk noreas other
EU-15 M+F NA 9.5 19.9 28.2 17.2 3.6 12.2 9.4
F NA 7.2 29.7 22.3 12.9 3.9 12.4 11.7
M NA 13.8 1.7 39.0 25.2 3.1 11.8 5.3
EU-25 M+F NA 11.1 18.6 29.8 18.2 3.6 10.3 8.4
F NA 8.5 28.1 23.8 14.9 3.7 10.6 10.3
M NA 15.7 1.6 40.3 24.2 3.4 9.7 5.1
layoff illdis fam_per ineduc retired thknowk noreas other
EU-15 M+F NA 9.3 18.9 23.1 19.5 3.7 16.7 8.7
F NA 7.1 28.5 18.3 14.7 3.9 16.5 10.9
M NA 13.1 1.7 31.9 28.3 3.3 17.0 4.7
EU-25 M+F NA 10.9 17.7 26.0 20.0 3.7 13.9 7.8
F NA 8.4 27.0 20.9 16.4 3.8 13.9 9.6
M NA 15.2 1.5 34.9 26.2 3.5 13.9 4.7
layoff illdis fam_per ineduc retired thknowk noreas other
EU-15 M+F 0.3 9.8 15.7 22.7 18.5 4.5 15.8 12.6
F 0.2 7.7 23.7 18.2 14.1 4.7 15.5 16.0
M 0.4 13.5 1.5 30.9 26.5 4.0 16.5 6.7
EU-25 M+F 0.3 11.4 15.1 25.8 19.1 4.4 12.8 11.2
F 0.2 9.0 23.1 20.9 15.8 4.5 12.6 13.9
M 0.4 15.6 1.3 34.4 24.8 4.1 13.1 6.4
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by numerous micro panel studies102,
which show that certain active labour
market policies are effective. In partic-
ular, public employment services and
administration tend to have consistent-
ly positive outcomes, but other types
of measure such as employment subsi-
dies and labour market training must
be well designed if they are to have a
significant impact. As regards train-
ing, the results are generally poor
other than making the unemployed
job-ready, though it works better for
women (Walsh et al., 2005)103. 
Some studies104 suggest that (certain)
ALMPs can reduce the potential
trade-off between efficiency and equi-
ty, which, translated into the overarch-
ing objectives of the EES, basically
means solving the possible dilemma
between labour market participation
and social cohesion. Following this
through, Groot et al. (2004) find that
spending on ALMPs, especially in
certain types of measures, can simul-
taneously raise the rate of participa-
tion, lower the rate of unemployment
and reduce income inequality. This
result contrasts with the estimated
(1) Training  --- 0.33 --- 0.28 0.29 0.28
(2) Job rotation and job sharing --- 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(3) Employment incentives --- 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
(4) Integration of the disabled 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
(5) Direct job creation --- 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14
(6) Start-up incentives 0.02 0.02 --- 0.03 0.02 0.03
(1) to (6): "Active measures" --- 0.80 --- 0.73 0.73 0.70
(8) Out-of-work income --- 1.34 --- 1.16 1.26 1.34
(9) Early retirement --- 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
(8) to (9): "Passive measures" --- 1.44 --- 1.26 1.35 1.43
(2) to (9): Total measures --- 2.24 --- 1.98 2.08 2.13
% of "Active measures" in total  --- 35.8 --- 36.7 35.0 32.8
Table 36 – Government expenditure on active labour market policies in the EU-15 as percentage of
GDP (unless otherwise stated)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Table 35 – Willingness to work of inactive persons 
aged 15-64 (percentages)
EU-15 M+F 11.5 11.2 10.0 9.7 10.8 10.4 13.8 13.2
F 11.6 11.4 10.1 9.8 10.8 10.5 13.8 13.4
M 11.4 11.0 9.9 9.4 10.8 10.2 13.6 12.9
EU-25 M+F NA NA 11.1 10.5 11.9 11.5 14.2 13.7
F NA NA 11.1 10.5 11.8 11.5 14.2 13.8
M NA NA 11.3 10.5 12.1 11.5 14.2 13.5
a b a b a b a b
1998 2001 2003 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: a) Fraction of those willing to work over total respondents.
b) Fraction of those willing to work over total respondents and non-respondents.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Market Policy database, August 2005.
102 Martin J (2000), “What works among active labour market policies? Evidence from OECD countries”, OECD Economic Studies, nº30, pp. 79-112. 
103 Walsh K. and Parsons D. (2005), “Active policies and measures: impact on integration and reintegration in the labour market and social life”,
Third Research Report on Vocational Education and Training in Europe, Thessaloniki, CEDEFOP.
104 Koning and Vollaard (2000), Martin (2000), OECD (2001) and Groot et al. (2004).
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effects of other polices, notably the
replacement rate, duration of unem-
ployment benefit and the employment
protection legislation, which all seem
to lead to a trade-off between partici-
pation and income distribution105.
Although this analysis cannot be
taken as conclusive evidence, these
results nevertheless suggest that EU
Member States can improve partici-
pation while maintaining income
cohesion by spending/investing in
ALMPs of the right sort. As an exam-
ple, the high level of ALMPs spend-
ing in some countries (e.g. in Scandi-
navia) might be partly to offset their
rather generous unemployment bene-
fit systems and to push unemployed
individuals back to work (Nickell et
al.106, 2005). 
3.3. Quality and productivity
at work
Improving quality and productivity at
work is one of the three overarching
objectives of the Employment Guide-
lines for the period 2003-2005, in
addition to full employment and
social cohesion and inclusion. Quality
is a complex concept with many inter-
acting facets, such as the working
environment, equal opportunities, the
reconciliation of working and person-
al life, lifelong learning, health and
safety, contractual security and job
satisfaction. Bringing the concept of
quality of work into operation has
posed difficulties. Nonetheless, in
2001 the Council agreed to assess
progress using a set of quality indica-
tors founded on the ten dimensions of
quality in work identified by the
Commission107 and a progress report
was prepared in 2003108.
There is a positive link, with potential-
ly wide-ranging synergies, between
quality and productivity at work. In
particular, improvements in work
organisation and in working condi-
tions, as well as in the quality and effi-
ciency of investment in human capital
and training, are essential for any
improvements in productivity. 
For an extensive discussion of the
quality of work indicators, see
COM(2003) 728 final. In this chapter,
the analysis uses data for both the
EU-15 and the EU-25 separately,
reflecting the difficulties in collecting
data covering a sufficiently long time
span for the new Member States.
However, it is interesting to note that
the analysis remains broadly
unchanged (in qualitative terms)
whether considering either the EU-15
or the EU-25. 
3.3.1. Human capital investment and
lifelong learning
In recent years, some progress has
been made in raising the EU average
level of participation in lifelong learn-
ing109. Since 1997, the ratio of the
adult working-age population (25 to
64 age group) participation in lifelong
learning increased from 5.7% to
10.6% in 2004 in the EU-15 (table
37). In the EU-25 (table 38), this indi-
cator has also improved in recent years
(though less markedly), increasing
from 7.9% in 2000 to 9.9% in 2004.
However, after correcting for some
statistical breaks, the lifelong learning
ratio is estimated to have increased by
less than 1 percentage point since
2000. At this pace of progress, the
overall target of 12.5% for 2010 in the
EU as a whole is unlikely to be
reached110. 
Although the level of participation in
lifelong learning has increased in
recent years in many EU Member
States, the social return of these active
labour market programmes, especially
for some disadvantaged groups such
as youth and low-skilled workers,
remains largely to be evaluated. More-
over, a number of empirical studies
have questioned the effectiveness of
these programmes111. 
105 In addition, liberalisation of these policies usually meets strong political and social resistance due to their anticipated impact on income distri-
bution.
106 Nickell S, Nunziata L, and Ochel W. (2005), “Unemployment in the OECD since 1960s. What do we know?”, The Economic Journal, 115, pp.
1-27.
107 The Employment Committee agreed a list of indicators on quality in work under the ten dimensions. These indicators were approved by the
Council and communicated to the Laeken European Council in December 2001: “Indicators of Quality in Work, Report by the Employment
Committee to the Council, 14263/01, 23.11.2001. The ten dimensions of quality are: i) intrinsic job quality; ii) skills, lifelong learning and
career development; iii) gender equality; iv) health and safety at work; v) flexibility and security; vi) inclusion and access to the labour market;
vii) work organisation and work-life balance; viii) social dialogue and worker involvement; ix) diversity and non-discrimination; and x) over-
all work performance.
108 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, Improving quality in work: a review of recent progress, COM(2003) 728 final.
109 A note of caution is necessary. Definitions of lifelong learning vary across Member States. Although they generally include only structured
learning (i.e. courses), their contents can vary from a more “leisure” type to studying for a professional qualification. 
110 Across the EU, this target has already been achieved in 6 countries (DK, NL, SI, FI, SE and UK).
111 Heckman et al. (1999), “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs”, Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3a.
Goux and Maurin (2000), “Returns to Firm Provided Training: Evidence from French Worker-Firm Matched Data”, Labour Economics, vol.
7(1), pp. 1-20.
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Lifelong learning – total (a) 5.7 NA 8.2 8.4 8.3 8.5 9.9 10.6
Lifelong learning – women 5.6 NA 8.5 8.9 8.9 9.1 10.7 11.4
Lifelong learning – men 5.9 NA 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.8 9.1 9.8
Youth education attainment – total (b) 69.6 NA 72.4 73.5 73.3 73.8 73.7 73.8
Youth education attainment – women 71.9 NA 75.0 76.5 76.3 76.8 76.3 77.0
Youth education attainment – men 67.2 NA 69.6 70.5 70.3 70.7 71.0 70.7
Gender pay gap (non adjusted) (c) 16.0 16.0 15.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 NA
Total employment rate (d) 60.6 61.4 62.6 63.4 64.0 64.2 64.3 64.7
Employment rate – women 50.8 51.6 53.0 54.1 55.0 55.6 56.0 56.8
Employment rate – men 70.6 71.2 72.1 72.8 73.1 72.8 72.7 72.7
Employment rate (15 to 24 years) 37.2 38.2 39.6 40.5 40.9 40.6 39.9 40.0
Employment rate (25 to 54 years) 73.9 74.6 75.7 76.5 77.0 77.1 77.1 77.6
Employment rate (55 to 64 years) 36.4 36.6 37.1 37.8 38.8 40.2 41.7 42.5
Part-time work (e) 16.7 17.3 17.5 17.7 17.9 18.1 18.5 19.4
Fixed-time work (f) 12.4 13.0 13.4 13.7 13.5 13.1 13.1 13.6
Total unemployment rate (g) 9.8 9.3 8.5 7.6 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.1
Unemployment rate – women 11.8 11.2 10.3 9.3 8.7 8.9 9.2 9.3
Unemployment rate – men 8.4 7.8 7.1 6.4 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.1
Total long-term unemployment rate (h) 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4
Long-term unemployment rate – women 5.9 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.0
Long-term unemployment rate – men 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0
Youth unemployment rate (i) 20.6 19.0 17.1 15.3 15.1 15.6 16.3 16.6
Serious accidents at work – total (j) 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 94.0 86.0 NA NA
Serious accidents at work – women 99.0 100.0 101.0 103.0 100.0 96.0 NA NA
Serious accidents at work – men 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 93.0 88.0 NA NA
Total early school-leavers (k) 20.6 NA 20.5 19.4 18.9 18.6 18.3 17.8
Early school-leavers – women 18.7 NA 18.5 17.1 16.6 16.2 16.1 15.3
Early school-leavers – men 22.7 NA 22.6 21.7 21.3 21.1 20.4 20.4
At risk of poverty rate before social transfers – total (l) 25.0 24.0 24.0 23.0 24.0 NA NA NA
At risk of poverty rate after social transfers – total 16.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 16.0 NA NA NA
Table 37 – Selected indicators for the EU-15
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Eurostat, Structural and Employment indicators.
Note: (a) Adult participation in education and training, percentage of the population aged 25-64 participating in education and training over the four weeks
prior to the survey; (b) Percentage of the total population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education; (c) Difference between men’s
and women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of men’s gross hourly earnings; (d) Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the total
population of the same age group; (e) Part-time workers as percentage of total employment; (f) Percentage of employees with temporary contracts; (g)
Unemployed persons as a percentage of the total active population; (h) Long-term unemployed (12 months and more) as a percentage of the active population;
(i) Unemployed population aged 15 to 24 as a percentage of the total population of the same age group; (j) Index of the number of serious accidents at work
per 100 000 persons in employment (1998=100); (k) Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further
education or training; (l) Percentage of persons with an equivalised disposable income, before social transfers, below the risk-of-poverty threshold, set at 60%
of the median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). For EU aggregates, this indicator is computed as a population weighted average of
available national data. 
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Source: Eurostat, Structural and Employment indicators.
Note: See table 37 for legend.
Lifelong learning – total (a) NA NA NA 7.9 7.8 7.9 9.2 9.9
Lifelong learning – women NA NA NA 8.4 8.4 8.5 9.9 10.7
Lifelong learning – men NA NA NA 7.4 7.2 7.2 8.4 9.0
Youth education attainment – total (b) NA NA 74.8 76.4 76.5 76.5 76.5 76.7
Youth education attainment – women NA NA 77.3 79.2 79.0 79.5 79.1 79.6
Youth education attainment – men NA NA 72.2 73.5 73.4 73.6 74.0 73.8
Gender pay gap (non adjusted) (c) 16.0 17.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 15.0 NA
Total employment rate (d) 60.6 61.2 62.0 62.4 62.8 62.8 62.9 63.3
Employment rate – women 51.1 51.8 52.9 53.6 54.3 54.7 55.0 55.7
Employment rate – men 70.2 70.6 71.0 71.2 71.3 71.0 70.8 70.9
Employment rate (15 to 24 years) 36.4 37.1 37.8 38.1 38.1 37.5 36.9 36.8
Employment rate (25 to 54 years) 74.3 74.9 75.6 76.0 76.3 76.3 76.4 76.8
Employment rate (55 to 64 years) 35.7 35.8 36.2 36.6 37.5 38.7 40.2 41.0
Part-time work (e) 16.0 15.9 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.6 17.0 17.7
Fixed-time work (f) 11.7 11.8 12.3 12.6 12.9 12.9 13 13.7
Total unemployment rate (g) NA 9.5 9.1 8.6 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.0
Unemployment rate – women NA 11.3 10.8 10.2 9.9 10.0 10.2 10.2
Unemployment rate – men NA 8.0 7.7 7.3 7.3 7.7 8.0 8.1
Total long-term unemployment rate (h) 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
Long-term unemployment rate – women 6.1 5.5 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7
Long-term unemployment rate – men 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6
Youth unemployment rate (i) NA 19.4 18.4 17.4 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.7
Serious accidents at work – total (j) NA 100.0 100.0 99.0 95.0 88.0 NA NA
Serious accidents at work – women NA 100.0 101.0 104.0 101.0 97.0 NA NA
Serious accidents at work – men NA 100.0 100.0 98.0 94.0 89.0 NA NA
Total early school-leavers (k) NA NA NA 17.3 16.9 16.6 16.1 15.7
Early school-leavers – women NA NA NA 15.2 14.7 14.3 14.1 13.3
Early school-leavers – men NA NA NA 19.4 19.1 18.9 18.1 18.1
At risk of poverty rate before social transfers – total (l) NA NA NA NA 24.0 NA NA NA
At risk of poverty rate after social transfers – total NA NA NA NA 15.0 NA NA NA
Table 38 – Selected indicators for the EU-25
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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The youth education attainment level
(measured as the percentage of the
total population aged 20 to 24 having
completed at least upper secondary
education) has continued to rise in the
EU. This indicator increased by a full 4
percentage points in the EU-15
between 1997 and 2004, reaching
73.8%112. The EU enlargement of May
2004 has increased by about 3 percent-
age points the average level of youth
education attainment, reflecting the
overall favourable position in the new
Member States. The above-average
performance of new Member States as
regards youth education attainment
levels contrasts with their below-aver-
age performance in other EES targets,
notably those related to employment
rates. Among the 25 EU Member
States, nine had already attained in
2004 the youth education attainment
target of 85%113 for 2010, including
five new Member States. However, a
number of Member States remain in a
particularly unfavourable position114.
Where gender mainstreaming is con-
cerned, the existence of a positive gap
favourable to women across Member
States should be noted. Overall, the
gender gap favourable to women
reached over 5 percentage points in
2004 in the EU-25 (table 38). 
Despite the general increase in educa-
tion attainment levels across the EU,
earnings data suggest that the degree
of inequality115 has increased between
the 1990s and the early 2000s in a
number of EU Member States, partic-
ularly in DE, ES, FR, IT, and PL (see
Chapter 4).
The importance of raising the educa-
tion level of the (working-age) popula-
tion in general and of the youth popu-
lation in particular, aiming to equip all
individuals with the skills required for
a modern workforce in a knowledge-
based society, should not be underesti-
mated. Furthermore, the quality of the
labour supply and the willingness of
individuals to participate in the labour
market are highly correlated with edu-
cation attainment levels (table 30). In
this respect, any ongoing rise in educa-
tion levels is likely to contribute
towards reaching the employment rate
targets set for 2010.
1998 2001
M+F F M M+F F M
2003 2004
M+F F M M+F F M
EU-15 Total 61.4 51.6 71.2 64.1 55.0 73.2
0-2 48.1 34.4 62.4 49.3 37.5 62.0
3-4 64.9 55.9 73.6 70.3 63.3 77.1
5-6 78.7 73.1 84.3 82.9 78.5 86.9
EU-25 Total 61.2 51.9 70.6 62.9 54.3 71.4
0-2 NA NA NA 46.7 35.8 58.5
3-4 NA NA NA 68.8 61.9 75.5
5-6 NA NA NA 83.0 78.7 87.0
EU-15 Total 64.4 56.1 72.8 64.8 57.0 72.7
0-2 49.5 38.1 61.6 49.2 38.0 60.8
3-4 70.2 63.8 76.4 70.1 63.8 76.3
5-6 82.5 78.7 86.1 82.5 78.9 86.0
EU-25 Total 63.0 55.1 70.9 63.3 55.8 70.9
0-2 46.6 36.2 57.8 46.2 36.0 57.0
3-4 68.4 61.9 74.7 68.3 61.8 74.6
5-6 82.5 78.8 86.1 82.5 78.9 86.0
Table 39 – Employment rates among individuals aged 15-64 by
highest level of education attained (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS (annual averages based on quarterly data).
Note: 0-2: Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education – levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997). 
3-4:Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education – levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997). 
5-6: Tertiary education – levels 5-6 (ISCED 1997).
112 However, and particularly for some Member States, breaks in series affect comparability.
113 CZ, IE, LT, AT, PL, SI, SK, FI, and SE. 
114 MT, PT, ES and IT.
115 As measured by the ratio between decile 9 to decile 1 of the earnings distribution.
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3.3.2. Productivity developments
This section looks at aggregate pro-
ductivity developments in the EU and
the United States, suggesting some
major reasons for the different trends
observed in recent years116. It also
projects developments up to 2006
based on the Commission’s Spring
2005 forecast117.
3.3.2.1. A long-term perspective
The process of real convergence
between the EU and the US in terms
of per capita GDP (measured at pur-
chasing power standard (PPS) prices)
petered out around the early 1970s,
following the rapid progress achieved
after the Second World War. In terms
of per capita GDP at PPS, the EU-15
has made no significant progress since
the 1970s in closing the gap, which
hovers at around 30 percentage points
(chart 80). This gap can be largely
explained by lower total labour input
(both a lower employment rate and
fewer hours worked per worker) and
lower productivity per hour. A break-
down suggests that roughly two-thirds
of the differential is due to the under-
utilisation of labour, while the other
third is related to lower hourly labour
productivity. 
However, the lack of progress in rela-
tive GDP per capita over the past thir-
ty years or so does not mean that the
EU has a substantially lower welfare
level than the US and has been unable
to catch up. The GDP per capita gap
mainly reflects the reduction in the
average number of hours worked per
worker in the EU-15, and only to a
lesser extent the lag in terms of hourly
productivity. Labour productivity,
measured as GDP per hour worked,
has increased much faster in the EU-
15 than in the United States. EU-15
hourly productivity, which stood at
about 65% of the US level in the mid-
1960s, now stands at roughly 90%
(chart 81). 
When compared with the US, the
largest Member States of the EU-15
have tended to show a greater willing-
ness to trade off income for leisure118.
Had relative hours worked per worker
remained the same, the EU would,
other things being equal, now have a
per capita income level closer to that
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Chart 80 – Relative indices EU-15 compared to the US (US=100) 
Source: Ameco, GGDC-OECD, and DG EMPL calculations.
116 In the short- to medium-term, productivity and employment display significant co-movements, reflecting cyclical conditions in the economy. It
is only over the longer term that these two variables can be seen as independent, according to both theoretical considerations and empirical evi-
dence (see the “European Economy: 2004 Review”, European Commission).
117 Data for annual working hours per worker is taken from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) database. It is also assumed
that over the period 2005-2006 the average annual hours worked per worker will stabilise at their 2004 values. 
118 As an example, and according to the GGDC database, between 1980 and 2004 the average annual number of hours worked per person employed
fell by more than 10% in DE, FR, ES, and the NL, and by close to 8% in IT and the UK. In the US over the same period, the average annual
number of hours worked per person employed fell only by almost 2%.
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Chart 81 – Relative indices EU-15 compared to the US (US=100)
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Chart 82 – Relative indices of total factor and hourly productivity EU-15 compared to the US 
Source: Ameco, GGDC-OECD, and EMPL calculations.
Note: Total factor productivity: EU/US (1960=100).
Source: Ameco, GGDC-OECD, and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: (1) Calculated as: Employment rate = 100 * GDP per capita / Labour productivity per person employed. (2) Calculated as: Hours worked
per worker = 100 * Labour productivity per person employed / Hourly labour productivity. (3) Calculated as: Total labour supply = Employment
Rate * Hours worked per worker.
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of the US. This assumes, of course,
that neither the higher unemployment
rate in the EU nor the higher capital to
labour ratio played a major role in
raising the measured (hourly) labour
productivity119. The close link between
relative hourly labour productivity
and relative total factor productivity
(chart 82) does not call for rejecting
this assumption.
Two major competing causes are usu-
ally put forward to explain the decline
in the average number of hours
worked per worker. Firstly, the prefer-
ences of workers and, secondly, the
effects of increasing tax distortions
faced by workers (Prescott120, 2003).
In the EU, there is evidence linking
labour taxation to labour supply.
Mourre (2004) relates labour tax
wedges to the presence of a positive
break in aggregate employment
demand after 1997. Econometric esti-
mates (Nickell et al., 2003) find a sig-
nificant role for taxes in explaining
the decline in hours worked. More
specifically, the evolution of tax rates
may explain about a third of the
decrease in hours worked in the EU.
3.3.2.2. A medium-term perspective
In recent years, some progress has
been achieved in raising total labour
input in the EU compared to the US.
Between 1997 and 2004, total labour
input rose overall by 6 percentage
points in the EU-15 relative to the US
(see chart 81). This improvement
results from an increase in the
employment rate in the EU-15 rela-
tive to the US (chart 83), which more
than offset the continuous reduction
(although at a reduced pace) in the
number of hours worked per worker.
The decline in average annual hours
worked per worker in the EU-15 rela-
tive to the US seems to have levelled
off after 2000.
The rise in the employment rate in the
EU means that nearly 13 million jobs
were created between 1997 and 2004
(a cumulative increase of about
8.5%). However, nearly all net job
creation took place in the first part of
that period, between 1997 and 2001.
Subsequently, employment creation in
the EU-15, although remaining posi-
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Chart 83 – Determinants of total labour input, EU-15 compared to the US (US=100)
Source: Ameco, GGDC-OECD, and DG EMPL calculations.
119 Blanchard (2004), “The Economic Future of Europe”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, v°18, No 4. The author argues that two types of caus-
es might have “artificially” raised the measured level of (hourly) labour productivity in the EU versus the US: i) relatively high unemployment
that disproportionately affects low-skilled workers, together with a higher ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage (i.e. wage compres-
sion), excluding more low-skilled workers from the labour force; and ii) due to higher labour costs in the EU, firms have adopted more capital-
intensive technologies, increasing measured productivity. 
120 Prescott (2003), “Why do Americans Work so much more than Europeans?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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tive, was much slower principally
because of the lack of sufficient eco-
nomic growth. 
With respect to productivity, it is wor-
rying to see that since 1995 the Euro-
pean Union’s relative position vis-à-
vis the United States has deteriorated
significantly121. After having peaked
in the mid-1990s at around 97% of
the US level, EU-15 labour productiv-
ity per hour is projected to decline to
around 88% of the US level by 2006,
which is close to its relative level 
in the late 1970s/early 1980s. The
decline in EU labour productivity
growth rates since the mid-1990s can
be attributed to lower investment per
employee and to a slowdown in total
factor productivity growth. The for-
mer can be partially explained by a
higher rate of job creation, involving
a high proportion of low-productivity
jobs. The latter has been associated
with the following factors: (i) low
investment in R&D122; (ii) the diffi-
culty in the EU of reorienting outlays
towards those sectors with high pro-
ductivity growth prospects; (iii) the
lower productivity performance and
size of information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) industries
(including office equipment and
semiconductors) and the lower pro-
ductivity performance in ICT using
services (such as the wholesale and
retail trade and financial services);
and (iv) the difficulty in producing
and absorbing new, more knowledge-
based technologies. 
Recent research suggests that at the
most one third of the productivity
slowdown is due to the increased
employment of low-skilled people and
seems to confirm that the slowdown in
productivity is mostly due to a slow-
down in total factor productivity123.
In an OECD paper on ICT and eco-
nomic growth124, encompassing a sur-
vey of the relevant literature, there is
ample evidence suggesting that the
use of ICT does have a significant
impact on the productivity of firms,
but primarily, or only, when accompa-
nied by other [organisational]
changes and investments. This state-
ment is in line with the results of other
empirical studies suggesting that ICT
primarily affects firms where skills
have been improved and/or organisa-
tional changes have been introduced.
Therefore, in order to reap the full
benefits of ICT, firms have to carry
out complementary actions such as
training their staff or introducing
organisational changes. These comple-
mentary investments are often much
more costly than the initial outlays in
ICT investment goods125. The evidence
suggests that for ICT to be developed
and used effectively, and network
externalities to materialise126, the skills
and competences of workers have to
be raised through a variety of means,
such as formal education, vocational
training and lifelong learning (see the
Special Focus on ICT, organisational
change and productivity at the end of
this chapter).
3.4. Strengthening social
cohesion and inclusion
A social market economy should
endeavour to have an adequate level of
social protection delivered by a well-
designed welfare system so as to min-
imise efficiency costs. Therefore, an
optimum welfare system should aim,
among other things, to reduce poverty,
to minimise the impact of income
uncertainty/volatility, to facilitate struc-
tural change and to stabilise aggregate
demand, all at a minimum cost in terms
of economic efficiency. A well-
designed welfare/social protection sys-
tem should thus not only be effective in
combating and preventing poverty but
also contribute to increasing labour
supply, through developing people’s
capacity to work and a judicious use of
the “make work pay” principle127. 
121 “Commission Staff Working Document in support of the report from the Commission to the Spring European Council, 22-23 March 2005, on
the Lisbon Strategy of economic, social and environmental renewal”, SEC(2005) 160.
122 In 2003, the EU spent on average 1.9% of GDP on R&D (although ranging from 0.3% to 4.3% of GDP across Member States), barely up from
the level at the time of the launch of the Lisbon strategy. This compares with a collective EU target for investment in R&D of 3% of GDP. More-
over, only around 55% of research spending in the EU is financed by industry. In 2003, expenditure on R&D amounted to 2.6% and 3.2% of
GDP in the US and Japan, respectively. 
123 Denis et al. (2004), “An analysis of EU and US production developments (a total economy and industry level perspective)”, DG ECFIN, Eco-
nomic Papers No 208. 
Denis et al. (2005), “The Lisbon Strategy and the EU’s structural productivity problem”, DG ECFIN, Economic Papers No 221.
Duchêne and Hassan (2005), “Key Figures 2005 on Science, Technology and Innovation -Towards a European Knowledge Area”, European Com-
mission. 
124 OECD (2003), “ICT and Economic Growth, evidence from OECD countries, industries and firms”.
125 Brynjofsson and Hitt, (2000), “Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance”,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4) pp. 23-48. These authors suggest that USD 1 of ICT investment may be associated with USD 9 of
investment in intangible assets, such as skills and organisational changes.
126 It takes time to build networks that are sufficiently large to have an effect on the economy. In this respect, the US may have benefited from ICT
investment ahead of other OECD countries. 
127 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions – Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, SEC (2005). 
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In a rapidly changing world, social pro-
tection systems need to be responsive
to wider social and cultural trends, such
as those resulting from demographic,
economic and socio-cultural factors.
The rapid ageing of EU societies,
resulting from the combination of
declining birth rates and the rise in life
expectancy, poses a major challenge to
the sustainability of social protection
systems, notably with regard to health-
care and maintenance of adequate
income levels. The interaction of these
factors is producing a dramatic change
in the size and age composition of
Europe’s population128. With unchanged
policies, it is estimated that the impact
of ageing will, on the one hand, reduce
the potential growth rate of the EU
from the present 2-2.25% per year to
around 1.25% by 2040129 and, on the
other, bring about a dramatic increase
in pension and healthcare spending,
varying from 4 to 8 percentage points
of GDP130. Moreover, enlargement has
made the financial needs related to EU
cohesion more pronounced. Higher net
migration flows into the EU could help
address the imbalance arising from
demographic changes, offsetting
labour supply shortages and improving
the financial sustainability of pension
systems, provided that the necessary
conditions for the integration of immi-
grants into the formal labour market, as
well as their economic and social inte-
gration, are put in place. 
In order to meet these challenges,
social systems need to be modernised.
Existing social protection systems have
mostly been devised in times of near
full employment and favourable demo-
graphic conditions. The political chal-
lenge now is to offer citizens a credible
“new deal” that allows for an optimal
balance between, on the one hand,
security and solidarity, and, on the
other, an adequate level of flexibility131. 
As regards the strengthening of social
cohesion and inclusion, progress is
difficult to assess (as is the case for
quality in work) due to lack of data.
The available data on poverty and
social exclusion only cover a limited
time span and do not address the situ-
ation of the most exposed groups,
especially immigrants, ethnic minori-
ties, people with disabilities, the
homeless, and other risk groups,
although this situation will improve in
the future following recent investment
in statistical capacity-building132.
Moreover, the available indicators can
be difficult to interpret at EU level as
they are typically designed to reflect
the specific national situations. 
Harmonised data on income, poverty
and social exclusion are only available
for EU-15 Member States since the
mid-1990s. Following enlargement
and during the transition to a new data
source, information is being compiled
from the best available national
sources. Data on social cohesion and
inclusion are usually derived from sur-
veys on private households (as for
labour market data), hence they can-
not reflect the situation of certain
highly vulnerable groups such as the
homeless and persons in institution-
alised care. In addition, sample size
issues may restrict the robustness of
data concerning immigrants, ethnic
minorities and other risk groups. Ide-
ally, social cohesion should be seen in
a broad context: having a low income
may not necessarily imply having low
living standards (e.g. assistance from
family), and there are aspects of social
inclusion which cannot be measured
in monetary terms.
The following discussion assesses
progress in strengthening social cohe-
sion and inclusion in a number of spe-
cific areas, notably income distribu-
tion and the risk of poverty, gender
equality, people at a disadvantage in
the labour market, and regional labour
market disparities. 
3.4.1. Income distribution and the
risk of poverty
In the EU-15 between 1995 and 2001,
the risk-of-poverty rate133 hovered at
around 15 percent, although there is
some evidence of an increase in living
standards over the period when
anchoring the risk-of-poverty thresh-
old at a point in time and comparing
that to current incomes134. There is
now a risk that the 2001-2003 eco-
nomic slowdown, accompanied by ris-
ing unemployment and fewer job
opportunities, will put more people at
risk of poverty and social exclusion
and worsen the position of those who
are already affected. The challenge is
even greater in many of the new Mem-
ber States, where economic restructur-
ing requires appropriate social poli-
128 Facing the Challenge – The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment (2004), Report from the High Level group chaired by Wim Kok. 
129 “The EU economy: 2002 review”, European Economy No 6/2002, pp. 192.
130 “The impact of ageing populations on public finances”, EPC/ECFIN/407/04 2003.
131 “Commission Staff Working Document in support of the report from the Commission to the Spring European Council, 22-23 March 2005, on
the Lisbon Strategy of economic, social and environmental renewal”, SEC (2005) 160.
132 For example, the launch of data collection under the EU-SILC regulation No 1177/2003. 
133 The risk-of-poverty rate measures the share of the population (as a percentage) living in households with a disposable income below 60% of the
national median. The EU aggregate is computed as a population-weighted average of national values. This is therefore a relative concept, depend-
ing on national poverty thresholds.
134 Such risk-of-poverty rate decreased from 15% in 1998 to 12% in 2001.
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Table 40 – Selected measures of monetary poverty and social exclusion in 2003 (or the latest year 
for which data are available)
BE 28.0 29.0 15.0 4.0 32.0 117.7
CZ  25.0 21.0 8.0 NA NA 68.7
DK 25.0 32.0 12.0 NA NA 122.0
DE 28.0 24.0 15.0 4.0 37.0 108.0
EE 34.0 25.0 18.0 NA NA 48.7
EL 35.0 24.0 21.0 12.0 39.0 81.0
ES 31.0 22.0 19.0 10.0 37.0 97.7
FR 27.0 26.0 12.0 8.0 31.0 110.9
IE 30.0 31.0 21.0 7.0 54.0 132.4
IT  29.0 22.0 19.0 10.0 51.0 106.8
CY 27.0 18.0 15.0 NA NA 81.3
LV  34.0 24.0 16.0 NA NA 41.0
LT 30.0 24.0 17.0 NA NA 45.8
LU 28.0 23.0 10.0 8.0 48.0 214.6
HU  24.0 15.0 10.0 NA NA 60.5
MT 30.0 20.0 15.0 NA NA 73.0
NL 28.0 22.0 12.0 8.0 18.0 120.9
AT  27.0 24.0 13.0 6.0 23.0 121.9
PL 31.0 32.0 17.0 NA NA 45.9
PT  37.0 26.0 19.0 12.0 38.0 74.7
SI  22.0 16.0 10.0 NA NA 76.7
SK  31.0 28.0 21.0 NA NA 52.3
FI 26.0 28.0 11.0 5.0 31.0 113.6
SE  23.0 29.0 11.0 NA NA 115.2
UK  35.0 26.0 18.0 6.0 54.0 119.1
EU-25 29.0 24.0 15.0 NA NA 100.0
EU-15 30.0 24.0 16.0 7.0 39.0 109.2
EU-10 (b) 28.0 NA 15.0 NA NA 52.7
Gini coefficient Risk of poverty Risk of poverty Risk of poverty rate GDP per capita (c)
rate before rate after after social transfers
social transfers (a) social transfers Employed Unemployed
Source: Eurostat, Income and Living Conditions Statistics, and DG ECFIN Ameco.
Note: Data for 2003 except 2002 (FR, LV, LT, HU, NL, PL, SI, SE, EU-10), 2001 (IT, PT, EU-25, EU-15), 2000 (MT). (a) Risk-of-poverty rate: the share of
persons with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income. This share is calculated before social
transfers (original income including pensions but excluding all other social transfers) and after social transfers (total income). (b) CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU,
MT, PL, SI ,SK. (c) Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population (PPS; EU-25=100).
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cies to limit the number of people at
risk of poverty.
In an enlarged EU where some of the
new Member States have income lev-
els below half of the average for the
EU-15, differences in economic cir-
cumstances have clearly widened
(table 40). Although average income
levels in new Member States are con-
siderably below the average for the
EU-15, due to the relative nature of
the indicators employed, there is no
evidence of any significant difference
in income inequality or risk of pover-
ty between new and old Member
States. Using either the poverty rate or
the Gini135 coefficient, there are appar-
ently no significant differences
between new and old Member States.
In the EU, the poverty rate ranges
from a minimum of 8% in the Czech
Republic to a maximum of 21% in
Greece, Ireland and Slovakia.
As evidenced in table 40, social trans-
fers (other than pensions) play a major
role in reducing income inequalities,
significantly reducing the average
poverty rate in the EU by about 9 per-
centage points (or about one third of
the poverty rate before transfers).
However, there are large differences in
the social transfer systems as regards
their ability to reduce the poverty risk
(chart 84). In “southern” Member
States, social transfers reduce the
poverty risk by less than 30 percent
(EL, ES, IT, MT, CY and PT), while in
other countries they cut the poverty
rate by more than 50 percent (FR, LU,
FI, CZ, SE and DK). This may in part
be due to a greater focus placed in
“southern” countries on care in the
family/community than on institution-
alised care arrangements provided by
public authorities.
As shown in table 40, moving from
unemployment into employment low-
ers considerably the likelihood of being
exposed to the risk of poverty. This is
particularly true for persons living in
households where the work intensity of
other members is low. Employment is a
key factor for social inclusion, not only
because it raises income but also
because it can promote social inclusion
per se and personal development/
advancement in a professional career.
Employment also contributes to main-
taining adequate living standards in old
age through the accrual of entitlement
to pension benefits. 
3.4.2. Gender equality
According to the Employment Guide-
line136 on gender equality: Member
States will, through an integrated
approach combining gender main-
streaming and specific policy actions,
encourage female labour market par-
ticipation and achieve a substantial
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
  EL   ES    IT    CY    MT   SK    PT    EE    LT    UK    IE    LV   HU  EU-15  DE    SI  EU-25  NL    AT    PL    BE    FR    LU    FI    CZ    SE    DK  
%
Chart 84 – Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) in the reduction of the risk-of-poverty rate
In percentage of the poverty rate before transfers for 2003 or the latest year available
Source: Eurostat.
135 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality in the distribution of income. It is half the absolute mean difference in incomes between each
pair of individuals, relative to mean income. Plotting a Lorenz curve gives it an intuitive graphical interpretation (“Microeconomic Theory”,
Layard and Walters, pp. 49).
136 Specifically, the sixth Employment Guideline for 2003-2005. 
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Table 41 – Gender gaps
EU-15 Employment rate gap (a) 19.8 19.6 19.1 18.7 18.1 17.2 16.7 15.9
Unemployment rate gap (a) -3.4 -3.4 -3.2 -2.9 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -2.2
Pay gap (b) 16.0 16.0 15.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 NA
EU-25 Employment rate gap (a) 19.1 18.8 18.1 17.6 17.0 16.3 15.8 15.2
Unemployment rate gap (a) NA -3.3 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -2.1
Pay gap (b) 16.0 17.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 15.0 NA
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators.
Note: (a) Difference between men’s and women’s rates; (b) Difference between men’s and women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of
men’s gross hourly earnings.
reduction in gender gaps in employ-
ment rates, unemployment rates and
pay by 2010.
Table 41 suggests that since the launch
of the EES in 1997 some progress has
been achieved in reducing both the
employment and unemployment rate
gender gaps, but that no progress has
been made in reducing the (unadjusted)
gender pay gap137. Progress in reducing
the employment rate gap is likely to be
related (at least in part) to the trend for
higher female labour force participa-
tion, and the impact of active labour
market policies.
An unemployment gap equation –
defined as the difference between the
female and the total unemployment
rates – is estimated for the EU-15138
over the period 1985-2004 (for more
details see Annex II). The results sug-
gest that: i) the gap between female and
total unemployment rates is counter-
cyclical; and ii) this gap has narrowed
significantly since the beginning of the
EES. 
3.4.3. Long-term unemployment 
Long-term unemployment139 is a partic-
ular concern of the EES due to the evi-
dence linking it to a number of prob-
lems such as social exclusion, poverty
and low productivity growth (or pover-
ty traps). In the Employment Guide-
lines140, Member States are asked to
ensure that: i) every unemployed per-
son is offered a new start before reach-
ing […] 12 months of unemployment in
the case of adults in the form of train-
ing, retraining, work practice, or other
employability measure, combined
where appropriate with ongoing job
search assistance; ii) by 2010, 25% of
the long-term unemployed participate
in an active measure […], with the aim
of achieving the average of the three
most advanced Member States. 
In the EU-15, despite the economic
slowdown of 2001-2003, significant
progress has been achieved in reducing
the long-term unemployment rate since
the onset of the EES (table 42 and chart
70). Among all Member States, some
have been particularly successful in
reducing it by more than 2 percentage
points, notably ES, IE, IT, LV, HU, and
FI. In some Member States, notably SK
and PL, the long-term unemployment
rate is above 10% and has increased
since 1999. Rates are also above the
EU-25 average in DE, EE, EL, LT and
LV. 
Developments in the long-term unem-
ployment gap – defined as the differ-
ence between the total and the long-
term unemployment rates – for the EU-
15 in the period 1985-2004 suggest
that: i) the gap between the total and the
long-term unemployment rates is likely
to be countercyclical; and ii) this gap
has narrowed significantly since the
onset of the EES. 
3.4.4. Youth unemployment
Although no specific employment rate
target is set for younger workers in the
EU, issues related to youth unemploy-
ment141 are specifically addressed by a
number of Employment Guidelines142:
137 The unadjusted gender pay gap does not use econometric techniques to correct for differences due to factors such as age, experience, education
or occupation. 
138 EU15, excluding Luxembourg. 
139 Unemployed for 12 months or more.
140 Specifically, the first Employment Guideline for 2003-2005. 
141 Between 15 and 24 years old. 
142 Specifically, the first, fourth and seventh Employment Guidelines for 2003-2005. 
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i) Member States will ensure that every
unemployed person is offered a new
start before reaching six months of
unemployment in the case of young
people […]; ii) by 2010, at least 85%
of 22-year olds in the European Union
should have completed upper second-
ary education; and iii) policies will
aim to achieve by 2010 an EU average
rate of no more than 10% early school
leavers. 
In the EU-15, despite the economic
slowdown of 2001-2003, limited
progress has been achieved in reducing
the youth unemployment rate since the
onset of the EES (table 43). As with
many labour market variables, youth
unemployment has a marked gender
dimension. Although a positive gap
still persists between the male and
female youth unemployment rates, it
has narrowed considerably in recent
years. Among all Member States, some
have been particularly successful in
bringing down the total youth unem-
ployment rate by more than 3 percent-
age points, notably ES, IE, IT, LT, LV,
and HU. Rates are above the EU-25
average in twelve Member States143. 
Developments in the youth unemploy-
ment gap – defined as the difference
between youth and total unemployment
rates – for the EU-15 in the period
1985-2004 suggest that: i) the gap
between youth and total unemployment
rates is countercyclical; and ii) this gap
has narrowed significantly since the
onset of the EES. 
3.4.5. People at a disadvantage in the
labour market
Under the Employment Guidelines144,
Member States are asked to foster the
integration of people facing particular
difficulties on the labour market, such
as early school leavers, low-skilled
workers, people with disabilities, immi-
grants, and ethnic minorities, by devel-
oping their employability, increasing
job opportunities and preventing all
forms of discrimination against them.
Table 43 –  Youth unemployment rate
EU-15 M+F 20.6 19.0 17.1 15.3 15.1 15.6 16.3 16.6
F 23.0 21.3 19.3 17.1 16.8 16.7 16.9 17.3
M 18.4 17.0 15.2 13.7 13.6 14.7 15.9 16.0
EU-25 M+F NA 19.4 18.4 17.4 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.7
F NA 21.6 20.3 19.0 19.2 19.1 19.2 19.3
M NA 17.6 16.8 16.0 16.3 17.3 18.2 18.1
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Table 44 – Early school-leavers (percentage of the total population
aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training)
EU-15 M+F 20.6 NA 20.5 19.4 18.9 18.6 18.3 17.8
F 22.7 NA 22.6 21.7 21.3 21.1 20.4 20.4
M 18.7 NA 18.5 17.1 16.6 16.2 16.1 15.3
EU-25 M+F NA NA NA 17.3 16.9 16.6 16.1 15.7
F NA NA NA 19.4 19.1 18.9 18.1 18.1
M NA NA NA 15.2 14.7 14.3 14.1 13.3
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Table 42 – Long-term unemployment rate
EU-15 M+F 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4
F 5.9 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.0
M 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0
EU-25 M+F 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
F 6.1 5.5 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7
M 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Eurostat.
Source: Eurostat.
Source: Eurostat.
143 BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LT, MT, PL, SK and FI.
144 Specifically, the seventh Employment Guideline for 2003-2005. 
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In this context, a number of objectives
were set for 2010, notably: a) a reduc-
tion in the average rate of early
school-leavers to less than 10%; and
b) a significant narrowing of the
unemployment gaps for people at a
disadvantage and between non-EU
and EU nationals.
As regards the proportion of early
school-leavers (table 44), progress has
been achieved in recent years. In 2004
the proportion of early school-leavers
declined to 17.8% and 15.7% in the
EU-15 and the EU-25, respectively.
The pace of progress in recent years
suggests that, if continued, it will
reduce the average for the EU-25 to
less than 10% by 2010. However, a
number of Member States such as ES,
IT, MT, and PT have much further to
go in terms of progress towards this
target. It is interesting to note that in
all EU Member States there are lower
proportions of women early school-
leavers than men. On average in the
EU, this gender gap (in favour of
women) widened somewhat between
1997 and 2004.
Non-EU nationals145 have higher
unemployment rates than national cit-
izens (table 45). Although the avail-
able data cover only a limited number
of years, they suggest a somewhat
gradual narrowing of the differentials
between nationals and non-nationals.
A breakdown of employment rates by
nationality confirms the relative dis-
advantaged situation for non-nationals
(table 46).
3.4.6. Regional labour market
disparities
Under the Employment Guidelines146,
Member States should implement a
broad approach towards reducing
regional employment and unemploy-
ment disparities. In this respect, Mem-
ber States will: i) promote favourable
conditions for private sector activity
and investment in regions lagging
behind; ii) ensure that public support
in regions lagging behind is focused
on investment in human capital and
knowledge capital, as well as ade-
quate infrastructure. 
In the period 1999 to 2003, modest
progress was achieved in reducing the
dispersion of regional employment
rates (table 47) and of regional unem-
ployment rates (table 48). As regards
the former indicator, this basically
reflects a fall in the female component. 
Table 46 – Employment rates per nationality (aged 15-64)
Table 45 – Unemployment rates per nationality (aged 15-64)
EU-15 non-nat. women 35.3 41.0 43.3 43.1
men 59.9 64.9 64.1 64.5
nat. women 54.8 58.2 59.3 59.5
men 72.3 74.2 73.6 73.2
EU-25 non-nat. women NA 43.5 44.1 43.5
men NA 65.3 64.3 64.6
nat. women NA 57.8 58.8 57.5
men NA 73.4 73.0 70.9
1998 2001 2003 2004
1998 2001 2003 2004
EU-15 non-nat. women 21.9 16.0 17.0 17.9
men 20.0 15.2 17.2 17.3
nat. women 11.1 7.6 8.2 8.7
men 8.4 5.9 7.1 7.5
EU-25 non-nat. women NA 14.6 16.8 17.8
men NA 14.2 16.9 17.1
nat. women NA 7.9 8.4 9.9
men NA 6.4 7.3 8.7
Source: Eurostat.
Note: Nat.: EU Nationals; Non-Nat.: non-EU Nationals (EU-15).
Annual values are an unweighted average of the available quarterly data.
Source: Eurostat.
Note: Nat.: EU Nationals; Non-Nat.: non-EU Nationals (EU-15).
Annual values are an unweighted average of the available quarterly data.
145 Non-nationals of the EU15.
146 Specifically, the tenth Employment Guideline for 2003-2005. 
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4. Summary and
Conclusions
This chapter takes stock of the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy (EES)
launched in November 1997147. The
main purpose of the EES is the promo-
tion of more and better jobs. For this,
it sets many objectives (some of them
quantified), which are grouped under
three main headings: i) full employ-
ment; ii) quality and productivity at
work; and iii) strengthening social
cohesion and inclusion. 
However, two notes of caution are
necessary. Firstly, the identification of
causal relationships, linking policy
measures adopted under the EES and
labour market/social outcomes, is par-
ticularly challenging, not only because
of the natural complexity of the prob-
lem (e.g. the varying time lags
involved and the possible effects of
the position in the economic cycle),
but also because the 1990s witnessed
a series of significant changes in
Europe with a potentially large impact
on labour markets. Secondly, the
analysis carried out in this chapter is
basically a backward looking exercise,
as it ignores the introduction of
(labour market) reforms, particularly
in Germany. These reforms are
expected to put the EU economy in a
better position to take full advantage
of the next economic upswing, espe-
cially as regards employment creation.
As regards taking stock of the full
employment objective of the EES, the
analysis made in this chapter strongly
suggests that structural improvements
have indeed occurred in recent years,
although problems remain in a num-
ber of areas. Such a view is in line
with an emerging consensus, which is
based on ample evidence, pointing to
structural improvements across the
board in EU labour markets. 
As regards the overarching objective
of “full employment” the following
points can be made: 
• Although, estimated structural
unemployment rates have declined
on average across the EU, insuffi-
cient or no progress was recorded
in some of the largest EU Member
States (France and Germany),
while a marked deterioration
occurred in some new Member
States (Poland and Slovakia). 
• Lower long-term unemployment
rates and shorter average spells in
unemployment were observed, par-
ticularly in the EU-15. 
• An increased efficiency in match-
ing between the unemployed and
unfilled vacancies has been seen in
a number of EU Member States,
according to analyses based on the
Beveridge Curve. 
• The sustained increase in profitabil-
ity during the 1990s, the general
favouring of stability-oriented
Table 47 – Dispersion of regional employment rates (a)
EU-15 M+F 14.1 13.5 13.2 12.6 12.0
M 8.9 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.2
F 22.8 21.8 21.1 20.2 19.2
EU-25 M+F 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.5 13.0
M 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.6 10.4
F 21.1 20.6 20.1 19.6 18.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Table 48 – Dispersion of regional unemployment rates (a)
EU-15 59.1 63.9 65.0 60.2 56.0
EU-25 55.1 61.5 66.1 64.0 59.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Eurostat.
Note: (a) Coefficient of variation of employment rates (aged 15-64) across regions (NUTS 2
level) in the EU.
Source: Eurostat.
Note: (a) Coefficient of variation of unemployment rates (aged 15-64) across regions (NUTS 2
level) in the EU.
147 This assessment is carried out under the Employment Guideline approved by the Council in 2003 for the period 2003-2005 (OJ L197/13). On
12 April 2005, the Commission published its recommendation for Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs for the period 2005-2008. The new
set of integrated guidelines was approved at the European Council of June 2005, leading to the Council Decisions of 12 July 2005 on guidelines
for employment policies of Member States (OJ L205/21), and on the broad guidelines for economic policies of the Member States and the Com-
munity (OJ L205/28).
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macroeconomic policies and the
introduction of structural reforms in
a number of areas such as competi-
tion policy and labour markets have
all contributed to an improvement
in the functioning of labour mar-
kets, which is beginning to bring
benefits, particularly since 1997.
• There is the econometric finding of
a positive break in the level of
aggregate labour demand functions
in many EU Member States (but
not all) around 1997148. 
• There is statistical evidence indi-
cating that the development of cer-
tain types of labour contracts,
namely part-time and temporary
work, is positively correlated with
employment creation and rises in
employment rates. As regards tem-
porary work, however, there is also
evidence of market segmentation
between temporary and permanent
workers. 
• Expenditure on active labour mar-
ket policies has been increased and
better targeted to the needs of the
labour market, with positive results
for example in employment cre-
ation. 
• According to a range of indicators,
such as labour tax wedges and
unemployment and inactivity traps,
little progress has been achieved in
lowering marginal effective tax
rates on low wages or on facilitat-
ing the transition from unemploy-
ment/inactivity to employment.
However, a decline in tax wedges
seems to have contributed some-
what to employment creation in a
limited number of Member States
in the late 1990s149.
With respect to the overarching objec-
tive of “quality and productivity at
work”, the situation is complex, but
the following observations can be
made: 
• Quality is a multidimensional con-
cept. There have been significant
rises in participation in lifelong
learning and youth education
attainment levels continue to rise,
with (for the latter indicator) a gen-
der gap favourable to women
emerging. Further progress is nec-
essary as regards transitions,
because the transition probabilities
both from a temporary to a perma-
nent job and out of low-paid
employment are relatively low.
• With respect to productivity devel-
opments, there has been a decline
in EU productivity growth rates
since the mid-1990s, which can be
attributed to the creation of low-
productivity jobs and a slowdown
in total factor productivity growth.
The pace of creation and absorp-
tion of new technologies decelerat-
ed, which according to some
authors largely reflects insufficient
outlays on organisational change. 
With respect to the overarching objec-
tive of “strengthening social cohe-
sion and inclusion”, some limited
improvements have been achieved,
including the following: 
• Gender and age labour market gaps
have been somewhat reduced. 
• The data suggest that social transfers
(other than pensions) play a major
role in reducing income inequalities,
significantly reducing poverty rates
in many Member States. 
• The data also show that moving
from unemployment to employ-
ment lowers considerably the likeli-
hood of being exposed to the risk of
poverty. Employment is a key fac-
tor for social inclusion, not only
because it raises income but also
because it can promote social inclu-
sion per se and personal advance-
ment in a professional career. 
148 This break corresponds to an upward shift in the level of the long-term employment relationship, which results in higher but temporary employ-
ment growth rates until the new long-term equilibrium is reached.
149 IE, NL and ES, and possibly also in BE and FR.
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ICT diffusion in Europe and the 
United States: explanation of the 
productivity growth gap?
The remarkable acceleration in labour
productivity and total factor productivity
growth in the United States since the mid
1990s has been widely discussed in
recent years. A general consensus has
emerged that this acceleration can largely
be attributed to information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) (Denis, Mc
Morrow, Röger, 2005 ; Gordon, 2004;
Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2004; Nord-
haus, 2005), suggesting that the “Solow
paradox” (“we see computers everywhere
but in the productivity statistics”) has
been largely resolved.
Empirical studies at aggregate, industry
and firm levels all point to three main
channels linking ICT and productivity
(OECD, 2003; Pilat, 2004).
Capital deepening
Investment in ICT can contribute to capi-
tal deepening by adding to the stock of
capital that is available for workers and
consequently helps raise labour produc-
tivity and growth (e.g. Colecchia and
Schreyer, 2001; Schreyer, Bignon and
Dupont, 2003; Timmer, Ypma and Van
Ark, 2003; Van Ark, Melka, Mulder, Tim-
mer and Ypma, 2003). 
ICT investment accounted for between
0.3 to 1.0 percent of average annual GDP
growth during 1995-2002 in EU coun-
tries (for which data are available) and the
United States. Sweden, the United States,
Denmark and Belgium had the largest
contributions of ICT investment to GDP
growth, while France, Germany and Italy
lagged behind (Chart 85). 
Increased productivity in ICT-
producing sectors
The contribution of ICT producing manu-
facturing to labour productivity growth in
the 1990s increased substantially (e.g.
Pilat and Wölfl, 2004; Van Ark, Inklaar
and McGuckin, 2002). This reflects in
part the growing share of the ICT manu-
facturing sector in total manufacturing,
but also the increased rate of technical
change in the production of some ICT
goods. ICT producing manufacturing
made the largest contributions to labour
productivity growth in Ireland, Finland,
Sweden and the United States during the
period 1996-2002. Its role was more lim-
ited in Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands (Table 49).
ICT producing services contributed to
labour productivity growth in the 1990s,
although to a lesser extent than ICT pro-
ducing manufacturing. ICT producing
services increased labour productivity
growth in several countries, such as Ger-
many, Finland and Luxembourg (Table
49). The contribution of ICT producing
services mainly reflects the liberalisation
of the telecommunications sector and the
rapid expansion of the computer services
industry. 
Increased productivity in the ICT-
using sector
The impact of ICT is not limited to ICT
producing sectors, but also involves the
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Chart 85 – Contribution of ICT investment to GDP growth in selected EU countries and the US (in percentage points)
Source: OECD Productivity Database, September 2004, [www.oecd.org/statistics/productivity].
Note: 1995-2002 for France, Germany and the United States; 1995-2001 for other countries.
Box 6 – Special Focus on Information and Communications Technologies (ICT),
Organisational change and Productivity
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ICT using sector (Pilat and Wölfl op. cit.;
Triplett and Bosworth, 2004; Van Ark,
Inklaar and McGuckin op. cit.; Van Ark
op. cit.). Some estimates emphasise the
dramatic increase in the contribution of
the ICT using sector to labour productiv-
ity growth in the United States in the
1990s, while its contribution remained
quite subdued in many EU Member
States, such as Luxembourg, France,
Spain, Germany and Italy (Table 49).
The results of some of these studies also
show that Europe lags behind the United
States in terms of labour productivity
growth, especially in ICT using services.
The performance of the United States in
ICT using services seems to be mainly
linked to a major acceleration in labour
productivity and output growth in distri-
bution (retail and wholesale trade) and
financial services (Table 50). 
Organisational change: the missing
link in Europe?
Although there are large differences
across countries in terms of ICT diffu-
sion, the reviewed literature shows that
Europe has enjoyed fewer benefits from
ICT than the United States.
The slow ICT diffusion and productivity
growth in many countries in recent years
may be due to the insufficient response of
firms in introducing the organisational
changes necessary to cope with a rapidly
changing business environment (Aske-
nazy and Gianella, 2000; Lundvall,
2004). There is growing evidence that
maximisation of the productivity gains
resulting from ICT effectively requires
changes in workplace organisation
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Arnal, Ok
and Torres, 2001; OECD op. cit.).
However, the importance of organisation-
al aspects should not lead to an underes-
timation of the role played by other fac-
tors, such as the costs of ICT investment,
firms’ ability to absorb knowledge (avail-
Box 6 (cont.) – Special Focus on Information and Communications Technologies (ICT),
Organisational change and Productivity
Table 49 – Sectoral contributions to labour productivity growth in selected EU countries and the US
(percentage points)
AT 2.32 1.73 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.59 0.51
BE 1.90 0.78 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.47 0.17
DK 1.99 1.45 0.09 0.09 0.27 0.13 0.18 0.37
FI 2.65 2.02 0.20 0.82 0.13 0.36 0.10 0.22
FR 1.13 1.00 0.20 0.21 0.02 0.14 0.01 -0.17
DE 2.11 1.38 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.46 0.17 0.12
IE 2.39 3.76 0.43 0.89 0.10 0.28 0.15 0.73
IT 2.83 0.56 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.20 0.88 0.14
LU 2.08 0.51 -0.03 -0.01 0.74 0.32 1.13 -0.20
NL 0.63 0.77 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.28
ES 1.22 0.28 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.16 -0.17 -0.03
SE 2.95 2.67 0.27 0.51 0.24 0.22 0.45 0.60
UK 2.20 1.08 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.37 0.85
US 1.12 1.74 0.33 0.45 0.14 0.16 0.24 1.29
1990-1995 1996-2002 1990-1995 1996-2002 1990-1995 1996-2002 1990-1995 1996-2002
Total economy ICT-producing manufacturing ICT-producing services ICT-using services
Source: Pilat and Wölfl (2004) based on STAN database.
Note: ICT-producing manufacturing covers ISIC Rev3 30-33; ICT-producing services cover ISIC Rev3 64+72; ICT-using services cover ISIC
Rev3 71-74.
1991-95 for Germany; 1992-95 for France and Italy; 1996-98 for Sweden; 1996-99 for Spain; 1996-2000 for Ireland; 1996 2001 for France,
United Kingdom and United States.
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ability of human capital, experience with
other innovations), the nature of the busi-
nesses and the regulatory environment.
The latter factor can play an important
role in reducing firms’ incentives to
introduce new organisational practices.
Changes in workplace organisation
and productivity
Since the mid-1980s, an increasing num-
ber of firms have introduced new work
practices in order to better cope with a
more competitive economic environment
(Arnal, Ok and Torres op. cit). 
These new work practices take many
forms, including the restructuring of pro-
duction processes (e.g. just in time, lean
production), management systems and
employee involvement schemes (e.g.
teamwork, flexible work arrangements,
flexible compensation systems), and
external re-organisation (e.g. outsourc-
ing) (Murphy, 2002). 
A number of studies have highlighted the
favourable impact of organisational
changes on firms’ performance (e.g. Cap-
pelli and Neumark, 1999; Eriksson,
2003). Two main reasons that can be
advanced to explain this positive relation-
ship are as follows: 
• Organisational changes may improve
the overall efficiency of firms in com-
bining labour and physical capital;
• Organisational changes may con-
tribute to productivity growth via their
synergies with ICT. 
Empirical evidence for the link
between ICT, organisational changes
and firm performance
A number of studies have related changes
in the organisation of work to the intro-
duction of ICT in the workplace, follow-
ing the seminal contribution of Milgrom
and Roberts (1990). 
For the United States, Bresnahan, Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (2002), using panel data
for large firms in the manufacturing and
services sectors, found evidence of com-
plementarities among ICT, workplace
organisation, and the launch of new prod-
ucts and services. Black and Lynch
(2000a), examining a sample of US
establishments, found that firms that re-
engineer their workplaces to incorporate
more high performance practices (e.g.
profit sharing, greater teamwork) experi-
ence higher productivity compared to
those that have kept more traditional
practices. In a subsequent study, these
authors, analysing the impact of work-
place practices, information technology
and human capital on productivity, found
that unionised establishments that have
adopted new industrial relations practices
that promote joint decision making have
higher productivity than other similar non
union plants (Black and Lynch 2000b). 
For a number of EU Member States, evi-
dence is also available regarding the link
between ICT, organisational change and
firm performance. For Finland, Maliranta
and Rouviren (2004) found that organisa-
tional change has a significant impact 
on productivity gains. In the case of 
Germany, Bertschek and Kaiser (2004)
suggest that workplace reorganisation 
Box 6 (cont.) – Special Focus on Information and Communications Technologies (ICT),
Organisational change and Productivity
Table 50 – Average annual growth rates of hourly labour 
productivity in the ICT and non-ICT industries of 
the EU-15 and the US
EU-15 US EU-15 US
1979-1995 1995-2002
Total Economy 2.3 1.2 1.8 2.5
ICT Producing Industries 6.8 7.2 8.6 9.3
ICT Producing Manufacturing 11.6 15.1 16.2 23.5
ICT Producing Services 4.4 2.4 5.9 2.7
ICT Using Industries 2.3 1.6 1.8 4.9
ICT Using Manufacturing 2.7 0.8 2 2.6
ICT Using Services 2 1.9 1.7 5.3
of which:
Wholesale Trade 2.4 3.5 1.5 8.1
Retail Trade 1.7 2.4 1.5 7.1
Financial Services 1.9 1.5 2.3 5
ICT-intensive Business Services 0.8 -0.9 0.6 0.7
Non-ICT Industries 1.9 0.4 1.1 0.2
Non-ICT Manufacturing 3.2 2.3 2.1 1.2
Non-ICT Services 0.8 -0.3 0.5 0.2
Non-ICT Other 3.4 1.4 2.1 0.4
Source: Van Ark (2005) based the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-industry
Database.
Note: Total economy excludes real estate.
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(i.e. enhancement of group work and flat-
tening of the hierarchy) in business-relat-
ed services increases labour productivity.
For France, Guellec and Greenan (1998)
showed that the use of advanced tech-
nologies and the skill base are positively
correlated to organisational aspects. In
addition, firms that introduce organisa-
tional changes are more able to adjust to
changing market conditions through
technological innovation. For the Nether-
lands, Broersma and McGuckin (2000)
found that computer investments have a
positive impact on productivity in the
wholesale and retail trade sectors. 
Conclusions and implications
Since the mid 1990s, labour productivity
developments in Europe vis-à-vis the
United States have raised concerns. There
is a general consensus that the New
Economy has largely driven the upsurge
in labour and total factor productivity
growth in recent years in the United
States. Conversely, Europe has benefited
less from ICT. Moreover, evidence shows
that a large ICT producing sector does
not seem to be a prerequisite to obtain the
full benefits of ICT, since the major con-
tribution to aggregate productivity at
industry level comes from the ICT-using
sector, especially ICT using services.
However, ICT alone is not enough to
raise productivity growth. ICT use
requires complementary investments,
especially in intangible assets. More
specifically, the introduction of new work
practices in the workplace, often associat-
ed with changes in the skill bases of
firms, appear to be paramount in order to
optimise the return from ICT investment.
The critical importance of such organisa-
tional changes, and more generally, in the
context of ICT, the concept of adaptabili-
ty, is corroborated by several historical
studies on the introduction and diffusion
of general purpose technologies (e.g.
David, 1990).
As a consequence, policies aiming at
facilitating the uptake of ICT in Europe,
as mentioned in the Integrated Guidelines
for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008) op. cit.,
should go hand in hand with those aiming
to improve the adaptability of workers
and enterprises. Such objective has also
been recently stressed in the framework
of Commission initiative “i2010: Euro-
pean Information Society 2010”.
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This type of equation reflects the fact that
labour market variables display a consider-
able amount of cyclical variation. In fact,
when output moves above trend, employ-
ment grows as non-active individuals join
the labour force. Typically, the growth in
employment tends to outstrip that in the
labour force, yielding a reduction in unem-
ployment. The reverse occurs during
downturn periods, although the amplitude
of movements can vary over the business
cycle. 
Okun type equations are estimated using a
balanced set of pooled annual data for the
EU-15a, covering the period 1972-2003. In
effect, what is tested is the correlation of
the deviations of labour market variables
from their trends (unemployment, employ-
ment and the labour force) with the output
gap (the deviation of real GDP from its
trend). A dummy variable is considered to
test for the asymmetry of the effect of the
cycle on labour market variables. Another
dummy variable is included to identify
possible changes that have occurred in the
period covered by the EES (1998-2003).
The combined effect of these two dummy
variables is also considered. 
The following equation is estimated for
unemployment, employment and the
labour force (yit) 
where i and t are, respectively, the country
and period indices; αi are the fixed effect
coefficients; yit is the cyclical component
of the labour market variable being con-
sidered; git is the cyclical component of
real GDP; d1 is a dummy that equals one
when the cyclical component is positive
(gt>0) and zero otherwise; d2 is a dummy
that equals one in the period 1998-2003
and zero otherwise. 
The cyclical component is calculated
using the Hodrick Prescott filter. In order
to eliminate country specific effects,
besides calculating country fixed effects
(αi), the data used in the regressions are
the differences relative to period averages. 
The data have various sources. Whenever
possible, Eurostat data are used, namely
the Labour Force Survey. The other
sources of data are DG ECFIN Ameco,
OECD MEI, and the IMF IFS. 
The following structure for the errors is
assumed: (i) errors are independent over
time but are contemporaneously correlat-
ed across country/cross section; and (ii)
the standard deviation of errors varies
across country/cross section. 
An obvious problem with the estimation of
this type of equation is the presence of
endogenous regressors, notably the cycli-
cal component of real GDP (git). This is a
serious statistical problem because it leads
to biased and inefficient estimates even in
large samples. The traditional solution to
this problem is the use of instruments. 
Using the Eviews programme, two stage
least squares (tsls) regressions were calcu-
lated. In a first stage, two types of instru-
ments were used: (i) common to all cross
sections; and (ii) country specific. The set
of common instruments includes: all non
endogenous regressors and the lagged
endogenous regressor, the relative price of
crude oil deflated by the GDP deflator, and
total factor productivity. The latter two
variables can be seen as a proxy for global
shocks. The set of country specific instru-
ments includes: indicators for relative
price competitiveness, foreign demand,
real wages (deflated by the GDP deflator),
and the cyclical adjusted net primary gov-
ernment balance.  
In addition, given the assumed structure
for the errors, a cross section weighted
least squares procedure is used to estimate
the coefficient matrix, together with a
robust estimation procedure for the coeffi-
cient covariance matrix, which takes
account of the contemporaneous cross sec-
tion heteroskedasticity of the errors. 
a EU-15, excluding Luxembourg.
Box 7 – The estimation of Okun type equations 
β1 0.93 0.86 0.73
(24.6) *** (20.1) *** (16.2) ***
β2 -0.45 -0.38 -0.28
(-12.7) *** (-10.4) *** (-6.8) ***
γ1 -0.13 0.26 0.12
(-11.2) *** (7.1) *** (4.6) ***
γ2 --- 0.10 0.10
(3.4) *** (4.6) ***
γ3*d1 --- -0.15 -0.17
(-3.5) *** (4.9) ***
γ4*d2 --- --- ---
γ5*d1*d2 --- 0.07 0.21
(0.7) (2.3)*
R2 adj. 0.76 0.74 0.60
Standard error 1.02 1.01 1.00
of the regression
Coefficient Unemployment Employment Labour Force
The t ratios are in parenthesis. *** coefficient significant at 1%; ** coefficient significant at
2%; and * coefficient significant at 3%.
The estimates are presented in the following table:
Annex I
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A prominent feature of European labour
markets is the presence of certain groups
in a permanent disadvantaged position.
For some of them, such as immigrants,
ethnic minorities, people with disabilities,
the homeless, etc., no (sufficiently long)
data series is available to carry out econo-
metric analysis. However, if the data are
pooled together across countries, there are
some groups for which some preliminary
estimates can be presented for the evolu-
tion of the gaps in their respective labour
market outcomes against a benchmark
group. These groups are women, the long
term unemployed and youth unemployed.
The benchmark group used is the total
aggregate (i.e. the universe). The unem-
ployment rate is the measure chosen for
labour market performance. 
Unemployment gap equations are estimat-
ed using an unbalanced set of pooled
annual data for the EU-15a. Equations for
three gaps are estimated: i) women’s ver-
sus total unemployment rates; ii) long
term versus total unemployment rates;
and iii) youth versus total unemployment
rates. In the first equation, the estimation
period is 1985-2004, while in the second
and third equations the period is 1991-
2004. 
The regressors are the endogenous vari-
ables lagged one period and two dummy
variables. A first dummy variable is con-
sidered to test for the asymmetry of the
effect of the cycle on the unemployment
gaps. The cyclical component of GDP is
calculated using the Hodrick Prescott fil-
ter. A second dummy variable is included
to identify possible changes that have
occurred in the period covered by the EES
(1998-2004). 
The following type of equation is estimated
where
where i and t are respectively the country
and period indices; fit is the women’s
unemployment rate; uit is the total unem-
ployment rate; lit is the long term unem-
ployment rate; yit is the youth unemploy-
ment rate; git are the gap variables
defined in such a way as to hold normally
positive values; βi are the fixed effect
coefficients; d1 is a dummy that equals
one when the cyclical component of GDP
is positive and zero otherwise; d2 is a
dummy that equals one in the period
1998-2004 and zero otherwise; and eit are
the errors which are tested for a first order
autoregressive structure. 
The source for the data is the Employment
Indicators database of Eurostat. 
The following structure for the errors is
assumed: (i) a possible first order autore-
gressive structure i.e. ar(1); (ii) contem-
poraneously correlated across country/
cross section; and (iii) the standard devia-
tion of errors varies across country/cross
section. 
Following the equation specification,
regressors and errors are assumed to be
independent, allowing the use of cross
section weighted least squares. In addi-
tion, given the assumed structure for the
errors, the coefficient covariance matrix is
estimated using a robust method with
respect to the presence of cross section
heteroskedascity. 
a EU-15, excluding Luxembourg.
Box 8 – The estimation of unemployment gap equations
The t ratios are in parenthesis. *** coefficient significant at 1%; ** coefficient significant at
5%; and * coefficient significant at 10%.
β1 0.34 1.8 3.6
(3.6) *** (8.1) *** (8.3) ***
β2 0.83 0.66 0.69
(19.9) *** (14.4) *** (16.3) ***
β3 -0.08 -0.11 -0.24
(-2.3) ** (-2.0) ** (-1.8) *
β4 -0.12 -0.28 -0.84
(-2.2) ** (-4.5) *** (-6.2) ***
AR(1) 0.28 --- ---
(3.8) ***
R2 adj. 0.98 0.98 0.97
Standard error 0.33 0.47 1.14
of the regression
Coefficient Women Long-term Youth
The estimates are presented in the following table:
Annex II
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Chapter 3 Employment and aggregate
demand
1. Introduction
National accounts data suggest that the
economic slowdown of 2001-2003,
though rather prolonged, was not par-
ticularly sharp. However, recent sur-
veys (for the first quarter of 2005)
have underlined the risks posed, for
example, by increases in energy prices,
which have clearly heightened the dan-
ger of a “double-dip” cyclical down-
turn1. This bears out the assessment
made in the Commission’s Spring
2005 forecast that the balance of risks
was tilted towards the downside.
Although in the EU-15 both the output
gap and the dynamism of domestic
demand during the 2001-2003 period
compare favourably with the previous
cyclical downturn of 1992-1994, Ger-
many stands out as a major cause for
concern because of the weakness and
even decline in all major expenditure
components and in employment in
recent years. This concern also
reflects the potential impact on the EU
as a whole through the usual knock-on
effects (i.e. cross-border trade and
financial links).
It is against this backdrop that this
chapter examines a number of issues
related to economic activity in gener-
al, and employment and aggregate
demand in particular, beginning with
the level of economic activity and
short-term prospects (based mainly on
survey data). Then, for the seven
largest EU Member States2, economic
developments are compared between
the cyclical downturns of 1992-1994
and 2001-2003, with a particular
focus on domestic demand and its
components. This is followed by an
analysis of the quarterly national
accounts data for some of the largest
EU-15 Member States3 to assess cycli-
cal trends, with a particular emphasis
on the links between output/demand/
exports and employment outcomes.
Then, following broadly consensual
findings in the literature, the impact of
aggregate demand (shocks) on labour
market outcomes is briefly reviewed.
Finally, given the potential role of dis-
equilibrium factors, such as demand
shocks, in conjunction with the high
persistence of labour market variables,
the cyclical properties of budgetary
policy are investigated for the euro
area as a whole, together with a brief
mention of the rationale behind the
revised Stability and Growth Pact and
some of its essential aspects. 
2. Analysis of cyclical
developments based on
survey data 
Although rather prolonged, the eco-
nomic slowdown of 2001-2003 was
not particularly sharp when compared
to the economic recession of 1992-
1994 (chart 86). The estimated output
gap4 in the EU-15 for the 2002-2004
period averaged -0.6 percentage
points, which compares with -1.4 per-
centage points for the 1993-1995 peri-
od. This general assessment regarding
the relative sharpness and duration of
the 2001-2003 cyclical downturn is
corroborated by a number of indica-
tors, as follow: 
• The seasonally adjusted capacity
utilisation level in the industrial
sector has remained below its his-
torical average since the fourth
quarter of 2001 (chart 87). 
• The seasonally adjusted consumer
confidence indicator deteriorated
between early 2001 and the begin-
ning of 2003, but has since steadily
improved (chart 88). 
• The seasonally adjusted industrial
confidence indicator deteriorated
markedly between mid-2000 and
the end of 2001, but then improved
before declining in the first quarter
of 2005 (chart 89). 
• The euro area business climate
index (a composite indicator)
declined between the end of 2000
and late 2001. However, the indica-
tor improved significantly between
mid-2003 and mid-2004 but then in
March 2005 moved back into nega-
tive territory (chart 90). 
Overall, the available data suggest that
the economic slowdown of 2001-2003
was not particularly sharp. However,
as recent developments revealed by
economic surveys indicate (in the first
quarter of 2005), the risks posed by
additional rises in commodity prices
(chart 91), particularly in the energy
sector, have clearly heightened the
danger of a “double-dip” economic
downturn. In the Commission’s Spring
2005 economic forecast, economic
activity in the EU was already project-
ed to decelerate in 2005, largely
because of the strong rise in oil prices.
1 For a detailed analysis see the Commission’s forthcoming Autumn economic forecast. 
2 DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PL and UK.
3 DE, ES, FR, IT, NL and UK.
4 Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product expressed as a percentage of potential gross domestic product; Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
 
More recent developments seen in
economic surveys and oil prices seem
to confirm the assessment made in the
Commission’s Spring 2005 forecast
that the balance of risks was tilted
towards the downside5. 
3. Analysis of economic
developments based on
annual national accounts
data
In the EU-15, GDP grew on average at
a similar pace in the 2001-2003 period
compared to the previous cyclical
downturn of 1992-1994 (1.2 percent
and 1.1 percent per year, respectively).
However, an analysis by Member
State shows a diversity of experiences.
Using annual national accounts data,
scatter plots have been drawn to relate
average growth rates during the last
two economic slowdowns for a num-
ber of aggregate variables. For practi-
cal reasons, this exercise has been car-
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Chart 86 – Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at 1995 market prices
Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
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Chart 87 – Current level of capacity utilisation in the industrial sector (seasonally adjusted percentages)
Source: DG ECFIN, Industrial Survey.
5 For an updated and more comprehensive analysis see the Commission’s forthcoming Autumn forecast.
 
ried out for only the seven largest EU
economies (DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PL
and the UK), which represent about 80
percent of the total EU economy. 
GDP
As regards GDP (chart 92), three
Member States performed worse in
the last economic slowdown (2001-
2003) than in the previous one (1992-
1994), namely Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Poland6. In two Member
States (Italy and the United King-
dom), the outcomes were qualitatively
similar in the two periods, although
the growth rate was significantly high-
er in the United Kingdom. Finally, two
Member States (France and Spain)
performed better in the last cyclical
downturn, although the improvement
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Chart 88 – Consumer Confidence Indicator in the EU (seasonally adjusted)
Source: DG ECFIN.
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Chart 89 – Industrial Confidence Indicator in the EU (seasonally adjusted)
Source: DG ECFIN.
6 It can be argued that the Polish case is qualitatively different from that of the other countries, because Poland is undergoing a protracted period
of economic restructuring, which has gathered pace since 1998, first in the aftermath of the Russian crisis and then in the 2001-2003 period with
the economic slowdown in the EU-15. Therefore, the recent negative developments in Poland cannot be fully attributed to cyclical conditions as
in the other ‘mature’ economies considered.
 
was only marginal in France while in
Spain it was more significant. 
Employment
During the economic slowdown of
2001-2003, employment develop-
ments were considerably more
favourable than in the previous cycli-
cal downturn in the first half of the
1990s (chart 93). This is in line with
the finding that structural improve-
ments in the functioning of European
labour markets have occurred in
recent years (discussed more fully in
Chapter 2), together with the fact that
the cyclical downturn of 2001-2003
was less pronounced than the previous
one. The strength of job creation in
Spain and Italy over the period 2001-
2003 is particularly worth mentioning.
Both Member States had introduced
significant (labour) market reforms in
the second half of the 1990s. 
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Domestic demand
Comparing the two cyclical down-
turns, the significantly slower GDP
growth in Germany and in the Nether-
lands largely reflects domestic
demand developments7 (chart 94). In
particular, domestic demand in Ger-
many decreased from an average
annual growth rate of 1.5 percent in
the 1992-1994 period to -0.6 percent
in 2001-2003. Part of this decline does
not seem to be associated with
changes in cyclical patterns per se, but
instead results from “levelling-off ”
effects related to the process of Ger-
man reunification, including the unin-
terrupted fall in construction invest-
ment since 1995 following the sharp
rise in the period immediately after
reunification (see below). 
Construction
Somewhat unexpectedly (and contrary
to some widely held views), domestic
aggregate demand was on average
stronger during 2001-2003 than dur-
ing the 1992-1994 cyclical downturn
in Spain, France, Italy and the United
Kingdom, contributing to higher
domestic aggregate demand in the
EU-158 as a whole. In particular,
investment in construction was higher
in a number of Member States (chart
96). The loosening of monetary policy
in the euro area since 2000, following
the lowering of nominal rates in the
run-up to EMU, together with the
housing boom in the UK, contributed
to the significant growth rates in con-
struction spending during the 2001-
2003 period, which are especially sig-
nificant given the cyclical position in
the EU at the time. In the 2001-2003
period, annual spending on construc-
tion grew on average by 4.9 percent in
Spain, 2.6 percent in Italy, and 10.3
percent in the United Kingdom, while
it stabilised in France. 
In Germany and (to a lesser extent) the
Netherlands, trends in construction
spending diverged from those in the
other Member States. In the 2001-
2003 period, construction spending in
Germany fell on average by 4.6 per-
cent per year, compared to an average
positive growth rate of 6.4 percent
during the period 1992-19949. In the
aftermath of German reunification,
between 1991 and 1994, the level of
construction investment increased by
an overall 20 percent, but since 1995 it
declined year on year (with the excep-
tion of 1999) to reach in 2004 a level
(at constant prices) 6.5 percent below
that of 1991. Consequently, the
decline in construction expenditure in
Germany has been exerting a consid-
erable drag on total investment and
domestic aggregate demand since the
second half of the 1990s. 
Equipment
Equipment spending fell in nearly all
the large Member States during both
periods (chart 97), although, apart
from the UK (where spending grew in
the early period), the drop was smaller
in the period 2001-2003. 
Private consumption
Overall, developments in private con-
sumption expenditure corroborate the
assessment that the economic slow-
down of 2001-2003, although rather
prolonged, was not particularly sharp
when compared to the economic
recession of 1992-1994. In France,
Spain and the UK, the average growth
rate of private consumption in the
2001-2003 period exceeded that in
1992-1994, while the average growth
rate in Poland was a vigorous 2.8 per-
cent in the 2001-2003 period (chart
98). However, Germany stands out
again as having the weakest average
growth rate of only 0.3 percent per
year in the 2001-2003 period. More-
over, in the years 2001 to 2004, private
consumption in Germany fell by an
overall 1.1 percent. Since 2000, the
household savings rate has increased
significantly in Germany (chart 103)
following a marked deterioration in
consumer confidence. 
Government consumption
In the EU-15 as a whole and in a num-
ber of large Member States (Spain,
France, Italy and the United King-
dom), the average growth rate of gov-
ernment consumption increased dur-
ing the 2001-2003 period compared to
1992-1994 (chart 99). In Germany
and Poland the opposite occurred,
although in Germany the average
growth rate of government consump-
tion in the 2001-2003 period was con-
siderably higher than that of GDP (1.0
percent and 0.3 percent, respectively),
while in the 1992-1994 period it was
boosted by outlays related to reunifi-
cation. 
The German singularity
An analysis of open economies
requires a comprehensive assessment
of the drivers of economic growth and
employment creation without this
being limited to a discussion of the
factors affecting total and domestic
aggregate demand. Foreign demand,
and in particular the ability of coun-
tries to remain competitive and secure
an adequate level of exports and mar-
7 Domestic demand excluding stocks.
8 EU-25 data for the 1992-1994 period are not available. 
9 In the Netherlands, -2.1 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively.
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ket share, are also issues that have to
be addressed. Although in the EU-15
as a whole both the output gap and the
dynamism of domestic demand during
the 2001-2003 period compare
favourably with the previous cyclical
downturn of 1992-1994, Germany
stands out as a major cause for con-
cern because of the weakness or even
decline in all major expenditure com-
ponents during the 2001-2003 period.
This special concern is not only for
this country per se but is also due to
the potential impact on the EU as a
whole through the usual knock-on
effects. However, assessment of
domestic demand developments in
Germany calls for two important qual-
ifications to be made. 
Firstly, since the mid 1990s, Germany
has been gaining price competitive-
ness particularly against other EU
Member States (chart 101). In recent
years, very low growth in nominal
wages has translated into price com-
petitiveness and market share gains,
despite the appreciation of the euro.
Exports of goods and services in real
terms have increased on average by
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Source: Ameco.
Note: PL: 1993-1994.
Chapter 3. Employment and aggregate demand
143
close to 4 percent per year (chart 100).
According to calculations reported in
Jansen (2005)10, nearly all of the 6 per-
cent cumulative growth in GDP in the
six-year period from 1999 to 2004 is
due to the net external contribution.
Clearly, this foreign impulse has not
been translated into higher employ-
ment and domestic demand. The for-
mer declined between the second
quarter of 2001 and the second quarter
of 2003 (chart 105), while the latter
has stagnated since the end of 2000.
The dynamism of German export per-
formance stands alone among the
largest EU Member States, and only
some new Member States have regis-
tered a better performance. Therefore,
part of the weak domestic demand in
Germany seems to reflect a significant
reorientation of resources towards
tradeable sectors of the economy,
encouraged by the substantial gains in
price competitiveness. 
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Chart 95 – Gross Fixed Capital Formation, average growth rates (percentages)
Source: Ameco.
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Chart 94 – Domestic Demand (a), average growth rates (percentages)
Source: Ameco.
Note: (a) Domestic demand excluding stocks.
10 Jansen (2005), ‘Domestic gloom and export boom: a look at German competitiveness’, ECFIN Country Focus, v.2, No 6.
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Secondly, in the early 1990s, reunifi-
cation represented a huge economic
shock with long-lasting consequences
in terms of both the dynamics of
adjustment and equilibrium variables.
For example, the large (labour) pro-
ductivity differentials between the
western and eastern parts of Germany
had a considerable and lasting impact
on employment outcomes, partly due
to the adoption of a one-to-one
exchange rate for German monetary
union at the time of reunification. The
overvalued exchange rate for the east-
ern part of Germany, coupled with
access to generous unemployment
insurance and social assistance
schemes, effectively priced out of the
labour market, or else discouraged, a
large number of low-skilled workers.
In addition, buildings in the eastern
part of the country were generally in a
comparatively poor condition and a
huge investment effort was needed to
bring them up to standard, leading to
an upward shift in spending during the
first half of the 1990s. The correction
of this level shift brought about a pro-
longed period of negative growth
rates. 
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Chart 98 – Private Consumption, average growth rates (percentages)
Source: Ameco.
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Chart 99 – Government Consumption, average growth rates (percentages)
Source: Ameco.
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Chart 100 – Exports of Goods and Services, average growth rates (percentages)
Source: Ameco.
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1
9
9
5
=
1
0
0
UK
PL
IT
ES
NL
FR
DE
Chart 101 – Nominal unit labour costs (a), total economy – relative to EU-25
Source: Ameco.
Note: (a) Ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person employed.
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Source: Ameco.
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Chart 103 – Saving rate, gross; households and NPISH (a)
Source: Ameco.
Note: (a) Gross saving as percentage of gross disposable income.
 
4. Analysis of cyclical
developments based on
quarterly national
accounts data
The EU-15
In order to assess cyclical develop-
ments, quarterly national accounts
data for the EU-15 and a selected
number of Member States are present-
ed in charts 104 to 110. In order to
identify cyclical patterns, the data are
smoothed by calculating year-on-year
growth rates for the year ending in the
current quarter. 
In the EU-15 (in the year ending in the
first quarter of 2005) domestic
demand increased by 2.1 percent
(chart 104). In fact, domestic demand
has been increasing since the low of
0.5 percent reached in the third quarter
of 2002, although it tapered off some-
what in the fourth quarter of 2004.
Since 2004, export growth in the EU-
15 has accelerated to around 6 percent
(on an annual basis by the first quarter
of 2005). Employment growth remains
subdued, which can be partly attrib-
uted to the uncertainty surrounding the
strength and duration of the present
economic recovery, together with the
usual lags in economic activity. 
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Chart 104 – Data for EU-15 – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts; EU-11: AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, UK.
Germany
In Germany, the growth rate of domestic
demand (in the year ending in the cur-
rent quarter) moved from +2.6 percent
in the second quarter of 2000 to -2.1
percent in the third quarter of 2002
(chart 105). This big swing mainly
reflects developments in private con-
sumption, although the growth rates of
gross fixed capital formation and gov-
ernment consumption have also moved
into negative territory. Although private
consumption and investment expendi-
tures have recovered somewhat in recent
quarters, domestic demand remained
virtually unchanged in the year ending
in the first quarter of 2005. Employment
growth also registered a swing compara-
ble to that in domestic demand (from an
annual growth rate close to 2 percent in
2000 to -1.1 percent in the year ending
in the third quarter of 2003). Since late
2003, employment has risen in parallel
with the trend in GDP, which contrasts
with the trend in domestic demand. In
fact, despite the near stagnation in
domestic demand, GDP increased by 1
percent in the year ending in the first
quarter of 2005, reflecting buoyant
exports of goods and services, which
progressed by 8.1 percent over the same
period. 
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Chart 105 – Data for Germany – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts.
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France
Economic activity has been stronger
in France than in Germany (chart
106), with the main driving force of
economic growth in France being
domestic demand, while in Germany it
is export growth11. During the 2001-
2003 cyclical downturn, the growth
rate of domestic demand never fell
below 1 percent in France, while pri-
vate consumption showed a remark-
able resilience with the annual growth
rate remaining above 1.5 percent even
at the low point of the cyclical down-
turn (i.e. the fourth quarter of 2003).
With economic recovery, the growth
rates of domestic demand and private
consumption increased to 3.4 percent
and 2.3 percent, respectively (in the
year ending in the first quarter of
2005). The relatively good perform-
ance of domestic demand in France
compared to Germany can partly be
explained by lower job losses in the
former, together with more favourable
developments in terms of consumer
confidence. Yet employment out-
comes remain relatively unfavourable
overall.
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Chart 106– Data for France – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts.
11 The annual growth rate of exports of goods and services in France has been increasing since the beginning of 2004, reaching 2.7 percent in the
year ending in the first quarter of 2005, compared with 8.1 percent for Germany. 
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Italy
Following two years of near stagna-
tion, economic growth in Italy picked
up in 2004 (chart 107). The main driv-
ing force for this growth is exports of
goods and services, while domestic
demand remains subdued. Employ-
ment developments since the mid-
1990s have been particularly
favourable following a number of
labour market reforms. However,
although the pace of job creation has
slowed down with the cyclical down-
turn, the annual growth rate (for the
year ending in the current quarter)
remained close to 1 percent in the
fourth quarter of 2004. 
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Chart 107 – Data for Italy – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts.
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The United Kingdom
In the last ten years or so, GDP growth
in the United Kingdom has stayed
close to or above 2 percent (chart 108),
with domestic demand as the key driv-
er of this favourable performance.
Both private and government con-
sumption have sustained domestic
demand on a regular basis, while
investment has been subject to the
normal cyclical fluctuations. Since the
economic recession of the early
1990s, employment performance has
remained very favourable throughout. 
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Chart 108 – Data for the United Kingdom – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts.
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Spain
The dynamism of economic activity in
Spain since the mid-1990s has been
remarkable (chart 109). All the main
components of domestic demand have
contributed positively to GDP growth.
Net trade, in contrast, has acted main-
ly as a drag on growth, particularly
since the beginning of 2003. Since the
mid-1990s, employment growth has
remained very positive throughout
following a number of labour market
reforms. 
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Chart 109 – Data for Spain – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts.
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The Netherlands
Economic developments in the
Netherlands are highly synchronised
with those in Germany. During the
economic slowdown of 2001-2003,
domestic demand in general and pri-
vate consumption in particular weak-
ened substantially compared with the
very high growth rates registered at
the end of the 1990s (chart 110). As in
Germany, the economic recovery has
been driven by buoyant export growth.
Exports of goods and services
increased by close to 9 percent in the
year ending in the first quarter of
2005. In Germany and the Nether-
lands, substantial gains in price com-
petitiveness are shifting resources to
tradeable sectors, yielding an overall
strengthening in the net trade contri-
bution to growth and a reduction in the
domestic absorption contribution. 
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Chart 110 – Data for the Netherlands – Year-on-year real growth rates for the year ending in the current quarter
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts.
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5. Labour market
outcomes – the role of
aggregate demand
Policy concerns
One of the three overarching objectives
of the Employment Guidelines for
2005 to 2008 – Integrated Guidelines
17 to 2412 – is full employment, together
with improving quality and productivi-
ty at work, and strengthening social
and territorial cohesion. Full employ-
ment is to be achieved by a balanced
approach aiming to increase both the
demand for and supply of labour. 
This section briefly reviews the role of
aggregate demand (i.e. demand
shocks) on the evolution of labour
market variables, relying for most of
the analysis on some well-known (and
broadly consensual) results published
in the academic literature. The motiva-
tion here is the general concern about
the potential impact of unfavourable
demand shocks on labour market out-
comes which, in current circum-
stances, seems to be particularly rele-
vant for some EU economies, notably
Germany (cf. the preceding analysis,
and see charts 111 and 112). 
The interplay between demand and
supply
In the long-run, unemployment is
determined entirely by supply factors
and tends towards the Nairu/Nawru13.
However, in the short to medium-run,
unemployment is determined by the
interplay of demand and supply fac-
tors14. Seen as a succession of short-
12 Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (2005/600/EC).
Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the Community (2005/601/EC).
13 The non-accelerating inflation/wage rate of unemployment. This concept captures the theoretical prediction that over the long-run real demand
and unemployment generally tend towards the level consistent with stable inflation. 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (2005), Unemployment - Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press.
14 In the labour market, the medium-run horizon can be relatively long due to the high persistence of endogenous variables (e.g. wages, unemploy-
ment rates, etc.). 
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run equilibriums, labour market vari-
ables are largely determined by aggre-
gate demand factors. However, the
fact that unemployment is mainly
determined by aggregate demand fac-
tors is fully consistent with the notion
that unemployment is on average
across economic cycles (i.e. in the
long-run) influenced mainly by supply
factors, such as terms-of-trade, and
(the interaction of) labour market
institutions, such as tax structures and
their interplay with benefit systems,
hence emphasising the importance of
structural reforms. 
Factors influencing the long-run
equilibrium level of unemployment
According to Layard et al. (2005): the
long-run equilibrium level of unem-
ployment is affected, first, by any vari-
able which influences the ease with
which unemployed individuals can be
matched to available jobs and, sec-
ond, by any variable which tends to
raise wages in a direct fashion despite
excess supply in the labour market.
Variables in the first group impact on
the position of the Beveridge Curve15,
whereas those in the second do not do
so in any direct fashion. Any variable
shifting the Beveridge Curve to the
right will increase equilibrium unem-
ployment.
Economic analyses usually list the fol-
lowing factors and labour market
institutions as those variables influ-
encing the long-run equilibrium
unemployment rate (through their
impact on the effectiveness with
which the unemployed are matched to
available vacancies): (i) the unemploy-
ment benefit system; (ii) active labour
market policies (ALMPs); (iii) the real
interest rate; (iv) employment protec-
tion laws (EPL); (v) barriers to labour
mobility; (vi) systems of wage deter-
mination; (vii) product market compe-
tition; (viii) labour taxes; and (ix) real
wage resistance.
Demand versus supply shocks 
Blanchard and Quah (1989)16 use a
bivariate Structural Vector Autore-
gressive (SVAR) methodology with
equations for output and the unem-
ployment rate to break down the rela-
tive contributions of demand and sup-
ply disturbances to output fluctua-
tions. A number of restrictions are suf-
ficient to identify the two types of dis-
turbances, and their dynamic effects
on the joint behaviour of output and
unemployment. The identification
assumptions are: (i) each disturbance
is uncorrelated with the other; (ii) nei-
ther has a long-run effect on unem-
ployment; and (iii) the supply distur-
bance has a long-run effect on output
while the demand disturbance does
not17. One of the main conclusions of
this analysis is that although demand
disturbances do not have a long-run
effect on either output or unemploy-
ment, they do make a substantial con-
tribution to output fluctuations in the
short and medium-term horizons18.
The dynamics of unemployment
Several approaches have been used to
explain the dynamics of unemploy-
ment across countries (Layard et al.,
2005). Firstly, there are econometric
studies versus calibrated models19.
Secondly, a distinction may be made
between studies that consider the
interaction between economic shocks,
or baseline variables, and stable labour
market institutions and those that
focus on changes in labour market
institutions. 
Well-known examples of studies that
interact stable institutions with shocks
or baseline variables include Blan-
chard and Wolfers (2000)20, Bertola et
al. (2001)21 and Fitoussi et al. (2000)22.
All these studies use panel data tech-
niques to explain long-run changes in
unemployment rates, which depend on
long-run shifts in a set of baseline
variables/shocks and their interaction
with labour market institutions. 
In order to explain the evolution of
European unemployment, two stylised
facts must be accounted for, namely
the general rise in unemployment
since the 1960s; and the heterogeneity
of individual country experiences
15 The loci of unemployment and vacancy rates. 
16 Blanchard and Quah (1989), ‘The dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Supply Disturbances’, American Economic Review, Vol. 79, pp. 655-673.
17 Even where demand disturbances may have some long-run effect on output, the identification assumptions used are close to the correct ones
when the size of the long-run effect of demand disturbances becomes arbitrarily small relative to that of supply disturbances. Another issue is
the possible non-stationary nature of the unemployment rate. In this case, both output and unemployment could be affected even in the long-run
by demand and supply disturbances. This is predicted by models with a ‘hysteresis’ effect, Blanchard and Summers (1986), ‘Hysteresis and Euro-
pean Unemployment’, Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 15-78.
18 However, Blanchard and Quah (1989) were unable to quantify this contribution with any great precision. 
19 Calibrated models reproduce major stylised facts characterising an economy or group of economies. 
As an example see Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), ‘The European Unemployment Dilemma’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, No 3.
20 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), ‘The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence’, The Eco-
nomic Journal, 110 (March), C1-C33.
21 Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001), ‘Comparative Analysis of Labor Market Outcomes: Lessons for the US from International Long-Run Evidence’,
NBER Working Papers No 8526.
22 Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps and Zoega (2000), ‘Roots of the Recent Recoveries: Labor Reforms or Private Sector Forces?’, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, Summer, pp. 237-311.
 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
Adverse shocks alone cannot explain
much of the heterogeneity in country
experiences, because there is insuffi-
cient variation in the shocks affecting
the different countries. Conversely,
while explanations focusing on labour
market institutions can account well
for cross-country differences, many of
these labour market institutions pre-
cede the rise in unemployment and
have been relatively stable since.
Using a panel of labour market institu-
tions and economic shocks for twenty
OECD countries since 1960, Blan-
chard and Wolfers (2000) find that the
interaction between shocks and insti-
tutions is crucial to explaining both
key facts23. This finding reflects the
varying persistence of unemployment
in response to shocks depending on
the labour market institutions in place
in the different countries24. 
As regards studies that rely on chang-
ing institutions to explain unemploy-
ment developments, Nickell et al.
(2003)25 use panel data techniques in a
dynamic setting. In order to explain
the evolution of unemployment, this
model also includes factors that might
explain the short to medium-run devi-
ations from its equilibrium level, in
addition to the long-run determinants
of the equilibrium level. The main
idea behind this analysis is to explain
unemployment by: (i) those factors
that impact on equilibrium unemploy-
ment (i.e. the usual list of labour mar-
ket institutions26); and (ii) those
shocks that cause unemployment to
deviate from equilibrium unemploy-
ment. The latter include aggregate
demand shocks, productivity and
other labour demand shocks, and
wage shocks. A standard co-integra-
tion test does not reject the hypothesis
that the regression explains unemploy-
ment in the long-run despite the rather
high value of the coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable. This
reflects the high persistence of labour
market variables in general, and
unemployment in particular, but also
the unsatisfactory quality of data for
labour market institutions. 
Dynamic simulations of the estimated
model27 track the actual data relatively
well. It suggests that the institutional
variables included in the unemploy-
ment regression explain about 55% of
the individual country changes in
unemployment from the 1960s to the
early 1990s. Therefore, other factors
not captured by the institutional vari-
ables considered, such as demand and
supply shocks, other institutions not
included in the analysis, the interac-
tion between demand shocks and insti-
tutions, or lack of quality of data for
institutions, account for the remaining
half of the unemployment changes. 
Consequently, in the short- to medium-
run a potentially important role is
played by disequilibrium factors such
as demand shocks/disturbances (Blan-
chard and Quah, 1989, and Blanchard
and Wolfers, 2000). In conjunction
with the (consensual) finding that
labour market outcomes in general, and
the unemployment rate in particular
have a high persistence, the question
emerges whether cyclical fluctuations
are detrimental to employment per-
formance. Related to this question are
two issues: 
• First, is there an asymmetric impact
of business fluctuations on employ-
ment performance?
• Second, in the affirmative, would
this motivate attempts to counteract
the impact of shocks on economic
activity through macroeconomic
policies?
A detailed investigation of these two
issues is beyond the scope of this
report. Analysis on the first question
was published in Employment in
Europe 200228. As regards the second
issue, the reluctance of many econo-
mists to advocate active use of macro-
economic policy to stimulate economic
activity is rooted in negative experi-
ences with these policies between the
1960s and the 1980s. Moreover, mod-
ern economic theory emphasises the
importance of long-term sustainability
and confidence effects as crucial deter-
minants for the success of macroeco-
nomic policy. Policies that are detri-
mental to long-term sustainability risk
a response of private sector expecta-
tions that runs counter to the initial pol-
icy objectives and as a result is likely to
jeopardise the effectiveness of macro-
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23 The interaction explanation of unemployment is attractive because it has the potential to explain not only the increase in unemployment over
time (through adverse shocks), but also the heterogeneity of unemployment evolutions (through the interaction of the shocks with different
labour market institutions).
24 For example, if labour market institutions lead to a labour market with long unemployment duration, adverse economic shocks are more likely
to result in some of the unemployed becoming disenfranchised, reducing the pressure of unemployment on wages, thereby slowing and possibly
even halting the return to lower unemployment. 
25 Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2003), ‘The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment, and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s’, pub-
lished in Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps, Princeton University Press.
26 Including (some) interactions between labour market institutions.
27 Labour market institutions are fixed at their 1960s values. 
28 Chapter 2.
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economic policies 29. Against this back-
ground, the following sections analyse
the cyclical properties of budgetary
policy and the motivation of the revised
Stability and Growth Pact.
6. The cyclical properties
of budgetary policy 
In a monetary union, monetary and
exchange-rate policies are determined
by taking into consideration the col-
lective situation throughout the par-
ticipating countries. Therefore, the
role of budgetary policy is of central
importance in bringing about stabili-
sation through tackling country-spe-
cific developments. Consequently,
EMU brings with it an increased need
to achieve and maintain sound budget
positions over the cycle in order to
provide a sufficient budgetary margin
to absorb (or even to respond to) cycli-
cal fluctuations or economic shocks
with an asymmetric impact30. 
As regards the cyclical properties of
budgetary policy, some preliminary
econometric evidence (see Annex),
using macro-pooled data for the EU-
15, suggests that on average since
1993, the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance (CAPB) of participants in
EMU shows no significant reaction to
variations in the output gap after con-
trolling for a monetary conditions
indicator (MCI). This is consistent
with findings elsewhere. 
For example, Jordi and Perotti (2003)31
argue that the quality of macroeco-
nomic stabilisation in the euro area
increased in comparison to the 1980s,
when, on average, discretionary budg-
etary polices were strongly pro-cycli-
cal. Debrun and Masson (2004)32 also
found that, on average and in most of
the EU-15 Member States, (discre-
tionary) budgetary policy, although
remaining pro-cyclical, has become
less so since EMU. The estimated
coefficients of the equation in the
Annex are in line with these results,
pointing to an overall pro-cyclical
stance for fiscal policy, although this
has been less pronounced since the
start of EMU. Debrun and Masson
(2004) also suggest that the recent
reduction in the pro-cyclical nature of
budgetary policy can be attributed to a
change in behaviour during cyclical
downturns33.
7. The revised Stability
and Growth Pact
In order to strengthen the economic
rationale behind the existing frame-
work for budgetary surveillance,
together with the need to reinforce the
stabilisation role of budgetary poli-
cy34, the Commission issued a Com-
munication35 that considered several
elements for strengthening the Stabili-
ty and Growth Pact (SGP). These
included the following:
• Placing more focus on debt and
sustainability in the surveillance of
budgetary positions; 
• Allowing for more country-specific
circumstances in defining the
SGP’s medium-term deficit objec-
tive of “close to balance or in sur-
plus”;
• Considering economic circum-
stances and developments in the
implementation of the Excessive
Deficit Procedure; and
• Ensuring earlier actions to correct
inadequate budgetary develop-
ments.
The Commission’s proposals have
been largely adopted by the Council in
its report of 20 March 200536. As
expressed in the broad guidelines for
the economic policies of the Member
States and the Community for 2005 to
2008 op. cit., in the present economic
circumstances, for those Member
States that have already achieved
29 The following two examples illustrate the argument: i) an increase in long-term interest rates in response to a reduction in short-term rates by
the central bank; and ii) a reduction in private consumption spending or investment in reaction to expansionary fiscal policy.
30 Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the Community (2005/601/EC).
31 Jordi and Perotti (2003), ‘Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe’, Economic Policy, No 37, October.
32 Debrun and Masson (2004), ‘L’UEM et son cadre macroéconomique: plus grand, plus haut, … plus fort?’, contribution au XVI congrès des
économistes belges de langue française. 
33 Pisani-Ferry (2005) advances two ideas to explain this change: (a) during cyclical downturns the SGP has been relatively accommodating to
higher deficits; and (b) the disappearance of the disciplinary exchange-rate mechanism. 
Pisani-Ferry (2005), La réforme du Pacte de stabilité: ni règles, ni discrétion?, Rapport préparé pour le XVI congrès des économistes belges de
langue française.
34 By securing a sound budgetary position which will allow the full and symmetric play of the automatic budgetary stabilisers over the cycle with
a view to stabilising output around a higher and sustainable trend. 
Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the Community (2005/601/EC).
35 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, COM(2004) 581 final. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Public finances in EMU–2005, ECFIN/C2/REP/51021-EN. 
36 Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact – Council Report to the European Council, (21.3.2005) 7423/05.
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sound budgetary positions the chal-
lenge is to retain that position; while
for the remaining Member States, it is
vital to take all the necessary correc-
tive measures to achieve their medi-
um-term budgetary objectives, in par-
ticular if economic conditions
improve, thus avoiding pro-cyclical
policies and putting themselves in a
position in which sufficient room for
the full play of automatic stabilisers
over the cycle is ensured prior to the
next economic downturn. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the EU
surveillance framework for fiscal pol-
icy has been given a broader perspec-
tive as economic and budgetary poli-
cies thus need to set the right priorities
towards economic reforms, innova-
tion, competitiveness and strengthen-
ing of private investment and con-
sumption in phases of weak economic
growth37. The improved governance of
the budgetary surveillance process
should contribute towards achieving
the economic objectives for growth
and employment set out in the Lisbon
strategy38. 
Debt sustainability and country-
specific circumstances
The increased focus on debt sustain-
ability, together with the increased
weight given to country-specific eco-
nomic and budgetary circumstances in
defining the SGP’s medium-term
objectives, is expected to foster invest-
ment in physical and human capital,
thereby raising the productive capaci-
ty of the economy in the medium to
long-term39. A one-size-fits-all medi-
um-term balanced budget require-
ment, independent of country-specific
circumstances, could lead in some
Member States to an excessive reduc-
tion in government debt levels40 which
could, among other things result in
sub-optimal expenditure on infrastruc-
ture and on education and training (De
Grauwe, 200541). There is strong
empirical evidence that investment in
infrastructure and in human capital are
key drivers of long-term economic
growth42. 
The revised SGP allows the short-term
costs of major reforms to be taken into
account.
It is often claimed that the Stability
and Growth Pact neglects a possible
trade-off between short-term budget-
ary objectives and the implementation
of reforms that could durably improve
public finances over the medium to
long-term. One reason why there
could be a trade-off between reforms
and budgetary objectives is the fact
that reforms have direct budgetary
costs. This is the case of pension
reforms that introduce a funded pillar
classified outside the government sec-
tor. In this case, budgets would nor-
mally undergo a temporary deteriora-
tion (due to lost social security contri-
butions by the government), offset by
long-term improvements (associated
with lower government expenditure on
pension payments). A second reason
for a trade-off is the fact that reforms
can be politically costly, weakening
the drive for fiscal consolidation as
policymakers attempt to overcome
resistance to reforms via, for instance,
tax cuts or government transfers43.
Under the revised SGP, the budgetary
costs of major structural reforms
which have a verifiable positive
impact on the long-term sustainability
of public finances will be taken into
account in assessing of the adjustment
to the medium-term budgetary objec-
tive. In particular, structural reforms
that unequivocally improve the long-
term sustainability of public finances
should not be hampered in order to
meet the targets of the SGP. In order to
enhance the growth-oriented nature of
the Pact, structural reforms will be
taken into account when defining the
adjustment path to the medium-term
objective for countries that have not
yet reached this objective and in
allowing a temporary deviation from
this objective for countries that have
already reached it, with a clear under-
standing that a safety margin to
ensure respect of the 3% of GDP ref-
erence value for the deficit has to be
guaranteed and that the budgetary
position would be expected to return
to the medium-term objective within
the programme period44.
37 Council of the European Union, ECOFIN 104, 21 March 2005.
38 For an overview of the (revised) Lisbon strategy, see the Commission’s Communication entitled Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005-2008), COM(2005) 141 final.
39 The medium-term objective should be differentiated and may diverge from ‘close to balance or in surplus’ for individual Member States on the basis
of their current debt ratio and potential growth, while preserving sufficient margin below the reference value of -3% of GDP, COM(2004) 581 final. 
40 Leading to a potentially inefficient inter-temporal/dynamic allocation of resources. Blanchard and Fischer, (1989) Lectures on Macroeconomics,
MIT press.
41 De Grauwe (2005), ‘The Stability and Growth Pact in need of reform’, ETUC conference on ‘Delivering the Lisbon Goals: the Role of Macroeco-
nomic Policy Making’, 1-2 March 2005.
42 For a general reference see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Economic Growth, MIT Press.
43 For an analysis of the link between structural reforms and budgetary policy, see European Commission (2005): Public Finances in EMU 2005. 
44 Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact – Council Report to the European Council (21.3.2005) 7423/05.
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Discretionary fiscal policy has some
potential drawbacks
According to some authors45, another
limitation of structural reforms under
EMU is their potential deflationary
impact which, for political economy
reasons, might reduce their attractive-
ness to policymakers. They argue for
discretionary budgetary expansion to
accompany structural reforms. Others,
however, argue that reforms can also
have a direct positive impact on
demand through confidence effects46.
Although it is clear that, under the
new EMU policy regime, the role of
budgetary policy is now of central
importance for stabilisation purposes,
particularly in the presence of cyclical
fluctuations or economic shocks with
an asymmetric impact, a note of cau-
tion is necessary regarding the effec-
tiveness of discretionary fiscal policy. 
Fiscal policy is subject to various lags,
including the time needed to recognise
the situation requiring attention, to
propose appropriate action and to
carry it through the political process.
In addition, the ideal timing of discre-
tionary fiscal policy would depend not
only on the position in the domestic
economic cycle, but also on the condi-
tions prevailing in the euro area and
the policy response of the European
Central Bank. As a result of these
drawbacks, discretionary fiscal policy
might possibly have a destabilising
effect on economic activity. However,
automatic stabilisers do not suffer
from the many potential problems of
discretionary fiscal policy, although,
by their nature, they can only attenuate
and not fully offset the effects of
shocks. 
8. Summary and
Conclusions
The main conclusions of the foregoing
analysis are as follows: 
• In the EU-15 during the period
1997-2000, economic growth was
particularly rich in jobs, and in the
cyclical downturn of 2001-2003
employment levels showed a
remarkable resilience compared to
the previous cyclical downturn of
1992-199447. The current broad con-
sensus48 is that structural improve-
ments have occurred in the function-
ing of labour markets, resulting
from a number of factors, such as:
(a) past and ongoing reforms in
labour, products and services, and
financial markets; (b) development
of certain types of labour contracts
(e.g. part-time work); (c) changes in
the sectoral composition of employ-
ment49; and (d) wage formation
45 Silbert and Sutherland (1998), "Monetary Regimes and Labour Market Reform", CEPR Discussion Paper No 1731.
Calmfors (1998), "Macroeconomic Policy, Wage Setting and Employment – What Difference Does EMU Make?", Oxford Review of Economic
Policy.
Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2000), "Will EMU increase Eurosclerosis?", CEPR Discussion Papers No 2423.
46 See Public Finances in EMU 2005.
47 In the EU-15 during the 1992-1994 recession, employment declined by nearly 3 percentage points. This contrasts with an increase in cumulative
terms of about 2 percentage points during the period 2001-2003. 
48 For example see recent issues of the European Economy Review and of the Employment in Europe publications (http://europa.eu.int/comm/econ-
omy_finance/publications/the_eu_economy_review_en.htm and http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/index_en.html, respectively).
49 Resulting from high employment (and GDP) growth rates in most service sectors with a higher weight in total employment in the late 1990s than
a decade earlier; conversely, sectors with low or negative employment growth, such as agriculture and industry excluding construction had a lower
weight in total employment in the late 1990s than a decade earlier. 
50 The risk of a jobless (or even of a ‘jobs-loss’) economic recovery is mentioned in ‘Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2004, with a Spe-
cial Focus on the Risk of Jobless Growth’, European Economy Special Report No 3/2005.
51 In recent years, unfavourable/unsustainable starting positions have prevented a number of countries from making full use of automatic stabilis-
ers and even more from introducing discretionary counter-cyclical measures. 
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mechanisms that take better account
of prevailing (competitive) condi-
tions in the economy. 
• The economic upswing that started
in the second half of 2003 has been
characterised by the slow response
of employment, which mirrors the
limited labour market response dur-
ing the prolonged downturn. The
risk of an upward cycle with low
employment growth overall cannot
be excluded50. The persistent weak-
ness of domestic demand in Ger-
many poses a major downside risk
to the current economic recovery in
Europe in general, and job creation
in particular. The present surge in
energy prices could damage eco-
nomic confidence, adding further to
the impact of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the strength and duration
of the present economic recovery.
Across EU Member States and over
the cycle, the poor track record of
budgetary policy with respect to
economic stabilisation51 and the dif-
ficulties in undertaking a coherent
and comprehensive strategy of
structural reforms are also likely to
weigh negatively on economic con-
fidence, yielding lower investment
expenditure and job creation. In the
present circumstances, firms might
not want to expand (at least early on
in the upswing), fearing a possible
“double-dip” in the economic cycle. 
• While in the EU-15 GDP grew at
similar rates during the cyclical
downturns of 2001-2003 and 1992-
1994, an analysis of individual
Member States shows diverse expe-
riences, which are reflected in
employment outcomes. For exam-
ple, Germany, the Netherlands and
Poland displayed a weaker perform-
ance in the 2001-2003 slowdown
than in 1992-1994, mainly because
of the weakness or stagnation of
domestic demand. Conversely, in
France, Spain, Italy and the United
Kingdom, domestic demand was
stronger on average during the
2001-2003 period (compared to the
recession in the first half of the
1990s), contributing to higher
domestic demand growth in the EU-
15 as a whole. 
• Econometric results suggest that
although demand disturbances do
not seem to have a significant long-
run effect on either output or unem-
ployment, they make a substantial
contribution to output fluctuations
in the short- and medium-term. In
the short- to medium-run a poten-
tially important role is played by dis-
equilibrium factors such as demand
shocks/disturbances. This, together
with the (consensual) finding that
labour market outcomes in general,
and the unemployment rate in par-
ticular, have high persistence, raises
the important issue of the quality of
macroeconomic policy stabilisation. 
• As regards the usefulness of macro-
economic policies, and in particular
budgetary policy in stabilising eco-
nomic activity, a note of caution is
necessary especially regarding the
effectiveness of discretionary fiscal
policy. Fiscal policy is subject to
various lags, together with the vary-
ing policy response of the monetary
authorities. Therefore, discretionary
fiscal policy might possibly have a
destabilising effect on economic
activity and hence also a negative
impact on the labour market. How-
ever, automatic stabilisers do not
suffer from the numerous drawbacks
of discretionary fiscal policy,
although, by their nature, they can
only attenuate and not fully offset
the effects of shocks.
• With the revised SGP, the EU sur-
veillance framework for fiscal poli-
cy has been given a broader perspec-
tive as economic and budgetary
policies need to set the right priori-
ties for economic reforms, innova-
tion, competitiveness, and strength-
ening of private investment and con-
sumption in phases of weak eco-
nomic growth. The improved gover-
nance of the budgetary surveillance
process, also thanks to the increased
attention paid to the quality of pub-
lic finances, should contribute
towards achieving the economic
objectives set out in the renewed
Lisbon strategy for both growth and
employment.
• In particular, the increased focus on
debt sustainability, the extra weight
given to country-specific economic
and budgetary circumstances in
defining the Pact’s medium-term
objectives, and the enhanced role of
structural reforms are expected, on
the one hand, to foster investment
spending on physical capital and
knowledge (both human capital and
R&D), thereby raising the produc-
tive capacity of the economy over
the medium to long-term and, on the
other, to establish a political econo-
my mechanism more favourable to
the process of structural reform and
ultimately act to boost employment
creation.
• Successful implementation of the
re-launched Lisbon strategy, encom-
passing guidelines for macro-,
micro-economic and employment
policies at national level and for
structural action at EU level, would
make European economies more
resilient and able to adjust faster to
shocks, thereby strengthening and
sustaining confidence among eco-
nomic actors and reducing the need
for stabilisation policies.
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The general government cyclically-adjust-
ed primary balance (CAPB) aims to meas-
ure the discretionary impulses of budget-
ary policy52. The adjustment is based on
the estimated average impact on govern-
ment revenue and expenditure of the devi-
ation between actual and potential GDP53.
An increase/decrease in the CAPB repre-
sents a fiscal tightening/loosening. The
monetary conditions indicator (MCI) is a
weighted average of changes in domestic
real interest rates and real effective
exchange rates54. An increase/decrease in
the MCI represents a monetary tighten-
ing/loosening.
Using macro-pooled data for the EU-1555,
the following equation is estimated to
explain the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance (capb): 
where i and t are respectively the country
and period indices; αi is the fixed effects
coefficient; mciit is the monetary condi-
tions indicator; gapit is the cyclical com-
ponent of output using the production
function approach (i.e. the output gap);
dum1 is a dummy that equals one after
1993 for EMU participants and zero
otherwise56; uit is a first order autoregres-
sive stochastic process; and d is the first
difference operator. 
The source of the data is DG ECFIN,
Ameco. Data for the MCI are derived
from calculations made in DG EMPL
using Ameco data for real interest rates
and real effective exchange rates. 
The pool equation for the EU-15 (exclud-
ing Luxembourg), covering the 1970-
2004 period, is estimated using ordinary
least squares. 
A note of caution is necessary regarding
the estimation method. Due to the possi-
ble endogeneity of regressors, it would
have been preferable to use the two-stage
least squares estimation method. Lack of
adequate instruments prevented this.
Therefore, the results should only be
taken as illustrative, because the esti-
mates might be both biased and ineffi-
cient.
The estimates of this equation are used to
test the following hypothesis. On average
across EMU countries, and after control-
ling for monetary conditions (MCI), dis-
cretionary fiscal policy (CAPB) has not
been actively/systematically used to
counteract cyclical fluctuations since the
onset of the EMU project (1993). This
hypothesis corresponds to testing for β2
+ β3 = 0. With a p-valuea of 60%, this
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
a) The p-value indicates the probability of
obtaining a test statistic whose absolute
value is greater or equal to the sample sta-
tistic if the (null) hypothesis is true.
Box 9 – Estimation of a ‘reaction’ function for budgetary policy
52 It excludes variations in the general government primary balance due to cyclical fluctuations and the impact of automatic stabilisers. However,
in recent years the systematic recourse by many Member States to one-off/transitory budgetary measures has introduced a bias between this indi-
cator and the underlying fiscal stance.
53 Source: DG ECFIN, Ameco.
54 , where rt is the short-term real interest rate, qt is the log of the real effective exchange rate (where a rise in qt
represents an appreciation), ω is the weight of the interest rate component, and rb and qb are the levels of the real interest rate and the log of the
real effective exchange rate in a given base period. The data source is DG ECFIN, Ameco. ω is set to 2/3, which is a value commonly used. 
Batini and Turnbull (2000), Monetary Conditions Indices for the UK: A Survey, Bank of England.
55 EU-15, excluding Luxembourg.
56 It is implicitly assumed that in a number of EU Member States a break in fiscal policy might have occurred around 1992/1993 (the Maastricht
Treaty was signed in 1992), as at that time future participants in EMU embarked on a budgetary consolidation path to reduce by 1997 their gen-
eral government deficits below the reference value of 3% of GDP, and thereby qualify for the first wave of monetary union. Later dates for the
starting year of the ‘EMU effect’ (i.e. the dummy in the regression) were tested without significant changes in the results.
β1 -0.10
(-1.4) 
β2 -0.20
(-3.6) *
β3 0.18
(2.7) *
AR(1) 0.76
(20.6) *
R2 adjusted 0.76
Standard error of the regression 1.4
Coefficient Estimate
The t ratios are in parentheses. * coefficient significant at 1%.
Annex I
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Chapter 4 Earnings disparities and
determinants of the earnings
distribution in the EU
1. Introduction 
The structure and evolution of earn-
ings are important features of the
labour market. As earnings reflect
labour supply decisions by workers or
individuals and labour demand deci-
sions by firms, information and data
collected from both firms and workers
are most useful in analysing the deter-
minants of earnings. Furthermore, the
link between earnings, productivity,
profits and consumption are strong
determinants of economic growth and
employment performance, which are
overarching objectives of the renewed
Lisbon Strategy. As highlighted in the
new ‘Integrated Guidelines for growth
and jobs’1, there are two guidelines
which deal essentially with wage
developments and their social and ter-
ritorial dimension, thus providing for
social cohesion2.
Essentially this chapter will provide a
recent perspective for the understand-
ing of earnings differentiation across
Member States, regions, and individ-
ual characteristics that determine
earnings inequality, exploring the
micro-economic foundations of earn-
ings inequality. It provides elements
on the distribution of earnings and
attempts to relate these elements to the
causes of earnings inequality identi-
fied in the economic literature, such as
individual characteristics (e.g. age,
gender, skills), company specificities
(e.g. size, location, physical capital,
technology, work organisation),
increased economic integration, and
the institutional and bargaining frame-
work.
Such an analysis is greatly assisted by
availability of the Structure of Earn-
ings Survey (SES) results from the
European Statistical Office (Eurostat),
released at the end of April 2005. The
SES3 contains – in its underlying ques-
tionnaires – an abundance of informa-
tion on both the employer and the
employee, all gathered at enterprise
level and thus represents an extremely
valuable source for research in labour
economics using micro-data. The SES
is an important survey for two main
reasons: firstly because it covers the
difficult subject of earnings data,
though accessibility is constrained by
data confidentiality. Secondly, it pro-
vides EU-wide harmonised coverage
of the data. Such information makes it
possible to improve understanding of
some key elements for the Lisbon
Strategy, including: 
• Increased wage differentiation
(wage inequalities, according to
gender, regions, industries, and
their individual and collective
determinants) and their links to
employment performance and
labour mobility4; 
• Impact of remaining pay gaps, in
particular the persistent pay
inequalities between men and
women, which probably form one
of the most persistent obstacles to a
balanced participation of men and
of women in employment5; 
• The role of collective agreements
in the regulation of wages, in par-
ticular taking into account produc-
tivity. Unfortunately, owing to a
low response rate in some Member
States (the relevant questions in the
survey were optional), analysis of
this issue is only possible for select-
ed Member States; 
• Member States have different histo-
ries as far as the trend in wage
inequalities is concerned. For
instance in the new Member States
of Central and Eastern Europe,
under central planning, earnings
inequality was traditionally low.
Then the dispersion in earnings
1 COM(2005)141 final.
2 Integrated Guideline 4. To ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic stability and growth and to increase adaptability, Mem-
ber States should encourage the right framework conditions for wage-bargaining systems, while fully respecting the role of the social partners,
with a view to promote nominal wage and labour cost developments consistent with price stability and the trend in productivity over the medi-
um term, taking into account differences across skills and local labour market conditions. 
Integrated Guideline 22. Ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage-setting mechanisms by encouraging social partners
within their own responsibilities to set the right framework for wage-bargaining in order to reflect productivity and labour market challenges at
all relevant levels and to avoid gender pay gaps; and reviewing the impact on employment of non-wage labour costs and where appropriate adjust
their structure and level, especially to reduce the tax burden on the low-paid.
3 Eurostat has published the aggregate data on the following website: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734
&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/popul/labour/earncost/gearning/ses2002&language=en&product=EU_MAIN
_TREE&root=EU_MAIN_TREE&scrollto=176.
4 However the scope of this chapter obviously will not allow coverage of all the issues and the data does not allow us to go as far as examining
‘local labour market conditions’ in great detail.
5 On the gender pay gap, see the Commission Staff working paper at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/ gen-
der/sec_03_937_en.pdf.
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increased and they are now close to
or have even exceeded the levels of
inequality found in the established
market economies of Western
Europe6. As such, the European
Structure of Earnings survey is
potentially a very rich source for
information on this subject over
time;
• Wage formation is a complex issue,
with wage developments and
aspects of wage flexibility being at
the heart of the current policy
debate on competitiveness and
maximising job creation. There-
fore, new surveys such as the Euro-
pean SES provide valuable insights
into the issue.
Let us not forget that earnings have a
dual nature: they reflect a reward for
productivity, skills, enterprise charac-
teristics, sectoral characteristics, qual-
ity in work generally 7 and are crucial
to defining a job as being a ‘good job’,
in the sense of ‘better jobs’8; but they
are also an essential component for
achieving social cohesion, which fun-
damentally depends on the distribu-
tion of earnings. This duality mirrors
the themes which are central to the
European agenda – Europe has to
stimulate growth and employment
while guaranteeing social cohesion.
The monitoring of the new Lisbon
strategy requires robust examination
of the question of remuneration. The
main issue is that the development of
pay is to a great extent determined by
the characteristics of workers, firms,
location, and a variety of national
institutions and this makes it difficult
to generalise and to derive any upward
or downward trend in the incidence of
inequalities in the EU. Essentially this
topic reflects the range of choices fac-
ing a society, which revolve around
equity and efficiency.
2. No generalised trend
across the EU 
Earnings inequalities are one of the
most tangible subjects, and obviously
one of the most sensitive for European
populations, with real implications for
each and every individual. Earnings
inequality in Europe is a major cause
for concern among the public at large.
Recent developments in the EU such
as enlargement or the development of
non-wage remuneration (for example,
stock options and the like) have inten-
sified interest in the subject. However,
it is also a central issue for the eco-
nomic and social modernisation of
Europe because earnings reflect
essential elements of the economy
(such as productivity) and of society
(such as the evolution of skills).
Throughout the EU-25, earnings
inequalities have been strongly driven
by several country-specific elements.
In the United Kingdom, for example,
earnings inequality has grown dramat-
ically over a long period among all
employees, men and women, young
and older workers alike9. The new
Member States of Central and Eastern
Europe that joined the EU in 2004
have also witnessed a widening of the
earnings distribution10 during their
transition stages, though they started
from the comparatively low levels of
inequality which were a feature of the
centrally planned systems they for-
merly had. In continental Europe, we
see more variation, with inequality
growing in some Member States, but
declining in others11. Therefore, in
terms of the EU, it is not possible to
identify a ‘generalised trend of widen-
ing earnings inequality’12 such as the
one identified in the US, and this is
evident from chart 113. Chart 113
plots the evolution over time (1969 to
2004) of the decile ratios (decile 9
over decile 1 – on the vertical axis),
which measure earnings dispersion for
full-time workers as measured by the
earnings limit of the ninth decile of
workers relative to the earnings limit
for the bottom decile. 
6 Rutkowski, J. (1996), ‘Changes in the wage structure during economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, Social Challenges of Transi-
tion Series, World Bank Technical Paper n°340.
7 Ten indicators of quality in work were adopted at the Laeken European Council in December 2001 as a means of both assessing the quality of
work in Europe and monitoring its evolution over time. These are (1) Intrinsic job quality, (2) Skills, lifelong learning, and career development,
(3) Gender equality, (4) Health and safety at work, (5) Flexibility and security, (6) Inclusion and access to the labour market, (7) Work organi-
sation and work-life balance, (8) Social dialogue and worker involvement, (9) Diversity and non-discrimination, (10) Overall work performance
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/dimensions_en.htm.
8 Report of the European Employment task-force, chaired by Wim Kok, Jobs, jobs, jobs, which underlined the need for ‘more and better jobs’.
9 McKnight, A. (2000), Trends in earnings inequality and earnings mobility, 1977-1999, the impact of mobility on long-term inequality, for the
Department of Trade and Industry.
10 Rutkowski, J. J. (2001), ‘Earnings inequality in Transition Economies of Central Europe, Trends and Patterns During the 1990s’, Social Protec-
tion Discussion Paper Series n°117, World Bank. 
11 Howell, D., Huebler, F. (2001), ‘Trends in earnings inequality and unemployment across the OECD’, CEPA working paper n°23; they state that
‘some countries clearly show declines in earnings inequality (BE, IT, DE, FI, FR, NO) while others are stable or exhibit modest increases).
OECD (1996) even documents a decline in French earnings inequality in the 1970s to mid-1990s. 
12 OECD (1996), Perspectives économiques.
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From these data, it is clear that earn-
ings inequality increased in the US,
the UK, Poland, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, while it clearly
decreased in Japan, slightly in France
and was relatively stable in Sweden.
More specifically there has been a
steady increase in earnings inequality
in the US over the last thirty years, and
in the UK over the last 20 years,
whereas the trend has been observable
in Poland only since the early 1990s
(although it is not strictly comparable
to the other countries, given its transi-
tion from planned to market economy
over the period). Unfortunately the
range of years available for the data
varies between countries, making
comparisons difficult. Interestingly,
Finland, Denmark and Sweden feature
the lowest levels of earnings inequali-
ty; thus there does not seem to be a
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Chart 113 – Trends in earnings inequality (selected countries)
Source: OECD data on the ratio decile9/decile; the source is the Structure of Earnings Database, and in all cases, refer to earnings of full-time
workers; data sources are diverse (enterprise surveys, household surveys, tax records, social security records) and can be communicated upon
request. There were too many missing values for other European countries not displayed in this chart; some linear interpolation was necessary for
FI, DK, NL, PL; data was available for DK (1980-2003), FI (irregular), FR (1969-2002), DE (1984-2002), NL (1977-1999), PL (1980-2002), SE
(1980-2003), UK (1970-2003) US (1973-2003), JP (1975-2003).
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Chart 114 – Trends in earnings inequality (selected new Member States)
Source: Data in Rutkowski J. (2001), ‘Earnings Inequality in Transition Economies of Central
Europe, Trends and Patterns During the 1990s’, op. cit., World Bank. 
Note: Missing and truncated data for some of the countries.
direct link to labour market and eco-
nomic performance. Rising trends in
earnings inequalities are usually
pointed out when analysing the US
and the UK, but this does not neces-
sarily imply a generalised world-wide
trend. Indeed charts 113 and 114 sug-
gest that there may be many more fac-
tors at work which determine trends in
earnings inequality. 
Again, no clear trend can be inferred
for the new Member States (see chart
114 except Poland, for which data
were available for a longer period of
time and so are displayed in chart
113). Yet the average level of inequal-
ity is significantly higher than for
other Member States (the decile ratio
varies between 3 and 5, as compared
to 2 and 3 for other Member States
except the UK).
However, earnings inequality is best
understood when studied over time,
and it would be useful to have data
collected regularly at the level of the
enterprise to monitor trends across the
EU (firm-level panel data) and here
the SES can help up to a point. Unfor-
tunately, because of a number of fac-
tors relating to the development of the
EU, the information in the two SES
exercises carried out in 1995 and 2002
are not strictly comparable. 
During the 1980s, earnings inequality
increased in several OECD countries,
widening the gap between the richest
and poorest. This trend has been par-
ticularly striking in the US, where
researchers largely agree that the main
factors bringing about this change
have been globalisation and rapid
technological change (with the impli-
cations for skill needs). However, oth-
ers have pointed towards labour mar-
ket institutions and notably the degree
of compression of the wage structure,
which also reflects certain aspects of
wage flexibility, as the principal
engine of change. Overall, there
appears to be a lack of consensus as to
the relative strengths of these effects. 
Nonetheless, much more in-depth
analysis is needed to establish a causal
link, not least as there are various pos-
sible explanations to earnings inequal-
ity in economic theory that are
explored later on in this chapter, after
having presented the descriptive evi-
dence from the data contained in the
SES.
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Measuring earnings differentials or earn-
ings inequality is very difficult because
of problems with the source of data, the
coverage, the definition of ‘earnings’
(whether it includes social benefits or
family allowances) and the fact that earn-
ings tend to be misreported (this is the
typical shortcoming of household sur-
veys), as both employers and workers
might underreport actual earnings for tax
purposes. 
Evidence based on a cross-section of the
earnings distribution provides a snapshot
of the extent of earnings inequality at a
single point in time and this chapter
adopts this approach, given the point
made about the lack of comparability
between the SES of 1995 and 200213. It is
also legitimate to examine the dynamics
of earnings inequality over time, as well
as other issues such as the lifetime per-
spective and the development of the situ-
ation over the long-term. It would also be
important to know whether or not an
increase in cross-sectional inequality at
any one point in time could lead to an
increase in lifetime earnings inequality14.
These issues are important because there
is some evidence (for example in the US
and the UK) that increases in cross-sec-
tional earnings inequalities have been
accompanied by rising lifetime earnings
inequality. However, such questions can-
not be addressed using the results of the
2002 SES, since evidence is needed from
longitudinal earnings data that tracks
individuals continuously over a long peri-
od of time.
Employer-based surveys, such as the
SES, usually yield different results from
those obtained using household surveys,
because, wages in the private sector, for
example, tend to be more unequally dis-
tributed, and the main difference is that
these surveys are based on very different
designs, with differences in coverage and
sampling procedures.
Differences also reflect, in part, varia-
tions in coverage and the adopted defini-
tion of earnings. For example, in the SES,
firms with fewer than 10 employees are
not necessarily included in the survey, as
reporting these data was optional for
countries. In addition, the distribution of
earnings tends to differ from an hourly
wage rate; this is sometimes due to a pre-
mium paid in the private sector, for
instance. 
Box 10 – The difficulties in measuring earnings inequality
13 Owing to developments in European integration, the 1995 survey covered only 15 countries. Exchange rate, inflation, and macroeconomic devel-
opments also interfere with data comparability and the structure of the survey itself has changed (classifications).
14 For the UK, a study using longitudinal data on individuals between 1977 and 1997 shows that lifetime earnings inequality has risen over the
same period which has seen cross-sectional inequality increase. The measured earnings inequality observed over the past 20 years has increased
long-term inequality across the population. 
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3. What do the data 
tell us?
(For detailed information about 
the Structure of Earnings Survey, see
Box 13 in Annex I)
Users of the SES want to determine
the earnings received by employees
and to investigate the statistical rela-
tionship between the level of the earn-
ings and the individual characteristics
of the employees and the characteris-
tics of the employer. National statisti-
cal offices collect the information on
earnings used in the survey and it con-
tains questions about the enterprise
and on the individual employee, aim-
ing to gather individual data on earn-
ings and working hours, as well as
personal characteristics and character-
istics of the jobs. 
The statistics provide detailed results
on gross hourly, monthly and annual
earnings of men and women, of
salaried employees and wage earners,
which can be analysed in relation to
personal characteristics and job char-
acteristics (workplace). Monthly earn-
ings only include payments made in
each pay period, while annual earn-
ings also include bonuses and
allowances that are not paid regularly.
Data cover both full-time and part-
time employees. 
Using aggregate data from the SES, it
is possible to give an overview of the
various dimensions of earnings dis-
parities15 (including the national, sec-
toral, occupational and individual
dimensions) that will be further
explored later on.
3.1. Differences in earnings
between countries
A preliminary examination of the
aggregate figures from the SES shows
that earnings in industry and in serv-
ices are, on average, comparable
across the EU-2516. However, average
annual earnings in the services sector
tend to be higher (measured using
Purchasing Power Parity Standards
(PPS), a unit which reflects differ-
ences in national price levels) in Lux-
embourg (37 200 PPS), UK (33 600
PPS), Germany (33 500 PPS), Nether-
lands, Denmark, Austria and Belgium -
while they are three times lower in Bul-
garia, Romania, Latvia (7 200 PPS),
Lithuania (8 300 PPS), and Estonia
(9 400 PPS). Average annual earnings
are on average two to four times lower
in the new Member States compared
with the EU-15 or the euro-zone. The
comparison of earnings in PPS show a
much smaller gap between Member
States than the comparison in euros17,
15 For an interesting review of the main explanations to wage differentials in the Euro area, see Genre V. et al (2005), ‘Wage diversity in the Euro
area, an overview of labour cost differentials across industries’, European Central Bank, Occasional Paper series, n°24. 
16 Let us note that the SES covers 27 countries, therefore in this chapter the use of ‘countries’ is acceptable instead of only ‘Member States’, unless
the sentence specifically refers to EU members.
17 Eurostat News release n°68/2005, 30 May 2005.
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Chart 115 – Average annual earnings by activity (in € per annum)
Source: SES, data for the year 2002.
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effectively reducing the differences in
earnings between countries. While the
ratio between the Member States with
the highest and the lowest earnings in
euros was 11 to 1 (Denmark with
41 700 and Latvia with 3 600), the
ratio for earnings in PPS is approxi-
mately 5 to 1 (Luxemburg with 37 200
and Latvia with 7 200).
3.2. Services pay only slightly
more than industry
Chart 115 displays the average annual
earnings by broad sector (industry and
services) for the year 2002, in euros. It
turns out that services pay only slight-
ly more than industry and in some
countries, such as Germany, Austria,
Norway, Ireland, Greece, and the
Netherlands, earnings in industry are
higher. Earnings are similar in both
sectors in the UK and Finland, where-
as they are markedly higher in servic-
es in Luxembourg, Italy, Cyprus, Por-
tugal, among some others. 
Hourly earnings measured in PPS in
the industrial sector tend to be rela-
tively high in Denmark, Germany,
Norway and (perhaps surprisingly)
the UK, which belong to a group of
Member States that seem to have rel-
atively high wages in industry, being
well above the EU-25 average. In con-
trast, Italy, Finland, Sweden and Spain
have comparatively lower wages in
industry. The new Member States
tend to pay significantly less than the
average at present, as can be seen
from chart 116, although this is
already starting to change18. 
In the services sector, earnings dispari-
ties tend to be wider than those in the
industrial sector. For example, financial
services are an important driver of the
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Chart 116 – Hourly earnings in Industry (C-F), in PPS
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Chart 117 – Hourly earnings in Services (G-K), in PPS
Source: SES 2002.
PPS
Source: SES 2002.
18 For the sake of clarity, the 10 countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 are referred to as ‘New Member States’ (NMS) despite the fact that
at the time the survey was conducted, in 2002, they were not yet members of the EU.
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high level of annual earnings – espe-
cially in the case of Luxembourg and
the UK. Once again, in the new Mem-
ber States, the average annual earnings
are much lower than for other EU coun-
tries. Chart 117 shows that the group-
ings of Member States according to the
level of earnings in services are howev-
er fairly similar to those displayed in
chart 116, indicating the potential
importance of ‘earnings structures’ and
country-specific determinants of these.
Median earnings tend to be higher in
the services sector largely because
they mostly comprise private sector
employers (G-K) as shown in chart
118, especially in financial intermedi-
ation (J). Furthermore, hourly earn-
ings can vary considerably (indicating
the extreme difference between the
highest and lowest earnings per hour)
in activities as diverse as mining and
quarrying (C), electricity, gas and
water supply (E) and financial inter-
mediation (J). As may be expected,
though, hotels and restaurants (H)
mostly offer comparatively low-paid
jobs. The data in chart 118 help rein-
force the point that the ‘services’ sec-
tor is not necessarily a high-
paying/high-skilled sector19. 
Chart 11820 illustrates the dispersion
of gross hourly earnings in a specific
activity, not only as regards the medi-
an, but also in terms of dispersion. It
shows, for example, that earnings are
more dispersed in mining and quarry-
ing (C) (this may be due to the fact
that activities such as oil extraction,
considered to be comparatively risky
and thus well paid, are included in this
category) than ‘hotels and restau-
rants’ (H).
3.3. The number of hours
worked counts
The difference in the number of month-
ly hours worked is also at the heart of a
controversy between ‘models’ of work
organisation, namely models according
to which the number of hours worked
in a week or given month is very high
and models by which more leisure is
warranted. This is also a characteristic
that contributes to a large gender differ-
ence in earnings. 
From the data (charts 119 and 120), it
is important to note that in the NMS,
workers seem to work much longer
hours than in the EU-15. Also strik-
ing, is the fact that on average, the
working week seems to average 43
hours of work, be it in services or
industry, with the notable exceptions
of both France and Ireland, where the
average working week in services
amounts to 38.5 hours and in industry,
it is 38 hours and 40.5 hours a week in
France and Ireland respectively.
Such differences play a role when
comparing hourly earnings to month-
ly and annual earnings, notably for
France and Ireland, because it affects
the ranking of countries when com-
paring their earnings to other coun-
tries. Such rankings are also influ-
enced by other components of pay-
ments to the worker, such as
allowances and benefits that are not
paid by the hour, for example the thir-
teenth month or holiday bonuses, as
well as irregular allowances.
19 See previous editions of Employment in Europe for a thorough discussion of the composition and features of the services sector.
20 Chart 118 represents a set of 12 boxplots (one boxplot per NACE category or grouping). Each boxplot displays the within-branches dispersion by
aggregating the information contained in the annual earnings data for the countries for the corresponding NACE category to only five character-
istics. These characteristics are the lower quartile (25th percentile) and the upper quartile (75th percentile) of the data set defining the length of
the box, the median (50th percentile) marked inside the box and the minimum and maximum of the data set which are connected with the box.
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Chart 120 – Hours paid in Industry (C-F)
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3.4. Wage disparities across
Member States and regions
So far the analysis has been con-
cerned with developments at the
country level and with differences
between countries. There are, howev-
er, equally important differences
between regions within the countries
and this is especially true of the new
Member States and so it is these
regional differences that are the focus
here. There are observable variations
in terms of economic performance,
the structure of economic activity and
the skill requirements of the work-
forces in these regions, complicated
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by the fact that they tend to change
over time. Issues of regional disparity
are central to identifying a strategy
for reducing regional employment
imbalances and moving towards the
objective of greater social cohesion.
In this, three policy dimensions stand
out, namely the reduction of the
obstacles to geographical mobility,
wage adjustment and the promotion
of local job creation. 
Regional disparities in technology
can reflect genuine productivity dif-
ferences across regions via differ-
ences in local facilities. Such an argu-
ment has been advanced by econo-
mists21, confirming that the drivers of
regional disparity are such factors as
infrastructure, local institutions, tech-
nology (such as the increased usage
of sophisticated machinery and com-
puters, ICT, etc) and climate. All
those elements that potentially influ-
ence the productivity of labour can
help create a region’s ‘competitive
advantage’. Generally, this type of
explanation favours high-skilled
labour (cf. the special ‘focus’ at the
end of this chapter). The evidence
supporting this hypothesis sees an
increase in the demand for highly
skilled labour, creating excess
demand, which puts upward pressure
on their wages, while at the same time
depressing those of the less skilled.
However, there is some empirical evi-
dence that such a scenario may not
always prevail22. There is the further
point that regional disparities of these
kind can also increase inequality
between skill groups.
Empirical testing on the reasons
behind the variation in nominal
wages across 200 European regions
(NUTS 2) was carried out23 and it
seems that “what is important for
wage variations among NUTS 2
regions of the EU are the links
between competitive industries and
market service providers, the increas-
ing variety of which in the larger
denser cities imparts increasing
returns to scale with employment
density. Wages also seem to depend
on the efficiency of the labour force,
plus technological spillover external-
ities, captured by measures of school-
ing and technical skills, plus nation-
al-level effects that are picked up by
country dummy variables”. Increas-
ing returns - as a basis for under-
standing the spatial concentration of
economic activity - are not the single
most important explanation for
regional wage variation; indeed mar-
ket access (or market potential) is
also a highly relevant issue.
Moreover, increased economic integra-
tion and competition from lower-wage
countries, due to increased internation-
al trade have been said to increase the
demand for skilled labour in industri-
alised economies at the expense of the
unskilled. This is consistent with the
fact that skilled labour is relatively
cheap in industrialised economies
compared with developing countries,
and unskilled labour is relatively
expensive. It has been argued that
industrialised economies have there-
fore shifted towards the production of
goods and services using more skill-
intensive labour, increasing inequality
between skills-groups. However, there
is no conclusive evidence as yet on the
impact of international trade onto
employment and wages24. 
Regional employment changes have
been the subject of various research
analyses25 for the European Commis-
sion, and the findings can be encap-
sulated in the discussion below.
Mapping regions according to their
specialisation pattern shows some
interesting features26. In particular, it
indicates that regions with a relative
concentration of employment in a
given broad sector tend to be contigu-
ous in both the EU-15 countries and
the new Member States. A further
21 Quah D. (2002), ‘Spatial agglomeration dynamics’, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 92 no. 2, pp. 247-252.
22 Experiments carried out on French data (Combes P. P. op. cit.) show that endowments only appear to play a small role. 
23 Fingleton B. (2005), ‘Testing the new economic geography: a comparative analysis based on EU regional data’, paper presented at the workshop
on spatial economics held at the Kiel Institute for World economics April 8-9, 2005.
24 For further discussion of the related literature, please see Employment in Europe 2004, European Commission, chapter 5.
25 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/restruct_sem_en.htm, Final report on Economic Restructuring and Labour
Markets in the Accession Countries, December 2004. For purposes of the analysis, the NUTS 2 regions across the EU-25 plus Bulgaria and Roma-
nia are divided into five clusters or groups, in each case according to the relative importance to employment of broad sectors of activity for employ-
ment. This is defined in terms of the share of employment in particular sectors relative to the national average. The sectors in question are agricul-
ture, industry, basic services - here defined as all service activities apart from business and financial services - and business and financial services.
A final group of regions includes those in which capital cities are located, since these tend to have a specific structure of economic activity as com-
pared with other regions, with more employment in government as well as in financial and business services. Since the national average shares vary
markedly between countries, this means that each group contains regions with very different absolute shares of employment in the sector defining
the group in question. For example, in the EU-15 countries, the agricultural group includes UK regions with only around 3-4% of employment in
agriculture as well as regions in Greece, with over 30% in this sector. In the new Member States, the group includes regions in the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Slovakia with under 10% of employment in agriculture and those in Poland and Romania, where the figure is 40% or more (see
map 1 for the location of the regions concerned). The same contrast in employment proportions also applies to the other sectors.
26 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/restruct_sem_en.htm, Final report on Economic Restructuring and
Labour Markets in the Accession Countries, December 2004.
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point to note is that both agricultural
and industrial regions in the new Mem-
ber States tend to have larger shares of
employment in these sectors than simi-
larly classified regions in the EU-15
countries, while both the basic service
and business services regions have
smaller shares of employment in these
sectors than in the latter countries and
correspondingly larger shares in agri-
culture and/or industry. 
Following from this, by using per-
centiles calculated from the SES 2002
(on the basis of the whole sample) and
applying them to the regions at NUTS 1
level and comparing them to national
averages (see map), we obtain a picture
– albeit a crude one – of the regional
dimension of the issue of earnings dis-
parities. It suggests that regions around
capital cities or large cities display rela-
tively high earnings levels. Unfortu-
nately, the level of aggregation (NUTS
1) does not enable us to come up with
very conclusive evidence on the region-
al dimension of earnings disparities.
Nevertheless, there is the suggestion
that the peripheral regions and remote
areas seem to share the characteristic of
relatively large agricultural employ-
ment or basic industry services and also
relatively low earnings disparities (e.g.
South-West France, Corsica, and South-
ern Italy). By contrast, capital cities or
large cities tend to display relatively
high earnings disparities partly because
they attract more of the higher-skilled
workers (Northern Italy, the region
around Madrid, Athens, and London).
The map is based on the SES data,
which contain all the individual charac-
teristics of persons surveyed. Years of
schooling are a key individual-level
determinant of wages for individuals,
and the more skilled individuals, those
with the highest educational attain-
ment, tend to be located in the more
populated regions. Furthermore, for-
eign-owned firms are likely to be locat-
ed in larger cities27, some of which will
be the capitals, thereby helping to
shape the skill-composition of labour
demand. Moreover, such incoming
firms may tend to pay higher wages
than many local firms (which could be
as high as a +30% premium), partly in
order to secure the skilled workforce
they require. 
In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland28, the capital cities and well-
connected areas closer to Western mar-
kets in the EU have gained most from
overall economic growth, while remot-
er regions have not done as well or may
have even lost out from the process of
transition and integration. Further-
more, these gaps – notably the rural-
urban divide – have tended to widen.
Overall, regional disparities have
widened substantially over the transi-
tion period. Economic activity has
grown disproportionately in capital
cities and surrounding regions, where
new businesses and other services have
developed most rapidly, and where For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI) has been
concentrated. It is also likely that
regional disparities will widen further
in the absence of measures to achieve
more balanced development within the
countries concerned29. In addition to
proximity to EU markets driving the
concentration of economic activity, the
uneven distribution of infrastructure
and public services also creates very
different opportunities for the regions.
In the new Member States, managers,
professionals and technicians (or high-
ly skilled non-manuals) account for a
much larger proportion of employment
in capital cities than in the other region-
al clusters and this reflects both the
underlying sectoral structure of eco-
nomic activity, with higher employ-
ment in services and in high skill serv-
ices, in particular, and the type of activ-
ity performed within each sector. In
total, therefore, some 42% of overall
employment was in these types of job
in capital cities in 2003 as opposed to
30% or less in the other regions and
only 25% in the agricultural regions.
Similarly, within industry, around 29%
of jobs fell into the highly skilled non-
manual category in the capital city
regions as opposed to 20% or less in
other regions. The difference within
services activities was less marked but
still significant (around 6 percentage
points or slightly more)30.
The prospects for agricultural regions in
the new Member States are heavily
influenced by restructuring taking
place, which, though it entails a reduc-
tion of agricultural labour force, is
accompanied by an improvement in
agricultural income per annual work
unit. Agriculture, which has been
declining in employment terms in most
of the new Member States, remains
comparatively high in Poland for
instance. At the same time, the average
educational levels of the working-age
population are relatively high but never-
27 Geishecker I. (2004), ‘The skill-bias of foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe’, DIW, Berlin, http://europa.eu.int/comm/employ-
ment_social/employment_analysis/restruct/fdi_case_en.pdf.
28 Förster, Jesuit D., Smeeding T. (2005), ‘Regional Poverty and Income Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from the Luxembourg
Income Study’, UNU/WIDER discussion paper DP2003/65. Forthcoming (2005) in: Kanbur and Venables (eds.), Spatial Inequality and Devel-
opment http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/publications.htm.
29 On this issue, please refer to the recent Commission study on Economic Restructuring and Labour Markets in the Accession Countries, Study
prepared for the European Commission by WIIW, DIW, Alphametrics, December 2004. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/restruct_sem_en.htm.
30 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/restruct_sem_en.htm, Final report on Economic Restructuring and Labour
Markets in the Accession Countries, December 2004.
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theless not easily adaptable (as applies
sometimes to other Member States).
This is a factor which may deter poten-
tial foreign business investors. The
scale of likely restructuring in these
regions is therefore substantial and in
some cases the services needed to
encourage investment are underdevel-
oped. Problems are also acute in the tra-
ditional industrial regions where heavy
industry and mining are in decline.
Those individuals who will tend to lose
out are likely to be those with little or no
education beyond basic schooling and
many of whom tend to be dependent on
agriculture for employment. Unlike in
most of the EU-15, the service sector
tends to be underdeveloped in some of
the new Member States (with the
exception of Cyprus, Malta and Slove-
nia), whereas the distributive trades,
hotels and restaurants in particular offer
the best prospect of alternative jobs to
those currently working in agriculture.
Enlargement has widened the labour
market search area across the EU. This
is especially visible in the UK, Ireland
and Sweden, where no labour market
mobility transitional measures are in
place, but it is also true in all other
Member States through undeclared
work. The ability to move where the
jobs are alleviates some of this relative
educational disadvantage.
Looking in more detail at regional
inequalities, table 58 (in Annex II) exam-
ines the comparative indices which show
that some specific locations are subject
to higher earnings disparities (with
inequality measured by percentile ratio
P90/P10 being above 4 in London (UK)
and Ile de France (FR), where the high-
est earnings are concentrated. Poland,
Estonia and Slovenia feature a higher
than average degree of earnings inequal-
ity across the whole distribution
(P90/P10, P90/P50, P50/P10).
The degree of variability in indices of
earnings inequality across regions
(using decile or percentile ratios) is
another illustration of regional dispari-
ties. For instance, the top to bottom
decile ratio (percentile 90 over per-
centile 10) ranges between 1.95 in Fin-
land (Åland) and 5.13 in Slovenia,
which represents a much wider range
of inequality (2.55 times) than in the
other categories: the maximum differ-
ence for percentile 90 over percentile
50 is 1.91 times lower in Finland
(Åland) than in Latvia, and for per-
centile 50 over percentile 10 the ratio
is 1.95 times lower in Sweden than in
Slovenia.
More specifically, within the regions
mentioned in table 58 of Annex II,
some specific groups are subject to
higher degrees of earnings inequality
than others, as illustrated in table 58.
In order to specify and characterise
these regional earnings inequalities,
the regions where inequality at the
lower end (P50/P10) is higher than
inequality at the upper end (P90/P50)
were identified, by gender and age
class. Taking the analysis further, table
58 lists only the regions actually dis-
playing this characteristic of higher
inequality at the lower end (P50/P10),
thus the groups listed in table 51 are
those most affected by earnings
inequality. This could possibly sug-
gest a certain degree of polarisation
of low-end/low-skilled workers versus
high-skilled/high-paid workers, and
may be due to some compression at the
higher end of the earnings scale. Some
researchers31 have found evidence of
wage compression in Europe, meaning
that relative wages are lower compared
to what the productivity differential
would allow. However, further research
would be warranted to shed light on
such aspects.
However, despite attempts to link
regional earnings disparities to
regional labour market outcomes,
such as the employment or unemploy-
ment rates, no significant link could
be found (using correlations calculat-
ed for this purpose). This is potential-
ly an important conclusion, in the
sense that many more factors influ-
ence the labour market outcomes of
employment and unemployment rates,
and also taxes and social security con-
tributions, labour market policies and
institutions, and these aspects should
also be taken into account when
studying regional disparities.
In examining the regional dimension
of earnings inequalities, there are
some methodological issues to consid-
er including the difficulty in account-
ing for regional price differences or
variations; using survey data, the sam-
ple is not large enough to provide ade-
quate measures of regional inequality;
where census data are used there is not
enough detailed information on per-
sonal characteristics and especially
employer characteristics to carry out
the same type of analysis.
The best approach therefore combines
various data sources, especially those
with micro-data. In reality, regional
convergence issues are a mix of demo-
graphic and economic factors, for
instance the age-earnings relationship
and the age structure of a region. As a
result, some regions may converge at a
faster rate than others, largely reflect-
ing the prevailing age composition
and the change in it for a given
region32. Also, the relative size of a
region and spillovers between neigh-
bouring regions matter for a region’s
own productivity33. As an illustration
of such spillovers, using data on 131
31 A review of this ‘wage compression hypothesis’ has been carried out in Employment in Europe 2004, European Commission, Chapter 4.
32 This strand of literature largely follows Krugman’s pioneering works in the early 1990s, e.g. Krugman P. (1991), ‘Increasing returns and eco-
nomic geography’, Journal of Political Economy, 99.
33 Davis D., Weinstein D. (2004), ‘A search for multiple equilibria in urban industrial structure’, NBER working paper n°10252, use Japanese data
and show that doubling the size of a region raises productivity by 3.5 %.
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European regions, researchers34 have
found that the economic performance
of a particular region depends on that
of the surrounding areas and that the
intensity of spillovers fades with dis-
tance. In addition, technology differs
across regions and convergence is
partly due to technological catch-up.
Using data on 89 European regions35,
researchers have shown that techno-
logical spillovers have played a role
across Europe, at local/regional level,
at national level (through the intensity
of sectoral R&D) but also through
international trade that favours tech-
nology transfer (though to a smaller
extent), thereby increasing labour pro-
ductivity. 
3.5. Gender disparities remain
An initial assessment of the aggregate
data on gender disparities is the focus
of this section, without checking for
factors other than those displayed in
the charts, which are illustrative. More
detailed analysis of the gender param-
eter will be covered in section 5,
where results of earnings regressions
also shed light on the gender gap in a
way that takes into account individual
characteristics.
Regarding the gender dimension, in
1995, the SES showed that on average
across the EU, women working full-
time were paid 75% of the male gross
hourly wage (unadjusted gap36). For the
34 Paci R., Pigliaru F. (2001), ‘Technologi-
cal diffusion, spatial spillovers and
regional convergence in Europe’, Uni-
versity of Cagliari, CRENoS Working
Paper No. 01/01, FEEM Working Paper
No. 36.
35 Cainelli G. et alii (2003), ‘Spatial
knowledge spillovers and regional pro-
ductivity growth in Europe’,
http://www.idse.mi.cnr.it/pdf/GCR-
LAM_paper.pdf
36 Gender Pay Gap, defined as the average
earnings of all full-time female employ-
ees divided by the average earnings of
full-time male employees. Data are for
gross hourly earnings including overtime. 
Table 51 – Regions and groups most affected by earnings inequality
CZ Czech Republic Women 30-59
DE1 Baden-Württemberg Women 20-39 and men 20-29 and 60+
DE2 Bayern Women and men 20-29
DE3 Berlin Women 20-29, 39-59 and men 20-39 and 60+
DE4 Brandenburg Women 20-59, men 20-29
DE5 Bremen Women 20-29, 50+, men 20-29 and 60+
DE6 Hamburg Women 20-59, men 20-29 and 60+
DE7 Hessen Women 20-39 and 50-59, men 20-29 and 60+
DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Women 20-39, men 20-29
DE9 Niedersachsen Women and men 20-29
DEa Nordrhein-Westfalen Women 20-39, men 20-29
DEb Rheinland-Pfalz Women 20-59, men 20-29 and 60+
DEc Saarland Women 20-59, men 20-29
DEd Sachsen Women 20-39 and 60+, men 20-29
DEe Sachsen-Anhalt Women 20-49, men 20-29
DEf Schleswig-Holstein Women 20-60+, men 20-29 and 60+
DEg Thüringen Women 20-39, men 20-29
EE Estonia Women 20-29 and 50-59, men 20-59
EL2 Kentriki Ellada Men 40-49
EL3 Attiki Men 40-49
EL4 Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti Men 60+
FR3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais Women 60+
FR4 Est Women 60+
FR8 Méditerranée Women 60+, Men 60+
ITe Centro Men 50-59
CY Cyprus Women 60+
NL3 West-Nederland Women 30-59, men 20-29
NL4 Zuid-Nederland Women 40-49 and 60+, men 20-29 and 60+
PL Poland Women 60+
SI Slovenia Women 60+ and men 60+
FI2 Åland Women 40-49, 60+
UKi London Women 20-39, men 20-29
UKn Northern Ireland Men 40-49
Source: own calculations on the basis of SES data.
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2002 survey this gap has been margin-
ally reduced marginally (women were
paid 77% of the male wage). 
Again, including other types of pay-
ments, benefits and allowances,(i.e.
taking the annual average earnings as
an indicator) the gender difference is
greatest at 30% or more in the UK and
Cyprus, whereas the smallest differ-
ences in annual average earnings are
found in Slovenia, Hungary, Poland,
Belgium, Sweden and Finland (less
than 20% difference).
Across the EU-15 in general and in
the UK, Cyprus, Austria, and Ger-
many in particular (chart 121), distinct
gender differences in earnings are
prevalent, more so than is currently
the case in the new Member States of
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Chart 122 offers a closer look at rela-
tive hourly earnings of women in the
very specific activity of financial
intermediation, which, on average,
displays the highest levels of earnings
compared to other activities across the
EU-25. It shows that the gender earn-
ings gap is more complicated than can
be explained by activity or occupation.
Indeed the relative earnings of women
as a percentage of those of men are
unexpectedly higher than average in
countries such as Bulgaria, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Italy, Romania,
Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium and
Greece. One explanation for this is
that, in the transitional economies,
women have a significantly better
earnings position owing to the fact
that the transition period itself brings
an increase in the demand for those
skills held predominantly by women,
and exemplified by the high propor-
tion of women working in the services
sector. The findings are in line with
other research covering issues to do
with gender and economic transition37.
Then for the other countries, it could
be that highly skilled women tend to
choose to work in the services sector;
this point requires further investiga-
tion with the micro-data (and is cov-
ered later in this chapter).
3.6. The occupational structure
plays a large role
Earnings differentials obviously reflect
differences in the type of jobs taken up
by individuals, according to their
acquired skills, background and educa-
tion. Some of these factors are therefore
reflected in the occupational structure of
earnings and illustrated in chart 123. It
shows that higher-level occupations
(such as legislators, managers, etc.) have
twice the average hourly earnings, while
manual workers in general earn less than
the average.
The gender dimension of earnings dif-
ferentials has attracted much attention
and a great number of studies have
used increasingly complex economet-
ric techniques in order to assess the
degree of ‘discrimination’ in the
labour market. Other authors have point-
ed to the existence of a certain degree of
‘occupational segregation’, indicating
that by choosing certain types of occu-
pations (which is basically a self-selec-
tion process) or not breaking through the
‘glass ceiling’ of career advancement,
women are automatically affected by
this problem. 
There is little doubt that occupational
structures play an important role in
widening the gap between men’s and
women’s earnings, the extent of which is
clearly shown in chart 124 which
depicts the percentage of women’s earn-
ings as a proportion of men’s for differ-
ent occupations. It clearly shows that the
gap is largest in certain manual occupa-
tions (crafts), where women represent a
comparatively small proportion of the
workforce. This also holds true for cer-
tain non-manual occupations (top man-
agers and legislators), where the gap is
also relatively large, and illustrates the
presence of a ‘glass ceiling’. 
To illustrate in more detail the effects of
segregation between men and women in
different types of occupations,
researchers often use a measure known
as the ‘Duncan index’38, which can pro-
vide some additional information as to
the degree of segregation, especially
when it is calculated on the basis of the
whole sample of the SES survey.
In the first case, the index is calculated
for all occupational groups for the EU as
a whole, revealing a Duncan Index or DI
= 0.312 (table 52). This is comparable to
other reference figures for the DI for
OECD countries, where the usual DI for
individual OECD countries ranges
between 0.21 and 0.45.
The range of the DI’s is relatively wide
(ranging from 0.15 in Romania to 0.55
37 Rutkowski J. (2001), op. cit.
38 The Duncan Index of Dissimilarity is a weighted measure of the dispersion of the gender ratios across occupations or activities. It is actually the
most common index of occupational segregation, the latter being measured by the mean of the deviation about ratio (Fi/Fi+Mi).
The Duncan Index varies between 0 and 1; the closer it is to 1, the higher the degree of occupational segregation. While the index can be cal-
culated for broad occupational groups, it can also be used for age cohorts and educational attainment in order to derive more refined figures. In
essence, the Duncan index can be interpreted as a kind of ‘Gini’ index of inequality, depicting the degree of dispersion of the genders across a
given group.
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in Austria), indicating the extent to
which men and women are employed in
different types of occupations; this is
especially true for Austria, Luxem-
bourg, the UK, Germany. By contrast,
fairly little difference in the types of
occupations performed by men or
women is observed in Romania, Italy,
Portugal, Slovenia, Belgium and the
Czech Republic, where this indicator
points to less occupational segregation.
More detailed investigation is needed to
discover the reasons behind these dif-
ferent outcomes.
However, this broad indicator on the
degree of occupational segregation
needs to be complemented with other
120
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tools, especially when carrying out
comparisons across countries.
Table 53 shows the results of applying
the DI formula using age-related data
for the 27 countries covered by the
SES. From this it is evident that the
DIs tend to decrease in the early years
of labour market participation (25-35),
then increase again up to the mid 50’s,
before, decreasing again beyond 55.
Table 54 provides an additional per-
spective using educational levels
attained. Here there is a clear trend of
the DI rising for medium levels of
education, but decreasing sharply for
higher levels of education, broadly
indicating less segregation in jobs
requiring such a level of attainment.
When the education level increases
sharply, segregation diminishes; men
and women end up doing more similar
jobs or occupations, as one would
intuitively expect39.
Another related question is that of the
distribution of earnings inequality,
which is best illustrated using the SES
data collected. Given the nature of the
dataset, this aspect can be studied in
detail. Indeed, individual observations
are needed to locate an individual rel-
ative to the whole earnings distribu-
tion within the sample of workers.
4. Distribution of
earnings
In this section some of the key find-
ings that can be derived using the SES
are examined, putting them into a
broader perspective of labour market
developments within the enlarged EU.
The overall aim is to provide a per-
spective on the earnings structures in
Member States.
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Chart 123 – Hourly earnings by gender and occupation
Source: SES 2002.
39 It would be interesting to calculate such Duncan indices using the Labour Force Survey, in future work, to check if these are at least compara-
ble or of comparable magnitude. Given the different nature and basis for data collection for the two surveys, we preferred to stick to one data
source in this chapter, thereby avoiding any confusion.
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4.1. Disparities within
countries are higher in the
NMS…
In this analysis, the use of percentiles
allows a better feel for the distribution
of earnings within Member States and
across the EU. Using three types of
ratios - namely the 90th/10th percentile,
the 50th/10th percentile and the 90th/50th
percentile, some results are shown in
chart 125, which illustrates an aspect of
the distribution of earnings inequality
within Member States. Decile ratios are
simple indicators of dispersion (scale
on the vertical axis), comparing ratios
of the upper earnings limits of various
deciles of the earnings distribution. 
The 90th/10th ratio expresses the dis-
persion in earnings between the top
and bottom percentiles. Inequality of
the 90th/50th ratio on the one hand and
the 50th/10th ratio on the other hand
indicates asymmetry of the earnings
distribution. Chart 125 illustrates the
asymmetries in earnings distribution,
a feature which is particularly acute in
Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, and
slightly less so inter alia in Ireland,
Austria, Spain, France, the UK. Table
55 shows the values of the interdecile
ratios, respectively for the 50th/10th,
90th/10th and 90th/50th ratios. So, for
example, the most extreme earnings
disparities are to be found in Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, and Slovenia. Among all the
Member States shown in the table, Ire-
land stands out as the Member State in
the middle, which, taking this as a ref-
erence point, all other remaining
countries feature a lesser degree of
earnings disparities. This is the case
for all EU-15 countries plus Slovakia,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Hun-
gary, with Finland, Norway and Den-
mark displaying the lowest disparities.
The 90th/10th decile ratio (top to bot-
tom decile) ranges in most EU (and
OECD40) countries from 2 to 3.5, with
most of the countries in the 2.5 to 3.0
range. The value of the decile Ratio
for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia
exceeds 4, a level not observed in the
other European countries41 using the
2002 SES data. A relatively large dis-
persion of earnings in the top half of
the distribution may have a positive
impact, inter alia by providing incen-
tives to invest in more skills and lead
to higher average productivity levels
Table 52 – Duncan Index by country
AT 0.55 IS 0.36
BE 0.27 IT 0.25
BG 0.24 LT 0.31
CY 0.40 LU 0.45
CZ 0.27 LV 0.39
DE 0.42 NL 0.39
DK 0.34 NO 0.38
EE 0.32 PL 0.37
ES 0.36 PT 0.24
FI 0.34 RO 0.15
FR 0.33 SE 0.31
EL 0.30 SI 0.23
HU 0.35 SK 0.30
IE 0.40 UK 0.44
Source: Commission services; data refers to the 27 countries covered by the SES 2002. Source: Commission services.
Table 53 – Developments by age
cohort
15-25 0.34
25-35 0.28
35-45 0.31
45-55 0.32
55-65 0.25
Table 54 – Developments 
by education level 
(ISCED classification)
Low 0.30
Medium 0.36
High 0.27
Duncan index
by age cohort
Duncan index by ISCED level
Source: Commission services.
40 The US is an outlier with the decile ratio reaching 5.5.
41 For Slovenia, this figure contrasts with previous findings by Rutkowski J. (2001), op.cit. As noted by Rutkowski, patterns of inequality are
changing in Central European countries, and trends can be reversed.
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of workers over time. On the other
hand, greater inequality in the bottom
end of the distribution might imply
substantial hardship for low-skilled
workers at the lower end of the earn-
ings distribution. 
Labour market policies or institutions
such as those relating to a minimum
wage play an important role in the dis-
tribution of earnings. This means that
the higher the minimum wage as a
proportion of the average wage, the
more compressed is the bottom part of
the earnings distribution (the 50th/10th),
although there is no strict relationship
between this 50th/10th decile and the
impact of the minimum wage. For the
New Member States, Rutkowski
(2001) reports42 that the minimum
wage as a percentage of the average
wage is relatively low in the Czech
Republic (less than 30%) while the
50th/10th gap is relatively small or com-
pressed. By contrast in Hungary
where the minimum wage is relatively
high (47% of the average wage) the
50th/10th gap is quite large. In Latvia
and Romania, the minimum wage is
low relative to the average wage and
so is the bottom decile wage (the
50th/10th gap is large). According to
the literature43, this would lead one to
expect that more compression at the
bottom end of the earnings distribu-
tion would exist in countries where
trade unions are stronger, as indicated
by a high trade union membership
density and extensive coverage of col-
lective agreements. However, these
factors all depend on the structure and
level of bargaining, and on the owner-
ship and governance structure of
enterprises.
Table 55 - Interdecile gaps
interdecile gap
P50/P10 P90/P10 P90/P50
AT 1.54 3.03 1.95
BE 1.59 2.62 1.64
BG 1.95 4.40 2.26
CY 1.58 3.11 1.94
CZ 1.63 2.80 1.71
DE 1.78 3.15 1.78
DK 1.34 2.14 1.60
EE 2.20 4.94 2.22
ES 1.58 3.15 1.96
FI 1.32 1.96 1.48
FR 1.64 3.36 2.00
EL 1.47 2.63 1.75
HU 1.63 3.40 2.05
IE 1.78 3.91 2.17
IS 1.43 2.27 1.58
IT 1.38 2.46 1.78
LT 1.91 4.55 2.37
LU 1.76 3.40 1.99
LV 1.69 4.76 2.82
NL 1.57 2.75 1.75
NO 1.30 1.98 1.52
PL 1.99 4.67 2.27
RO 2.08 5.09 2.53
SE 1.27 2.03 1.59
SI 2.09 4.50 2.08
SK 1.66 3.21 1.93
UK 1.59 3.16 1.97
Source: Eurostat calculations.
42 Op. cit.
43 Acemoglu D. (2002), ‘Cross-country inequality trends’, for a review of the main hypotheses on this issue. This topic will be brought up again
in section 6 of this chapter. 
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4.2. … Across countries, some
cases are surprising
The general picture showing higher
earnings inequality in 2002 in the
countries of Central and Eastern
Europe is confirmed by the findings
in charts 126, 127 and 128. They show
a decile ratio above 4 for Romania,
Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania,
Slovenia and Bulgaria, which is more
than twice as high as the decile D5/D1
(the median relating to the bottom
decile of workers). On the other hand,
ratios for Hungary, the Czech Repub-
lic, Cyprus and Slovakia do not differ
radically from other European coun-
tries. 
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Chart 125 – Asymmetry of the earnings distribution
Source: SES 2002. 
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Chart 126 – Earnings of top decile of workers relative to bottom decile (D9/D1)
Source: SES 2002. 
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By contrast, the Nordic countries (Fin-
land, Norway, Sweden and Denmark)
are at the other end of the scale, dis-
playing the lowest degree of inequali-
ty. Moreover the UK – contrary to the
conventional view that it has compar-
atively large earnings gaps – displays
average figures, and in fact sits below
France in all three charts.
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Chart 127 – Earnings of top decile of workers relative to the median (D9/D5)
Source: SES 2002. 
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Chart 128 – Median relative to earnings of the bottom decile of workers (D5/D1)
Source: SES 2002. 
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4.3. Comparing two points in
time
Comparing these data for 2002 to sim-
ilar calculations for the mid-1990s44,
the ranking of countries has changed,
sometimes very significantly. 
Table 56 summarises the change in
levels of inequality of the Member
States as classified according to their
degree of earnings inequality, meas-
ured by decile ratios, for those Mem-
ber States for which comparable data
are available for the two reference peri-
ods (both the mid-1990s and for 2002). 
Looking at some of the more interest-
ing changes, the level of earnings
inequality between the mid-1990s and
2002 has decreased in Spain, while in
Poland by contrast, earnings inequality
has increased significantly. However, it
should be noted that Table 56 presents
only broad trends, because the OECD
study providing the mid-1990s refer-
ence point, uses a variety of data
sources and measures of inequality
(such as decile ratios), and these may
differ according to the type of workers
examined and the type of earnings
available. This again points to the
uniqueness and the degree of compara-
bility that is ensured by the European
SES 2002. 
From charts 126, 127 and 128 it is pos-
sible to suggest that there is greater
inequality shown in comparisons of
D9/D1 (Chart 126) than of D5/D1
(Chart 128). Indeed chart 126 shows
that inequality in Romania and Estonia
is more than double that in Finland and
Norway, while chart 128 indicates a
much smaller difference between lower
decile earners in Sweden and Norway
compared with Slovenia and Estonia.
This effect might be caused, in part, by
employers providing incentives to
those in the top deciles, which con-
tribute towards higher returns to educa-
tion and skills, whereas bottom deciles
are generally less advantaged in
employment and social terms. 
In reality, the countries with a high (or
low) degree of earnings dispersion in
the bottom half of the earnings distri-
bution also tend to have a high (or low)
degree of earnings dispersion in the top
half. An example is the US, where
workers at the top end have very high
wages in relation to the median and
those at the bottom end have very low
wages. The correlation coefficient is
0.93 (own calculation). 
Workers are imperfect substitutes for
each other and the demand for certain
categories of workers varies according
to the production structure of the coun-
try, the technology in use, the labour
market policies and institutions, as well
as the extent of industrial regulation.
These factors combine to cause differ-
ences in earnings. Over time, the com-
position of the supply of workers will
also change, for example as a result of
the take-up of certain courses rather
than others, or immigration / emigra-
tion. Also, the general supply is affect-
ed by the birth rate and cohort effects
(baby-booms). The demand for certain
types of workers may also change
because of such factors as skill-biased
technological change, variations in sec-
toral productivity, shift in trade flows
and outsourcing trends, etc. 
Table 56 – Change in the level of inequality of countries by decile ratio
AT
BE
CZ
DE
ES
FR
HU
IE
IT
NL
PL
FI
SE
UK
Country D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1
=
=
stands for an increase of inequality
= means that inequality remains more or less stable
stands for a reduction of inequality
Source: Commission services.
44 Bardone L., Gittleman M. and Keese M. (1998), ‘Causes and consequences of earnings inequality in OECD countries’, OECD, Paris. This paper
presents an analysis of earnings inequality in the OECD countries in the mid-1990s, using various data sources such as enterprise surveys, house-
hold surveys and social security records, as were available at the time. The references vary and can be found in table 58 of this paper.
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This section has shown that the distribu-
tion of earnings is an important factor in
assessing the relative level of earnings
in a Member State and across Member
States (and not just differences in aver-
age wages); basically it suggests that
the shape of the overall distribution and
the relative position of a worker or a
group of workers in that distribution
should be taken into account. 
5. Individual
determinants of earnings
inequality
A review of the principal causes of
earnings inequality is given here,
before subsequent examination of the
empirical evidence to support it. As a
first approach to this dataset, the fol-
lowing section attempts a simple
empirical analysis of the determinants
of earnings differentials, based on the
2002 European SES. Naturally, there
will be a need for further and more
sophisticated studies, but those go
beyond the scope of this chapter.
There are a number of explanations
for the differences in individuals’
earnings45. The differences that relate
to large wage and earnings disparities
are generally based on characteristics
that are specific to the individual, the
firm or the country. 
Factors based on the individual
Individual characteristics relate to
conventional definitions of human
capital46, which include such elements
as education, skills, labour market
experience, innate abilities, age, gen-
der, attitude towards change/mobility,
and directly reflect disparities in the
skill composition of the workforce.
Furthermore, industries and services
are not evenly distributed across areas
and so requirements in terms of the
mix of skills will vary. These differ-
ences can therefore impact on the
decisions made by firms looking to
locate in the EU. In such a scenario
there would be an expectation of high-
er mean wages in those regions/coun-
tries with a higher skills profile. From
a theoretical perspective, one would
expect earnings inequality to reflect
this skills dispersion and the actual
distribution of skills47. This issue was
documented in chapter 3 of Employ-
ment in Europe 2004. To summarise,
such disparities based on individual
characteristics increase inequality
between different skill-groups.
Firm-based factors
Firm-based explanations for earnings
inequality include type of ownership,
the management and governance
structure, the degree of market power
held, trade union strength, size (in
employment and turnover terms), cap-
ital-to-labour ratios, capital formation,
etc. Some interactions between work-
ers and firms take place locally and
have an impact on productivity gains,
generating spillovers and agglomera-
tion effects48, leading to a greater divi-
sion of labour, higher wages, ultimate-
ly making the matching of workers
with firms easier in thicker labour
markets49. Thick labour markets are
defined as those allowing more job
offers, i.e. the worker has the option to
choose from among a wide variety of
job offers50. Input-output linkages
between buyers and sellers generate
such agglomeration economies. 
Changes in work organisation, some-
times called skill-biased organisation-
al change, have also been seen as a
source of earnings inequality. Recent
firm-level studies have shown that in
order to achieve efficiency gains, the
use of ICT should correspond to
appropriate organisational changes,
such as high-performance workplace
organisation, which includes team
working, flatter hierarchies, job rota-
tion or the use of quality circles, for
example. These uses of ICT and
organisational change are increasingly
viewed as strategic complements.
Both have a significant effect on
wages, with evidence from Germany51
indicating that wages earned by IT
users are 6% higher than those of their
peers and that companies that have
changed their work organisation do
pay higher wages. This effect usually
works through increased company
productivity52, and, in the case of the
US, results have included increased
profit sharing and stock options. Test-
ing the same idea on Italy has shown
that technology and organisation both
affect the demand for labour and drive
the shift towards higher-skilled
45 This chapter takes into account employees, and not the unemployed. It restricts itself to earnings differentials among jobholders. 
46 A broad definition of human capital can be found in OECD (2001), The well-being of nations, the role of human and social capital, which states
‘the knowledge of skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-
being’. 
47 Nickell S., Layard R. (1997), ‘Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance’, Papers 23, Centre for Economic Performance & Insti-
tute of Economics. 
48 Krugman P., Fujita M., Venables A (1999), The spatial economy: cities, regions and international trade, MIT Press, 1999.
49 Therefore growing disparities within Member States have become a key concern in the process of European integration, which has led to a push
for social and territorial cohesion. Experiments on French data show that interaction effects are mostly caused by the local density of employ-
ment, to the extent that high local wages are primarily the outcome of higher-skill workers gathering in dense local labour markets. 
50 Lazear E.P. (2004), ‘Firm-specific human capital: a skills-weights approach’, NBER working paper n° 9679.
51 Bertschek I., Spitz S. (2003), ‘IT, organisational change and wages’, ZEW discussion paper n°03-69.
52 Black S.E., Lynch M. (2000), ‘What’s driving the new economy: the benefits of workplace innovation’, NBER working paper n° 7479.
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labour53. As a consequence, the propor-
tion of skilled workers increases and
thus the organisation of work becomes
more decentralised54. Based on the
analysis of French data, both skilled
and unskilled workers become more
autonomous and perform a wider
range of tasks. Organisational change55
reduces the demand for unskilled
workers. In a nutshell, technical
change complements human capital.
From the 1995 SES, both firm-level
factors and individual employee char-
acteristics appeared to play a signifi-
cant role in explaining pay inequali-
ties56. Better business performance
had led to greater pay inequalities
within firms, but this relationship has
declined over time as levels of
inequality have increased generally.
Overall, the greater pay inequalities in
some Member States (such as IE, UK,
ES) compared with others, cannot be
proved to have systematically given
rise to higher employment rates. How-
ever, the greater inequality in these
three Member States appeared to be
linked to a greater degree of labour
market segregation of low-paid groups
and by gender and age. Pay inequali-
ties at enterprise level have to be con-
sidered in conjunction with other
human resources issues and work
organisation practices. One of the
most interesting findings is that many
interrelationships observed at the
aggregate level, such as between bar-
gaining structures and pay inequality,
or the determinants of the gender pay
gap, are not corroborated when full
account is taken of employment com-
position differences accessed through
the SES data. It underlines the value
of a sound analysis of the underlying
individual data of the SES. 
This kind of regression analysis will
help disentangle the sources of
inequality and identify the contribu-
tion of various factors to earnings
inequality, such as educational attain-
ment, gender, occupations and activi-
ties, the industry premium, the size of
enterprises, etc. Previous studies57
based on similar datasets for the new
Member States of Central and Eastern
Europe have shown that education is
the single most important observable
characteristic explaining the current
level of inequality. According to the
findings, differences in educational
attainment account for one third of the
explained variation in earnings, and as
much as 60% in Hungary. The second
most important factor contributing to
earnings inequality is inter-industry
wage differentials. Gender comes
third, but has a relatively small impact.
All other factors (labour market expe-
rience, firm ownership, urban/rural
residence) are secondary or insignifi-
cant. The authors conclude that higher
earnings inequality in those countries
is due to a revaluation of human capi-
tal during the transition period. 
Very few studies use individual data58
(especially at European level), con-
taining precise information about
employers and employees, and to test
the various explanations of wage
determination. Firm-level panel data
or linked employer-employee data59
could prove extremely rich sources,
inter alia:
• to estimate the magnitude and rela-
tive importance of these factors in
explaining wage disparities across
areas;
• to identify the determinants of
wage disparities among groups of
individuals;
• to identify the drivers of wage dis-
parities across regions.
A basic attempt at analysing the deter-
minants of earnings differentials is
carried out here, as a first use of the
SES dataset. Explaining the individual
earnings effects uses regression
(econometric) analysis to help identify
the weight of each personal or compa-
ny characteristic that contributes to
determining the earnings differentials
between individuals. Using this tech-
nique, several regressions were per-
formed in order to derive more mean-
ingful results and possibly find causal
relationships. 
53 Piva M. et alii (2005), ‘The skill bias effect of technological and organisational change: evidence and policy implications’, Research Policy 34,
pp. 141-147 and Giuri P. et alii (2005), ‘ICT, skills and organisational change: evidence from a panel of Italian manufacturing firms’,
www.lem.sssup.it.
54 Caroli E., Greenan N., Guellec D. (2001), ‘Organisational change and skill accumulation’, Industrial and Corporate Change, volume 10, nb 2.
55 Caroli E., Van Reenan J. (2001), ‘Skill-biased organisational change? Evidence from a panel of British and French establishments’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics.
56 PIEP results from the 5th framework project ‘Pay inequalities and Economic performance’, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/piep/query.asp?id=2.
57 Rutkowski (2001), Op. cit.
58 Combes et alii (op. cit.) use a panel of French workers and find that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing spatial wage dispar-
ities. Endowments only play a small role. In particular, the authors find that local public goods may not have a large direct impact on produc-
tivity and wage disparities. 
59 Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F. (1999), ‘The analysis of labour markets using matched employer-employee data’, in Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (eds),
Handbook of labour economics, volume 3B, chapter 40. 
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5.1. Returns to education are
unambiguously positive…
Individual earnings regressions
(table 59 is featured in Annex III)
This first regression uses over five
million observations taking the hourly
earnings differential between individ-
uals as the dependent variable. Its aim
is to estimate the marginal contribu-
tion of each variable to the earnings
differential. The model is structured to
describe the expected wage of an indi-
vidual given their place of work, size
of workplace enterprise, the activity
(NACE), gender, age, occupation,
highest level of educational attain-
ment, whether he/she is working full-
time or part-time, and the length of
tenure in the particular enterprise. 
For example, the estimate for males
measures the difference in the expect-
ed wage between a man and a woman
with the same other characteristics
(education, country, size of enterprise,
activity, etc.). This model would then
suggest that if we compare a man and
a woman with the same education,
occupation, experience, and company
characteristics etc, then the expected
wage differential it predicts is a 2.49
difference in hourly pay between men
and women (all other variables being
constant) and this difference is statisti-
cally significant. Furthermore, adjust-
ing for other variables does not great-
ly change the average hourly wage dif-
ferential, which is 3.19 taking the
‘raw’ hourly wage differential in the
EU-25 between men and women. Thus
controlling for individual characteris-
tics of the employee and of the firm,
the gender gap would be reduced from
22.6% to 17.6%60. 
Similarly the estimated coefficient for
the ISCED educational attainment
measure gives the expected wage dif-
ference between two individuals with
the same experience and gender where
one of them has attained a higher level
of education. This regression suggests
that returns to education are unam-
biguously positive61. Indeed the high-
est education category (ISCED 6) was
set as reference category in this case,
and so all other educational levels lead
to relatively lower earnings. Working
in top occupations (as legislators or
managers for example) increases earn-
ings significantly. Adding to this
model the data for the ‘length in enter-
prise’, (i.e. the length of service of the
employee in the same company),
regression results remain the same
overall, and the results show a positive
effect of length of service on earnings.
Working part-time on the other hand
has a negative effect on earnings. 
The current model explains 36% of
the within sample variation in earn-
ings, which can be considered quite
satisfactory compared to standard
earnings regressions. Further investi-
gation using a refined model gave the
following results:
5.2. …As are returns to higher-
skilled types of jobs
Logarithm of hourly earnings 
(table 60 is featured in Annex III)
In this second specification, the log of
hourly earnings is used; this is a stan-
dard approach (see Box 11) where the
interpretation of coefficients differs.
Here, the coefficient of the gender
variable measures the relative differ-
ence in expected earnings for males
and females; the difference in expect-
ed log earnings is now 0.22, which
equates to approximately 22%. This
corresponds to the average value using
aggregate figures from the SES.
60 This result is somewhat higher than the overall gender pay gap measure obtained from previous analyses, in which women’s average earnings
were 16% below those of men. This difference could be explained by the fact that the SES covers only private sector workers. For results of ear-
lier studies, please consult: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/gender/sec_03_937_en.pdf.
61 Indeed ISCED 6, the highest education category was set as the reference category in this case, so all other educational levels lead to relatively
lower earnings.
62 As presented and commented by Card D. (1999), ‘The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings’, in: Handbook of Labour Economics, ed. By
Ashenfelter O.C. and D. Card, Volume 3C.
The basic reasoning behind this type of
regression is that returns to education are
the essential determinant of individual
remuneration patterns. Most of the stud-
ies run Mincer regressions62 in order to
derive a meaningful measure of returns to
education. The initial idea is to test a sim-
ple model in which the logarithm of a
person’s wage at a certain point in time
can be broken down into the sum of a lin-
ear function of years of schooling and
work experience (squared). The usual
result is that an additional year of school-
ing increases the individual wage by
10%. In subsequent studies several
refinements have been added to this kind
of regression, because such a simple
model might be biased in three different
ways: (i) there might be a positive corre-
lation between the number of years of
schooling and the returns to education,
thus over-estimating the coefficient; (ii)
omitted variables such as initial intellec-
tual capabilities might also bias the esti-
mate; (iii) measurement errors could seri-
ously affect the final results. 
Box 11 – Methodological notes
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Under this, working part-time makes a
10% negative difference compared
with full-time work; being a non-man-
ual worker makes a 23% positive dif-
ference; working in a large enterprise
(more than 250 employees) makes an
18% difference; but most of all, being
a low or medium-skilled worker
reduces earnings by between 32 and
45%. The effect of age/seniority is
also positive. 
While Bulgaria and Romania come
out below all the EU Member States in
earnings levels, Denmark, Norway
and the UK are far ahead. However,
the country-specific dimension is
explored further below.
The above results should be interpret-
ed with caution. This is partly due to
the fact that the individual’s occupa-
tion (as indicated by the ISCO) will
tend to reflect his/her educational
attainment, since employers often use
educational qualifications as the main
recruitment filter. Because of this,
although the results may be valid for
the sample or sub-population used in
the regression analysis, they cannot be
extended to other groups such as the
unemployed or the inactive because of
the risk of a non-random decision to
enter the labour market (selection
effect) that is dictated by perceived
potential earnings. This would intro-
duce a selection bias into the regres-
sion analysis and so invalidate the
results.
5.3. Working in a large
company helps…
Individual earnings of men and women
(table 61 is featured in Annex III)
An attempt was made to separate men
and women into two different sub-
samples in order to check to what
extent some of the factors affect each
gender differently. From this analysis,
working in a larger firm (in employ-
ment terms) seems to positively affect
men’s earnings to a greater extent than
women’s. In addition, being a non-
manual worker yields higher rewards,
as does working in industrial sectors.
The age variable, which could be
interpreted as seniority or experience,
while remaining positive for both gen-
ders, has a greater positive effect on
earnings for men and for women. 
The two approaches explained in (2) and
(3) above account for around 80% of the
within sample variation in earnings.
5.4. …Especially in the case of
men in top occupations
Country-specific regressions (table 62
is featured in Annex III)
For the country-specific models, one
regression per country was attempted
separately, each using the same speci-
fication for each country, with the log-
arithm of hourly earnings as the
dependent variable. The model seems
to perform very badly for Belgium,
Spain and Iceland, for which none of
the results are significant. Yet the
model explains between 25% (Esto-
nia) and 63% (Germany) of the varia-
tion in earnings for the other coun-
tries. 
Among the other interesting results,
men’s wages are between 14% and
32% higher depending on the country.
Also, company size has a positive
effect on earnings, as does working in
industry, except in Cyprus, Portugal
and Romania where the effect is nega-
tive. Being a non-manual worker can
involve an earnings premium of up to
34% (in the UK). Having low-to-
medium skills generally has a negative
impact on earnings, with the notable
exception of Ireland in the case of
medium-skilled workers, perhaps this
reflects a shortage of such skills, and
thus explains the premium paid to
those who have them. Fixed-term con-
tracts and apprenticeships (where
available) also place negative strains
on the level of earnings. Part-time
working yields ambiguous results, as
does the bargaining level (i.e. whether
centralised or decentralised).
The composition of the earnings dif-
ferential can vary according to various
national or even company-specific
practices. One aspect of this, namely
‘rent-sharing’ practices will be devel-
oped in section 7.
6. Institutions matter
One of the main questions to which
we would like an answer is, to what
extent wage differentiation matters for
labour market outcomes, reflected in
the employment and unemployment
rates. However, a full review of this
question goes beyond the scope of this
chapter. Here the discussion focuses
on the issue from two perspectives that
both relate to the theories on the deter-
minants of earnings differentiation:
these are the role of labour market
policies and institutions and the
impact of wage differentiation on
unemployment.
As can be seen from chart 129, hourly
earnings vary considerably across the
countries shown and suggest the influ-
ence of a range of country-specific
characteristics. Moreover, this leads to
variability of hourly earnings and to
the upper and lower bounds displayed
around the median earnings being
fairly wide as evidenced in Luxem-
bourg, the UK, Norway, and Ireland,
for example. 
The common classification of ‘flexi-
ble’ labour markets in some countries
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and those countries with more ‘rigid’
labour markets could be a factor in
this variation. However, from the
information in chart 129, it is not
immediately obvious how the degree
of ‘flexibility’ of the labour market
explains this variability of earnings. 
However, the determinants of wage
variability cannot be looked at simply
in terms of labour market flexibility.
Other factors need to be considered
such as the effect of welfare transfers,
and labour market institutions/poli-
cies, including employment protection
legislation, unemployment benefits
and the like, that may act as a ‘com-
pensating mechanism’. 
6.1. Earnings dispersion and
labour market institutions 
Several types of labour market policy
or institution might have an effect on
earnings distribution. For instance, the
generosity of welfare benefits might
affect the willingness of individual
workers to take up low-paid jobs. A
weakening of employment protection
legislation (EPL) or low levels of it
might lead to greater inequality, as any
job loss would be associated with a
higher wage penalty for unskilled
workers than for skilled workers.
Labour market institutions and poli-
cies are seen as playing an important
role in the relative structure and distri-
bution of earnings, for example the
deregulation of the labour market in
the UK to ease the ‘compression’ of
the earnings structure, the introduc-
tion of performance-related-pay, and
similar measures. Such explanations
are based on the perceived role of
wage compression63 arising from the
power of strong trade unions and
works councils. According to this
explanation, ‘rigidity’ would tend to
hinder wage adjustment and impose
wage compression; if this were the
case, it would lead to tradeoffs
between earnings inequality and
unemployment rates. If the problem
were wage compression, lower earn-
ings inequality levels would be associ-
ated with higher unemployment levels
and wider unemployment gaps
between the skilled and the less
skilled. This extent of support for this
hypothesis ranges from nil64 to mild
support65 from some authors. 
A very extensive survey of the deter-
minants of wage structures was done
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Chart 129 – Variability of gross hourly earnings in different branches in industry and services, in PPS 
(within-country dispersion)
Source: SES 2002.
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63 Freeman R.B., Schettkat R. (2000), ‘Skill Compression, Wage Differentials and Employment: Germany vs. the US’, NBER Working Papers 7610.
64 Howell D., Huebler F. (2001), ‘Trends in earnings inequality and unemployment across the OECD: labour market institutions and simple sup-
ply and demand stories’, CEPA working paper n°23, http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/publications/workingpapers/archive/cepa0123.pdf.
65 Employment in Europe 2004, European Commission, chapter 3.
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in Employment in Europe 2003, chap-
ter 3, based on various data sources
provided by Eurostat. The main find-
ings were as follows:
• While non-wage labour costs are a
crucial determinant of total labour
costs, there is no simple relation-
ship between the two. The two
countries with the highest gross
hourly labour costs in Europe –
Sweden and Denmark – are also the
countries with the highest and low-
est share of non-wage labour costs,
respectively. In addition the relative
size of net wages, taxes and social
security contributions differs across
countries. Therefore, when inter-
preting differences in wage levels,
these differences have to be taken
into account. 
• There is a considerable amount of
wage differentiation across firms
and industries. Wage differentiation
across regions, however, is much
less pronounced. Wages are gener-
ally higher in high productivity
industry and services.
• Although wage structures are cer-
tainly not based solely on workers’
productivity, since they also reflect
historical influences, social norms
and managerial strategies of organ-
isational restructuring, there is evi-
dence that wage bargaining sys-
tems in Europe allow wages, by and
large, to actually reflect productivi-
ty effectively, taking into account
differences across skills and local
labour market conditions. 
• On the one hand, there is strong
evidence for traditional seniority-
and tenure-based pay schemes in
the European labour markets,
which is indicative of strong inter-
nal labour markets that tend to offer
long-term employment relation-
ships and provide effective insur-
ance against wage variations and
employment risks. On the other
hand, there is a considerable degree
of turbulence and flexibility in
European wage formation systems,
with wage formation accounting
for factors as diverse as family sta-
tus, career interruptions, contract
status, firm size, earnings risks and
local labour market conditions.
The extent to which these factors are
rewarded differs considerably across
the EU Member States. Another
example is the compensation of earn-
ings risks. There is in fact little evi-
dence of any effective compensation
of employment risks by means of
additional wage premiums. On the
contrary, in several Member States
there is evidence of quite strongly seg-
regated labour markets, where low-
wage earners are the ones who also
face the highest employment risks.
The UK actually seems to be the only
country in the EU with such risk com-
pensation in place66. 
Most theories have focused on the
impact of minimum wages and trade
unions. The theory relating minimum
wages to earnings inequality is rela-
tively straightforward and uncontro-
versial. It predicts67 that the imposition
of a binding minimum wage results in
lay-offs for the workers whose pro-
ductivity level is below the minimum
wage and thus, for those remaining in
work, to a reduction in the dispersion
of earnings. Some models predict that
the minimum wages might also
increase the earnings of those at the
bottom of the distribution. In any case,
the firm prediction is that in the pres-
ence of minimum wages, the earnings
distribution will definitely be more
compressed. 
The presence of trade unions could
work in one of two ways, either
towards the widening of the earnings
distribution or towards narrowing it.
The earnings distribution could widen
if the presence of trade unions gives a
relative wage advantage to unionised
workers, or it could become narrower
if the presence of trade unions tended
to compress wage differentials
between different types of workers
(e.g. manual vs non-manual).
Table 57 presents measures of earn-
ings dispersion alongside a variety of
indicators of labour market policies
and practices, as well as a calculation
of the simple correlation between
them. Collective bargaining seems to
have a dampening effect on earnings
dispersion; higher coverage or more
encompassing collective bargaining
tends to narrow earnings dispersion
and this finding is well established68.
The degree of coverage by a collective
agreement appears to affect the earn-
ings dispersion equally strongly at
both ends of the distribution; it has a
stronger effect than any other ‘institu-
tional’ variable presented here. Across
the EU, two thirds of employees are
covered by a collective agreement. Yet
there is significant variation between
countries, from around 90-100% in
France, Austria, Slovenia, Belgium,
and Sweden, to under 30% in the
66 This chapter of Employment in Europe 2003 had raised questions for further research, notably the separation of employer and employee effects
on wages, based on matched employer-employee data. 
67 Simple neo-classical models.
68 Blau F., Kahn L. (1999), ‘Institutions and laws in the labour market’, in Ashenfelter O., Card D. (eds), Handbook of labor economics, vol. 3,
OECD (2004), Employment Outlook, chapter 3.
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AT 3.03 1.95 1.54 95 NA 7 825 0.34 29.57 1.90
BE 2.62 1.64 1.59 90 0.49 13 193 0.38 40.12 2.20
BG 4.40 2.26 1.95 NA NA NA NA NA NA
CY 3.11 1.94 1.58 65 NA NA NA NA NA
CZ 2.80 1.71 1.63 25 0.32 526 NA 28.67 1.90
DE 3.15 1.78 1.78 68 NA 7 774 0.33 32.54 2.35
DK 2.14 1.60 1.34 80 NA 16 849 0.59 30.86 1.40
EE 4.94 2.22 2.20 30 0.34 NA NA NA NA
ES 3.15 1.96 1.58 80 0.32 3 221 0.34 31.37 3.10
FI 1.96 1.48 1.32 90 NA 5 286 0.30 38.54 2.00
FR 3.36 2.00 1.64 90 0.62 8 570 0.44 39.19 3.00
EL 2.63 1.75 1.47 NA 0.51 1 289 0.11 35.12 2.80
HU 3.40 2.05 1.63 30 0.51 2 479 NA 30.16 1.50
IE 3.91 2.17 1.78 NA 0.56 15 502 0.30 8.96 1.10
IS 2.27 1.58 1.43 NA NA NA NA NA NA
IT 2.46 1.78 1.38 80 NA 3 485 0.34 33.99 1.90
LT 4.55 2.37 1.91 14 0.41 NA NA NA NA
LU 3.40 1.99 1.76 60 0.49 NA NA NA NA
LV 4.76 2.82 1.69 20 0.42 NA NA NA NA
NL 2.75 1.75 1.57 80 0.47 31 199 0.53 25.22 2.10
NO 1.98 1.52 1.30 70 NA 15 571 0.43 27.22 2.60
PL 4.67 2.27 1.99 40 0.33 577 NA 37.75 1.70
RO 5.09 2.53 2.08 NA NA NA NA NA NA
PT 3.32 2.21 1.51 80 0.38 4 397 0.53 23.43 3.70
SE 2.03 1.59 1.27 90 NA 13 593 0.24 40.50 2.20
SI 4.50 2.08 2.09 100 0.46 NA NA NA NA
SK 3.21 1.93 1.66 50 0.42 318 NA 29.63 1.90
UK 3.16 1.97 1.59 30 0.42 3 868 0.17 18.16 0.70
Correlation with earnings dispersion 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2003
D9/D1 1.00 0.93 0.93 -0.54 -0.25 -0.31 -0.05 -0.29 -0.12
D9/D5 0.93 1.00 0.73 -0.56 -0.17 -0.33 -0.01 -0.40 -0.01
D5/D1 0.93 0.73 1.00 -0.42 -0.25 -0.24 -0.07 -0.21 -0.18
Country D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 Collective Minimum ALMPs Unemployment Tax EPL 
bargaining wage (expenditure) benefit wedge (overall
coverage (as % of  replacement strictness)
average wage) rate
57
Source: Eurostat, SES 2002 data for earnings dispersion and OECD data for labour market institutions, Industrial relations report for some collective
bargaining coverage (SI, CY, EE, LV, LT) and own calculations of the correlations. Note: ALMP expenditure is measured by unemployed person.
Unfortunately, the year 2002 is not always available for institutional variables; however, there is not a wide variation from one year to the other. The
coverage rate of collective bargaining is an indicator of the extent to which the terms of employment in an economy are regulated by collective
agreement. It represents the number of employees covered by a collective agreement as a proportion of all wage and salary earners.
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Baltic States, the UK, Czech Republic
and Hungary69. 
All of the different factors have on
average the same effect at the top or
the bottom of the earnings distribu-
tion, although collective bargaining
seems to have a stronger impact at the
top of earnings distribution. ALMPs
also reduce inequality of the earnings
distribution70. Minimum wages appear
to have a weaker effect than collective
bargaining and ALMPs, notably on
top-wage earners, which seems to be
in line with theoretical predictions
(although here no asymmetry is
found), and also on the replacement
rate, which has very small and
ambiguous effects. EPL seems to nar-
row earnings inequality to a greater
extent at the lower end of the earnings
distribution, and the tax wedge seems
to affect mostly the upper-end of the
wage distribution. 
Correlations in table 57 suggest that
stronger institutions reduce earnings
inequality (dispersion), which further
suggests that equity effects have to be
taken into account when giving policy
guidance on labour market institu-
tions. However, it should be pointed
out that while these correlations are
interesting as a means of illustrating
the variations, they are only indicative,
and do not suggest any causal links
between the factors. In addition, most
of the relevant economic literature is
devoted to explaining changes in the
levels of earnings inequality, which
cannot be attempted in this chapter,
given the available data. Regression
results from section 5, using the level
of centralisation of bargaining in the
model, did not enable further conclu-
sions to be drawn. 
6.2. Earnings inequality and
labour market outcomes
Economic theory, grounded in the
competitive model of supply and
demand, predicts a tradeoff between
earnings inequality and unemploy-
ment. As the demand for labour shifts
from the least skilled towards the
more skilled, earnings inequality has
increased and unemployment remains
high. Therefore, some countries with
high degrees of inequality and com-
petitive labour markets show a rela-
tively favourable employment per-
formance, while others display more
equality but slow employment growth
in protected labour markets. This con-
ventional wisdom has been challenged
by some researchers, who consider
that labour productivity is not exoge-
nous and is also influenced by relative
earnings in some particular cases,
which could blur the relationship
between the unemployment rate and
earnings inequality. The graphical
analysis, as displayed in chart 130
suggests that the relationship between
labour market performance and wage
dispersion is far from obvious at
macroeconomic level. There is no
robust relationship between the unem-
ployment rate and wage dispersion. In
looking at the development of EU
labour markets since the mid 1970s, it
is evident that the incidence of
unequal access to employment has
increased, with a specific feature
being the rise in the unemployment
rate of the least qualified. Data for rel-
ative unemployment rates - by skill
level are not available for many coun-
tries, and so the alternative measure of
the overall unemployment rate is used.
The rough correlation (own calcula-
tion) between wage dispersion (as
measured by decile ratio P90/P10) and
the unemployment rate is positive but
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69 For a more detailed discussion of collective bargaining in the EU, please refer to the Industrial Relations Report, 2004, European Commission.
70 The results of such bivariate correlations are in line with the findings of the OECD (2004), Employment Outlook, chapter 3.
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weak, and does not seem to suggest
any strong link between wage disper-
sion and the unemployment rate. 
In addition, there are many caveats to
the simplistic correlations presented,
notably in chart 130, there is an out-
lier (Poland) with an unemployment
rate above 18%, which tends to drive
the correlation upwards. Secondly,
graphical analysis of this kind tends
to be relatively weak and cannot be
considered conclusive.
Structural policies include changes in
labour market policies and institu-
tions. In some of the EU Member
States, little has been done to reform
such institutions and foster further
earnings differentiation. Therefore it
is worthwhile focusing on the interde-
pendence between labour market
institutions and earnings differentials.
The early research on the impact of
labour market institutions on the
wage level focused either on the
impact of taxes on wages, or on a stat-
ic cross-country framework. Howev-
er, thanks to accessible data encom-
passing information on changes in
institutions over time, researchers71
are now able to analyse the issue in a
panel approach, while controlling for
macroeconomic determinants. The
estimates reveal that unemployment
and productivity have a strong impact
on the level of labour costs. Labour
market institutions also have a signif-
icant impact, both directly and
through their interaction with unem-
ployment and taxation. For instance,
bargaining coordination has a nega-
tive direct effect on labour costs, and
also a negative indirect effect by
reducing the positive impact of taxa-
tion and increasing the negative
impact of unemployment. Higher
benefit replacement rates as well as
employment protection legislation
have a positive impact (increasing
labour costs) whereas benefit dura-
tion has no impact. Nunziata (2005)
points to the fact that the impact of
institutions on wage inequality is as
strong as that of trade and technology
measures and that more flexibility
might therefore increase wage
inequality. 
Chapter 3 of Employment in Europe
2004 extensively reviewed the ‘wage
compression’ hypothesis, according
to which the narrower wage distribu-
tion in Europe compared with the US
might reduce low-wage employment
in the EU especially in the low-pro-
ductivity services.
It is possible to try to identify wage
compression in Europe using the SES
2002. Wage compression was defined
by Mourre (2005) as the wage differ-
ences across workers or firms which
are narrower than productivity differ-
ences. When estimating a labour
demand model by means of cross-sec-
tional econometric analysis, there is
some evidence of wage compression
both across occupations and across
educational attainments. The evi-
dence, however, appears much less
robust across levels of education than
across occupations, which might be
due to the fact that educational attain-
ment was too coarse a measure to cap-
ture the various levels of professional
skills. Moreover, the research sug-
gests that compression of wages is not
uniform across wage levels, a finding
which is consistent with the tradition-
al observation of less wage dispersion
at the lower end of the earnings distri-
bution and with the earlier findings of
this chapter. 
7. Rent-sharing practices
7.1. Inter-industry wage
differentials reflect rent-sharing
between employers and
employees
‘Rent-sharing’ or ‘profit-sharing’ is
about defining the share of ‘profits’ to
which employers and workers respec-
tively are entitled. In other words, it
reflects the public debate on the
rewards to capital and labour, which
becomes especially acute when
growth picks up again and each party
searches for their entitlement arising
from the improving economic situa-
tion. By its nature, the type of firm-
level data contained in the European
SES seems ideally suited to investigat-
ing such a topic. However, this survey
does not contain information on
firms’ profits.
The idea behind the rent-sharing theo-
ry is that those firms earning positive
economic rents share them with their
employees, usually in relation to the
employees’ bargaining power. So
workers employed in the most prof-
itable firms will tend to earn more than
others. Companies and institutions
would usually try to ‘smooth’ the
cyclical effect of growth on profits, by
compensating workers’ risks. Indeed,
in order not to have to shed (hire) too
much labour in bad (good) times, com-
panies would pay workers and renego-
tiate their pay gradually, using variable
pay schemes or bonuses in good times.
Competitive models would predict
that there is no relationship between
workers’ wages and the profits of their
firms. Wages should purely reflect the
marginal productivity of labour. The
conventional explanation offered by
71 Nunziata L. (2005), ‘Institutions and Wage Determination: a Multi-Country Approach’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
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textbook economics is that there is a
shift in demand for skilled versus
unskilled labour, creating an excess
demand for skilled labour, which
drives up the wages of the high-
skilled. In the real world, that of
imperfect labour markets and imper-
fect information about workers’ true
productivity and effort, there is room
for manoeuvre as regards wage set-
ting. Non-competitive models predict
a positive correlation between rents
and wages for comparative workers.
Most authors studying the inter-indus-
try wage structure have found that
industry differentials ‘reflect in large
part rent sharing between firms and
workers’72. Moreover, signalling or
posting high wages attracts high qual-
ity workers. 
The degree to which supply and
demand factors impact on changes in
relative employment and earnings also
depends on institutions. Institutions
may affect the level and trends in earn-
ings inequality and the degree of reg-
ulation may affect the existence of
‘rents’ in regulated industries and the
extent to which workers are able to
capture the rents.
7.2. Rent-sharing increases the
skill-bias
Using a Portuguese matched employ-
er-employee panel and econometric
techniques that control for a number of
biases, Martins (2004)73 found a signif-
icant amount of rent-sharing, especial-
ly for those workers with high levels of
tenure or education and for men in par-
ticular, who benefit more from rent-
sharing. In the case of France and Nor-
way74, there is evidence of a positive
relationship between profits per work-
er and annual earnings, especially for
men, even though collective bargain-
ing plays a larger role in earnings
determination in Norway than in
France. Focusing on the relationship
between profits and pay, and data on
the UK, US and Canada, results give a
clear indication that more profitable
firms pay higher wages when all the
characteristics of the individual worker
and the firm’s characteristics are
included. Using detailed data on the
US manufacturing sector, substantial
rent sharing was identified75; the
authors discovering a relationship
between value added and wages, such
that variations in rents explain a sub-
stantial part of the wage variation,
while changing the mix of worker
quality is irrelevant. This suggests that
changes in industry rents are a very
important component of wage deter-
mination in US manufacturing. The
use of ICT can increase productivity
and profit-sharing opportunities. How-
ever, an increase in the use of profit-
sharing or stock options results in
lower wages for technical and clerical
or sales workers (in the US). In France,
for instance, profit-sharing (participa-
tion) is a statutory requirement for
companies with over 50 employees,
whereby companies set aside a certain
pre-defined percentage of their profits,
for distribution to their employees.
Then there are also forms of ‘volun-
tary profit sharing’ (intéressement).
A study76 using a firm-level panel
dataset of European companies shows
that the relationship between parent-
company profits per worker and
wages in affiliates is positive and of
similar magnitude to domestic profit-
sharing and partly explains why multi-
national affiliates pay higher wages.
On average, annual wage growth is
often less than 5% across Europe, and
this study shows that a 1% change is
solely due to profit sharing, thus
explaining a fifth of individual wage
outcomes, which is quite substantial. 
European and OECD trends illustrate
the sharp decline in the share of
rewards to labour in value added, from
the beginning of the 1980s77. This is
confirmed in France, whereas in the
US the sharing of returns between
capital and labour has remained stable
over time. Such trends have recently
been commented on by Askénazy
(2003)78, using detailed data by sector
and national accounts data. The capi-
tal/labour share was studied taking
into account the various components
of ‘earnings’ and using an innovative
way of calculating value added.
Results are very different compared to
previous literature on the issue. They
point to fairly similar developments in
the US and in France, when defini-
tions control for the sectoral aspects.
The author points to the need for fur-
ther evidence based on micro-data to
investigate this point; therefore the
Commission has launched a series of
projects to analyse linked employer-
employee datasets and firm-level
panel data. Further analysis of the SES
72 Krueger A., Summers L. (1987), ‘Reflections on inter-industry wage structures’, in Land K., Leonard J. (eds), Unemployment and the structure
of labour markets, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
73 Martins, P.S. (2004), ‘Rent sharing before and after the wage bill’, IZA Discussion Paper n°1376.
74 Margolis, D. N., Sylvanes, K. G. (2001), ‘Do firms really share rents with their workers?’, IZA Discussion Paper n°330.
75 Estevao M., Tevlin S. (2002), ‘Do firms share their success with workers? The response of wages to product market conditions’, Economica 70.
76 Budd J. W., Konings J., Slaughter M. J. (2005), ‘Wages and international rent sharing in multinational firms’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 87(1).
77 OECD (1998), Perspectives Economiques.
78 Askénazy Ph. (2003), ‘Partage de la valeur ajoutée et rentabilité du capital en France et aux Etats-Unis: une réévaluation’, Economie et 
Statistique n°363-364-365.
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data, in particular of the information
on bonuses, could help identify mean-
ingful patterns, but a first treatment of
the aggregate information contained
in the SES is given below.
7.3. Bonuses represent 8.4% of
average annual earnings in the
EU-25
Bonuses can encompass a variety of
elements related to holidays (such as
extra pay corresponding to a 13th
month), shift work, productivity, sen-
iority, or other factors. Following on
from this, profit-sharing schemes can
be added to this concept of ‘bonus’.
As a first approximation, given the
data available in the SES 2002, chart
131 shows the bonuses paid annually
in both industry and services. Bonuses
represent quite a large ‘top-up’ on reg-
ular wages of between 14 and 18%,
which might be considered quite
large, in Spain, the Czech Republic,
Portugal, Greece, Slovakia and Aus-
tria, and in France, Belgium, Slovenia,
and Luxemburg bonus payments
exceed the EU-25 average (i.e. over
8.4%). At the other end of the range,
workers in Poland, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, Ire-
land, Estonia, and Bulgaria receive
comparatively small bonuses (less
than 5% of mean annual earnings).
Another interesting characteristic of
bonuses is their fairly similar levels
across ‘sectors’, as broadly defined as
‘industry’ and ‘services’, apart from a
few exceptions. For example, in Lux-
emburg and the UK, but also to a less-
er extent in Spain and Portugal,
bonuses are much higher in the serv-
ices sector, while in Cyprus, Finland
and the Czech Republic, on the other
hand, bonuses in industry exceed
those in services. 
As clearly illustrated in chart 132, the
top occupations and in general non-
manual occupations, pay higher
bonuses than the average. 
Results for France79 show that profit-
sharing accounts on average for 3.1%
of annual gross earnings, whereas
bonuses related to holidays, shift
work, productivity and seniority
account for 13.7%. This proportion
has been fairly stable across time
79 Pouget J. (2005), Presentation on the French Structure of Earnings Survey 2002, in a joint seminar organised by DG Employment, Social Affairs
and Equal Opportunities and Eurostat on the results of the European Structure of Earnings Survey 2002.
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(across the 1990s and beginning of
2000s). Furthermore, 9 out of 10
workers receive bonuses and generos-
ity in the level of payment varies from
sector to sector (the energy sector is
more likely to spend on bonuses than
hotels and restaurants, for example).
Relating the various components of
earnings to the distribution of earn-
ings, researchers mentioned previous-
ly illustrate the fact that earnings
inequality as measured by the decile
ratio (D9/D1) remains the same
whether bonuses and profit sharing
are included or not. Therefore, earn-
ings inequality should not be affected
by such variable pay schemes in the
French case. 0%
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8. Conclusion
This chapter has explored the topic of
earnings inequality across Europe,
based on a new set of data – the SES
for the year 2002 – that has recently
been released at pan-European level.
However one needs to bear in mind
that this data refers to 2002 and may
already have evolved since then. This
issue is fundamentally linked to
employment and the creation of ‘more
and better jobs’ in the EU, relating
especially to the ‘better jobs’ part of
the objectives.
On the basis of this sample of 8 mil-
lion individuals employed in compa-
nies across Europe, the data indicates
that in 2002 there were wide dispari-
ties between the EU-15 and the new
Member States of Central and Eastern
Europe (as of 1 May 2004), where
average annual earnings were two to
four times lower. Across the EU-25,
services continued to pay slightly
more than industry, yet industrial
hourly wages were still comparatively
high in Denmark, Germany, Norway
and the UK and relatively low in
Latvia and Lithuania. Financial inter-
mediation was the highest paying
activity, and by contrast ‘hotels and
restaurants’ was the lowest. 
The distribution of earnings was also
extreme in most of the countries – in
particular Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and
Slovenia. It also appears that some
specific groups were subject to higher
degrees of earnings inequality than
others, these include women in gen-
eral (e.g. in Germany), but also young
men and women aged 20 to 29 across
the EU. Comparing findings about the
general level of earnings inequality
between the 1990s and the year 2002,
Poland and Spain are two Member
States which stand out: the former
having clearly increased its overall
level of inequality and the latter hav-
ing clearly reduced it. Inequalities
have also increased in Germany,
France and Italy, although to a lesser
extent. Furthermore, there is evidence
of a higher degree of inequality in the
top deciles for higher wage earners
than in bottom deciles for lower wage
earners, which might indicate that
incentives to invest in higher educa-
tion and skills are being provided.
The geographical location of a region,
e.g. proximity to a capital city or a
dynamic border region, seems to play
a role in earnings differentiation, bear-
ing in mind that the SES data contain
fairly limited information on this
regional dimension. Earnings dispari-
ties can be large in capital cities such
as London (UK), or the Île-de-France
(Paris) region (FR), where the highest
earnings are concentrated. Mean-
while, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia
featured a higher than average degree
of earnings inequality across the
whole distribution. Currently, the
countries with a high (or low) degree
of earnings dispersion in the bottom
half of the earnings distribution also
tend to have a high (or low) degree of
earnings dispersion in the top half.
More particularly, within regions,
some specific groups were subject to
higher degrees of earnings inequality
than others, notably affecting women. 
Exploration of the gender dimension
of earnings disparities showed in par-
ticular that occupations played an
important part in the persistent gender
gap. For example, in Austria, there
seems to be a marked segregation
between men and women in terms of
working in very different occupations,
whilst in Romania and Slovenia it is
much less the case. A further examina-
tion of the issue using individual data
and simple econometric techniques
indicates that the gender earnings gap
ranged between 14% (Norway) and
32% (Estonia). On average and con-
trolling for other characteristics, the
gap represents slightly over 17% of
the gender earnings gap among
employees of the private sector cov-
ered in this sample. In addition, some
factors such as seniority, being a non-
manual worker, and working in indus-
trial sectors leads to higher rewards in
the case of men.
Some regions actually exhibited
greater inequality at the lower end of
the earnings distribution, indicating a
polarised earnings structure, and sug-
gesting a certain compression of
wages. This points towards the role of
incentives for higher investment in
skills. However, compression was not
uniform across the earnings distribu-
tion, moreover it also depended
strongly on institutional features such
as minimum wages or collective bar-
gaining agreements. Moreover, the
effect of labour market institutions
and policies on the distribution of
earnings appears to be unequal, and
more specifically, the coverage of col-
lective bargaining seems to have a
greater effect on earnings inequality. 
More generally, company size had a
positive impact on individual earn-
ings. Within services and industry, the
premium can vary widely: it is posi-
tive for financial intermediation and
mining and quarrying whilst it is neg-
ative for hotels and restaurants and
construction, for example. Being a
high-skilled worker bears a high earn-
ings premium, and returns to educa-
tion were unambiguously positive,
whereas having low to medium-skills
generally had a negative impact on
earnings. Workers on fixed-term or
part-time contracts, as well as appren-
tices (where available) also earned less
on average. 
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The composition of the earnings dif-
ferential can vary according to various
national or even company-specific
practices, including ‘rent-sharing’
practices, such as bonuses that amount
to on average to 8.4% of annual earn-
ings in the EU. 
This chapter has shown that there are
many dimensions to the issue of earn-
ings inequality. Earnings disparities
have several determinants, including
the individual characteristics of
employers (firm size, the type of
activity) and workers (skills, gender,
age, and occupations), work organisa-
tion, the type of contracts and labour
market institutions. It would therefore
be misleading to suggest that there is a
growing trend in earnings inequality
throughout the EU similarly to that
observed in the US and the UK. Very
wide earnings differentiation is not 
the norm within European countries,
though there are significant disparities
between countries, particularly between
the EU-15 and the new Member States
of Central and Eastern Europe.
Further in-depth analysis of the pan-
European Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey is needed. While the scope of the
analysis in this chapter does not allow
any direct guidance to making policy
choices, it nonetheless contributes to a
better understanding of earnings
inequality across the EU.
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The skill-biased technical change
hypothesis
Although there is still some disagreement
concerning the fundamental causes of the
increasing skill-intensity of employment
and wage inequality in industrialised
countries, economists generally believe
that technical change is an important fac-
tor (Acemoglu 2002; Chennels and Van
Reenen 1999). Technical change has
increased the relative demand for skilled
labour, in what has been described as skill
biased technical change, and has even
contributed to increased wage differen-
tials compared with the past. This view
derives from a combination of empirical
findings based on the above hypotheses
and which are summarised below:
• The employment shifts to skill-inten-
sive industries seem too small to be
consistent with the hypothesis that
increased international trade between
industrialised and developing coun-
tries is the main cause (Katz and Mur-
phy 1992; Berman, Bound and
Griliches 1994). Indeed, around 70%
to 95% of the shift away from manual
to non-manual employment in the
United States and several European
countries (e.g. Norway, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, Sweden, Austria and
Belgium and the United Kingdom) in
the 1970s and 1980s are due to within-
industry changes (Berman, Bound and
Machin 1998). Moreover, globalisa-
tion has not led to a significant
increase in prices of skill-intensive
goods in the United States and several
European countries (e.g. United King-
dom, Germany, Denmark and Swe-
den) during that period (Lawrence and
Slaughter 1993; Sachs and Shatz,
1994; Desjonqueres, Machin and Van
Reenen 1999).
• The rise in inequality is unlikely to be
caused principally by deunionisation
(and the decline in bargaining cover-
age) in the United States and United
Kingdom contexts. In the United
Kingdom, for instance, the growth in
wage inequality began in the mid-
1970s, whereas union membership
density continued to increase until
1980. However, in the United States,
part of the increasing wage differen-
tials can indeed be attributed to the
decline in unionisation during the
1980s (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux
1996; Card 2001). However, deunion-
isation started in the 1950s at the time
when inequality was relatively stable
(Acemoglu, Aghion and Vilante 2001).
Moreover, while the erosion of the real
value of the minimum wage in the
United States during the 1980s had an
impact on wage inequality (Lee,
1999), the latter started to rise well
before this time.
• The slowdown in the rate of growth of
the share of more educated workers
coinciding with a continued growth in
the demand for educated labour has
effectively widened wage inequality.
In several countries, the rate of growth
of the highly educated section of the
workforce was slower than in the
1970s. Education differentials may
thus have increased later because the
supply of highly educated workers,
although rising, fell short of a steadily
growing demand (Katz and Murphy
op. cit.). However, the source of this
steady growth in demand remains
largely unexplained.
• There appears to be a strong positive
within-sector relationship between
technology related-indicators (e.g.
R&D intensity, technological innova-
tions, physical capital and computeri-
sation) on one the one hand, and the
increased demand for skills and the
rise of wage inequality on the other -
at both industry and firm levels. The
increased skill-intensity of employ-
ment associated with technology has
been emphasised in the United States,
Japan and several European countries
(e.g. Denmark, France, Germany,
Sweden and the United Kingdom)
(Berman, Bound and Griliches op.
cit.; Autor, Katz and Krueger op. cit.;
Doms, Dunne and Troske 1997;
Machin and Van Reenen, op. cit.;
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego
2001; Falk and Koebel 2004). The
positive relationship between technol-
ogy and the distribution of wages has
also been stressed for the United
States and a number of European
countries (e.g. Germany, Italy, Spain
and the United Kingdom) (Machin
and Van Reenen op. cit.; Doms, Dunne
and Troske 1997; Borghans and Weel
2004; Martinez-Ros 2001; Casavola,
Gavosto and Sestito 1996).
Is skill-biased technical change a new
phenomenon?
The introduction and rapid spread of
information technology and computers
(ICT) in modern economies over the past
three decades are generally perceived as
being responsible for this upward trend in
the skill-intensity of employment and in
wage inequality (Krueger 1993; Caselli
1999).
However, evidence shows that skill-
biased technical change has occurred
throughout the 20th century, since well
before the emergence of the New Econo-
my. Indeed there were already signs of
significant technology-skill complemen-
tarity in the first half of the 20th century
with, for instance, the diffusion of batch
and continuous-process methods of pro-
duction and with the switch from steam
and water-power energy to electricity in
many industries. The former reduced the
demand for unskilled manual workers
while the latter increased the demand for
skills; however, wage differentials by skill
did not increase during that period
(Goldin and Katz 1998).
Nevertheless, skill-biased technical
change seems to remain a 20th century
phenomenon. Indeed, there is a consensus
that technical change in the 19th century
was about deskilling because of the
increasing division of labour (Braveman
1974), even though recent evidence tends
to moderate this view (Chin, Juhn and
Thompson 2004). A major goal of techni-
cal change was indeed to raise the divi-
sion of labour and make tasks previously
performed by artisans simpler by splitting
them into smaller parts that required less
skill.
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Is the recent rise in wage inequality
attributable to an acceleration in the
skill-bias of technology?
Although technical change has encour-
aged a process of upskilling since the
early part of the 20th century, wage
inequality began to rise, in the United
States and the United Kingdom, in the
late 1970s, i.e. at the time when the rela-
tive supply of skilled labour was also
increasing. Why was this so? The answer
to this question is still controversial - all
the more so since there is no direct meas-
ure of the degree of skill-bias. However,
several hypotheses have been put forward
to explain the apparent acceleration in the
skill-bias of technology and the increas-
ing demand for more educated and
skilled workers. The most popular
hypotheses so far have been those which
regarded technical change as exogenous,
i.e. driven by scientific and technological
progress and independent of economic
forces. Nonetheless, alternative hypothe-
ses have been suggested which consider
that the apparent acceleration in the skill-
bias of technology is the result of eco-
nomic forces.
• Capital-skill complementarity. This
approach maintains that the more
rapid decline in the relative price of
production equipment goods in the
United States since the mid-1970s has
led to an acceleration of the pace of
capital-embodied technical change
and thereby to the rise in the skill pre-
mium (Krussel, Ohanian, Rios-Rull
and Vilante 2000), since, according to
Griliches’ hypothesis (Grliches 1969),
capital is assumed to be more comple-
mentary to skilled rather than
unskilled labour.
• Technological revolutions and human
capital. This approach claims that the
rise in wage inequality over the past
three decades is attributable to the ICT
revolution which has raised the pace
of technical change and its complexity
and thereby increased the premium
placed on adaptability in labour mar-
kets, according to the Nelson-Phelps
hypothesis (Nelson and Phelps 1966).
Indeed, the introduction of general-
purpose technology such as ICT and
its diffusion throughout the economy
requires intensive learning. Even
though in the long run everyone can
adapt to this technology, in the short
run some learn the requisite skills
much faster than others, and thus earn
a premium for their adaptability
(Greenwood and Yorukoglu 1997,
Caselli op. cit., Galor and Moav 2000;
Aghion and Howitt 2002).
• Directed technical change and
induced innovations. The above
approaches assume that technical
change is skill-biased by nature. A dif-
ferent perspective is to relate the type
of technologies that are developed
with profit incentives. The central idea
is that the development of skill-biased
technologies will be more profitable
when the market prospects are high,
i.e. when there are more skilled work-
ers to adopt and consume them. Thus,
the degree of skill-bias, determined
endogenously, could increase with the
rise in the relative supply of skilled
workers. An increase in the supply of
skills will then lead to skill-biased
technical change. In addition, acceler-
ation in the supply of skills can lead to
an acceleration in the demand for
skills (Acemoglu op. cit.).
Some empirical studies have attempted to
corroborate, in particular, the first two
hypotheses. The capital-skill complemen-
tarity hypothesis has been used to inter-
pret the dynamics of the skill premium in
European countries such as Sweden dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s (Lindquist,
2005). The Nelson-Phelps hypothesis in
the context of general-purpose technolo-
gies has proved to be valuable in explain-
ing the stagnation of aggregate multi-fac-
tor productivity since the mid-1970s. It
can indeed partially reconcile the idea of
acceleration in technical change (due to
ICT) and the “productivity slowdown”
(Hornstein, Krusell and Violante 2004) as
highlighted by other earlier historical
examples of the introduction of pervasive
technologies pointed out (David, 1990).
Besides, the comparative advantage of
more educated individuals at implement-
ing new technologies has been underlined
empirically (Bartel and Lichtenberg
1987).
Implications and follow-up
There is growing evidence that the
increasing skill-intensity of employment
in many countries over the past three
decades can be accounted for by skill-
biased technical change. An important
implication of such a causal relationship
between technical change and the skill
structure could be that the increase in
R&D investment in the EU in the frame-
work of the Barcelona objective set in
2002, could lead to labour market seg-
mentation and exclusion. However, the
EU has built-in mechanisms that could
help mitigate these negative effects of
technical change. Drawing on the Nel-
son-Phelps hypothesis, there is gener-
alised access to education and training as
well as to lifelong learning that could
help both workers and enterprises
increase their adaptability. In particular,
policies that favour general education,
which teaches fundamental analytical and
problem-solving skills, may reduce
inequality more than education policies
that favour specialised and vocational
education in an context of rapid technical
change (Aghion and Howitt, op. cit.;
Krueger and Kumar 2004).
However, existing studies on the relation-
ships between technical change, skills,
and inequality have several caveats,
including the following:
• Measurement issues. Measures of
technical change (e.g. R&D intensity,
physical capital, size of the ICT sector,
use of computers) vary significantly
across countries (Card and DiNardo
2002). In addition, measures of wage
structure, especially in the United
States, pose some methodological
problems that potentially affect the
measurement of wage inequality
(Card and DiNardo op. cit.). Finally,
the measures of skill level are also dif-
ferent (e.g. years of schooling, occu-
pations) in many studies and often not
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precise enough (e.g. blue versus white
collar jobs). More refined measures of
skill are required in further studies
(Howell and Wolff, 1992; Autor, Levy
and Murnane 2003).
• Returns to experience. Only a few
studies have attempted to link techni-
cal change to the experience premium
(Card and DiNardo op. cit.; Hornstein,
Krusell and Violante op. cit.).
• Organisational change and skill-
biased technical change. Several stud-
ies have shown that skill-biased tech-
nical change is not stand alone.
Indeed, the increasing diffusion of
new organisational practices within
firms (e.g. decentralisation, delayer-
ing, collective work, multi-tasking)
often associated with technical change
has led to an increased need for an
upskilled workforce. Empirical stud-
ies on French (Caroli and Van Reenan
2001; Greenan 2003), Italian (Piva,
Santerelli and Vivarelli 2005), and US
(Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1997; Bresna-
han, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002)
firms have shown such trends.
• Geographical coverage. The bulk of
studies on skill-biased technical
change focus on US and British indus-
tries and firms. Both the US and the
UK have indeed been characterised by
increasing inequality, especially since
the 1980s. Few studies have concen-
trated on the case of other countries, in
particular in the EU, which have not
shown substantial shifts in the wage
structure (Acemoglu 2003) during that
period despite a rise in R&D intensity.
They do not explain why low-skill and
low-wage jobs have grown faster in
the US than in the EU. Could skill-
biased technical change thus be more
a European than a US phenomenon
(Pianta 2004)? Does the relative sup-
ply of skills increase faster in Europe
than in the US? Do labour market
institutions prevent inequality from
rising? Does relative demand for skills
increase differently? 
There is a need for more systematic
analysis of the evolution in the wage and
employment structures, especially in the
EU, for example, by taking into account
the differential growth in the supply of
skilled workers (and not only the demand
for skilled workers), experience, learning
and adaptability, and the role of addition-
al factors (e.g. wage-setting institutions,
organisational change, international
trade) while relying on more precise
measures of skill.
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The main reasons for initiating the Euro-
pean Structure of Earnings Survey (SES)
were set out in the Council Regulation
(EC) No 530/1999 of 9 March 1999 con-
cerning structural statistics on earnings
and on labour costs. The SES 2002 is the
first in the series of 4-yearly surveys to be
conducted under the aforementioned reg-
ulation.
There were a number of aims shown,
including the following:
• In order to be able to perform the tasks
assigned to it, the Commission should
be kept informed of the level and com-
position of labour costs and of the
structure and distribution of earnings
in the Member States. The SES sheds
light on the latter part, gathering data
on earnings of employees working in
the private sector, through a firm-level
survey. 
• The development of the EU and the
operation of the internal market
increase the need for comparable and
harmonised data on the level and com-
position of labour costs and on the
structure and distribution of earnings.
This is particularly relevant as a means
of assessing progress in economic and
social cohesion and for establishing
reliable and relevant comparisons
between Member States and the
regions of the EU.
• In order to provide comparable infor-
mation at EU level, the creation of
common statistical standards is best
achieved at EU level. 
• To be able to reflect changes taking
place in the structure of the labour
force, in the distribution of earnings,
and in the composition of expenditure
on wages and related employers’ con-
tributions, the statistics need to be reg-
ularly updated.
• To establish complete, reliable and
comparable statistical sources at
national and regional levels of disag-
gregation.
• To give the European Central Bank
information on the level and composi-
tion of earnings in order to assess the
economic development in Member
States in the context of a single Euro-
pean monetary policy.
• Previously, not all Member States col-
lected complete data in certain activi-
ties, hence the need for a pan-EU
approach.
These reasons therefore provided the
rationale for producing EU statistics on
the level and composition of labour costs
and on the structure and distribution of
employee’s earnings.
The SES gives detailed and comparable
data on the distribution of earnings and
the individual characteristics of both
employers and employees. Major
improvements brought about with the
SES include the fact that it represents all
activities with NACE C-O codes and that
the definition covers all forms of employ-
ee compensation, consistent with prac-
tices in national accounts and other statis-
tical domains. The statistics cover all eco-
nomic activities defined in sections C
(mining and quarrying), D (manufactur-
ing), E (electricity, gas and water supply),
F (construction), G (wholesale and retail
trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcy-
cles and personal and household goods),
H (hotels and restaurants), I (transport,
storage and communications), J (finan-
cial intermediation), K (real estate, rent-
ing and business activities), M (educa-
tion), N (health and social work), and O
(other community, social and personal
service activities) of the NACE Rev.1
classification of economic activities in
the European Community; although the
inclusion of categories M-N-O remained
optional in 2002.
These statistics on the structure of earn-
ings have been produced for the year
2002 and subsequently every 4 years,
with a representative month in that year
taken as the reference point. The SES had
so far been an irregular survey of enter-
prises, covering industry and services,
but excluding agriculture, public admin-
istration and firms with less than 10
employees. Information is also not gath-
ered for the self-employed, which of
course would be a much more difficult
task. 
In all Member States of the EU (except
Malta), as well as Bulgaria and Romania,
Iceland and Norway, a SES has been car-
ried out in 2002, and the micro-data were
delivered by countries80. The data were
then verified and compiled by Eurostat
and relevant aggregates made publicly
available recently (April 2005). This
chapter reflects on earnings data across
the EU Member States, extracting as
much information as possible from the
following characteristics of the data:
Characteristics of the local unit (enter-
prise) in which the person is employed
• The regional breakdown (NUTS 1)
• The size of the enterprise to which the
local unit belongs (10-49, 50-249,
250-499, 500-999, 1 000 or more
employees)
• The economic activity (Nace Rev. 1,
2-digit)
• The type of collective pay agreement
80 According to Council Regulation 530/1999, all Member States were obliged to send their data (micro-data on individuals and enterprises) by
the end of June 2004 for SES 2002. After reception of the individual datasets, Eurostat verifies the data until the data are declared ready by both
the country concerned and Eurostat. The exact delivery date of final data for SES 2002 varied from country to country. For example, Portuguese
data was ready for publication only on 3 June 2005. The data for 24 Member States are now available.
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2005/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEA
R_2005_MONTH_05/3-30052005-en-ap.PDF.
Annex I
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Characteristics of the employee
• Sex
• Age
• Occupation (ISCO)
• Highest completed level of education
and training
• Length of service in the enterprise
• Whether full-time or part-time
• Type of employment contract
For the following variables:
• Gross earnings for a representative
month (distinguishing separately earn-
ings related to overtime and special
payments for shift work): this is the
remuneration paid (in money units) to
the employee by the employer for each
pay period, before deductions of any
tax and social security contributions
payable by the employee and withheld
by the employer. It includes the basic
wage or salary for work done or time
worked in the reference month, earn-
ings related to annual paid holiday
leave and absences paid in full by the
employer, payment for overtime, shift
work, public holidays, seniority, other
agreed entitlements, bonuses paid reg-
ularly. Hourly earnings refer to normal
working hours in the reference month. 
• Gross annual earnings in the reference
year (distinguishing bonuses paid on
an irregular basis)
• Working-time (the number of hours
paid in a standard working month, the
number of overtime hours paid in the
month and the annual leave entitlement)
The SES2002 provides data on 402 046
local units and gathers approximately 8
million observations. Full-time employ-
ees are considered to perform a full day
of work for the entire week in the local
unit. Part-time employees are defined as
those with contracts who did not perform
a full day’s work or did not complete a
full week. Part-time work rarely exceeds
35 hours a week while the normal dura-
tion of full-time is at least 30 hours a
week. For most of the countries, October
is taken as the representative month, with
some exceptions however.
The SES aims to give comparable
(between Member States) European-level
information on the structure and distribu-
tion of earnings, the individual characteris-
tics of the employer and of the employee. 
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Annex II
BE1 Région de Bruxelles-Capitale/
Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 2.72 1.74 1.56
BE2 Vlaams Gewest 2.26 1.60 1.41
BE3 Région Wallonne 2.30 1.66 1.38
CZ Czech Republic 2.82 1.73 1.63
DK Denmark 2.13 1.59 1.34
DE1 Baden-Württemberg 2.94 1.72 1.71
DE2 Bayern 3.15 1.81 1.74
DE3 Berlin 3.35 1.82 1.84
DE4 Brandenburg 2.85 1.72 1.66
DE5 Bremen 3.07 1.73 1.77
DE6 Hamburg 3.49 1.83 1.91
DE7 Hessen 3.14 1.79 1.76
DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 3.58 1.85 1.93
DE9 Niedersachsen 2.98 1.74 1.71
DEa Nordrhein-Westfalen 2.90 1.73 1.67
DEb Rheinland-Pfalz 2.70 1.63 1.65
DEc Saarland 2.91 1.69 1.73
DEd Sachsen 3.08 1.83 1.69
DEe Sachsen-Anhalt 2.99 1.78 1.69
DEf Schleswig-Holstein 3.09 1.73 1.79
DEg Thüringen 2.88 1.77 1.63
EE Estonia 4.99 2.26 2.21
EL1 Voreia Ellada 2.58 1.82 1.42
EL2 Kentriki Ellada 2.47 1.69 1.46
EL3 Attiki 3.35 2.06 1.63
EL4 Nisia Aigaiou. Kriti 2.45 1.66 1.48
ES1 Noroeste 3.30 2.11 1.56
ES2 Noreste 3.02 1.86 1.62
ES3 Comunidad de Madrid 3.97 2.18 1.82
ES4 Centro 3.24 2.10 1.55
ES5 Este 3.23 2.06 1.57
ES6 Sur 3.24 2.06 1.58
ES7 Canarias 3.42 2.26 1.51
FR1 Île de France 4.21 2.30 1.83
FR2 Bassin Parisien 3.59 2.33 1.54
FR3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 2.97 1.99 1.49
FR4 Est 2.82 1.86 1.52
FR5 Ouest 3.29 2.18 1.51
FR6 Sud-Ouest 2.85 1.91 1.49
Table 58 – Regional earnings inequalities
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FR7 Centre-Est 3.31 2.16 1.53
FR8 Méditerranée 2.76 1.74 1.59
IE Ireland 4.02 2.23 1.80
ITc Nord Ovest 2.72 1.88 1.45
ITd Nord Est 2.42 1.75 1.39
ITe Centro 2.41 1.68 1.43
ITf Sud 2.42 1.87 1.30
ITg Isole 2.52 1.90 1.33
CY Cyprus 3.14 1.97 1.60
LV Latvia 4.76 2.82 1.69
LT Lithuania 4.56 2.39 1.91
LU Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) 3.33 2.08 1.61
HU Hungary 3.41 2.09 1.63
NL1 Noord-Nederland 2.68 1.81 1.48
NL2 Oost-Nederland 2.69 1.77 1.52
NL3 West-Nederland 2.81 1.78 1.58
NL4 Zuid-Nederland 2.55 1.60 1.59
AT1 Ostösterreich 3.12 1.99 1.57
AT2 Südösterreich 2.83 1.93 1.46
AT3 Westösterreich 2.96 2.01 1.47
PL Poland 4.73 2.36 2.01
SI Slovenia 5.13 2.07 2.48
SK Slovakia 3.26 1.95 1.67
FI1 Manner-Suomi 2.01 1.51 1.33
FI2 Åland 1.95 1.47 1.32
SE Sweden 2.05 1.61 1.27
UKc North East 3.02 1.91 1.59
UKd North West (including Merseyside) 3.21 2.02 1.59
UKe Yorkshire and The Humber 3.12 2.03 1.54
UKf East Midlands 3.01 1.95 1.54
UKg West Midlands 3.17 2.02 1.57
UKh Eastern 3.23 1.99 1.62
UKi London 4.24 2.20 1.93
UKj South East 3.48 2.08 1.67
UKk South West 3.18 1.98 1.61
UKl Wales 3.11 2.00 1.56
UKm Scotland 3.22 1.98 1.62
UKn Northern Ireland 3.12 2.01 1.56
Table 58 (cont.) – Regional earnings inequalities
Source: Eurostat calculations and own calculations.
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Annex III
1. Individual earnings regressions
Intercept 3.60 0.19 18.51
AT 4.73 0.19 24.79
BE 4.68 0.19 24.30
BG -7.96 0.19 -41.43
CZ -6.86 0.19 -36.15
DE 6.99 0.19 37.10
DK 12.33 0.19 64.35
ES 0.59 0.19 3.13
FI 4.37 0.19 22.69
FR 4.12 0.19 21.85
EL -1.19 0.19 -6.17
HU -6.25 0.19 -32.73
IE 7.30 0.19 37.79
IS 7.01 0.30 23.36
IT 2.87 0.19 15.18
LT -8.25 0.20 -42.22
LU 7.38 0.21 35.18
LV -7.79 0.20 -39.52
NL 5.72 0.19 30.20
PT -1.54 0.19 -8.06
RO -7.71 0.19 -40.69
SI -3.28 0.20 -16.66
SK -7.16 0.20 -37.35
SE 5.42 0.19 28.41
NO 12.77 0.19 66.74
EE -7.13 0.20 -35.49
PL -5.72 0.19 -30.23
UK 7.78 0.19 41.28
E10_49 0.57 0.03 22.67
Table 59 – OLS results Dependent variable: hourly earnings
nb of observations: 5431139
variable estimate Std error t-ratio variable estimate Std error t-ratio
E50_249 1.34 0.03 52.54
E250_499 1.86 0.03 67.11
E500_999 2.19 0.03 77.80
E1000 2.32 0.03 91.76
NaceC 0.81 0.05 17.73
NaceD 0.04 0.01 2.76
NaceE 0.04 0.04 12.83
NaceF -0.78 0.02 -39.14
NaceG -1.32 0.02 -84.53
NaceH -1.93 0.03 -75.98
NaceI -0.54 0.02 -29.80
NaceJ 2.76 0.02 129.64
Male 2.49 0.01 248.18
ISCOO 1.36 0.65 2.10
ISCO1 13.04 0.02 601.76
ISCO2 8.37 0.02 358.95
ISCO3 4.56 0.02 249.76
ISCO4 2.31 0.02 134.66
ISCO5 1.34 0.02 69.89
ISCO7 1.43 0.02 85.35
ISCO8 1.05 0.02 59.69
ISCED1 -5.73 0.04 -142.86
ISCED2 -5.69 0.04 -149.94
ISCED3 -4.52 0.04 -120.95
ISCED4 -5.02 0.04 -115.20
ISCED5 -2.42 0.04 -65.43
PTM -0.64 0.01 -46.44
Age 0.10 0.00 262.25
R =0.362
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2. Log of hourly earnings
Intercept 1.13 0.00 613.12
AT 0.81 0.00 455.89
BE 0.84 0.00 391.67
BG -2.04 0.00 -1 012.10
CZ -0.73 0.00 -452.53
DE 1.01 0.00 736.02
DK 1.44 0.00 820.50
ES 0.41 0.00 287.52
FI 0.87 0.00 398.59
FR 0.82 0.00 602.36
HU -0.85 0.00 -456.16
IE 0.98 0.00 442.69
IS 1.09 0.01 115.56
IT 0.64 0.00 460.05
LT -1.29 0.00 -521.87
LU 1.06 0.00 260.16
LV -1.43 0.00 -531.07
NL 1.01 0.00 668.36
RO -1.84 0.00 -1 162.50
SI -0.12 0.00 -44.52
SK -1.11 0.00 -563.15
NO 1.14 0.00 721.87
EE -1.04 0.00 -329.90
PL -0.63 0.00 -432.42
UK 1.07 0.00 805.94
E10_249 0.05 0.00 51.87
E250 0.18 0.00 177.59
Industry 0.01 0.00 163.49
Non-manual 0.23 0.00 520.22
ISCED_L -0.45 0.00 -747.28
ISCED_M -0.32 0.00 -602.72
Part-Time -0.10 0.00 -186.44
Length in enterprise 0.01 0.00 403.23
Male 0.22 0.00 542.18
Age 25-34 0.30 0.00 461.74
Age 35-44 0.38 0.00 586.83
Age 45-54 0.37 0.00 518.63
Age 55-64 0.33 0.00 376.36
Age 65 0.18 0.00 71.96
R2=0.82
Table 60 – OLS results
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings
variable estimate Std error t-ratio
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3. Explaining individual earnings of men and women
Table 61 – OLS results  for women and men
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings
Women
variable estimate Std error t-ratio variable estimate Std error t-ratio
Intercept 1.32 0.00 488.24
AT 0.73 0.00 267.55
BE 0.81 0.00 264.24
BG -2.10 0.00 -711.31
CZ -0.83 0.00 -353.93
DE 0.93 0.00 525.18
DK 1.35 0.00 438.09
ES 0.29 0.00 142.46
FI 0.78 0.00 234.68
FR 0.74 0.00 394.29
HU -0.88 0.00 -335.70
IE 0.88 0.00 272.27
IS 1.00 0.16 61.59
IT 0.60 0.00 311.95
LT -1.36 0.00 -365.64
LU 1.01 0.01 143.23
LV -1.52 0.00 -390.00
NL 0.95 0.00 424.51
RO -1.91 0.00 -868.79
SI -0.17 0.00 -39.73
SK -1.24 0.00 -440.11
NO 1.38 0.00 464.26
EE -1.17 0.00 -253.06
PL -0.72 0.00 -353.24
UK 0.97 0.00 539.58
E10_249 0.03 0.00 18.24
E250 0.15 0.00 93.79
Industry 0.03 0.00 44.18
Non-manual 0.20 0.00 250.71
ISCED_L -0.46 0.00 -463.30
ISCED_M -0.33 0.00 -373.37
Part-Time -0.10 0.00 -140.60
Length 0.01 0.00 248.14
Age 25-34 0.27 0.00 249.11
Age 35-44 0.32 0.00 291.29
Age 45-54 0.29 0.00 245.26
Age 55-64 0.24 0.00 157.40
Age 65 0.13 0.00 31.70
R2=0.83
Intercept 1.34 0.00 594.40
AT 0.75 0.00 341.89
BE 0.72 0.00 257.58
BG -2.09 0.00 -792.96
CZ -0.79 0.00 -402.93
DE 0.93 0.00 634.63
DK 1.33 0.00 548.35
ES 0.35 0.00 217.05
FI 0.78 0.00 288.22
FR 0.70 0.00 456.79
HU -0.96 0.00 -420.28
IE 0.93 0.00 323.42
IS 1.03 0.01 78.28
IT 0.54 0.00 341.73
LT -1.34 0.00 -396.56
LU 0.97 0.01 186.98
LV -1.47 0.00 -387.75
NL 0.93 0.00 528.90
RO -1.91 0.00 -1 013.40
SI -0.21 0.00 -59.78
SK -1.11 0.00 -423.93
NO 1.33 0.00 562.31
EE -1.06 0.00 -237.60
PL -0.71 0.00 -420.91
UK 1.02 0.00 681.35
E10_249 0.07 0.00 52.32
E250 0.21 0.00 150.87
Industry 0.08 0.00 154.77
Non-manual 0.25 0.00 437.79
ISCED_L -0.45 0.00 -552.13
ISCED_M -0.32 0.00 -442.60
Part-Time -0.10 0.00 -98.01
Length 0.01 0.00 291.15
Age 25-34 0.33 0.00 354.93
Age 35-44 0.44 0.00 468.34
Age 45-54 0.44 0.00 433.81
Age 55-64 0.40 0.00 335.57
Age 65 0.22 0.00 63.85
R2=0.81
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4. Country-specific regressions
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Chapter 5 The economically inactive
population in the EU: Out of the
labour force or potential labour
supply? A perspective from the EU
Labour Force Survey
1 Jobs, Jobs, Jobs – Creating more employment in Europe, Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, November 2003.
2 For example by contacting a private or public employment office, sending applications to employers directly, inserting, answering or studying
advertisements in newspapers or journals, taking tests, interviews or examinations or taking concrete steps to start working as a self-employed
person, such as looking for land, premises or equipment or looking for permits, licences or financial resources.
1. Introduction
To underpin economic growth, Mem-
ber States must attract more people
into employment and ensure they can
achieve sustainable integration into
the labour market. This is all the more
important as demographic ageing will
result in a decline in the working age
population. As emphasised in the
report of the employment taskforce
chaired by Wim Kok1, in the face of
an ageing workforce, everyone is
needed. Furthermore, in line with the
overall Lisbon employment objective
of aiming for full employment, an
increase in labour force participation
is a fundamental pre-requisite to
achieve this goal. Breaking down bar-
riers to labour market entry or re-
entry, assisting effective job search,
creating attractive working arrange-
ments, ensuring that work pays and
promoting lifelong learning are
essential to achieving increased activ-
ity in the labour market.
This chapter examines in detail the
current situation and past develop-
ments concerning the inactive popula-
tion in Europe. It provides an analysis
of the size and structure of the inactive
population, generally defined as those
‘out of the labour force’, with break-
downs according to gender, age, edu-
cation, reasons for inactivity, length of
inactivity, degree of attachment to the
labour market, willingness to work,
etc., as a guide to identifying where
measures to increase participation
could most effectively be targeted. 
2. Economic inactivity:
some definitional issues
The focus of the discussion is on the
situation of the economically inactive
population of working age, broadly
defined as those persons outside the
labour force (i.e. neither employed nor
unemployed). However, it should also
be borne in mind that ‘inactivity’ cor-
responds to a rather ad hoc statistical
definition that includes a very diverse
group of people in terms of their
‘proximity to the labour market’. 
The conventional ILO statistical defi-
nition classifies someone as ‘unem-
ployed’ if five conditions are fulfilled:
the person is currently not working,
has looked for work in the four weeks
prior to the survey, has done so active-
ly2, is willing to work and is immedi-
ately available for work, which means
s/he can start a job within the two
weeks following the survey interview.
Between a situation whereby all five
characteristics are fulfilled - and the
person is classified as ‘unemployed’ -
and a situation whereby none of the
last four characteristics is fulfilled -
and the person is classified as ‘inac-
tive’ – lies a ‘grey’ area, also classified
as ‘inactivity’. It may be the case,
therefore, that a person is classified as
‘inactive’ even if s/he has been active-
ly looking for work and is willing to
work, but is not immediately available
to start work within two weeks. Alter-
natively, an inactive person may be
willing to work and available to start
immediately, but is not actively look-
ing for work, say, because s/he does
not believe that there is any available
(and is therefore discouraged). 
These simple ‘definitional’ considera-
tions call into question the commonly
held view that ‘inactivity’ is exclusive-
ly a ‘supply-side’ problem and that
active labour market policies are the
only relevant option to mobilise the
inactive workforce. For this reason,
new concepts such as ‘labour force
reserve’ are being introduced to iden-
tify, in this case, working age people
who despite being classified as ‘inac-
tive’ are actually ‘willing to work’,
should the opportunity arise. An effec-
tive response to the need for mobilis-
ing the workforce more than is cur-
rently the case should therefore con-
sist of a comprehensive set of policies
that combines Active Labour Market
Policies (ALMPs) with other meas-
ures aimed at supporting job creation
and opportunities. 
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3. The policy context
The European Council of March 2005
has again emphasised that ‘it is essen-
tial to attract more people into the
labour market. This aim will be
achieved by following the course of an
active employment policy, of making
work pay and of measures to reconcile
working life and family life, including
the improvement of childcare facili-
ties; priority must also be given to
equal opportunities, active ageing
strategies, encouraging social integra-
tion and converting undeclared work
into lawful employment’.
A core element of the new Integrated
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005-2008)3, as adopted by the Com-
mission on 12 April 2005, includes
taking the necessary action to attract
more people into the labour market
and create more jobs. As mentioned in
the Communication, the continued
under-performance of the EU econo-
my is due, in part, to the fact that
labour input remains relatively low
compared with other developed
economies such as the US or Japan,
despite the recent improvements in
raising the employment rate to just
over 63% in 2004. This comparatively
low employment rate suggests that the
EU still has a substantial reservoir of
unused labour, and that there remains
considerable scope for raising
employment further, especially among
such sub groups as women, youth and
older workers. It is evident that a sub-
stantial part of the potential labour
force is currently not engaged in
labour market activity and hence
unable to make a contribution to
increased economic performance.
3.1. The new integrated
guidelines
Achieving higher labour market par-
ticipation will provide an essential
contribution to sustainable develop-
ment and social cohesion in the EU.
The re-launched Lisbon Strategy pri-
oritises the need to attract and retain
more people in employment. The goal
of achieving full employment involves
reducing unemployment and inactivi-
ty, and increasing the demand for and
supply of labour. However, to achieve
this will require determined action to
improve the attractiveness and quality
of work, to prevent exclusion from the
labour market and support integration
into employment of those currently
disadvantaged. The new integrated
guidelines that specifically address
these issues are as follows:
• Integrated Guideline 17 specifical-
ly calls for implementation of
employment policies aimed at
achieving full employment, and
reducing unemployment and inac-
tivity. Raising employment levels 
is the most effective means of 
generating economic growth and
promoting socially inclusive
economies whilst ensuring a safety
net for those unable to work. 
Promoting a new lifecycle
approach to work and modernising
social protection systems to ensure
their adequacy, financial sustain-
ability and responsiveness to
changing needs in society are all
the more necessary because of the
expected decline in the working-
age population.
• Integrated Guideline 18 calls,
among other things, for measures
to increase youth participation, to
support better reconciliation of
work and private life, including the
provision of accessible and afford-
able childcare facilities and care for
other dependants, appropriate
incentives to work and discourage-
ment of early retirement, and sup-
3 COM(2005) 141 final.
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Chart 134 – International comparison of activity rates in 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD for EU-15 and EU-25, OECD Employment Outlook 2005 for AU,
CA, JP, US and CH. 
Note: US refers to pop 16-64.
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port for working conditions con-
ducive to active ageing.
• Integrated Guideline 19 specifically
seeks to ensure inclusive labour
markets for jobseekers and disad-
vantaged people. Facilitating access
to employment for jobseekers, pre-
venting unemployment and ensur-
ing that those who become unem-
ployed remain closely attached to
the labour market and increase their
employability are essential to
increasing participation and com-
bating social exclusion. Active and
preventive measures are called for
to break down barriers to entry to
the labour market by assisting with
effective job search, facilitating
access to guidance, training and
other active labour market meas-
ures, ensuring that work pays, and
removing unemployment, poverty
and inactivity traps. Special atten-
tion should be paid to promoting the
inclusion of disadvantaged people
in the labour market. In this regard,
combating discrimination, promot-
ing access to employment for dis-
abled people and integrating
migrants and minorities are particu-
larly essential.
• Finally, Integrated Guideline 20
calls for improved matching of
labour market needs, in order to
better anticipate and resolve possi-
ble mismatches. This will require
the modernisation and strengthen-
ing of labour market institutions,
notably public employment servic-
es, greater transparency of employ-
ment and training opportunities at
national and European level to
facilitate mobility across Europe,
better anticipation of skill needs,
labour market shortages and bottle-
necks, and appropriate manage-
ment of economic migration.
The guidelines emphasise that Mem-
ber States and the social partners must
increase efforts to boost the level of
employment - particularly by pursuing
active employment policies that help
people into work and provide incen-
tives for them to remain there, devel-
oping active ageing policies to dis-
courage people from leaving the
workforce too early, and modernising
social protection systems so that they
continue to offer the security needed
to help people embrace change.
Increasing the labour market partici-
pation of older workers is one of the
underlying requirements for achieving
the employment rate targets set by the
Lisbon and Stockholm European
Councils of 2000 and 2001 respective-
ly. Moreover, the Open Method of
Coordination in the field of pensions
that was launched by the Laeken
European Council in December 2001
also identifies the promotion of active
ageing as a priority for action, partic-
ularly through its 5th common objec-
tive of extending working lives. 
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Chart 135 – Inactivity rates of the working age population (aged 15-64) by Member State, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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Many people are inactive due to a
lack of relevant skills (because their
existing skills have atrophied or
because they did not have them in the
first place) or a lack of the necessary
incentives or support to enter or re-
enter the labour market. In particular,
many are likely to be inactive due to
sickness or disability, because they
have to take care of children, elderly
or sick relatives, because the wages
are too low to make work worthwhile,
or simply because they do not under-
stand what to do to find work.
Improving participation in the labour
force therefore requires the EU to
tackle in particular those barriers to
labour market participation experi-
enced by disadvantaged people such
as the low-skilled and people with
disabilities.
4. The size and
characteristics of the
inactive population in
the EU in 2004
International comparison of activity
rates for the working age population in
2004 reveals that the EU rate of 69.7%
is below that of many other similarly
advanced economies (Chart 134). In
particular, activity rates in Canada and
the USA are more that 5 percentage
points higher, while within Europe the
rate for Switzerland is around 11 per-
centage points higher.
These figures suggest an underutilisa-
tion of the EU labour force potential,
and inactivity remains high in most
Member States (Chart 135). In 2004
the inactive population of working age
(15-64) in the EU-25 amounted to
some 92 million people, corresponding
to an average inactivity rate (the mirror
image of activity rates) of 30.3%. The
inactivity rate varied quite markedly
between Member States, ranging from
a low of 19.9% in Denmark to a high of
39.5% in Hungary and 41.7% Malta.
4.1. Inactivity by gender
For all Member States the inactivity
rate is higher for women than for men,
the disparity averaging around 16 per-
centage points for the EU-25 as a
whole, although the difference is rela-
tively small (less than 5 percentage
points) in Finland and Sweden
(Chart 136). This compares with gaps
in the order of 25 percentage points in
Greece, Italy and Spain, and as high as
44 percentage points in Malta.
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Chart 136 – Inactivity rates of the working age population (aged 15-64) by gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
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4.2. Inactivity by age
As would be expected, inactivity rates
are much higher for the youth (aged
15-24) and older persons (aged 55-
64) compared to the population of
prime working age (25-54), (Chart
137). In the case of young people, this
is primarily due to their participation
in education or training and can there-
fore be considered a positive alterna-
tive to labour market activity (in
effect postponing their labour market
entry). The different incidence of
inactivity for each age group is
reflected in the underlying structure
of the inactive population, with some
34% of the total inactive population
of working age being accounted for
by those in the age group 15-24, and
32% by those aged 55-64. As a simple
guide, the inactive population aged
15-64 is distributed evenly with one
third in each of the three main seg-
ments - youth, prime age and older
people (Chart 138)4.
However, among Member States there
are some quite marked deviations
from the average EU-25 age distribu-
tion of the inactive population. In par-
ticular, inactivity in the youth age
group (aged 15-24) accounts for a
much larger share (over 40%) of the
total inactive population in CZ, EE,
CY, LV, PL, SK and SE, and over 50%
in LT (Table 63). In contrast, com-
pared to the EU average the inactive
population is more concentrated in
the older age group (55-64) in DE, FI,
SI and especially in AT and NL. This
suggests the need for a different
emphasis in policies targeting the dif-
ferent age groups in each Member
State concerned.
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Chart 137 – Inactivity rates in the EU-25 by age group, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 138 – Structure of the EU-25 inactive population aged 15-64 
by age group, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
4 For a more in-depth analysis of the labour market situation of the young and older people, see chapter 1. Chapter 5 (‘Labour market trends and
characteristics of older workers’) of the 2003 Employment in Europe report contains a detailed analysis of the labour market situation of older
workers. The policy implications are also stressed in COM (2004) 146 final ‘Increasing the employment of older workers and delaying the exit
from the labour market’. 
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Comparing gender gaps across age
groups (Chart 139), the main differ-
ence in inactivity rates occurs for the
older age group (a 21 percentage point
gap between men and women), while
for the prime age group it is generally
around 16-17 percentage points on
average and for the youth age group
only 7 percentage points. Despite the
large gaps still existing in 2004, much
progress has been made to reduce the
differences in inactivity rates between
men and women in recent years. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that there is still
much scope for reducing overall inac-
tivity by implementation of measures
targeting the female inactive popula-
tion aged 25 and over. 
In the EU-25, inactivity rates tend not
to differ substantially between nation-
als and non-nationals, the difference
being only around 3 percentage points
in 2004 (Chart 140). However, the
picture changes slightly if we disag-
gregate non-nationals as to whether or
not they come from another Member
State5. Whereas the inactivity rate of
other Member States’ nationals tends
to be lower by half a percentage point
as opposed to that of nationals, the
inactivity rate of non-EU-15 nationals
is actually substantially higher – by
approximately 7 percentage points.
Also, the gender gap in inactivity
rates is much higher for non-EU-15
nationals where it corresponds to
approximately 26 percentage points
as opposed to 14 for nationals in the
EU-15. 
4.3. Inactivity by skill level
For all Member States inactivity rates
are much higher among the low-
skilled population than among both
the medium- and high-skilled
(Table 64). At EU level the inactivity
Table 63 – Structure of inactive population by age group in 2004 
(% of total inactive population in age group)
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
EU-25 33.6 11.0 10.4 13.4 31.6
EU-15 31.8 11.4 11.4 13.2 32.3
BE 35.0 6.9 10.0 15.3 32.7
CZ 41.3 14.0 4.6 6.9 33.2
DK 27.9 13.9 11.6 13.0 33.6
DE 31.9 11.0 10.4 10.9 35.8
EE 47.4 11.9 6.9 8.6 25.2
EL 33.6 10.4 10.6 15.8 29.6
ES 32.2 12.0 13.4 15.9 26.5
FR 39.5 9.2 8.4 10.8 32.2
IE 37.9 11.9 13.8 14.5 21.8
IT 26.8 13.0 12.2 14.6 33.4
CY 40.9 9.2 10.7 13.5 25.7
LV 46.0 9.7 8.0 9.8 26.4
LT 54.0 8.6 6.6 7.2 23.6
LU 35.5 8.0 12.7 13.8 29.9
HU 34.7 13.0 8.2 14.2 29.9
MT 20.2 12.5 18.6 23.5 25.1
NL 21.1 9.8 13.4 16.0 39.7
AT 25.5 9.6 10.4 11.8 42.6
PL 41.1 7.9 6.0 17.7 27.3
PT 39.5 10.0 8.9 13.9 27.8
SI 39.8 5.6 5.0 13.5 36.0
SK 47.2 10.0 4.4 8.3 30.1
FI 30.7 11.1 9.9 12.2 36.0
SE 42.6 12.3 9.8 10.7 24.6
UK 29.0 13.5 14.3 13.4 29.9
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
5 However, up to 2004, which is the latest year for which data are available, this can only be done for the EU-15.
 
rate for the low-skilled population
aged 15-64 is 47%, compared to
24.5% for the medium-skilled and
13.1 % for the high-skilled. Inactivity
rates for the low-skilled are especially
high in almost all of the new Member
States in central and eastern Europe.
In particular, the inactivity rate for the
low skilled is over 60% in EE, LT, PL,
HU and CZ and over 70% in SK. 
The majority of the inactive popula-
tion tends, on average, to consist prin-
cipally of low-skilled people. For the
EU-25 as a whole, the low-skilled
(those with lower secondary educa-
tion and below) account for some
53% of the inactive population aged
15-64. However, it is also the case that
there are substantial shares of medi-
um-skilled (upper secondary com-
pleted) and high-skilled (tertiary edu-
cation completed), accounting for
around 39% and 8% respectively.
There is also a very wide variation in
the skill structure of the inactive pop-
ulation between Member States
(Chart 141). In general, those located
in the southern part of the EU tend to
have inactive populations composed
of relatively high shares (over 55%)
of low-skilled above the EU average,
while for northern and central Euro-
pean Member States the share of low-
skilled is generally much lower. For
LU and the UK, for example, the
share of low-skilled among the total
inactive population is less than one
third. 
Therefore, while the incidence of
inactivity is higher among the low
skilled – and this is true in all Mem-
ber States – the composition of the
inactive population is often charac-
terised by a large share of medium-
skilled individuals. This means that
although the low-skilled are a particu-
larly disadvantaged group and it is
therefore an important target for
active labour market policies, if inac-
tivity is to be reduced substantially, it
is also important to consider the prob-
lems of all skill groups, including the
higher skilled. It suggests that not
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Chart 139 – Inactivity rates for the EU-25 by age group and gender, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 140 – Inactivity rate of the working age population by nationality 
and sex, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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only is it necessary to have an ade-
quate level of skills per se, but it is
equally important that these skills
correspond to the changing require-
ments of the labour market. 
The skill structure of the inactive by
age groupings (Chart 142) indicates
that, apart from the youth age group
(where the share of low skilled is high
because it includes those still in com-
pulsory and further education), the
share of low-skilled increases with
age. Within the working age popula-
tion the age groups 45-54 and 55-64
show large shares (around 53%) of
low skilled compared to 32% and
45% for the age groups 25-34 and 35-
44. This highlights the need to also
address in particular the skill levels
and training needs of the older people
in the inactive working age popula-
tion to enhance their options for par-
ticipation in the labour market6.
The skill structure of the inactive pop-
ulation aged 15-64 is very similar for
both men and women, with 53% con-
sisting of low-skilled individuals,
39% medium-skilled and 8% high-
skilled. However, if we exclude the
15-24 age group (Chart 143), the
share of low-skilled women in the
female inactive population is 7 per-
centage points higher than for men. 
Table 64 – Inactivity rates by skill level, 2004 (row percentages)
Low Medium High
EU-25 47.0 24.5 13.1
EU-15 44.3 23.7 13.0
BE 53.5 29.7 13.7
CZ 69.2 22.9 12.6
DK 35.9 17.3 10.1
DE 50.5 23.2 12.7
EE 63.3 23.8 16.1
EL 45.3 30.7 11.8
ES 37.9 30.1 13.7
FR 45.5 23.8 16.6
IE 48.2 26.1 13.1
IT 48.7 27.9 14.0
CY 43.8 23.0 9.2
LV 59.1 23.7 13.2
LT 67.3 24.2 9.8
LU 48.5 36.5 16.2
HU 68.8 30.5 16.0
MT 48.5 30.5 13.5
NL 36.8 18.6 11.9
AT 50.2 24.9 16.0
PL 67.4 29.4 13.4
PT 28.7 33.1 8.7
SI 54.1 24.7 10.7
SK 71.1 20.3 12.6
FI 42.1 20.2 11.2
SE 39.1 16.2 11.2
UK 44.7 19.8 10.6
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Notes: Low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary), high (ISCED
5-6: tertiary).
6 However, it should be remembered that the classification used here is based on the highest qualification obtained since this is the only measure
of skills available in the LFS. It does not take account of skills acquired, for example, through work experience. Therefore, the skill level of older
people is likely to be underestimated by the measurement used. 
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Chart 141 – Skill structure of the inactive population aged 15-64, 2004
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Note: Low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary).
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Note: Low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary), high (ISCED 5-6: tertiary).
Chart 142 – Skill structure of the inactive population aged 15-64 in the EU-25 by age group, 2004
 
Employment in Europe 2005
220
0%
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
Women Men Tota l
High
Medium
Low
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary).
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Chart 143 – Skill structure of the inactive population aged 25-64 in the EU-25 by gender, 2004
In preparation for the 2003 European Year
of People with Disabilities, an ad hoc
module on the employment situation of
disabled people was carried out during the
Spring 2002 round of the Labour Force
survey7. In relation to the overall preva-
lence of long-standing health problems or
disabilities in Europe, the key results of
the survey can be summarised as follows8: 
• Of those persons aged between 16 and
64, 44.6 million – i.e. one in six
(15.7%) – stated that they had a long-
standing health problem or disability
(LSHPD).
• Overall there is little difference in the
prevalence of disability among males
and females, while the prevalence
rates of LSHPD strongly increase with
age. They are higher among those with
lower education, among the widowed,
divorced and the inactive.
• The percentage of the working-age
population with LSHPD varies widely
among countries, with the highest per-
centage (32.2%) found in Finland and
the lowest in Romania (5.8%). This
wide-ranging spectrum might also
reflect differences in how respondents
perceived the question. Although
utmost attention was paid to transla-
tion of the questions, the replies could
have been mediated by cultural traits.
Concerning more specifically the employ-
ment situation of people with LSHPD,
labour force participation is indeed much
lower for the disabled: 78% of the severe-
ly disabled aged 16-64 are outside of the
labour force as compared to 27% for those
without LSHPD. And even among those
in the labour force, the unemployment
rate is nearly twice as high among the
severely disabled as compared to the non-
disabled. Only 16% of those who face
work restrictions are provided with some
assistance to work, with wide variations
between countries. 43.7% of non-working
persons with LSHDP and facing work
restrictions consider that they would need
some form of assistance to work. Howev-
er, this percentage also varies widely
among countries. The major type of assis-
tance needed to work also relates to the
kind of work performed.
BOX 15 – Labour market disadvantage and inactivity: the disabled
7 The following key results are taken from Dupré D. and A. Karjalainen, 2003, ‘Employment of disabled people in Europe in 2002’, in Statistics
in Focus, theme 3 – 26/2003, Eurostat. 
8 See the data annex for a comprehensive table of the characteristics of disabled people and their labour market status. 
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5. The evolution of the
inactive population in
the EU
5.1. General long-term trend
Looking at developments in the inac-
tive population over time, and focus-
ing on the EU129 (for which longer
time series are available), there has
generally been a gradual long-term
decline in the share of the inactive in
the working age population since the
mid-1980s, although progress halted
temporarily in the early 1990s before
picking up again from 1995 onwards
(Chart 144).
For those Member States where data
are available (basically the EU-12),
the longer-term developments from
the mid-80s onwards show mixed
trends (Chart 145). In particular,
inactivity rates decreased more
sharply in the NL, where they fell
from 41.4% in 1983 to 23.4% (a
decrease of over 43%) and in ES,
from 44.1% in 1986 to 31.8% in
2004 (a decrease of 39%). In FR
inactivity rates were broadly con-
stant over the period, with a slow
increase in the late 1980s from
31.6% in 1983 to 33.3% in 1991, fol-
lowed by a slow decrease afterwards
to 30.8% in 2004. Similarly, in DK
the inactivity rate remained broadly
unaltered over the period, oscillating
between around 18% and 21%. 
In the remaining Member States
there was a moderate decrease
between the first half of the 1980s
and 2004, with different trajectories
in between. In the UK, inactivity
noticeably decreased in the second
half of the 1980s, from 29.1% in
1983 to 23.5% in 1990 and slowly
increased afterwards to 25.1% in
2004. In DE, too, inactivity
decreased markedly from 35.9% in
1983 to 28.3% in 1991 and it
remained broadly constant after-
wards, reaching 27.9% in 2003. In IT
and PT inactivity peaked in 1995
when it reached 42.4% and 32.6%
respectively and then it slowly
declined in the remaining period. In
BE and EL inactivity peaked earlier,
in 1988 and 1987 respectively, and
then declined afterwards, apart from
a small increase in 2001. In IE inac-
tivity rates remained between 37%
and 40% for the period up to 1997
and then decreased substantially to
31.3% in 2004. Finally, in LU inac-
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Chart 144 – Inactive working age population as share of total working age population (aged 15-64)
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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9 The EU-12 includes BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT and the UK. 
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Chart 145 – Inactive population as share of the working age population (aged 15-64)
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tivity went from 39.4% in 1983 to
34.9 in 2003, with two peaks in 1988
and 1995.
5.2. Reasons behind the trends
The decline in the inactive popula-
tion in the EU-25 over recent years
appears to have been driven by two
main trends (Chart 146): the entry
into the labour market or delayed exit
of increasing numbers of women
aged over 25 and of older people
(aged 55-64) of both sexes. In con-
trast, men of prime working age have
shown signs of a limited withdrawal
from the labour market, while youth
of both sexes have seen a more sig-
nificant change, with inactivity rates
rising by around 1.5 percentage
points in the period 2000 to 2004.
This development in the EU-25 over
the last four years is broadly similar
to the longer-term changes in the
EU-15 observed since the mid-1990s
(Chart 147). The same patterns in
trends are apparent for the EU-15,
but with an even stronger effect from
the entry of women aged 45-54 into
the labour market and a reduced neg-
ative effect for youth.
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Chart 146 – Change in inactivity rates for the EU-25 by age group and gender
between 2000 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 147 – Change in inactivity rates for the EU-15 by age group and gender
between 1995 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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6. Length of inactivity
and previous work
experience
Policies aimed at encouraging activity
among those currently out of the
labour force need to take into account
the reasons why people are inactive
and for how long they have been out.
6.1. Periods of inactivity
Examining the period of inactivity
first, an important consideration
emerging from the data is that over
40% of the inactive population of
working age (15-64 year old) have
never been in employment (Table 65).
A further 23% have been without a
job for the previous 8 years, and only
around 15% of the inactive popula-
tion were without a job for less than 2
years. There are of course significant
differences between Member States.
The percentage of the inactive popu-
lation with no previous work experi-
ence ranges from very low figures in
FI, DK and the NL (18.6%, 22.8%
and 22.9% respectively) to very high
values of over 50% in EL, LT, CY and
ES. FI, DK and the NL, together with
SE and AT, are also the Member
States with the highest proportion of
inactive people who have had some
work experience in the previous two
years (over 17%). On the other hand,
LT, EL, HU, SI and SK have less than
9% of the inactive workforce with
some recent work experience. 
Chart 148 shows the differences in
inactivity by gender and age. The per-
centages of inactive men and women
in the EU-25 with no work experience
are similar, with a slightly higher pro-
portion for men than for women (45%
and 42% respectively). However, for
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: * Data for IE and SE to be interpreted with caution due to high non-response rate. 
Table 65 – Time since inactive people last worked 
by country – 2004 (row percentages)
worked 0 to worked 2 to worked 8+ yrs No work 
2 yrs before 8 yrs before before experience
EU-25 14.5 19.5 23.1 42.9
EU-15 15.3 19.1 23.1 42.5
BE 12.0 17.3 26.8 43.9
CZ 15.6 25.6 15.3 43.5
DK 29.1 25.4 22.6 22.8
DE 14.0 21.9 23.5 40.6
EE 16.0 22.8 15.4 45.7
EL 7.5 12.5 12.0 68.1
ES 16.1 12.9 18.9 52.1
FR 14.7 21.6 18.1 45.5
IE* 14.1 19.7 27.4 38.8
IT 13.2 14.8 25.3 46.6
CY 11.7 14.5 18.5 55.3
LV 14.0 15.2 25.7 45.1
LT 7.3 17.7 17.5 57.4
LU 9.7 18.3 28.1 43.8
HU 7.8 21.4 30.4 40.4
MT 9.5 14.9 37.9 37.6
NL 17.0 22.6 37.6 22.9
AT 18.4 24.7 27.1 29.8
PL 11.5 20.6 24.1 43.9
PT 13.3 18.6 20.1 48.1
SI 8.3 20.5 25.0 46.2
SK 9.0 22.1 19.3 49.6
FI 37.3 25.3 18.7 18.6
SE* 49.3 12.7 4.6 33.4
UK 16.8 23.7 28.9 30.6
those with previous work experience,
the length of inactivity is longer for
women than for men, with 46% of
women not having worked for more
than 8 years as opposed to 30% of
men. This may reflect the withdrawal
of women from the labour market to
have and look after children following
a period of working. The percentage
of individuals with no work experi-
ence decreases with age, with only
just over 1% of inactive men – and
17% of women - aged 55-64 without
any work experience. However, for
those affected, the length of inactivity
increases with age, with 54% of
women and 33% of men having
stopped working more than 8 years
before the survey. In other words,
while for younger cohorts the main
problem is acquiring skills and work
experience in the labour market, for
older cohorts a key issue is likely to
be coping with skills obsolescence. 
6.2. Reasons for leaving
previous employment
The length of inactivity also depends
on the reason why the individuals left
their last job (Chart 149). People
made redundant are more likely to
stay out of the labour market for
longer than those in temporary
employment whose job came to an
end. In particular, 57% of the inactive
that were dismissed are out of the
labour force for more than 2 years, as
opposed to 30% for those whose job
ended. The time spent without work is
highest for those that left their last job
due to illness or disability and for
those who retired, with respectively
73% and 66% being without work for
more than 2 years. Considering those
who stopped working due to personal
or family responsibility, the highest
proportion of them (35%) has been
without work for 2 to 5 years. Finally,
35% of the inactive that stopped
working to undertake education or
training have been without a job for a
period of between 6 to 11 months. 
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Chart 148 – Length of inactivity by gender and age in the EU-25, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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7. Why people are
inactive
Inactive people are essentially those
that are neither employed nor unem-
ployed. As already indicated, follow-
ing the standard ILO definition, the
employed are those that have worked
at least one hour in the week before
the survey and the unemployed are
those that are not working, are active-
ly seeking employment, and are will-
ing and available to work. One small
caveat relates to those that are not
seeking employment because they
have already found a job which starts
at some later point: only those that are
starting their new jobs in more than 3
months’ time are classified as inac-
tive. 
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Chart 150 – Reasons for inactivity for the working age population (15-64) 
in the EU-25
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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7.1. Main reasons for current
inactivity
The main reason for inactivity among
the working age population is educa-
tion and training (Chart 150), corre-
sponding to 32.5% of the inactive
population and with a much higher
incidence for men than for women
(42% and 27% respectively). Howev-
er, if the younger age group (15-24)
are excluded, the percentage of the
inactive population in education or
training falls dramatically to just
4.7%. The second most important rea-
son for inactivity is retirement, at
around 20% of the inactive popula-
tion, while family or personal respon-
sibilities comes third at approximate-
ly 16%. However, if the gender break-
down is examined, the picture is very
different, with family responsibilities
rather more important than retirement
for women (25% compared to 17%
respectively), while the opposite is
true for men, with a very low percent-
age inactive for family or personal
responsibilities (1.5%). 
The incidence of illness or disability
in the inactive population varies
between 18% for men and 11% for
women. Finally, around 4.5% of the
inactive population are not looking
for work because they believe that
there is none available, a group that
will be referred to as ‘discouraged’
workers. 
7.2. Changes in reasons for
inactivity
In the 10-year period from 1995 to
2004, the reasons for inactivity have
changed markedly in the EU-15
(Chart 151). In particular, the percent-
age of people that have dropped out of
the labour market because they
‘believe that no work is available’
went up by just over 3 percentage
points, with only a minor difference
between men and women. Illness or
disability as a cause of inactivity has
increased by 1 percentage point,
while family or personal responsibili-
ties has decreased dramatically, espe-
cially for women, where it went down
by almost 13 percentage points. This
may be due to better public care facil-
ities, higher income so that people
can afford private care facilities, more
extensive maternity leave, lower fer-
tility rate or changes in social or cul-
tural norms that affect the way people
answer the relevant survey question.
Correspondingly, the proportion of
women who retired or left the labour
force to undertake education or train-
ing went up by 4 and 2 percentage
points respectively, with minor
changes for men (+ 0.2% and – 0.6%
respectively). 
7.3. Changes in inactivity 
with age
The reasons why people are inactive
clearly change with age (Chart 152).
Perhaps predictably, the main reason
why individuals aged 15-24 are inac-
tive is education and training, which
amounts to 86% of the inactive popu-
lation in this age bracket. More inter-
estingly, this percentage drops signifi-
cantly to around 23% for those aged
25-34 and then to below 4% for those
aged 35+. This means that very few
prime age workers leave the labour
market to pursue further education or
training. The percentage of discour-
aged workers more than doubles with
age, from just over 3.5% for those
aged 15-24 to almost 8% for those
aged 45-54. The same is true for ‘ill-
ness and disability’, which rises from
just below 2% for individuals in the
15-24 age bracket to more than 32%
for those aged 45-54. ‘Family respon-
sibilities’ is the main reason for inac-
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Chart 151 – Change in reasons for inactivity in the EU-15 between 1995 and
2004 for the working age population (15-64)
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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tivity among individuals aged 25-44,
while retirement accounts for 58% of
the inactive population aged 55-64.
The very high proportion of retired
people in this latter category also
explains why the incidence of other
reasons, including disability and lack
of prospects, declines after 55 as early
retirement schemes are partly taken up
by disabled or discouraged individu-
als. 
7.4. Changes in inactivity
reasons by skill level
It is also possible to notice specific
patterns when looking at the reasons
why people are inactive by skill levels
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Chart 152 – Reason for inactivity by age in the EU-25, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Chart 153 – Reason for inactivity by educational qualifications for the working age population (15-64), 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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(Chart 153). In particular, the percent-
age of discouraged workers in the
inactive population decreases with the
level of qualifications, from 6% for
the low-skilled to just over 3% for the
high-skilled. If the 15-24 age group
are excluded, education and training
as a reason increases with skill levels
– for example, over 13% of the better
qualified inactive are in education or
training, against below 1% for the low
qualified. Illness and disability is
inversely correlated with skills, with
20% of the low-skilled inactive being
ill or disabled, against just over 11%
of the highly qualified. Finally, retire-
ment is a more important explanation
for inactivity among the highly quali-
fied inactive; almost 36% of them are
retired, against 28% among the low-
skilled. 
7.5. Differences between
Member States
Table 66 presents an overview of the
reasons why people are inactive by
Member State. The percentage of
inactive people that do not look for
work because they believe that no
work is available is relatively high in
EE, LV, IT and HU, where it is above
5%. By contrast, it is relatively low
(below 0.5%) in LU, PT, SE, the UK,
MT and CY. The percentage of ill and
disabled people is particularly high in
SE, DK, the UK, FI and the NL where
it is above 27%, reaching 36.5% in
SE; it is lowest in EL, AT, IT, MT, SI
and LU. However, definitions of ill-
ness and disability vary between
Member States and are a function of
institutional factors such as access to
and levels of support. Family or per-
sonal responsibilities are a relatively
important cause of inactivity – over
25% - in MT, CY, LU, the UK and EL.
This may reflect cultural and social
norms or the availability of affordable
care facilities for children, the dis-
abled and elderly people. The propor-
tion of retired people of working age
is more than a quarter in SI, AT, HU,
DE, CZ and SK; this is linked to
demographic and institutional factors,
such as the availability of early retire-
ment schemes. 
Education and training as the reason
for inactivity affects more than 40% of
the inactive population in LT, SE, SK,
EE, SI and LV. However, if the 15-24
age group are excluded, the percentage
of those aged 25-64 who are inactive
because of education or training drops
to less than 5% in the EU-25. Only in
DK, at 18.4%, and SE, at 15.8%, does
this percentage rise above 10%. The
situation in some of the new Member
States may be a cause for particular
concern, since the percentage of indi-
viduals within the 25-64 age group
who are inactive because of education
and training is only around 1%. 
In order to assess the numerical
importance of the various reasons for
inactivity in an EU context, Table 67
reports the numbers of inactive people
in each Member State by reason for
inactivity10. Of the 3.9 million inactive
people who are not looking for work
because they think that there is none
available, almost a million are in Italy
and a further half a million in Poland.
Two Member States account for
around 40% of the inactive population
due to illness or disability, with 2.5
million in the UK and 2 million in
Poland. Given the large working age
population in DE and the high inactiv-
ity rate in IT, these two Member States
account for the largest groups of inac-
tive people in absolute terms, corre-
sponding to just over 15 and 14 mil-
lion respectively, and to the highest
number of inactive people in the ‘ill-
ness and disability’, ‘retirement’ and
‘education or training’ categories. 
8. Labour market
transitions and inactivity
8.1. Flows into and out of
inactivity
The long-term decline in inactivity
rates since the 1980s is accompanied at
any point over that period by relatively
large flows into and out of inactivity.
Increasing labour force participation
and the mobilisation of labour
resources to deal with the demograph-
ic challenge means both a reduction in
the flows into inactivity and an
increase in the outflows. Furthermore,
while for the young the key challenge
is to facilitate entry into the labour
market, for older generations it is
important to delay their exit from the
labour market.
Table 68 shows that between 2003 and
2004 around 9.5% of the inactive popu-
lation moved into employment, while a
further 4.2% entered the labour force
either by becoming an active job seeker
or by becoming immediately available
for work - or both. At the same time, 3%
of the employed and 21.6% of the
unemployed left the labour force. It is
interesting to note that while employed
people tend to withdraw from the
labour market for several different rea-
sons (with only a slightly higher per-
centage for those who retire or have
personal or family responsibilities) the
main reason why the unemployed leave
the labour market is because they stop
searching for a job because they believe
there is none available. 
10 The percentage values reported in Table 66 depend on the proportion of inactive people and the total size of the working age population. 
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discouraged illness/disab. fam. respons. retirement educ. or training other
EU-25 4.5 13.2 16.1 20.5 32.5 13.2
EU-15 4.6 12.0 16.9 20.4 31.0 15.1
CZ 0.6 14.7 15.3 27.2 39.9 2.3
DK (0.9) 29.5 6.5 20.3 38.3 4.5
DE 0.9 8.3 19.1 27.4 32.3 12.0
EE 7.2 14.7 15.1 17.4 43.0 (2.5)
EL 0.5 5.2 24.0 17.1 32.7 20.4
ES 1.6 10.4 19.3 7.6 31.7 29.4
IT 6.8 7.1 17.2 17.3 27.2 24.5
CY (0.4) 11.5 42.1 6.5 38.5 1.1
LV 7.0 13.5 15.9 18.9 41.0 3.7
LT 3.4 16.7 9.1 15.4 52.1 3.4
LU (0.0) 7.9 39.5 14.5 36.9 1.2
HU 5.3 13.4 11.4 29.4 32.3 8.3
MT (0.4) 7.3 58.1 13.0 17.8 3.4
NL 3.5 27.5 16.2 21.8 21.0 10.0
AT 0.7 6.4 17.6 38.4 26.2 10.8
PL 4.8 21.9 12.4 16.4 38.0 6.5
PT (0.0) 11.2 18.8 19.3 39.5 11.2
SI (1.6) 7.6 5.0 41.5 41.7 2.7
SK 0.5 14.8 12.3 26.1 44.0 2.2
FI 4.3 28.0 12.1 15.1 27.4 13.1
SE (0.3) 36.5 10.9 5.3 45.6 1.4
UK 0.4 28.4 27.3 15.8 19.5 8.6
Table 66 – Reason for inactivity by country for the working age population (15-64), 2004 
(row percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Data for BE, FR and IE not available. Percentages of valid answers. Data in brackets not fully reliable due to small sample size.
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Table 67 – Reason for inactivity by country in thousands for the working age population (15-64), 2004
discour. illness/ disab. fam. respons. retirement edu. or training other Total
EU-25 3 920 11 592 14 099 17 942 28 465 16 195 92 213
EU-15 3 217 8 386 11 818 14 252 21 692 15 195 74 559
CZ 13 319 331 589 865 60 2 177
DK (6) 207 46 142 269 35 704
DE 139 1 258 2 907 4 161 4 907 18 48 15 221
EE 20 40 41 47 117 (7) 272
EL 13 123 567 405 771 506 2 384
ES 147 955 1 777 694 2 917 350 9 190
IT 971 1 001 2 437 2 459 3 854 3 545 14 269
CY (0) 15 54 8 49 2 129
LV 34 66 78 92 200 18 489
LT 24 117 64 108 366 29 708
LU 0 8 42 15 39 2 107
HU 144 364 310 800 878 226 2 721
MT 0 8 65 15 20 5 113
NL 83 660 388 524 505 399 2 560
AT 12 103 285 622 424 175 1 622
PL 454 2 076 1 177 1 555 3 599 616 9 477
PT (0) 211 352 363 741 255 1 921
SI (7) 32 21 175 176 12 423
SK 6 169 141 299 504 26 1 145
FI 36 230 99 124 226 108 823
SE (4) 446 133 65 556 102 1 305
UK 36 2 492 2 399 1 383 1 707 1 583 9 600
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Data for BE, IE and FR not available. Data in brackets not fully reliable due to small sample size.
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However, the picture changes if differ-
ent age groups are examined. In partic-
ular, inactive people aged 55-64 are the
least likely to move into employment
(only 2.2% do so) and when they leave
the labour market, it is mainly due to
retirement (54%) or illness or disabili-
ty (15.7%). Similarly, unemployed
older workers are also less likely to
find a job (12.1% against 38.2% and
30.2% for young and prime age unem-
ployed people respectively), and are
more than twice as likely as the other
age groups to drop out of the labour
force altogether, mainly ceasing to
look for a job in the belief that they
cannot find one (11.7%). Personal or
family responsibility tends to be the
main reason why prime age workers
move out – or are out – of the labour
force, while for younger people it is
education or training. It is also worth
noting that young workers aged 15-24
are more than twice as likely as prime
age workers to lose their job and
become unemployed. 
8.2. Movements into and out of
inactivity by Member States
The situation by Member State is
shown in Table 69. Between 2003 and
2004, 30% of the unemployed in the
EU-25 found a job, with percentages
of over 40% in DK, PT and ES and
over 50% in the UK, LU and CY. On
the other hand, Member States where
it was comparatively more difficult to
find work include MT, PL, SE, DE, SI
and BE, where only 19% of unem-
ployed people found a job. Around
22% of the unemployed dropped out
of the labour force and became inac-
tive in the EU-25, but this figure
exceeds 40% in HU, SI and BE, where
almost one in two unemployed people
leave the labour market. 
Table 68 – Transitions by economic status and reasons for inactivity in the EU-25 between 2003 and
2004 (row percentages)
20
03
Employed Unempl. Inactive
discour. ill/dis- fam. retired edu. or other/no Total 
abled respons. training reason Inactive
2004
Total
Employed 94.1 2.9 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.8 3.0
Unemployed 29.9 48.5 5.6 3.1 3.5 1.0 1.6 6.9 21.6
Inactive 9.5 4.2 3.3 10.9 14.9 16.9 28.4 11.9 86.3
15-24
Employed 89.1 6.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.0 2.0 1.2 4.8
Unemployed 38.2 44.1 3.9 0.9 3.0 0.0 3.5 6.5 17.7
Inactive 12.5 5.3 3.0 1.2 2.8 0.1 69.6 5.6 82.3
25-54
Employed 95.3 2.7 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.7 2.0
Unemployed 30.2 49.8 5.1 3.1 3.9 0.1 1.2 6.4 20.0
Inactive 12.4 5.8 4.3 17.4 33.2 4.5 7.2 15.3 81.8
55-64
Employed 89.9 1.8 0.2 1.0 0.2 5.6 0.0 1.3 8.3
Unemployed 12.1 47.1 11.7 7.2 1.7 8.6 0.1 11.4 40.8
Inactive 2.2 0.7 2.7 15.7 8.6 54.0 0.1 16.0 97.1
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Table 69 – Transitions by economic status and by country between 2003 and 2004 in the EU-25 (cell
percentages)
2003 2004 EU-25 EU-15 BE CZ DK DE EE EL
Employed Employed 94 94 95 93 95 94 94 96
Unemployed 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2
Inactive 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 2
Unemployed Employed 30 32 19 37 40 22 33 27
Unemployed 48 45 33 50 28 61 57 64
Inactive 22 23 48 13 31 17 10 9
Inactive Employed 10 10 7 11 27 11 7 3
Unemployed 4 4 4 4 6 3 5 4
Inactive 86 86 89 85 67 86 88 93
2003 2004 ES IT CY LV LT LU HU MT
Employed Employed 92 96 95 93 95 95 94 97
Unemployed 4 2 2 4 3 2 2 1
Inactive 4 3 3 4 2 3 4 2
Unemployed Employed 45 29 54 33 31 51 34 23
Unemployed 41 34 29 42 56 41 26 60
Inactive 14 36 17 25 14 8 40 17
Inactive Employed 8 6 12 10 7 5 6 3
Unemployed 4 3 3 4 5 3 2 3
Inactive 88 91 85 85 88 92 92 94
2003 2004 AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Employed Employed 93 92 95 96 90 93 95 95
Unemployed 3 4 3 2 6 3 3 2
Inactive 5 4 2 2 4 4 3 3
Unemployed Employed 35 22 41 21 25 27 22 50
Unemployed 31 61 46 34 67 38 50 33
Inactive 34 17 13 45 8 36 29 16
Inactive Employed 18 6 7 10 7 23 13 16
Unemployed 3 7 2 2 6 12 12 4
Inactive 80 88 91 88 87 65 75 80
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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9. Inactivity and human
capital
High labour market participation is an
essential requirement to underpin eco-
nomic growth and foster social inclu-
sion. Individuals who are not working
may see their skills become obsolete,
thereby reducing their future employa-
bility and making it more difficult for
them to reintegrate in the labour mar-
ket. This, of course, is not necessarily
true of all inactive individuals as some
people may delay their entrance into
or leave the labour market precisely to
improve their skills and enhance their
long-term employability (through
education and training). Others, who
end up without a job, may decide to
undertake education or training, either
to avoid skills obsolescence or to
become more adaptable to labour mar-
ket needs. 
9.1. Participation in education
and training
Chart 154 shows that around 37% of
the inactive population of working age
received training in the four weeks
preceding the survey – with a relative-
ly higher percentage for men than
women (47% compared to 30%
respectively). The vast majority of
young people aged 15-19 (around
96%) have been in education or train-
ing, and this percentage declines
markedly with age. However, more
than a quarter of inactive men have
participated in education and training
up to their mid-30s, while for women
it drops from 28% to 10% at the age of
30. After 35, less than 10% of inactive
men and women have done any train-
ing at all, and this figure drops to
1.5% for older people. 
General – secondary Vocational – Vocational – Tertiary Other
or lower lower secondary upper secondary
15-19 71.6 2.1 17.3 8.4 0.7
20-24 8.6 0.6 8.3 80.8 1.8
25-29 4.9 1.3 3.9 84.1 5.8
30-34 8.7 6.5 10.0 62.6 12.3
35-44 9.9 9.9 16.7 42.3 21.1
45-54 13.8 13.3 14.3 26.7 31.9
55-64 10.8 11.0 6.4 11.8 60.0
Total 48.7 2.0 13.9 33.0 2.4
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: 2002 data is the last one that includes both general and vocational education and training by level. 
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Chart 154 – Inactive people participating in education or training 
in the EU-25, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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Table 70 – Inactive people undertaking education or training by level in the EU-25, 2002 
(row percentages)
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The education and training undertaken
by inactive people of working age is
mainly of the general type at second-
ary or lower level and at tertiary level,
but this differs for each age group
(Table 70). The former is relatively
more prevalent for the youngest
group, while tertiary education is by
far the most important type for those
in the 20-44 age group, but it remains
the main type of education leading to
a recognised qualification also for
progressively older people up to 55,
albeit at a declining rate. Vocational
education is undertaken by roughly
16% of the inactive population and it
is predominantly at upper secondary
level, except for older workers. 
It is also interesting to note that train-
ing not leading to a formal qualifica-
tion that can be allocated to one of the
ISCED classification increases with
age ranging from 0.7% for those aged
15-19 to 60% for those aged 55-64.
This category includes language
courses, computer courses, seminars
and the like. Although it is not possi-
ble to say a priori whether these
courses are of a lesser quality, the fact
that they do not lead to a standard
qualification may pose problems in
terms of their recognition by potential
employers11. 
9.2. Trends in participation in
education and training among
inactive people
Between 1995 and 2004, the percent-
age of inactive people participating in
education or training in the four weeks
prior to the survey increased by an
average 20 percentage points for the
whole EU-15 inactive population12
(Chart 155). However, increases were
particularly marked for the under 30s,
for whom this proportion increased by
13, 40 and 29 percentage points
respectively for the three age groups
15-19, 20-24 and 25-29. The increase
in participation in education or train-
ing also occurred for older people, but
at a decreasing rate, being less than 1
percentage point for those aged 45-64. 
There are also significant gender dif-
ferences in the changes in participa-
tion in education or training, with
much bigger increases for men than
for women. In particular, the increase
was 30 percentage points for men but
only 13 for women. The difference
between increases in male and female
participation in education or training
was particularly large for the 25-29
and 30-34 age groups, where it
reached 34 and 20 points respectively. 
10. Inactivity and
proximity to the labour
market 
As mentioned earlier, the convention-
al definition of unemployment is
rather restrictive. Between the situa-
tion where individuals fulfil all of the
unemployed criteria and one where
they fulfil none of them (except, of
course, that they are not working) lies
a ‘grey’ area that from a statistical
point of view is still classified as inac-
tivity. However, it is not always correct
to classify all of those ‘inactive’ as
also ‘out of the labour force’, in the
sense that they have severed all links
with the labour market, since they still
have varying degrees of attachment to
the labour market. For example, it
could be the case that although indi-
viduals are not able to start working
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Chart 155 – Inactive people participating in education or training in the EU-15
between 1995 and 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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11 For a discussion on the role of human capital in labour market transitions, see Employment in Europe 2004, chapter 4 (‘Labour market transi-
tions and advancement: temporary employment and low pay in Europe’). 
12 The figures presented in the following two paragraphs have to be interpreted with great caution due to the very high no-response rate in 1995,
which amounted to approximately 40%. 
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within the two week rule of the survey
definition, they nevertheless under-
took some active steps to look for
work, such as registering at a public
employment office. Alternatively,
although they did not actively look for
work in the previous four weeks (to
the survey), they could in principle be
willing to work, should the opportuni-
ty arise. The analysis that follows tries
to explore these varying degrees of
attachment to the labour market, giv-
Table 71 – Inactive people registered at a Public Employment Office, 2004 (cell percentages)
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Percentages of valid answers; data for IE is not available; ‘.’ figure not publishable due to small sample size; data in brackets not fully reliable
due to small sample size. 
Female Male 15-24 25-54 55-64 Work No work Total
experience experience
EU-25 8.3 8.3 5.0 15.0 4.6 10.7 5.3 8.3
EU-15 8.9 9.3 5.8 15.4 5.2 11.3 6.0 9.0
BE 17.2 26.7 4.0 29.8 30.4 34.1 4.2 21.0
CZ 2.8 3.3 1.1 7.9 1.5 4.5 1.0 3.0
DK 5.6 5.7 . 9.8 4.1 6.8 (2.6) 5.7
DE 2.8 5.6 1.7 7.2 2.8 5.9 0.9 3.9
EE . . . . . . . .
EL 1.8 1.2 0.9 2.7 0.9 2.8 1.0 1.6
ES 8.5 9.3 4.2 14.3 5.8 16.0 2.1 8.5
FR 7.7 7.6 2.6 13.5 8.6 12.7 1.6 7.6
IT 21.8 17.5 22.3 33.2 3.8 19.3 21.6 20.4
CY 2.2 . . 4.9 (1.6) 5.0 . 2.3
LV 4.8 3.7 (1.3) 11.0 (2.7) 7.0 . 4.4
LT (2.5) . . (6.0) . (4.5) . (2.0)
LU . . . . . (0.9) . (0.6)
HU 3.9 5.2 2.0 9.7 1.0 6.8 1.4 4.4
MT . . . . . . . .
NL 11.2 16.4 6.9 22.7 6.6 13.2 12.1 13.0
AT 4.9 13.5 3.9 18.5 3.1 11.2 (1.2) 8.2
PL 8.4 5.0 3.7 15.5 2.2 9.6 3.7 7.0
PT 6.6 6.9 2.9 11.2 6.8 11.7 1.4 6.7
SI 8.9 12.4 (4.5) 28.2 (5.0) 14.9 (5.2) 10.4
SK 3.2 2.7 1.5 8.9 (1.0) 4.1 2.0 3.0
FI 12.1 14.6 5.1 20.8 13.1 16.1 3.3 13.2
SE 7.9 7.7 4.1 15.5 6.4 10.4 5.6 7.8
UK 0.6 2.1 0.8 1.8 0.7 1.3 0.7 12
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13 Brandolini A., P. Cipollone and E. Viviano, 2004, ‘Does the ILO definition capture all unemployment?’, in Temi di discussione del servizio Studi
della Banca d’Italia, number 529, December 2004. 
ing a rough estimate of the inactive
labour force that could be most easily
mobilised to increase overall employ-
ment. It also questions the assumption
that the whole inactivity problem is
linked to supply-side problems. 
10.1. Registrations at public
employment offices
Table 71 looks at the percentages of
the inactive population that are regis-
tered at a public employment office
(PEO). In 2004 more than 8% of the
inactive population in the EU-25 was
registered at a PEO. The percentages
are similar for men and women, but it
tends to be 3 times greater for prime
age people (25-54) as opposed to
younger and older workers. Interest-
ingly, the percentage is twice as high
for people with previous work experi-
ence as for those without, possibly
indicating a higher labour market
attachment for people who have previ-
ous work experience. However, in cer-
tain Member States and for certain cat-
egories of people (such as those on
temporary lay-offs) this might be
linked to the legal requirements for
claiming benefits. This is particularly
the case in BE and FI where 31.5% and
13.5% of inactive people with previous
work experience are registered at a
PEO and claim benefits (as opposed to
2.7% in each Member State who are
registered but do not claim benefits).
However, apart from institutional dif-
ferences and whether the registration
was at an individual’s own initiative or
because of a requirement, registering
at a PEO can provide the opportunity
to become acquainted with labour
market openings and, if appropriate
support is given, can help to motivate
individuals who might otherwise not
consider the work option. 
Registration of inactive individuals at
a PEO varies greatly between Member
States, ranging from less than 1% in
LU, the UK and EL to over 10% in SI,
NL, FI, IT and up to 21% in BE. In the
cases of BE and FI these very high
percentages (21% and 31% respec-
tively) mainly consist of inactive indi-
viduals with previous work experience
who are claiming benefits, while in IT
and the NL (20% and 13% respective-
ly) it mainly involves inactive individ-
uals not claiming benefits and with no
work experience. 
10.2. Estimating the labour
force reserve
It is possible that individuals who are
not working and have not sought
employment in the four weeks preced-
ing the survey might nevertheless be
willing to work. Many people might
consider themselves effectively trapped
on the outside of the labour market
because of barriers – real and perceived
– even though they are willing and able
to work. Overcoming these obstacles to
participation requires addressing the
barriers to employment, facilitating
integration in the labour market and
increasing the rewards of work as com-
pared to inactivity. It also means com-
bining activation policies with effective
economic policies aimed at supporting
a high and sustainable degree of job
creation for those who are willing and
able to work.
The percentage of this ‘labour force
reserve’ in 2004 is estimated at just
over 14% of the inactive population in
the EU-25 (Table 10). Willingness to
work does not appear to differ much
between inactive men and women, but
in terms of age it is highest for prime
age inactive people at just over 23%,
falling to around 6% for those in the
55-64 age group. Those inactive peo-
ple with medium level qualifications
are more willing to work than both the
low and highly qualified ones, and this
level is almost 5 percentages points
higher for people who worked before. 
The differences between Member
States also need to be considered, with
percentages of inactive people willing
to work above 20% in LV (36%), IT
(26%), AT (25%), EE (24%), the UK
(21%) and SI (20%). By contrast,
those inactive are less willing to work
in LU, EL, PT, FR, CY, DE and ES, all
with fewer than 10% in this category. 
Among the different categories of
inactive people, the percentage of
those that are willing to work is high-
est for those currently not looking for
work because they think that there is
no work available, representing 43% of
this category (Chart 156). Over 20% of
those currently inactive because of
personal or family responsibilities are
willing to work, and this percentage is
much higher for men at 32%, than for
women at around 20%. It is also inter-
esting to note that over 17% of those
inactive due to illness or disability are
actually willing to work, with little dif-
ference between men and women.
Almost 12% of those in education or
training are willing to work and this
percentage doubles if we consider
those aged 25-64 only. Finally, and
perhaps not surprisingly, those already
retired are the least willing to work,
with a percentage of less than 3%. 
The fact that the labour market status
of many non-working people is at the
boundary between unemployment and
inactivity is also shown by a recent
study from the Bank of Italy13. The
authors show that many non-working
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Table 72 – Inactive people willing to work in the EU-25, 2004 (cell percentages)
Female Male 15-24 25-54 55-64 Low Medium Highly  no work exp. work exp. Total
qualified qualified qualified
EU-25 14.2 14.2 12.9 23.3 5.7 11.6 18.0 15.7 11.6 16.2 14.2
EU-15 13.8 13.6 12.8 22.6 5.0 11.7 17.2 15.0 11.3 15.6 13.8
CZ 12.0 12.9 10.9 20.3 8.3 9.8 14.3 12.9 10.9 13.5 12.4
DK 18.1 22.4 28.8 30.8 (2.0) 17.2 20.8 23.5 29.6 18.2 19.8
DE 9.6 8.3 7.9 17.1 3.6 7.5 10.6 11.6 7.1 10.5 9.1
EE 21.8 27.8 16.3 38.2 23.7 20.1 26.4 30.5 15.2 31.7 24.3
EL 3.3 2.8 2.8 5.4 0.8 2.1 4.5 4.8 2.6 4.5 3.2
ES 8.9 9.7 8.9 13.2 3.5 7.9 10.3 15.2 5.3 13.2 9.1
FR 5.3 4.8 2.9 12.4 1.4 3.9 6.3 7.5 2.5 7.4 5.1
IE 9.0 13.2 10.6 13.7 3.8 8.7 11.5 15.4 8.6 11.5 10.4
IT 27.2 24.0 32.4 39.1 6.0 21.6 35.5 36.9 27.2 25.2 26.2
CY 10.2 6.2 4.1 17.7 5.6 5.9 12.5 18.1 3.7 15.5 9.0
LV 39.7 30.8 31.1 56.3 24.4 26.9 43.6 51.7 29.3 42.0 36.2
LT 10.2 10.2 8.2 19.8 6.0 5.7 13.5 20.6 7.3 14.2 10.2
LU (1.1) (1.7) . (2.7) . . (1.3) . . (1.8) (1.3)
HU 12.9 16.1 9.7 25.9 5.6 12.8 16.2 10.9 9.2 18.2 14.2
MT 11.9 (11.0) 19.5 13.7 . 10.9 (17.6) . 9.0 13.3 11.7
NL 14.2 18.6 27.6 20.7 5.0 . . . 22.8 13.6 15.7
AT 23.6 28.5 24.4 44.5 12.5 21.0 28.6 30.6 21.1 27.4 25.5
PL 17.5 17.1 14.1 28.6 9.6 10.2 23.0 24.1 14.0 20.0 17.3
PT 5.5 4.3 2.8 10.1 2.3 5.3 3.0 . 1.6 8.3 5.1
SI 19.7 21.5 26.2 28.3 9.0 20.1 20.7 (22.1) 25.4 16.2 20.5
FI 14.9 17.3 24.6 19.1 7.5 16.9 16.4 11.5 22.5 15.4 16.0
UK 19.2 25.4 20.7 28.7 11.9 21.8 25.8 18.9 16.5 22.8 21.3
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Note: Percentages of valid answers; data for SE not available; very high non response rate for BE and SK; ‘.’ data not publishable due to very small
sample size; data in brackets not fully reliable due to small sample.
people do seek and are available for
work, in the same way as those unem-
ployed do; but unlike them, their last
search action was not recent enough to
meet the ILO definition of unemploy-
ment and they are therefore classified
as inactive. Using data from the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel,
they show that in most EU Member
States such job seekers constitute a
distinct labour market status. Further-
more, using information from the Ital-
ian Labour Force Survey, they derive a
measure of search intensity and they
use this to identify those job seekers
outside the labour force. On the basis
of their transition probabilities, the
most active of this group are indistin-
guishable from the unemployed (as
conventionally defined). 
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Similarly, a study by Schweitzer
(2003)14 shows that in the UK a group
far larger than the ILO defined unem-
ployed group is willing to work. Eval-
uating all working-age individuals
based on their likelihood of finding a
job in three months’ time, the author
finds that several categories of the
inactive have tendencies to work that
equal those of the unemployed. In all
of this it is clear that labour market
transition rates depend on both the
reasons/activities of the non-employed
and their other characteristics. The
paper suggests three main conclu-
sions. Firstly, a model of availability
for work relying only on the unem-
ployment rate is based on a false
premise that other categories of the
non-employed are considerably less
relevant to labour supply. Secondly,
models that combine information on
the classification of the inactive with
demographic information do best in
explaining labour supply. Finally,
models based on the unemployment
rate tend to overstate the recent falls in
amount of labour available for
employment in the UK. 
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Chart 156 – Willingness to work by reason of inactivity and gender in 
the EU-25, 2004
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
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14 Schweitzer M., 2003, ‘Ready, willing and able? Measuring labour availability in the UK’, Bank of England Working Paper no. 186. See also
Jones J., M. Joyce, J. Thomas, 2003, ‘Non-employment and labour availability’, in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn 2003. 
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Therefore, potential labour supply
extends far beyond conventional
measures of the unemployed, and the
inactive population constitutes a size-
able part of it. Furthermore, it is not
necessarily the case that this potential
labour supply faces only supply-side
constraints, such as high reservation
wages15, low skills or individual char-
acteristics. Indeed, the fact that inac-
tivity is not merely a supply-side prob-
lem is also shown by the fact that inac-
tivity tends to be correlated with
unemployment16. 
Chart 157 examines inactivity and
unemployment rates in the European
regions at NUTS2 level. For unem-
ployment rates roughly below 15%17,
regions with progressively higher
unemployment rates tend to have pro-
portionally more people out of the
labour market18. However, above this
unemployment threshold, the relation-
ship becomes weaker and this is prob-
ably due to the fact that workers have
different levels of labour market
attachment according to their personal
circumstances. So, for example, those
that can rely on other sources of
income, such as the salary of a part-
ner, will tend to drop out of the labour
market more readily as labour demand
weakens. However, inactivity will
eventually hit a critical threshold and
even if unemployment affects a larger
share of the population, including pri-
mary workers with lower labour mar-
ket elasticity, the active labour force
will stop shrinking any further regard-
less of the demand conditions.
11. Summary and
conclusions
A core element of the new Integrated
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005-2008) is the focus on growth
and employment, including taking the
necessary action to attract more peo-
ple into the labour market and create
more jobs. The continued under-per-
formance of the EU economy is due,
in part, to the fact that the labour input
remains comparatively low compared
to other developed economies such as
the US or Japan, despite the recent
improvements in raising the employ-
ment rate to just over 63% in 2004.
This relatively low employment rate
indicates that Europe still has a sub-
stantial reservoir of unused labour,
and that there remains considerable
scope for raising activity and employ-
ment further, especially among
women, youth and older workers.
Breaking down barriers to labour mar-
ket entry or re-entry, assisting effec-
tive job search, creating attractive
working arrangements, ensuring that
work pays and promoting lifelong
learning are essential to achieving
greater labour market participation.
The EU as a whole underutilises its
labour force potential, and inactivity
remains high in most Member States.
In 2004 the inactive population of
working age (15-64) in the EU-25, i.e.
those that are neither working nor
actively seeking and immediately
available for work, amounted to some
92 million people, corresponding to
an average inactivity rate (the residual
of the activity rate) of 30.3%. The
inactivity rate varied markedly
between Member States, ranging from
19.9% in Denmark to around 40% in
Hungary and Malta. For all Member
States the inactivity rate is higher for
women, and the disparity with men
averages around 16 percentage points
for the EU-25 as a whole. The inactive
population aged 15-64 is approxi-
mately one third in the youth, one
third in the prime age and one third in
the older age groups. 
There has been a gradual long-term
decline in the share of the inactive in the
working age population since the mid-
1980s, although progress halted tem-
porarily in the early 1990s before recov-
ering again from 1995 onwards. The
decline in the inactive population in the
EU-25 over recent years has been driv-
en by two main trends: the entry into the
labour market of increasing numbers of
women aged over 25 and of older peo-
ple (aged 55-64) of both sexes. In con-
trast, men of prime working age have
shown signs of a limited withdrawal
from the labour market, while youth of
both sexes have seen a more significant
change, with inactivity rates rising by
15 The reservation wage is the minimum wage at which individuals are willing to work. 
16 On this point, see also O’Leary N. et al., 2005, ‘Accounting for differences in labour market outcomes in Great Britain: a regional analysis using
the Labour Force Survey’, IZA Discussion Paper no. 1501. The authors highlight two main problems in under-performing regions connected to
inactivity. First, under-performing Northern UK regions appear to be structurally disadvantaged relative to more prosperous Southern regions.
The most likely source of this disadvantage is the dramatic decline in employment that took place in these regions during the 1980s and 1990s,
as large numbers of jobs in both heavy industries and manufacturing were lost in a relatively short space of time. As a result of these changes,
individuals living in under-performing regions are much less likely to be in employment and much more likely to be economically inactive than
otherwise identical individuals living in more successful regions. Second, and no less importantly, under-performing regions tend to have much
higher incidences of reported ill health, which are in turn associated with both lower employment propensities and higher inactivity propensi-
ties in all regions. 
17 Unemployment rates below 15% are characteristic of all European regions except those in Poland, Southern Italy, the Eastern Länder in Ger-
many, part of Macedonia in Greece, Extremadura and Andalucia in Spain, the French overseas territories, most of Slovakia and the region of
Bruxelles-Capitale. 
18 The R-square between inactivity and unemployment rates is almost 0.27 for this group of regions. 
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around 1.5 percentage points in the
period 2000 to 2004.
The long-term decline in inactivity
rates since the 1980s is accompanied at
any point in time by relatively large
flows into and out of inactivity.
Increasing labour force participation
and the mobilisation of labour
resources to deal with the demograph-
ic challenge means both a reduction in
the flows into inactivity and an
increase in the outflows. Indeed, while
for the young the key challenge is to
facilitate entry into the labour market,
for older generations it is important to
delay their exit from the labour market.
Between 2003 and 2004, around 9.5%
of the inactive population moved into
employment, while a further 4.2%
entered the labour force either by
becoming an active job seeker or by
becoming immediately available for
work - or both, i.e. they become
“unemployed”. At the same time, 3%
of the employed and 21.6% of the
unemployed left the labour force.
While employed people tend to leave
the labour market for several different
reasons, the main reason why the
unemployed leave is because they stop
searching for a job since they believe
there is none available. 
It is important to remember that, from
a definitional point of view, there is a
‘grey’ or indistinct area between
‘unemployment’ and ‘inactivity’. This
is because the conventional definition
of the unemployed requires those with-
out a job to have been actively looking
for work in the four weeks prior to the
survey and to be willing and available
to work in the following two weeks.
But if the respondent fails to meet any
of these criteria, then they would be
classified as inactive even if they have
been actively looking for work and are
willing to work, but are not immediate-
ly available to start work within two
weeks. Alternatively, inactive people
may be willing to work and available to
start immediately, but are not looking
for work, say, because they do not
believe that there is any available. In
2004, more than 8% of the inactive
population in the EU-25 was registered
at a PEO and 14% of the inactive pop-
ulation (23% for those aged 25-54)
were willing to work, according to the
LFS. 
The economically inactive population
is a very diverse group and therefore
effective targeting is crucial in order to
encourage their labour market partici-
pation. Demographic characteristics,
reasons for inactivity, work experi-
ence, skill levels and individual prefer-
ences for work are all key aspects that
need to be taken into account. There-
fore, a personalised approach is essen-
tial to promote labour market partici-
pation. Policies aimed at activating
individuals who are currently out of
the labour force should also take into
account how long they have been out:
over 40% of the inactive population of
working age (15-64 year-olds) have
never been in employment, a further
23% have been without a job for the
previous 8 years and only around 15%
of the inactive population were without
a job for less than 2 years. This means
that policies that prevent people from
dropping out of the labour market can
often be more effective than those try-
ing to ‘re-activate’ people, since the
majority of inactive people do not have
recent work experience, if any at all. 
Furthermore, the level and composi-
tion of inactivity also varies markedly
between countries according to institu-
tional factors, such as the design of the
benefit and retirement systems,
schooling and education systems, the
overall labour market performance and
the like. Given the diversity of the
inactive population, it is difficult to
envisage a set of policies that can be
equally effective in the whole EU.
Nevertheless the chapter identified a
few key issues that apply to varying
degrees in the various Member States. 
The first one is the level and rele-
vance of skills: while the incidence of
inactivity is higher among the low-
skilled – at EU level the inactivity rate
for the low-skilled population aged 15-
64 is 47%, compared to 24.5% for the
medium-skilled and 13.1 % for the
high-skilled – the composition of the
inactive population is often charac-
terised by a larger share of medium-
skilled individuals. This means that if
inactivity is to be reduced substantial-
ly, it is also important to consider the
problems of the higher-skilled. Not
only is it necessary to have an adequate
level of skills, but also the relevant
ones to be able to respond to the
changing requirements of the labour
market: the problem of skill mismatch
needs to be addressed and training
offered in the context of active labour
market policies (ALMPs) should take
into consideration the local demand
for skills. A considerable proportion of
the inactive population – 37% of the
working age population – undertakes
education or training, but often it does
not lead to any formal qualification
and therefore has a more limited value
in helping to find a job. 
Apart from improving the level and
quality of skills supplied by the work-
force, policies should aim at raising
the demand for skills and tackle prob-
lems such as low-skill equilibrium, for
example supporting R&D: this might
not only increase productivity and pro-
mote the development of a knowledge
society, but also increase labour mar-
ket participation. 
A second key issue is disability, even if
the incidence of disability as it emerges
from labour market surveys is likely to
be mediated by cultural traits. Further-
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more, the classification of disabled peo-
ple can also depend on institutional fac-
tors, such as the design of the benefit
system, whereby a very generous level
of disability benefits and/or a very
stringent or deficient unemployment
benefit system may artificially inflate
the number of those that are classified
as out of the labour force because of
disability. However, definitional prob-
lems apart, the incidence of illness or
disability in the inactive population
varies between 18% for men and 11%
for women, and 40% of people who are
inactive due to illness or disability in the
EU-25 are to be found in the UK and
PL alone. From the chapter it also
emerges that more than 15% of people
that are inactive because of disability
are in fact willing to work, only 16% of
those who face work restrictions are
provided with some assistance to work
and almost 44% of the non-working
people with long-standing health prob-
lems or disabilities and facing work
restrictions consider that they would
need some form of assistance to work.
It is therefore clear that there is scope
for increasing the labour market partic-
ipation of disabled people by promoting
equal opportunity policies and by offer-
ing assistance to work for those in need. 
Family and personal responsibilities
are a key factor in explaining labour
force participation especially for
women, whereby a quarter of inactive
women are out of the labour force
because of family or personal respon-
sibilities. In this respect, it should be
stressed that the definition of inactivi-
ty due to family responsibilities
depends to a large extent on the exclu-
sion of household production from the
definition of employment19 and poli-
cies addressed at increasing the
employment rate of women or men
with family responsibilities should
take into consideration an appropriate
life-work balance and individual
choice. However, it is still the case that
20% of women and around 35% of
men who are out of the labour force
because of family responsibilities are
willing to work and their entry into the
labour force could be facilitated by the
provision of adequate and affordable
care facilities for children, the elderly
and the disabled. The figures presented
also illustrate that the importance of
family responsibilities as a reason of
inactivity has decreased in the past 10
years especially for women. This could
be due to a number of reasons, includ-
ing better public care facilities, higher
incomes so that more people can
afford private care facilities, lower fer-
tility rate or changes in social or cul-
tural norms that affect the way people
answer the relevant survey questions. 
Retirement is still an important rea-
son for inactivity among older work-
ers, and in the EU-25 almost 60% of
inactive people aged 55-64 fall into
this category. However, a sustained
growth in longevity means that people
have greater opportunities to fulfil
their potential over a longer lifespan.
Furthermore, for the economy as a
whole, the increase in participation
and employment rates of older work-
ers is crucial for using the full poten-
tial of labour supply to sustain eco-
nomic growth, tax revenues and social
protection systems, including ade-
quate pensions, in the face of expected
reductions in the population of work-
ing age. Analysis presented in the
2003 Employment in Europe report
highlights the key factors that should
be taken into consideration to design
effective active ageing strategies
including: financial incentives to dis-
courage early retirement and to make
sure that work pays; access to training
and lifelong learning strategies and
effective active labour market poli-
cies; and good working conditions
conducive to job retention, in particu-
lar in relation to health and safety,
flexible working arrangements
(including part-time and career
breaks) and care services. Obviously,
incentives for older workers to remain
in the labour force must be reflected in
real prospects for employment.
Education or training is the main
reason for inactivity among younger
people – around 85% of whom are
inactive for this reason - and just over
20% of those aged 25-34 are also
inactive because of education or train-
ing. Although there are potentially
conflicting demands between greater
labour market participation and efforts
to raise human capital through a
reduction in early school leaving and
longer participation in education, it is
clear that youth inactivity does not
need to be a cause of policy concern,
at least for the majority of younger
people who are undertaking education
or training. However, a number of
individuals in education or training
would prefer to work and appropriate
support should be given in the transi-
tion between education and the labour
market: policies such as those envis-
aged in the European Youth Pact (and
described in chapter 1) should be
implemented to improve social and
vocational integration and fuller utili-
sation of the human potential embod-
ied by European youth. For those over
25, participation in education and
training as the main reason for inactiv-
ity is rather limited (amounting to less
than 5%), increasing with the level of
qualifications. 
19 For an analysis of the extent to which marketisation of household production could explain the EU-US job gap, see for example Freeman R.,
2003, Can marketisation of household production explain the EU-US jobs gap puzzle?, paper presented at the DEMPATEM Conference in
Seville, 18 October 2003. 
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Finally, there is a relatively small but
significant proportion – around 4.5% -
of the inactive population that are out
of the labour force simply because
they believe that there is no work
available. This percentage has
increased substantially in the past 10
years and it is inversely correlated
with the level of skills. For this group
of inactive people, their withdrawal
from the labour market is due to the
functioning of the labour market,
either because of imperfect informa-
tion or lack of demand. 
Apart from this group of ‘discour-
aged’ workers, recent research
referred to in this chapter shows that
several categories of the inactive have
tendencies to work similar to those of
the unemployed. It suggests that the
potential labour supply extends well
beyond the conventionally defined
unemployed and the inactive popula-
tion constitutes a sizeable part of it.
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the
case that this potential labour supply
faces only supply-side constraints,
such as high reservation wages, low
skills or disadvantageous individual
characteristics. Indeed, the fact that
inactivity is not merely a supply-side
problem is also shown by the fact that
it tends to be correlated with unem-
ployment. An effective response to the
need for increased mobilisation of the
workforce should therefore consist of
a comprehensive set of policies that
combine Active Labour Market Poli-
cies with other approaches aimed at
supporting job creation and work
opportunities.
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Unemployment Inactivity
European Union 9.1 43.5
BE
Bruxelles-Capitale 15.6 48.6
Prov. Antwerpen 6.4 48.2
Prov. Limburg (B) 6.8 47.5
Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 5.5 46.1
Prov. Vlaams Brabant 5.6 44.7
Prov. West-Vlaanderen 4.2 47.7
Prov. Brabant Wallon 7.9 46.3
Prov. Hainaut 12.6 52.2
Prov. Liège 11.2 50.3
Prov. Luxembourg (B) 6.7 48.8
Prov. Namur 9.5 49.3
CZ
Praha 4.2 37.6
Strední Cechy 5.2 40.1
Jihozápad 5.3 40.6
Severozápad 11.2 40.5
Severovy´chod 6.5 40.8
Jihovy´chod 7.2 42.0
Strední Morava 8.7 41.7
Moravskoslezko 14.8 42.1
DK
Denmark 5.4 34.5
DE
Stuttgart 5.7 39.7
Karlsruhe 6.0 41.4
Freiburg 5.1 39.7
Tübingen 5.5 40.3
Oberbayern 5.0 38.7
Niederbayern 6.1 39.3
Oberpfalz 6.6 39.5
Oberfranken 8.8 40.8
Mittelfranken 7.4 41.3
Unterfranken 6.3 41.0
Schwaben 5.8 39.4
Berlin 17.5 41.2
Table 74 – Inactivity and unemployment rates for the population aged 15+ by region 
at NUTS2 level, 2003
Unemployment Inactivity
Brandenburg 18.0 39.9
Bremen 11.1 46.3
Hamburg 9.4 41.2
Darmstadt 6.8 41.1
Gießen 7.4 42.7
Kassel 7.8 45.7
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 20.1 41.1
Braunschweig 9.8 45.8
Hannover 7.9 45.2
Lüneburg 7.9 43.8
Weser-Ems 8.2 44.0
Düsseldorf 8.9 46.3
Köln 7.9 46.1
Münster 8.5 46.3
Detmold 8.0 43.8
Arnsberg 9.9 46.5
Koblenz 6.6 44.1
Trier 5.0 44.2
Rheinhessen-Pfalz 6.4 43.6
Saarland 8.1 49.5
Chemnitz 17.3 43.5
Dresden 16.5 41.8
Leipzig 19.4 41.5
Dessau 21.3 42.3
Halle 21.3 43.1
Magdeburg 17.6 40.5
Schleswig-Holstein 8.7 41.9
Thüringen 16.1 41.9
EE
Estonia 10.0 41.3
EL
Anatoliki Makedonia. Thraki 10.3 52.6
Kentriki Makedonia 10.1 51.8
Dytiki Makedonia 16.1 53.5
Thessalia 9.7 51.6
Ipeiros 11.0 54.2
Ionia Nisia 11.0 53.6
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Unemployment Inactivity
Dytiki Ellada 8.9 54.3
Sterea Ellada 8.6 53.7
Peloponnisos 7.7 51.3
Attiki 8.7 49.8
Voreio Aigaio 7.4 60.3
Notio Aigaio 10.9 48.8
Kriti 6.8 47.1
ES
Galicia 12.6 47.5
Principado de Asturias 11.2 53.6
Cantabria 10.6 48.2
Pais Vasco 9.2 44.7
Comunidad Foral de Navarra 5.5 45.1
La Rioja 6.1 47.7
Aragón 6.3 48.5
Comunidad de Madrid 7.2 44.1
Castilla y León 11.0 50.4
Castilla-la Mancha 9.8 49.6
Extremadura 17.4 49.9
Cataluña 9.3 41.3
Comunidad Valenciana 10.8 43.7
Illes Balears 9.3 39.6
Andalucia 18.6 48.0
Región de Murcia 10.6 44.9
Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 9.1 51.9
Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla 9.1 52.4
Canarias 11.4 42.8
FR
Île de France 9.2 39.3
Champagne-Ardenne 8.8 42.9
Picardie 10.0 41.1
Haute-Normandie 9.4 43.3
Centre 6.4 43.8
Basse-Normandie 7.8 46.2
Bourgogne 7.0 44.7
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 12.5 47.2
Lorraine 9.7 46.2
Table 74 (cont.) – Inactivity and unemployment rates for the population aged 15+ by region at NUTS2 level, 2003
Unemployment Inactivity
Alsace 7.0 41.6
Franche-Comté 7.7 40.8
Pays de la Loire 8.1 40.7
Bretagne 6.9 45.5
Poitou-Charentes 7.6 44.7
Aquitaine 9.8 47.1
Midi-Pyrénées 8.6 43.6
Limousin 7.0 46.5
Rhône-Alpes 7.5 43.3
Auvergne 7.5 46.9
Languedoc-Roussillon 12.0 50.9
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 10.1 48.8
Corse 12.1 54.6
Guadeloupe (FR) 26.3 47.0
Martinique (FR) 21.0 48.2
Guyane (FR) 24.4 45.6
Reunion (FR) 31.8 46.9
IE
Border, Midlands and Western 5.5 41.8
Southern and Eastern 4.5 39.1
IT
Piemonte 4.8 48.2
Valle d'Aosta 4.1 44.6
Liguria 6.0 53.7
Lombardia 3.6 46.4
Prov. Autonoma Bolzano-Bozen 2.0 40.0
Provincia Autonoma Trento 2.9 47.6
Veneto 3.4 46.8
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 3.9 49.8
Emilia-Romagna 3.0 45.9
Toscana 4.7 49.8
Umbria 5.2 52.4
Marche 3.8 49.0
Lazio 8.7 50.5
Abruzzo 5.4 53.7
Molise 12.3 55.3
Campania 20.3 55.5
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Unemployment Inactivity
Puglia 13.8 57.0
Basilicata 16.1 56.7
Calabria 23.4 55.1
Sicilia 20.1 57.4
Sardegna 16.9 52.9
CY 
Cyprus 4.1 36.8
LV
Latvia 10.5 42.5
LT
Lithuania 12.4 41.8
LU
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) 3.7 45.2
HU
Közép-Magyarország 4.0 47.2
Közép-Dunántúl 4.6 45.7
Nyugat-Dunántúl 4.6 46.6
Dél-Dunántúl 7.9 52.4
Észak-Magyarország 9.7 53.8
Észak-Alföld 6.8 54.1
Dél-Alföld 6.5 53.7
MT
Malta 7.6 50.0
NL
Groningen 4.9 38.8
Friesland 4.2 37.5
Drenthe 3.8 36.9
Overijssel 3.6 35.9
Gelderland 3.3 34.6
Flevoland 4.1 28.8
Utrecht 3.5 31.6
Noord-Holland 3.8 34.0
Zuid-Holland 3.9 36.3
Zeeland 2.5 40.7
Noord-Brabant 3.5 34.5
Limburg (NL) 4.2 38.7
Table 74 (cont.) – Inactivity and unemployment rates for the population aged 15+ by region at NUTS2 level, 2003
Unemployment Inactivity
AT
Burgenland 4.3 42.9
Niederösterreich 3.5 41.0
Wien 7.7 40.4
Kärnten 3.3 45.1
Steiermark 3.9 42.6
Oberösterreich 3.3 38.6
Salzburg 2.3 38.0
Tirol 2.5 39.6
Vorarlberg 4.0 39.3
PL
Lódzkie 19.7 44.9
Mazowieckie 16.3 42.8
Malopolskie 18.0 43.4
Slaskie 20.2 49.4
Lubelskie 16.0 42.7
Podkarpackie 17.7 44.0
Swietokrzyskie 19.1 48.3
Podlaskie 17.8 44.4
Wielkopolskie 17.1 42.7
Zachodniopomorskie 25.5 47.1
Lubuskie 24.5 46.6
Dolnoslaskie 26.0 47.0
Opolskie 18.3 49.4
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 21.8 44.4
Warminsko-Mazurskie 23.9 46.1
Pomorskie 20.5 46.1
PT
Norte 6.8 37.4
Centro 3.6 33.5
Lisboa 8.1 39.2
Alentejo 8.2 44.5
Algarve 6.1 40.3
Região Autónoma dos Açores 2.9 44.9
Região Autónoma da Madeira 3.4 41.0
SI 
Slovenia 6.7 43.5
 
Unemployment Inactivity
SK
Bratislavsky´ 7.1 36.2
Západné Slovensko 15.9 40.3
Stredné Slovensko 20.5 39.9
Vy´chodné Slovensko 21.8 40.5
FI
Itä-Suomi 12.3 45.6
Etelä-Suomi 7.5 35.8
Länsi-Suomi 9.4 41.6
Pohjois-Suomi 12.3 40.5
Åland 2.6 41.5
SE
Stockholm 5.1 29.7
Östra Mellansverige 5.9 39.2
Sydsverige 6.8 41.3
Norra Mellansverige 7.3 44.2
Mellersta Norrland 5.6 45.8
Övre Norrland 6.8 45.0
Småland med öarna 4.4 37.0
Västsverige 4.9 34.7
UK
Tees Valley and Durham 7.5 44.9
Northumberland, Tyne and Wear 5.6 41.1
Cumbria 4.9 38.9
Cheshire 3.3 37.6
Greater Manchester 5.0 38.6
Lancashire 4.3 36.9
Merseyside 6.5 42.4
East Riding, North Lincolnshire 5.9 39.3
North Yorkshire 2.7 36.2
South Yorkshire 5.7 39.5
West Yorkshire 5.2 37.9
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 4.7 39.4
Leicestershire, Rutland, 
Northants 4.0 33.8
Lincolnshire 4.3 38.6
Herefordshire, Worcestershire, 
Warks 3.8 36.7
Table 74 (cont.) – Inactivity and unemployment rates for the population aged 15+ by region at NUTS2 level, 2003
Unemployment Inactivity
Shropshire and Staffordshire 4.1 35.2
West Midlands 7.6 40.7
East Anglia 3.7 36.3
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire 3.9 32.4
Essex 4.1 36.1
Inner London 8.8 36.5
Outer London 5.8 35.7
Berkshire. Bucks 
and Oxfordshire 3.9 28.6
Surrey, East and West Sussex 3.4 35.6
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 3.4 33.8
Kent 4.8 39.8
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, 
North Somerset 3.2 33.5
Dorset and Somerset 3.1 39.0
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 4.2 42.8
Devon 3.6 38.9
West Wales and The Valleys 4.9 44.7
East Wales 4.3 34.6
North Eastern Scotland 4.6 31.8
Eastern Scotland 4.9 36.6
South Western Scotland 7.0 39.3
Highlands and Islands 5.7 36.8
Northern Ireland 5.6 40.7
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